Serco

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock

Thursday 4th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I entirely concur with the observations of my noble and learned friend. The underlying purpose of deferred prosecution agreements is as he has set out, and the consequences are as he has referred to. It would have been wholly inappropriate to see the jobs of many employees put in jeopardy because of the nefarious activities of some in management, who have now been removed.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, with the Carillion scandal, the Capita scandal and the Serco scandal, do the Government not see a pattern? Will they not learn a lesson and realise that these services—particularly in the NHS—are better in public ownership?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, there is no pattern indicated by the parties to which the noble Lord referred.

Services of Lawyers and Lawyer’s Practice (Revocation etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, over time we will address the ability of the United Kingdom to agree with the EU the possibility of reciprocal rights for United Kingdom lawyers in Europe, but it is not something that we can dictate by our legislation. What we can do, however, is facilitate the position of EU-registered lawyers who are already in the United Kingdom and contributing to the legal services in the United Kingdom so that they can be secure in the knowledge of what their position will be in the event that we exit without any agreed deal.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)]

The Minister may have said this before I came in. I apologise: I was held up at a meeting outside. He mentions the United Kingdom, but paragraph 2.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum says:

“The purpose of this instrument is to end the preferential practising rights of EU and EFTA lawyers in England and Wales and Northern Ireland”.


What is the position in relation to Scotland?

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord is quite right: he was not here when I began. I said that with regard to Scotland, this is a devolved issue and the Scottish Government are addressing that matter. However, in taking forward negotiations with regard to reciprocal rights in the future, we would have in mind the interests of all lawyers within the United Kingdom, wherever they qualified. But for the purposes of determining the rights of registered European lawyers in the United Kingdom, we will deal with it by way of this instrument for England and Wales and for Northern Ireland, and the Scottish Government are undertaking to address it in the context of that jurisdiction. That is where we stand. As the noble Lord is aware, this is a devolved competence.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

The Minister has been particularly helpful in relation to that. I know that he knows Scots law very well, as do a number of other noble Members present. What is the current state of play in relation to this being dealt with in the Scottish Parliament? Is it running parallel with us? Is it ahead of us? Is it behind us? Will it be able to get it done in time? I know they are not very keen on no deal—in fact, they are not very keen on coming out of Europe at all—in the Scottish Parliament so I wondered what the state of play was in relation to dealing with this in the Scottish Parliament.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

In relation to this particular instrument, I am not in a position to say where the Scottish Government are in processing such a proposal. That is a matter for them and it is not a matter that they would, as a matter of course, disclose to me. But, as I say, I have confidence that they are aware of the issue and they have decided that they will take it forward. If they had wanted to utilise the provisions of the Scotland Act to have the UK Parliament legislate for them in regard to this matter, they would of course have said so. The very fact that they have not is indicative that they are making progress to legislate for this on their own behalf. That is where we stand.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I shall begin with the observation from the noble Lord, Lord Beith, because I omitted to identify the location of the suicide pill. I am advised that the intention is that, in the event of an agreement, it will be incorporated in the withdrawal agreement Bill, and that is the mechanism that it intend to employ’s for those purposes. I apologise for not having appreciated that when the question was first raised.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Will that apply to all several hundred SIs? Will they all be incorporated in the withdrawal agreement Bill?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My understanding is that that is the mechanism that will be employed.

A number of noble Lords raised the question about the access of UK lawyers to the EU 27 and EFTA. That is not the purpose of this instrument, but I do not wish to ignore it. Clearly, we would like to see a withdrawal agreement that leads on, pursuant to that, to negotiations that can ensure that we have as wide a form of access to the EU 27 and EFTA countries for legal services, like other services.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, made a number of perfectly good and valid points about where we are without a deal and the impact it will have upon the provision of legal services. This is a matter over which I have been in discourse with the legal profession for the past two years, and I have visited with a number of firms in jurisdictions outside the United Kingdom to discuss with them where they stand with regard to these matters, in particular in Paris. Of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has observed, this is not for the larger firms. It tends to be the very large firms—generally City-based—who are engaged in practice outside the United Kingdom, particularly in Europe.

The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about small firms and the impact on them. To a very large extent, it is the City firms who are employing European lawyers for a particular form of expertise. One has to bear in mind that small firms do not tend to have non-UK qualified European lawyers practising.

It is perhaps worth noticing—lawyers will appreciate this, but others may not—that, in England and Wales any natural person may deliver legal services for pay, except in the defined, reserved areas, of which there are six. They cannot call themselves solicitors or barristers, but they are only prohibited from practising in the reserved areas, unless they are subject to appropriate regulation. In the event, EU lawyers who have not requalified—and I will come back to this point—tend only to be here in order to show expertise within the law of their own particular jurisdiction. To try to put it in context, this applies not only to EU lawyers but also, for example, to American lawyers, so that, when they are doing international transactions they have available to them expertise in another jurisdiction’s law.

In addition, we have to bear in mind the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. After three years in the United Kingdom, an EU lawyer is in a position to apply to become a lawyer under the host state’s regulation—in other words, a solicitor or barrister. Generally speaking—and this is a point emphasised in the Bar’s briefing—those who intend to be engaged in reserved matters will take that qualification. That is why, when engaging with the profession on this matter, we have allowed for a transition period so that, by 2020, people who are intent on remaining in the United Kingdom to practise in reserved areas will have had the opportunity to move over under the three-year rule in order to have the host qualification to continue. The Bar’s briefing said that, in the experience of the Bar Council, most EU practitioners who are interested in delivering reserved legal activities, obtain one of the home titles in order to be more successful in our legal market. I hope that addresses this point.

On the issue of consultation and negotiation, the question of professional legal qualifications was raised with the EU at a very early stage on the basis that it was an adjunct to citizen rights. At that stage, the EU was not prepared to negotiate on that issue as distinct from what they regarded as citizen rights. It was, therefore, not taken forward in the context of the withdrawal agreement. In the context of the political declaration, it is directed principally to goods, although others elsewhere will discuss the distinction between goods and services. At the present time, it is our present intention to engage, if we have an agreement with the EU, on the question of reciprocity and recognition going forward. We understand the importance of this.

I might add that we have discussed the matter with those firms that generally operate in the EU and outside the United Kingdom. They have been aware of these issues for some time and very many of the lawyers whom they engage in their offices—for example in Paris and Hamburg—are now locally qualified or are qualified nationals of the host state. That is the way in which these practices are carried on.

I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that some restructuring has been required to allow for this, and that has to be accepted. It is restructuring that would not otherwise have been engaged in, but these firms have undertaken it in preparation for the possibility of a no-deal Brexit. However, these tend to be the major City firms. You do not get the high street conveyancing lawyer trying to open offices in Paris—if they do, I suspect it is not terribly successful.

I recognise the development of courts in other jurisdictions and, in particular, the point made with regard to potential developments in Ireland. I am well aware of many of my fellow barristers who have checked their ancestry just to ensure that they can secure an Irish passport. Lacking that, they have sought to secure a place at the Bar of Ireland. It may be apocryphal, but I understand that the fee for registration as a solicitor in Dublin went up rapidly from €300 to about €3,000. I may be doing the solicitors’ branch of the profession a disservice in relying on that story, but these developments are taking place. Let us remember that, at the level of international litigation, the real competitors are Singapore, Hong Kong and New York, which are all places outwith the EU, albeit that there are specialist centres—Stockholm being one, in the context of shipping and arbitration; and Hamburg being another. We recognise that as well.

I come back to the instrument itself. We are required to pass it because, otherwise, we will be in breach of our international law obligations under the WTO and, in particular, the GATTs. So it is necessary for this purpose. I hope that it will not be required. I express this view without qualification. It is only appropriate and sensible that the Government make provision for what could be an eventuality. I am not going to revisit ground that the House has already covered in the context of earlier statutory instruments which were before it. I hope that it will not be required, but it is only proper and appropriate that we should engage with the profession in order to ensure that we are prepared for any foreseeable eventuality, however unpleasant and unrewarding it may be. I beg to move.

European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock

Tuesday 11th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I commend the noble Lord upon his exercise in statutory interpretation, which would undoubtedly attract an A-. The position at present is that in keeping with the spirit of the Act the Government will ensure that the matter is brought back to the Commons before 21 January.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, we are all obliged to the Minister for his explanation. Will he now confirm that what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has been saying again and again has now been confirmed by the European Court of Justice, that we can unilaterally agree to withdraw our Article 50 withdrawal and remain part of the European Union now that we know the consequences of leaving? Is that not something that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has said on a number of occasions would be the sensible thing for Parliament to do and get on with running this country?

Prisons: Women

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock

Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am confident that the sentencing guidelines, and judicial guidelines in general, are sufficient to inform all levels of the judiciary as to the appropriate way in which to treat sentencing provision. Indeed, there is further guidance on this in England and Wales, which the noble Lord at the back may not be familiar with.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

The right reverend Prelate is also shaking her head.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Looking in this direction, I can only see the noble Lord’s head shaking. However, it might not be in disagreement; maybe it is an affliction, and I apologise. With regard to sentencing, there are clear guidelines, which include guidelines from the Court of Appeal over sentencing where there is an impact on children and other dependants.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

No, I have it absolutely right. I know that that is precisely what it is. I have said that on previous occasions. But, with respect, it was the couple of speeches that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, made earlier on that moved me in the Government’s direction.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions at this stage of the debate. I appreciate, as do other Members of the House, that when I move the government amendment to Clause 11, we will embrace a debate about the consequences of that amended clause and the significant change it makes to the way in which we are going to deal with, among other things, devolved competences. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed, his amendments are consequential in a sense on what is going to happen with regard to Clause 11. In that context, I point out that we had already indicated our intention to move the amendment to Clause 11 and then withdraw it, in order that the consequences for the schedules to the Bill can be addressed more properly when we reach Report. However, there is a more fundamental issue underlying this, which has been highlighted by the use of the terms “consult” and “consent”. It is really rather fundamental. Because these are probing amendments, I will just outline the Government’s thinking with regard to this area of the Bill and how it will work. I am sorry if I am going to appear somewhat repetitive about some matters of history that have been touched upon already, but perhaps your Lordships could bear with me, if but for a moment.

In 1972, the UK Parliament of course transferred certain competences to the EU. Having done so, it limited its competence to legislate for the United Kingdom. When it came to the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, that Brussels competence, as I will term it, had already gone. When it came to considering the scope of the divorce settlement, the matter of the powers held by the European Union in Brussels was not in scope for consideration as part of devolution. They had gone, by virtue of an international treaty implemented in domestic law pursuant to the ECA 1972. The devolved settlement was determined by reference to the competence that remained in Westminster in 1998 and in 2006.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to be able—I use that term advisedly—to respond to the issues raised in the context of these amendments. Given the scope of the contributions, I will perhaps begin by touching on one or two points that have been made by noble Lords in the debate.

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to the content of the joint report and quoted, among other things, the phrase,

“the Agreement should also establish”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, did likewise, and referred to the passage about the bestowal of rights that will come with the conclusion of the withdrawal agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Haskel, referred to Michel Barnier’s recent draft—quite accurately, if I may say so. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out that the European Parliament will have to agree to the terms of any withdrawal agreement. That is self-evident.

In other words, these matters are prospective. Why are they prospective? I do not want to be overly technical, and I do not believe that I will be, but we begin with the duality principle of our law. That means that we enter into international obligations at the level of international law and they have no direct impact on our domestic law. For example, the withdrawal agreement will be an international treaty entered into by the Executive. We then implement or bring the rights and obligations of that international treaty into domestic law by way of domestic legislation of this Parliament. That is the duality principle: you have international law and you have domestic law, and you can only have the domestic law once you have the international treaty, because it is from the international treaty rights and obligations that you allow the domestic rights and obligations to be brought into our domestic law. What we have at the present time is a joint report from December of last year. We acknowledge that.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

It is not a treaty.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not yet a treaty, if I can anticipate the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, because the position of the EU has been, quite rightly, that there is no agreement until everything is agreed. This has been a staged process. We believe that it is important that we were able to achieve the first stage and that we were able to achieve consensus. It is perhaps better to use the word “consensus” here rather than “agreement”, which can be confusing and sometimes misleading. We have achieved consensus in a number of important areas and, as we carry that forward, we proceed into the negotiation of what will be an international treaty.

As we have said before, once we have that international treaty, we can then draw down from the rights and obligations of that international treaty into domestic law by virtue of the fact that we will bring forward a withdrawal agreement Bill for scrutiny by this Parliament.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

No, my Lords, there will not be two classes of citizens. Let us take a simple example. If I hold USA citizenship and UK citizenship, I can pass between the UK and the USA because I am a citizen of both countries. If I am a citizen of the UK and a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, I can pass between the two countries because I am a citizen of each state. It is not a case of classification; it is simply a matter of status.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Will the noble and learned Lord clarify a point raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley? What is the position of citizens in Gibraltar?

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

Gibraltar is an overseas territory whose people hold UK citizenship. However, if they do not retain citizenship of another EU country after Brexit, they will not be EU citizens.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

As I understand it, they can get a Spanish passport if they so wish, although I do not think that many of them do. Will they continue to be citizens of the United Kingdom and will they be eligible also to get EU citizenship?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

This seems to confuse a number of different issues because the parallels are the same as those in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. If you are a UK citizen in Gibraltar and you are also entitled to apply for and be granted citizenship of Spain, you will then hold dual nationality or dual citizenship, and as a citizen of Spain, for as long as it remains a member state of the EU, you will enjoy the right to EU citizenship. It is no different from the position in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In the same way, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—perhaps referring to something she may have read in the Daily Mail—talked about people applying for citizenship of Malta in order to ensure they can maintain EU citizenship. This is how it happens, but the fundamental point is that you cannot be a citizen of the EU unless you are a citizen of a member state. That is written into the treaties.

It may appear—and it will almost certainly appear to the Chief Whip—that I have digressed slightly from some of the amendments; he will be watching. I just seek to touch on some of them. I hope I covered in my opening remarks some of the points made. Amendments 160 and 170 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and Amendment 202 by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. Unfortunately, she was not here to speak to it, but it was referred to. As I have indicated, at the end of the day, we will have to conclude the negotiations in respect of the withdrawal agreement treaty and then draw it down into our domestic law. Tying Clause 9 to a particular outcome is not going to assist that.

The noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, moved Amendment 210. Again, I hope I have set out the Government’s position on this. We appreciate what we have achieved by way of the joint report, and we go on to the detailed negotiations in the hope it will effectively mean that we can confirm in domestic law not only the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom, but the right of UK citizens in the EU.

The noble Lord, Lord Haskel, moved Amendment 211, which details a requirement to keep equivalence with the EU on rights and protections. Again, this is prospective. We are addressing it in the course of negotiations and we hope to achieve it in many respects. In my view and in the view of the Government, it would not be appropriate to bring this into our domestic law.

Finally, we have Amendments 49 and 52, which I hope I have gone some way to addressing so far. The Bill aims to provide a stable and certain domestic statute book on exit day. That is its point, irrespective of the result of the negotiations and of any final agreement with the EU. Of course, once we achieve a final agreement, we fully appreciate that we are going to have to draw it down into our domestic law. Parliament will have an opportunity to scrutinise it.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is unusual for me to intervene, but I feel that if the noble Lord is going to make statements, he should make them accurately. If he is going to represent what a Minister has said, he should do so accurately. The distinction I drew was between an agreement that was now binding in international law and an agreement that was not now binding in international law. I hope the noble Lord’s recollection coincides with mine. If it does not, could he perhaps consult Hansard?

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

It is a very interesting point, and the noble Lord, Lord Patten, highlighted it in his intervention. I wish that while he was speaking I had been able to translate “consensus” and “agreement” into Spanish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Welsh and so on to see whether there is a coincidence between one and the other. No doubt that is something that we can return to.

The Minister finished by saying that there is a time and a place, and that this is not the right time and not the right place for these amendments. There will be many more times and this will be the right place, and I look forward to speaking to the rights of European—

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure I agree with that proposition. But of course, at the end of the day, pursuant to Clause 7, it will be necessary to bring forward regulations which address amendments that are required in regards to retained EU law. At that point of course, those regulations will be the subject of scrutiny to ensure that they are limited to those aspects which are EU-derived law and therefore EU retained law. I do not believe that that is necessarily a problem, but I hear what the noble Baroness has said. We will of course take into consideration any difficulties that could arise in that context.

I wish to add one further point that I meant to make at the outset in response to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. He referred to me as the Advocate-General. I am not appearing here as a law officer, and nothing I say should be construed as law officer advice. I am appearing here as a Minister in respect of the Bill. I would not want there to be any misunderstanding in the light of his reference.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

I am really interested in what the noble and learned Lord has just said. Could he explain what the difference is if he says something as a law officer or as a Minister? What import does that have? What difference does it make in the context of this House and in the legal context?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. I would never say anything in this House as a law officer. It is my role to give advice to the Government in my role as a law officer, but I do not speak in this Chamber in that role. I just wanted to make that clear. The other difference can be found in the list of ministerial salaries.

Clause 2 is not broadly drawn for the reason that all this legislation needs saving—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with reference to Clause 14(6). It is broadly drawn for two important reasons. First, any deficiencies that might arise within this domestic legislation upon our withdrawal can be corrected by the Bill powers under Clause 7. I appreciate that there are noble Lords who will want to address the scope of those powers under Clause 7 when we come to it, but that is the purpose of drawing Clause 2 in this way. During the period in which we have been an EU member state, we have brought into our domestic law a great deal of EU law, and not just expressed as EU-derived law in the form of the implementation of directives or the direct effect of regulations. We have already had reference to the scope of, for example, the Equalities Act; there is also the health and safety at work legislation. These are areas in which we know we find EU-derived legislation. It is therefore important that we bring all that together in order that it can be subject to the regulatory processes in Clause 7, subject of course to the debate that will take place with regard to the scope of the powers in that clause.

The second, rather more important, reason for treating all this legislation as part of retained EU law—I emphasise the connection between EU-derived legislation and what is defined as “retained EU law” for the purposes of the Bill—is that we have to ensure that retained EU law will continue to be interpreted consistently by our courts under Clause 6 of the Bill. This, I apprehend, is why the Bingham Centre, for example, said, while addressing the question of the scope of Clause 2, “If you’re going to narrow the scope, then you’re going to have to amend other parts of the Bill, in particular Clause 6”. That might be a different road to the same goal. All I would say at this stage is that the road we would take is to address this in the context of Clause 2 and the scope of that clause. In a sense, if Clause 2 were narrower, the powers under Clause 7 would be much broader. If we did not bring all of this into the definition of EU-derived legislation but wanted to be able to operate by way of regulations pursuant to Clause 7, there would be virtually no boundaries for the Clause 7 powers, whereas they are circumscribed by the definition that is brought into Clause 2 in the present form.

In my respectful submission, it would be odd if we were to take these categories out of Clause 2 and therefore find ourselves in a situation in which the construction of that law now differed from what it would have been while it remained to be interpreted by reference to the canons of construction that presently apply while we are a member of the EU. It is important that it should be part of retained EU law in order that we have consistency of interpretation. I do not take issue with the suggestion that an alternative route might be to narrow Clause 2 and then completely amend Clause 6, but that is simply not the route that the Government are taking here. I have sought to explain why we are taking this particular route at this time.

I hope that I have reassured noble Lords that Clause 2 is wide in its scope, but for a legitimate purpose. As I said, we will come in due course to address the question of whether and to what extent Clause 7 should complement those provisions with regard to retained EU law. In those circumstances, and emphasising again that we are listening to various considerations about how Clause 2 is formulated, I hope that noble Lords will see fit not to press their amendments. I am obliged.

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[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, I am really grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, himself a former Advocate-General, for moving this amendment. In the light of what he said, all I can say is that I agree with his every word.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord not only for explaining the amendment but for their endorsement of it.

In responding to Amendments 16, 17 and 342, I start by reaffirming our view that Clause 2 is an essential provision for providing certainty and continuity regarding our law after exit day. I think that that is plain to all noble Lords. I shall then say a little more about why Clause 2 must stand part of the Bill. This clause, along with Clauses 3 and 4, delivers one of the core purposes of this Bill: maximising certainty for individuals and businesses when we leave the EU by ensuring that, so far as is practical, the laws that we have now will continue to apply. In that respect, Clause 2 preserves the domestic law that we have made to implement our EU obligations; we have touched on that already.

More particularly, on the point raised by the noble and learned Lord in this regard, Amendment 342 seeks to clarify that Acts of the Scottish Parliament are included within the clause only if they have received Royal Assent before exit day. I suspect that Amendment 16 also seeks to provide clarity on that same point. I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify any uncertainty that there may be here. Clause 2(2) states that,

“‘EU-derived domestic legislation’ means any enactment”

that is described in that subsection. Clause 14 defines the term “enactment” to include an enactment contained in an Act of the Scottish Parliament. An Act of the Scottish Parliament must have received Royal Assent; until that time, it is a Bill. Section 28(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 provides for this. So an Act of the Scottish Parliament that has only been passed and not received Royal Assent does not fall within this definition, and would not be categorised as EU-derived domestic legislation for the purposes of this Bill. I believe that the noble and learned Lord rather suspected that this might be the case; his concern seemed to be one of certainty as regards the drafting.

The same applies in relation to Acts of the UK Parliament. The reference to “passed” in Clause 2(2)(b) is therefore a reference to the purpose for which the enactment was passed, not whether it was passed. In that context, I venture to suggest that Amendments 16 and 342 are unnecessary.

Transparency of the Parole Board and Victim Support

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock

Tuesday 9th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, I can perhaps answer both questions by reference to the same issue. As far as I am aware, no pressure is being brought to bear on the Parole Board with respect to inappropriate release of IPP prisoners. The statutory test is perfectly clear, and the Parole Board is an independent body applying that statutory test, which should continue to be the position. It would not be appropriate that we should depart from the situation in which there is an independent Parole Board making these decisions objectively, to somehow bring it back into the fold of political decision-making where you may find pressure from the electorate, the media and elsewhere that impacts directly on someone’s right of liberty.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

From the Minister’s extensive experience north of the border, is there anything that can be learned from the procedures in Scotland?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord, but I have to confess that I have virtually no experience of criminal law north of the border.