Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 6th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The terms of the editors’ code are now referred to as the IPSO code, but I take the noble Lord’s point and I will take away and consider whether there is any material issue about using the designation of that code in the schedule. However, it is, with respect, essentially the editors’ code as it was originally recognised. As I understand it, that is reflected in the Information Commissioner’s current guidance under reference to Section 32, which is why it appears in the schedule in the form that it does.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I shall be corrected in due course if I am wrong, but I think the position is that the editors’ code was the code that was formulated under the PCC, and then when Sir Alan Moses became chair of IPSO the code was then amended to strengthen it—but I shall be corrected if that turns out to be mistaken.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord is quite right that it had its origin as the editors’ code before the PCC, but I am reflecting the fact that the Information Commissioner, being aware of the genesis of that code and its approval, has, as I understand it, under current guidance under reference to Section 32 of the existing Act acknowledged it as a relevant code. It seems to me that we may be arguing around designation rather than content, and I will give further consideration to the question of designation.

Removing that code—I will call it “that code” for present purposes—as proposed in the amendments would be a quite extraordinary step. Whatever one might think of IPSO, we should recognise that it has more than 2,500 members, including most of the major tabloids and broadsheets. Removing the code from the Bill would therefore remove protections for the vast majority of our press industry and cause significant detriment to what is a free press.

No codes adopted by a Press Recognition Panel-approved regulator are listed—and of course there is only Impress in that context. Under current legislation the Information Commissioner’s guidance on Section 32 does not include that code. That does not mean that such a code cannot be included in the future. However, before amending the list of codes, the current and proposed legislation makes it clear that the Secretary of State must consult the Information Commissioner. The self-regulator Impress has applied for its standards code to be included in the schedule, and the Secretary of State is currently considering that application—but in due course, once she has considered the application, she will have to refer to the Information Commissioner and consult her about that application.

I should also emphasise that the current list of codes, allowing for the point about designation, does not represent an endorsement of any one press regulator over another. This is about ensuring that the codes listed are appropriate, having regard to the need for data protection.

It is also worth noting that the exemption the Bill provides to those processing data for special purposes will be available to all journalists where the criteria set out in paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 2 are met. Where a publication is subject to one of the listed codes of conduct, it must take that code into account when determining whether publication is in the public interest. However, although the commissioner’s current guidance emphasises that compliance with industry codes will help demonstrate compliance, those publications that are not subject to a code are not somehow excluded from qualifying under the relevant exemptions, if they meet the three-part test in paragraph 24.

I appreciate that the intention of Amendment 91 is to ensure that we interpret the notions relating to journalism broadly and, in doing so, protect the right to freedom of expression. However, there is no requirement for this amendment if one has regard to Clause 184, the relevant interpretation clause, which makes it clear and underlines that material need be available only to a section of the public, and that would include those who subscribe by way of a fee for particular access to material. So these exemptions will extend to the sort of body that was referred to by the noble Lord in relation to Amendment 91. If anything, there is duplication, because we have not only paragraph 24(9), which refers to the public and a “section of the public”, but Clause 184, which defines the public by reference to, and includes, a section of the public. I believe that there was an earlier proposal to take paragraph 24(9) out in order to avoid that duplication.

I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and supported by my noble friend Lord Attlee. Article 85 of the GDPR requires member states to reconcile the right of protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression and information, which is of course embraced by the European Convention on Human Rights. Although like, clearly, other Members of the Committee, I have great sympathy for the noble Baroness’s own experience, I firmly believe that the Bill strikes the right balance in reconciling these interests and aligns with the requirements of the regulation.

By contrast, the proposed amendments seek to reset that balance, so that the right to personal information privacy trumps that of the right to freedom of expression and information. This would be inconsistent with Article 85, which recognises the special importance of freedom of expression and provides a wide power to derogate from the regulation for processing for the special purposes. That point was elaborated by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, when he underlined the importance of the freedom of the press in this context.

Amendment 87A seeks to amend the journalistic data protection exemption to make it available only where the processing of data is necessary for publication, rather than simply being undertaken with a view to publication. I fear that this does not reflect the realities of how journalists work and how stories, including the most sensitive and important pieces of investigative journalism, are put together and published. A journalist will not know what is necessary until the data has been gathered, reviewed and assessed.

Amendments 87C and 87D relate to what factors the controller must take into account when considering whether publication of data would be in the public interest. The amendments would remove the requirement on the controller to take account of the special importance of the public interest in freedom of expression and information, and make the exemption available only where, objectively, the likely interference with privacy resulting from the processing of the data is outweighed by the public interest.

Controllers already have to consider issues of privacy when considering the public interest. But this amendment goes too far in saying that public interest can be trumped by privacy, weighting the test away from freedom of expression. This is again contrary to Article 85, which requires a reconciliation of these rights. I understand the noble Baroness’s intent here, and the harm that she seeks to prevent, but the rebalancing that she suggests goes too far.

Finally, Amendments 89B and 91A aim to narrow the exemptions for journalists who are not members of an approved regulator as defined by the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Fundamentally, these provisions are about protections that journalists should be able to legitimately rely on in going about their important work. We should view these clauses through that lens—as vital protections that give journalists the ability to inform us about the world in which we live and to effectively hold those in power to account.

The Government do not condone the past behaviour of individual media organisations, nor, as I noted earlier, do we seek to legitimise it. Equally, though, we do not think the problems that Sir Brian Leveson and others have identified can, or indeed should, be fixed through the medium of data protection law. Indeed, the Government feel strongly that these important protections for journalists should be maintained.

We must strike the right balance in reconciling the right to privacy with the right to freedom of expression and information. I hope I have gone some way towards explaining how the Bill seeks to do that. I hope I have addressed the concerns that have been expressed through the amendments, and I urge noble Lords to withdraw them.

Digital Economy Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 8th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for raising this matter because it has generated a great deal of heat and debate in the context of the Bill. I appreciate the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, with respect to the number of responses there have been. I just emphasise that judicial review is a form of judicial oversight, and a very effective one, but I will elaborate on that in a moment.

We are aware that the major telecoms operators in particular, and their agents, have lobbied vigorously and in detail on this point. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, brought out many of the points that have been made by their agents in the course of that vigorous and detailed lobbying. I shall not go into the detail of Ofcom’s position on this. It has expressed its position very clearly and we understand it. What I would say is that there is no single position for all utility sectors, and both judicial review and appeals on the merits may be used in the same sector for different kinds of appeals. It is not a black and white situation.

The Government’s case is not that this change is needed to ensure consistency with other utility sectors but that the public interest will be best served in the communications sector by an appeals regime that focuses on errors which Ofcom is alleged to have made, rather than asking the court to reach a different conclusion. Let us remember that Ofcom is a qualified regulator and its decisions are entitled to respect. They are informed decisions and they are not irrational. They are not determined on the toss of a coin. That is why judicial review is an appropriate approach.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, also talked about consumers. I find that interesting. Perhaps I may refer briefly to the Which? response to Clause 75. It sees this measure as one of the most important currently contained in the Digital Economy Bill, saying that it will give the regulator the power and confidence to take the necessary actions to protect consumer interests without fear of costly and lengthy litigation procedures. Introducing a judicial review standard for appeals in telecoms will mean that decisions made by Ofcom in the interest of consumers should be easier to implement and quicker to take effect. That is a reflection of Ofcom’s own view of the matter. This is not necessarily about coming to the aid of Ofcom but about recognising these matters from the perspective of the consumer. That is extremely important.

Currently, appeals brought under Sections 192 to 196 of the Communications Act against Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are decided “on the merits” by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. That exceeds and, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, acknowledged, effectively gold-plates Article 4 of the EU framework directive, which requires that the merits of the case are duly taken into account in any appeal. That is not quite the wording of the proposed amendment.

The result of this over-implementation is an unnecessarily intensive and burdensome standard of review that can result in very lengthy and costly appeals litigation, which in turn can hinder timely and effective regulation. Some of the appeals that have taken place have done so over extraordinarily lengthy periods. Of course, the very large communications operators are in a position to fund that sort of appeal process. Clause 75 will change the standard of review so that the Competition Appeal Tribunal will decide appeals against Ofcom’s decisions by applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review and, in particular, judicial review of other administrative actions. This will focus appeals on the key questions of the legality and reasonableness of Ofcom’s decision-making.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, suggested that there might be cases in which there was simply no merit in a decision. If that was so, and if Ofcom proceeded without reliance on the facts of a particular case, that would be amenable to review under a judicial review standard.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Judicial review itself varies according to whether or not there is a European element. If the review is about a case where free speech under the convention is concerned or an EU directive is concerned, then judicial review embraces the principle of proportionality. However, if it is not about a case where European law can be involved—either system of European law—under the deciding case law, judicial review does not apply the principle of proportionality. In other words, it still—in my view, wrongly—does not look at whether the means employed to pursue a legitimate aim are necessary to achieve that aim. Is not what I have just said an indication of the unsatisfactory nature of relying on judicial review as the solution?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, I have to say no, because here we are dealing with judicial review in the context of the EU framework directive, which requires that the merits of the case are duly taken into account in any appeal, therefore effectively introducing the issue of proportionality into that process. Therefore, even if there are cases which some might criticise as involving too narrow an approach to judicial review, that does not apply here. This is an incidence in which the issues of proportionality will arise in the context of judicial review. By taking this route, we are applying an appropriate standard to Ofcom’s decision-making.

As has been acknowledged by noble Lords, this is a fast-moving sector, and regulation needs to be able to keep pace with technological and market changes. This is rather difficult when appeals can drag out for a year after a regulatory decision has been made. As the UK’s expert regulator in the telecommunications sector, it is right that Ofcom itself should be given an appropriate margin of appreciation by the tribunals. That is why we have an expert regulator there—so that it can make an informed decision that should be given an appropriate margin of appreciation by the Competition Appeals Tribunal.

A judicial review basis for appeals is intended to be a flexible process that will ensure that those affected by Ofcom’s regulatory decisions can still challenge those decisions effectively within the framework of Article 4 of the EU framework directive. A number of Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are already appealable only on a judicial review basis. I made the point earlier that, with regard to individual regulators, you can find instances in which there is a merits-based appeal for some matters and a judicial review standard in respect of others.

By changing the standard of review to reduce over-lengthy and costly litigation, this clause will enable consumers to benefit sooner from the outcome of decisions made by Ofcom in pursuit of its statutory duty to further the interests of consumers. I emphasise that: one of Ofcom’s statutory duties is to further the interests of consumers. The clause will also remove a significant potential barrier to the participation of smaller communications providers in the appeals process, benefiting smaller, “challenger” communications providers. Again, they are inhibited by the prospect of massive merits-based appeals going before the Competition Appeal Tribunal.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has tabled two alternative approaches. Amendment 215 would replace the existing “on the merits” standard with a requirement for the tribunal to take,

“due account of the merits of the case”.

I acknowledge that the amendment essentially replicates the wording of Article 4 of the EU framework directive, albeit it is not identical to it. While this would in one view remove the gold-plating of the existing standard in a technical sense, the Government consider that it would not lead to any substantive change in approach. That might be why this proposal is being pushed so hard by the major operators in the telecoms sector. It would not, therefore, result in quicker appeals, timelier implementation of regulatory decisions or resultant consumer benefits.

Amendment 216 would alternatively replace the existing “on the merits” standard of appeal with a list of specified grounds. The tribunal would be able to uphold an appeal only where it was satisfied that Ofcom’s decision was wrong on one or more of these grounds. However, as noble Lords may be aware, the previous Government consulted on a similar approach in 2013 and we do not consider that this approach has merit. On balance, we consider that such an approach would risk significant satellite litigation if it were to be introduced—about the nature of the new standard of appeal, for example, which could lead to longer appeals and further regulatory delay. A standard of review based on judicial review principles, including the principles of proportionality in the context of the application of the European directive, which is well understood and used in many other sectors, will minimise this kind of uncertainty. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Press Regulation (Communications Committee Report)

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Tuesday 20th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Best, for securing this important debate following the publication of the Communications Committee’s report in March last year. I note the lapse of time before this debate could be held but nevertheless it is important that it has taken place. The matter of press self-regulation remains a fiercely debated matter, and it is pertinent timing for us to have an opportunity today to discuss these issues.

A free press is an essential component of a fully functioning democracy and it is vital that the self-regulatory system allows the press to operate independently and carry out its crucial function. My noble friend Lord Lexden observed that we have a diverse, irreverent, bold press which is woven into our freedoms and liberty, and that is so important. It is a point that was echoed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill. Moreover, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, concluded her remarks, she spoke of the need for a media that will tell the truth. However, that poses the question: whose truth? That becomes a real issue if government regulation goes too far, so it is important to look at this in context.

Since the Leveson report was published four years ago we have seen significant changes to the press self-regulation landscape. Indeed, even since the report of the Communications Committee was published there have been notable changes, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Best, in his opening observations. In March 2015, as the report sets out, IPSO had only recently been established with around 70 members while Impress was still in development. The Press Recognition Panel was recently set up and it will be almost a year until the self-regulator applies for recognition under the new framework envisaged by Sir Brian Leveson. Today we are in a wholly different place. Impress was granted recognition by the Press Recognition Panel in October, making it the first and only recognised self-regulator under the new system. The Press Recognition Panel spent many months assessing the application from Impress against 29 criteria set out in the royal charter. This included three public calls for evidence and the panel published its report regarding its decision on 21 November.

Meanwhile, IPSO has also developed since its creation in 2014. It is trialling a pilot arbitration scheme that has already been referred to which is likely to conclude next summer, and a consultation on the editors’ code of practice was recently launched by the code committee. It also, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, observed, commissioned Sir Joseph Pilling to carry out a review of its independence and effectiveness which reported in October, and indeed this was also referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey. I take issue with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that there was any element of a sham about that process. With respect, that appears to be a misplaced suggestion.

We of course accept that IPSO has publicly stated that it will not seek recognition from the Press Recognition Panel. The background to that lies in some of the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, about whether this would be perceived to be a government-controlled form of regulation.

I turn to the system of incentives developed to encourage publishers to join a recognised self-regulator. There were, of course, the exemplary damages provisions, which came into force in November 2015, and, as the House knows, Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 made provision for cost clauses, which have not been commenced. Unlike the exemplary damages provisions, the costs provisions clauses in the Crime and Courts Act 2013 did not have a specific commencement date.

Section 40 has been discussed extensively in this House at various times. It was designed to incentivise newspapers to join a recognised self-regulator. It contains two presumptions, with which we are familiar. First, if a publisher that is a member of a recognised self-regulator loses a relevant media case in court, it does not have to pay the winning side’s costs. Secondly, if a publisher that is not a member of a recognised self-regulator wins such a case in court, it would have to pay the losing side’s costs as well as its own.

As we have heard, Members of this House argue that commencement of Section 40 will bring substantial benefits for ordinary citizens by providing improved access to justice for victims of press abuse, as well as providing protections for journalists against the threat of high-cost libel claims. However, we have also heard from others, such as my noble friend Lord Lexden, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, that commencement of Section 40 could have a chilling effect on the press, particularly local titles, which may be threatened with legal action by those wishing to suppress stories that are in the public interest. They may consider it safer not to publish those stories.

It is interesting that in the course of this debate a number of your Lordships used terms such as “stalemate”, “uncertainty”, the “need for compromise”, and, “Is there a better way?”—a comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, posed the question of why there is failure to produce a resolution at this stage. It is because of the continuing debate and the increasing recognition that there must be a middle way and room for compromise, as observed earlier.

It is because of these strong views on both sides of the debate that the Government decided to launch a consultation in November to inform next steps in this area. As the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport set out in her Oral Statement regarding the consultation, and again while giving evidence to the Communications Committee last week, this is an appropriate time to consider this incentive given the recent changes that have taken place in the press self-regulation landscape—changes that have been monitored by someone as independent as Sir Joseph Pilling.

The consultation presents five options regarding Section 40, ranging from full commencement through to full repeal. The consultation also asks for evidence regarding the impacts of these options on both the press industry and claimants. The Government are keen to hear views and evidence regarding the extent full commencement would have on incentivising publishers to join a recognised self-regulator. We do not shy away from that. We seek informed opinions from all sides in this difficult and demanding debate.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester, raised concerns around Section 40, its compatibility with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the issue of freedom of expression. The Government remain confident that Section 40 is consistent with human rights legislation. However, we encourage those who have a contrary view to contribute to the consultation and to the debate in order that this matter may be bottomed out. I will make one observation. When the Minister certified the Bill for its introduction, there was of course no Clause 40—he might be forgiven for that at least. However, Clause 40, which was the product of an inter-party agreement, was moved as a government amendment. We continue to be of the view that it is convention-compliant.

Leveson 2 has been raised. Part 2 of the Leveson inquiry will be the subject of the consultation that is going forward. The consultation asked respondents whether the inquiry should continue either with the original or amended terms of reference, or indeed be terminated. It also asked for views and evidence regarding which terms of reference have already been covered by part 1 of the Leveson inquiry and by the criminal investigations—which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said, have already been concluded. Therefore, that matter remains open for the purposes of the consultation.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Could the Minister write to those who have taken part in the debate without disclosing legal advice but nevertheless explaining how the Government can say that Section 40 complies with free speech and the convention?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am certainly prepared to arrange to write a short letter explaining the Government’s view that it does comply and why we consider that it complies without going into a detailed legal analysis, if the noble Lord would regard that as sufficient at this time. As I said earlier, I would welcome his contribution to the consultation process and he might wish to reciprocate by responding not to me directly but in the consultation with his own expanded views as to why he does not consider that Section 40 complies. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, observed, Sir Brian Leveson himself, a most distinguished judge, appeared to be of the view at a very general level that such a provision would comply with the convention.

I turn to one or two of the additional observations made by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Best, in a clear statement outlining the background to his committee’s report, himself observed that matters were far from resolved—a view with which the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, concurred. He used the term “stalemate” with regard to the present position, which is why we have sought to bring about this consultation period. It is the one way to resolve such a stalemate.

My noble friend Lord Inglewood came up with a novel suggestion of tying in the complaints procedure to the operation of VAT. I have to confess that that does not strike me immediately as a use of Occam’s razor. The idea that we should merge our regulatory system of value added tax with press regulation appears at first to be a recipe for further potential confusion and difficulty—but I note his point about the various ways in which a cat can be skinned and of course we will give that further consideration.

I cannot accept the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, suggested that the Government had spat in Parliament’s face with regard to Section 40. I simply do not accept that characterisation. He asked whether there was a better way or a compromise. There may be a better way; that is the purpose of the consultation. It is something that we must seek to bottom out. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, observed that there had so far been a failure to produce resolution—which is why, again, we consider it important that there should be this consultation period.

The noble Baroness suggested that the Government had intervened to suspend commencement of Section 40. That is not factually correct. There was never a commencement provision in respect of Section 40, unlike in respect of the provisions of the Act with regard to exemplary damages. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford also referred to compromise. Again, that is why we are proceeding down the route of consultation at this stage.

I have already referred to the observations of my noble friend Lord Lexden, but they are worthy of repetition. He said that we have a “diverse, irreverent, bold” press that is woven into our freedoms and our liberty. That must never be forgotten.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, raised the question of the recommendations in Leveson at paragraphs 83 and 84. I just remind him that paragraph 29 of the consultation document states:

“The Report”—

meaning Leveson—

“made recommendations on the relationship between the press and politicians. The Ministerial Code was amended and, as a result, all Ministers (as well as Special Advisers and Permanent Secretaries) must now disclose details of all meetings with media proprietors, editors and senior executives wherever they take place. This information is published on a quarterly basis”.

I add only that I take issue with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that IPSO is to be regarded as some form of ploy. With the greatest respect, that does not acknowledge the work of Sir Joseph Pilling in reviewing independently the setting up and operation of IPSO. Albeit it has not gone as far as we may have wished, or as many would have wished, and it may not go as far as the regulatory regime would at present require, nevertheless it has moved and at least in the correct direction.

Finally, I simply note that as we go forward I acknowledge the observation of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza: you cannot take democracy for granted. You cannot take the freedom of the press for granted, either. When we speak of “truth”, we must again pose the question of whose truth we refer to. This Government are determined that a balance be struck between press freedom and the freedom of the individual. Those treated improperly must of course have redress. Likewise, politicians must not seek to stifle the press or prevent it doing legitimate work such as holding us to account when required. The conclusion of the Communications Committee report makes clear the importance of finding an adequate balance between the right to privacy and freedom of expression. I thank the committee for its ongoing work in this important area.

Civil Proceedings, First-tier Tribunal, Upper Tribunal and Employment Tribunals Fees (Amendment) Order 2016

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Wednesday 20th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

The noble and learned Lord said a little earlier that the question is whether the taxpayer or those who use the system should pay. Does he not understand that the problem is not those who use the system but those who cannot afford to use the system? Is he not in difficulty in making the kinds of points he has made when he says that the Government have not published the review of the system and will do so only in what he calls “due course”?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not believe that that difficulty arises. I emphasise the point that I made earlier: if you look, for example, at the fees in respect of the employment tribunal, the gross figure is £12 million-plus; the sum remitted for those who could not afford the fees is £3.9 million. In other words, something of the order of 30% of employment tribunal fees came under the remittance scheme. It is working. It is effective. It is allowing access to those tribunals for those people who could not otherwise afford it.

I turn to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the three questions which he posed in the context of the Justice Committee’s June report. We welcome the report from the Justice Committee. We will consider it in detail. We will consider its conclusions. We will respond to it as it requested, and we anticipate responding by September this year in accordance with the Justice Committee’s wishes. It would not be appropriate for me to anticipate that response at this time.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, observed, there are instances in which some of our greatest advocates will take on the most hopeless of cases, and I applaud the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for stepping forward to take into court the issue of Article 50 and its exercise in the context of our exit from the European Union. I look forward with interest to the outcome of his efforts in such hopeless endeavours.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord is, I believe, entirely correct. The sequence will be that the Secretary of State will approve the warrant, the matter will be brought to the attention of the Prime Minister, who will then address it, and only after that will it go to the judicial commissioner, who will then apply his review process to the determination that has been made.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I wonder whether, just for the sake of completeness, I could get an assurance about this. On the first day in Committee the noble Earl, Lord Howe, with his customary courtesy, moderation and generosity, said that the Government would think again about Clause 2 and what I had said about its compatibility with the convention. I fully understand the Government’s reasons for the amendments now in this group, but they are of course parasitic on what is now in Clause 2, so I very much hope that Clause 2 will be improved before the Bill goes much further.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note the noble Lord’s observations. I cannot elaborate on the observations made by the noble Earl in response to his question, nor can I necessarily meet the manner in which he responded to him.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Let me say this: the matter is not speculative and it is not theoretical, as the noble Lord concedes. I am not aware of any example of this having happened in the past 16 years, but that does not render it speculative. The point is that the example that can be given—the example I gave—is one that could arise in the future. The question then is whether the agencies should have a means to secure that vital intelligence or face a complete brick wall. In this context, we would simply say this. In response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, over the past 16 years, there is no evidence of damage to the rule of law and no evidence of any intrusion on the ability of lawyers to say that their legal advice is confidential because it is appreciated that this is a wholly exceptional power.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

If we assume that the Committee is with the Minister in saying that a wholly exceptional power that has never been used should now be given new parliamentary authority in this Bill, the next question to ask is: what about the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood? He said that there need to be adequate safeguards against abuse and suggested that the adequate safeguard would be that the judicial commissioner should look at the merits of the matter. Perhaps I may remind the noble and learned Lord of a case in the mid-1970s, Klass and others v Federal Republic of Germany, when the Strasbourg court said of surveillance powers that there must be adequate safeguards against abuse. It would help me to know what the adequate safeguards against abuse really would amount to.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord and I am coming to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I am not entirely unfamiliar with the case of Klass, and I thank the noble Lord for drawing it to our attention. We recognise that if this exceptional power is to be maintained in the Bill as it is in existing legislation, and if the safeguards in the existing code are to be improved, we must address that very clearly. That is why I have had ongoing discussions with the Bar Councils, the Scottish Bar and the Law Societies to try to achieve some consensus on this point. I therefore welcome the amendment because we are still considering the issue and we recognise the need to ensure that such an exceptional power is properly safeguarded. As to the actual means, we have not come to a final conclusion, but I note the suggestion of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and I am conscious that that might be one approach. However, I cannot commit us to any single approach at this time. I underline expressly that this power would only ever be employed in exceptional circumstances.

I rather think we are circling the same point. Of course the Government recognise the concerns that people have with regard to legal professional privilege. We understand the critical nature of that privilege and that any intrusion on it calls into question its effectiveness in the context of the rule of law. I go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that a balance must be struck here, but if there is a balance, there has to be something on each side. The question now is what we can put in place on our side.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Monday 27th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting and thought-provoking debate, which has benefited from the considerable expertise on all sides of this House. I am grateful to all those who have contributed. In particular, I welcome the contributions from those opposite. This reflects the constructive approach that has been taken to the Bill right across Parliament.

Indeed, I recognise the consensus on all sides of this House that new legislation is needed to make the use of these powers clearer and more transparent. We have an opportunity now to ensure that the security and intelligence agencies and law enforcement have the powers they need, and to strengthen the safeguards and oversight that govern their use. The list of speakers this evening is testament to the importance of this issue.

Mention has repeatedly been made of the need to balance privacy and security. There have been references to the privacy of the innocents, but one must also take account of the protection of the innocents. As the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, observed, one of the primary human rights is the right to life, and without that the others fade into insignificance.

A number of issues have been raised in the course of this fairly lengthy debate. If I am short in responding to them at this stage, it is not because I consider those contributions slight but because I am constrained by time.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised the question of EU co-operation, which has just been revisited by the noble Baroness, and whether that would impact the present Bill. There is, of course, no immediate change to our relationship with the EU and it is not considered that any changes are or will be required to the Bill by virtue of recent developments. Of course, negotiations will take place over the coming weeks and months with regard to our situation and the EU, and these will clearly need to take account of our security and the need for cross-border co-operation in the area of security and the need for further co-operation beyond that. But let us remember that we already co-operate with many countries beyond the European Union in matters of security. Noble Lords will be familiar with the “Five Eyes”, which includes the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—none of them connected with the European Union. So it is not considered that that will be an issue for the Bill as it proceeds.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also referred to the undertakings and commitments that have been given in the Commons with regard to the Bill. Of course, we will meet those commitments and undertakings. We fully intend to bring forward a number of amendments. We intend to have those amendments available by 4 July.

There are remaining issues, of course, that will be the subject of further debate. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made reference to such issues as the privacy clause, which is now expressed in the Bill and the Bill is improved because of that; the express provision on trade unions—again, the Bill is improved because of that; and the question of dealing with whistleblowers’ protection, which the Solicitor-General alluded to in the other place. Again, we will meet our commitments with regard to these matters.

I turn to some of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which were supported to some extent by the noble Lord, Lord Oates. He concentrated in particular on internet connection records and something that he referred to as a draconian power. I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Condon, alluded to these powers and was at pains to point out that they were not extending any boundaries but maintaining them. I would go further: these powers are actually restoring a boundary that had been lost as people moved away from conventional telecommunications. There was a time when police powers in regard to conventional telecommunications would provide them with the datasets they required, particularly in the context of evidence gathering and prosecution.

I pause on that note. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested that recourse could be had to the powers of the security services rather than in gathering ICRs. But of course that is neither practical nor effective because many of the powers of the security services produce investigative material that is not admissible as evidence in a court of law. Therefore, one has to be careful about how one confuses the powers of the security services to gather and investigate and the powers that are conferred upon the police in the context of internet connection records.

With regard to the security of that material, the noble Lord, Lord Oates, raised a number of questions, some of which puzzled me a little. What I will say is this: clearly, the data are retained by the service provider and those service providers are bound by various data protection obligations with regard to the security of those data, and that will continue to be the case. As regards the period of retention—12 months—that reflects the requirements of the police in the context of the sorts of investigations that are carried out by reference to these kinds of data; that is, telephonic communications data and the like.

So far as cost is concerned, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, cited a figure of £1 billion. I know not where that figure came from, but the considered opinion of the Government is that the cost will be in the region of £174 million over 10 years. Of course, that cost is not to the service providers but will be met by the Government where it is reasonably incurred by the service providers when and if they are required to retain the relevant data.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also referred to the request filter as a database and said that it was therefore vulnerable. The request filter is not a database; it is simply a filter. It is a further safeguard because it will operate in such a way that where a mass of data are returned by a service provider they will go through the request filter, and the relevant authority will receive only the data it requested and no additional data, notwithstanding what the service provider may have made available. I hope that answers the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

I will not be able to answer every query that has been raised today. If at the end of this evening there are any points that noble Lords feel I have not responded to and wish me to do so before Committee, they should allow my office to be aware of that and I shall arrange to write to them on the particular topic. I say “my office” in response to an observation from one of my noble friends who said that there was no Home Office Minister here. I had understood that I was here in the capacity of a Home Office spokesperson. If I am not, I want to know why I have been answering all these questions for the past four weeks.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also referred to the RUSI 10 tests, which were alluded to by the noble Lords, Lord Hennessy and Lord Rooker. Professor Michael Clarke, the then director-general of RUSI, gave evidence to the Joint Committee that scrutinised the draft Bill. He said:

“As Chair of the RUSI panel, I can say that the Bill met most of our expectations in terms of the recommendations that we made”.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, made the sensible suggestion that we should consider producing a paper in which we set out the Government’s response to each of those 10 points. I hope he will understand what I mean when I say that we will take that and give it due consideration.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised the question of legal professional privilege. He was joined in these observations by the noble Lords, Lord Lester, Lord Beecham and Lord Thomas. I notice that, in his account of his experiences, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, did not say what happened to the bag of money but surely we can infer that it remained where it was. I fully accept the analysis of legal professional privilege that has been advanced by each of the noble Lords. The present position is this: I am due to meet representatives of the Bar Councils and the Law Societies this coming week to discuss the scope of the provisions within the Bill with regard to legal professional privilege.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was right to observe that there is one problematic area—the question of when and to what extent there should be access to LPP material in circumstances where there is no iniquity. There may be very exceptional circumstances in which it is critical in the context of an immediate investigation that some data should be recovered. That will be addressed and we will bring forward our finalised position in due course.

There was also the question of journalistic privilege. This has been clouded by a misunderstanding on the part of many journalists as to what, if any, privilege they actually enjoy, in particular the belief that whenever security services sought information from a service provider they would be given notice of that. That is not the case. It is not the present law and it is not realistic that that can be law. However, again, this will be addressed going forward.

In addition, of course, we have to address the question of what is a journalist. I believe one noble Lord on the opposition Benches said that could be defined normally by waving an NUJ ticket. That is no longer the case and virtually every blogger on the planet would claim to be a journalist of one kind or another. It is a very serious issue and we will seek to address it.

The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, mentioned the necessary balance between liberty and privacy and again underlined the need to balance the privacy of the innocent with their protection.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, raised a number of issues. I shall not repeat what I have already said about internet connection records or the request filter. He also questioned whether the provisions of the Bill would somehow threaten, as he put it, encryption. There is no question of that. The provisions of the Bill do not weaken encryption or threaten it. We do not seek what have sometimes been erroneously termed “back doors” into encrypted material. I would seek to dispel any such suggestion.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, raised questions about extraterritorial jurisdiction, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, and the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Janvrin. The US Attorney-General recently indicated that discussions are ongoing to address conflicting legal obligations in circumstances where we seek the release by American companies of material. United Kingdom law is perfectly clear that companies providing communication services to users in the United Kingdom, irrespective of where they are based in the world, must comply with lawful requests and warrants from UK authorities. The ultimate power to deal with that would of course be contempt of court proceedings. We maintain that right to extraterritoriality. In response to a further point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, I should add that we are satisfied that the provisions of the Bill comply with and meet our international legal obligations. Whether it sets a template for others is a different matter, but we are satisfied in that regard.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester, raised the question of legal professional privilege. He also referred to the position of the IPC and to the “commission”. I should be clear that in terms of the Bill there is no commission; there is a commissioner. However, the commissioner has the express power to seek independent legal advice as and when required. I believe that another of your Lordships referred to the commission. It is not a commission; it is the commissioner.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I am grateful for what the Minister has just said, but will the Government consider, as David Anderson has suggested, that there should be a commission endowed with the kind of powers that he has recommended?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note the observation. The position of the Government is that it is appropriate that there should be a commissioner and that it is not necessary that there should be a commission. Clearly, this matter can be revisited in Committee.

Thematic warrants were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and my noble friend Lord Lothian. Thematic warrants are considered vital to investigate complex and fast-moving threats, and they are currently provided for under RIPA. The Bill simply clarifies and strengthens the safeguards around the operation of thematic warrants but, again, if there are issues as to their scope, they can be revisited in Committee.

My noble friend Lord Lothian and the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, raised the question of bulk personal data. The Government accepted in principle the argument that we should provide further restrictions on the use of class BPD warrants and should take into consideration some of the detail contained in the ISC’s draft clause. The Government intend to bring forward some amendment on this—again, I indicate that it should be available by 4 July.

My noble friend Lord Lothian also mentioned additional offences being incorporated into the Bill. It is considered that the changes made to Part 1 make clear the criminal offences that apply. The Bill also creates a new offence for the acquisition of communications data without lawful authorisation. Beyond that, it is not considered appropriate to introduce further criminal offences into the Bill at this stage.

Questions were raised about the double lock, of course. The position of the Government, and I believe that of the Opposition, is that we have now arrived at a suitable position in this respect, but it is important that the judicial point here should be subject to a test of judicial review. It would not be appropriate for a judge in these circumstances to revisit the merits of a decision, and I hope that that will find wider support in the House in due course. In the end the Secretary of State must be answerable to Parliament for the warrants for these intrusive powers, and that is allowed for.

In the context of warrants, the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, raised the question of speed of operation. There is provision within the Bill for an emergency warrant to be issued by the Secretary of State and then be the subject of review by the judicial commissioner. It is hoped that speed of operation will not be challenged by the terms of the Bill going forward. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, mentioned in the context of journalists the matter of notification of warrants. As I indicated, that is not the present law and it is not considered a realistic way forward, but again I anticipate that that may be considered in Committee.

Modern legislation that consolidates and clarifies the powers available to the state to obtain communications and related information is, I believe it is generally acknowledged, badly needed now. That was the conclusion of three independent reviews and three committees of Parliament. The Bill achieves that aim. The threats we face are evolving and the ways in which we communicate are changing rapidly. The capabilities of law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies must evolve and change too. It is Parliament’s responsibility to ensure that those charged with keeping us safe have the powers they need, governed by strong safeguards, strict protections and robust oversight. That is what the Bill provides.

The Government are clear that the Bill must command the support of Parliament and the public. It arrives in this House having been subject to extensive debate and examination in the other place and having received cross-party support and a resounding majority there. As we have done to date, we will continue to listen, to engage and to make changes that improve the Bill or strengthen its safeguards. We have the opportunity here to deliver world-leading legislation that provides robust oversight and powerful privacy protections. It is legislation that is clear, comprehensible and legally sound. It will provide the men and women of our law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies with the powers they need to keep us safe. I commend the Bill to the House.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Tuesday 26th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

My Lords, will the Minister clarify for my benefit a matter which concerns me? Does he agree that the writ of habeas corpus referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, would not be of any use in the circumstances that we are discussing because the return to the writ would simply show that there was lawful authority for the detention? If that is right, does he agree that the right to liberty could be relied upon only by reference to the Human Rights Act and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which would mean that any statutory provision that we approve would have to be read and given effect in accordance with the convention right to liberty?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, on the last point, in respect of any answer to a writ of habeas corpus it would be possible to rely upon lawful detention, but the relevant lawful provision would have to be in compliance with the convention.

I turn to notice, a point that was made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, when he was referring to the matter of bail. He spoke of the default position. That is very important. It is a matter that was pointedly not addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, who said repeatedly that it was only after six months that there would be any judicial oversight of detention in the context of immigration. That is not the case. Once a person is detained, it is open to them to make an application for bail. That application is made to a judicial tribunal and will therefore be the subject of judicial determination. The onus will rest very firmly, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, made clear, upon the Home Secretary to justify the detention or continued detention in those circumstances. So it is not a question of judicial oversight arising only after six months: it is available from the outset. What we are providing for is the exceptional case in which an application is not made or is refused and, after a delay of time, should be reviewed.

Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Lester of Herne Hill

Wednesday 24th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Given the noble Lord’s invitation to ignore it, it is more than a novelty; it is rather generous. Be that as it may, I come back for a moment to the question of justiciability. The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and others of your Lordships have sought to ensure that the provisions of Clause 2 will not create a justiciable right. I understand and appreciate the reasoning behind that amendment, but our position remains that it is not necessary because Clause 2 cannot and does not create a justiciable right. I emphasise that it is not a question of whether the word “normally” is justiciable, as every word of a statute is in that sense capable of being interpreted by a court. It is the issue that is not justiciable. I return to a point that I mentioned briefly—

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

I had not intended to interrupt until I heard the noble and learned Lord just now. Since the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is simply a rule of recognition by the Queen’s courts that Parliament should be sovereign, is it not also a matter for the Queen’s courts and not for Ministers or government, or even Parliament, as to what is or is not justiciable?