Ministerial Code

Lord Kakkar Excerpts

Wednesday 13th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, perhaps I may read from paragraph 1 of the Ministerial Code:

“The principle of collective responsibility, save where it is explicitly set aside, applies to all Government Ministers”.

Three sentences before that, it states:

“The Ministerial Code should be read alongside the Coalition agreement”.

[Lord Kakkar]

My Lords, in coalition government, does the application of sanctions against Ministers who fail to respect the convention of collective responsibility lie with the Prime Minister or the Deputy Prime Minister?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, this is, as the noble Lord said, a convention. I am sure he recalls that it was developed in the 1780s as a way to protect the Cabinet as a whole against the monarch, who wished to call Cabinet Ministers in one by one to ask them what they personally thought; it was not originally concerned with Parliament at all. There is a very useful document with which noble Lords may not be familiar, which accompanied the coalition agreement, entitled the Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform, which states:

“There is no constitutional difference between a Coalition Government and a single party Government, but working practices need to adapt to reflect the fact that the UK has not had a Coalition in modern times”.

Parliamentary Constituency Boundaries: Review

Lord Kakkar Excerpts

Tuesday 9th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I am glad to see that the noble Lord reads the Daily Mail which, I think, was where the report came from. Primary legislation requires the commissions to report to Parliament before October 2013, and it would require primary legislation to stop that. It would then be for Parliament to consider the recommendations. There is precedent for Parliament voting against the acceptance of a Boundary Commission review; it was done by the Labour Government in 1969.

[Lord Kakkar]

My Lords, do Her Majesty’s Government consider that the 221 hours and 24 minutes over 35 days spent in your Lordships’ House and the other place on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill was a wise and mature use of precious parliamentary time, in view of the fact that the Deputy Prime Minister has suggested that Liberal Democrat Ministers and MPs will vote against the secondary legislation when it comes before this Parliament?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I think that it would be a little brave of me to say what I thought was a useful use of the time of this Chamber or of the other Chamber and what I thought was not. I have sat through a number of debates over the last 15 years that I have felt were not useful uses of this Chamber’s time.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Kakkar Excerpts

Monday 14th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kakkar]

My Lords, I fear that, once again, I have to start by putting a question to Her Majesty’s Government which I have put on a number of previous occasions when speaking on this important issue of reform of your Lordships’ House—that is, exactly what is the purpose of the reform Bill? Have the Government concluded that your Lordships’ House has failed, and continues to fail, the people of our country because it is unable to undertake scrutiny and revision of legislation, as I think all noble Lords understand its purpose to be; or is the Bill an attempt to overcome the accusation that your Lordships’ House is an affront to democracy? If it is the latter, the proposal to elect 80% of this Chamber for a fixed term of 15 years with no recourse to the electorate, and most interestingly no opportunity for these elected representatives, paid for by the taxpayer, to undertake any work on behalf of constituents, does not add up to democratic accountability. It is vital that the Government are able to understand clearly, and answer, that important question. There is no purpose at all in throwing this Parliament into turmoil by formally introducing this Bill for consideration in the other place, and ultimately in your Lordships’ House, unless its purpose is clearly understood.

During this debate a consensus has arisen on three important concerns which must be addressed. First, we must try to understand the constitutional ramifications of the Bill. These were well identified in the Joint Committee report and the alternative report. Secondly, we must try to identify actions that might be taken to mitigate those serious constitutional ramifications. The interesting contribution of my noble friend Lord Laming focused on the standing of Parliament and the view of our fellow citizens with regard to how we spend our time and use the resources that they as taxpayers make available to us. The third concern is that both Houses of Parliament should be able to communicate the fact that they work justly and fairly in the interests of the people of our country.

Much has been made of the fact that there are 77 parliaments in the world that are bicameral in nature. In the debate that took place on 1 May, following the publication of the Joint Committee’s report, I asked three questions: how many of those bicameral parliaments have no written constitution; how many of them have no definition of the powers of the two elected Chambers; and how many of them fail to provide a protocol to resolve disputes between the two elected Chambers? I have checked the latest available information on an Inter-Parliamentary Union database, and it indicates that 77 parliaments in the world are bicameral in nature. We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Norton, that 21 of them are wholly elected, 17 are indirectly elected, 15 are wholly appointed and the remainder are a mixture of appointment and election. However, only three countries in the world do not have a written constitution: Israel, New Zealand and this country. This means that only one bicameral system has no written constitution. We have dealt with this in a very elegant fashion by writing and defining conventions that are respected by the two Chambers in this great Parliament. It is a well recognised and accepted convention that the other place has primacy because it is the elected Chamber; it is fully democratic, and therefore our Parliament is fully democratic. Only one Chamber enjoys the democratic mandate and has primacy; so if a leader of a political party wishes to form a Government, that leader must enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons—not the confidence of your Lordships’ House. There is no confusion in that regard. Ultimately, when an election is called, Members of the House of Commons have to offer themselves back to the electorate. The electorate—our fellow citizens—decide whom they wish to be our representatives in the elected Chamber of Parliament, and it is that Chamber that determines who will govern our country.

If we are to dispose of the conventions, we must be sensitive to the wise advice provided in the preamble to the Parliament Act 1911. It states with absolute clarity that Parliament will have to make provision for limiting and defining the powers of a second Chamber elected with a popular mandate. It is not possible to ignore what was said in that preamble. So much of everything else regarding the relationships between the two Chambers—the conventions built from the 1911 Act—is fundamental to the way in which this Parliament conducts itself. It would be rather foolish, and lacking in decency and honesty, to disregard that important advice.

It has been said by Members of the other place who are particularly interested in this legislation that we should just get on with it. My noble friend Lady Boothroyd commented on what Vince Cable said with regard to getting on “quickly and quietly” with House of Lords reform. However, those who propose that that should be the disposition of this particular legislation—quiet acquiescence delivered quickly—fail to recognise what they are asking for, which is that we should commence to write the most important elements of our country’s constitution in the Chambers of the House of Commons and your Lordships’ House. What should we do when we come across serious and complicated issues that discussion, even in these two great Chambers of this great Parliament, cannot resolve? Would it be wrong to deliver those parts of a Bill to a special Select Committee? Would those taking that responsible decision be accused of wasting time and trying to undermine the passage of the Bill?

Surely it is much more sensible to proceed in a reasoned fashion, as suggested in the alternative report, through the creation of a constitutional convention that would allow all the issues that have been identified so far—as well as many of the other issues that have not been addressed—to be addressed fully and properly. One interesting issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Reid, concerned how a Government should be formed when we have two elected Chambers. How would our fellow citizens—the taxpayers—view the situation where no party leader in the elected House of Commons after a general election was able to command the confidence of that Chamber, but where a leader in an elected House of Lords was perfectly able to command the confidence of the elected second Chamber? Why should not that party leader be provided with the opportunity to form a Government rather than the whole country be thrown into turmoil and another general election be forced at considerable cost and in which the outcome may again be uncertain? That question needs to be addressed. As I see it, the draft Bill makes no provision for ensuring that that may never happen.

Other important constitutional issues currently confront our country. The question of independence, or potential greater devolution, in Scotland will have an important impact on the future of an elected second Chamber. If the Scottish people elect for independence, the people of Wales and Northern Ireland will rightfully be concerned about their constitutional position in a Parliament dominated by the country of England. If the Scottish people—not that I am suggesting that there should be two questions in the referendum in Scotland—moved to the devo-max solution, there would be important questions about whether we were moving to a more federal nation and whether an elected second Chamber should reflect that. These matters are not currently considered.

Interestingly, the question of asking the people of our country whether they support the proposals has been put only in terms of a post-legislative referendum. However, this fails to pay any attention to the 2011 referendum on voting systems for the other place. The people of our country rejected the AV system. What implications does that have for selecting the voting system for an elected second Chamber? Should we interpret the results of that referendum as the people of our country telling this Parliament that their preferred method of election is first past the post or should we have two questions in any future referendum related to the introduction of an elected second Chamber, the second question putting to the people of our country a choice of voting system for elections to that Chamber?

My noble friend Lord Laming raised the issue of the standing of politics, and here I think there is a vital question. Are the people of our country likely to hold in contempt politicians who single-mindedly push forward constitutional reform such as reform of your Lordships’ House, having initiated a period of debate and scrutiny on their proposed Bill over a year earlier and that scrutiny having told us that the Bill is wanting in many ways, is fraught with constitutional hazard and probably should not proceed as currently proposed; or are they more likely to hold in contempt political leaders who say, “We have offered this Bill for early scrutiny to our Parliament. Parliament has decided that the Bill is wanting in many ways and is fraught and dangerous, and it is inappropriate to proceed at this time. We are therefore going to proceed with a Bill that will deal with many of the anomalies relating to membership of the House of Lords in terms of expulsion, retirement, resignation, term of office and so on”? I suspect that the people of our country will be much more impressed if our political leaders are able to take the latter course, accept that what they have proposed will not work and does not enjoy support or consensus, and do what enjoys consensus and will be warmly received in both Chambers of this Parliament.

We currently ask many of our citizens to make great sacrifices for our country. We ask our brave servicemen potentially to sacrifice their lives in the longer-term interests and security of our nation. We are asking the people of our country to accept and experience austerity so that the national debt can be resolved and our nation can once again be put on a firm footing. We are asking our public servants, for instance, to have the terms and conditions of their service and pensions changed so that, once again, our country can enjoy secure finances. It is only right that the people of our country are able to ask their political leaders and those who represent them in this Parliament to focus on the interests, needs and anxieties that the people are facing at the moment, and that our politicians and Members of both Houses in this Parliament give their undivided attention to dealing with issues such as job creation, growth, living standards and reducing the debt—all issues that the Prime Minister has himself identified as key priorities.

It is interesting to speculate on how debate on the future of the House of Lords may distort priorities during this Session of Parliament. You have only to look at the allocation of time for debates following the humble Address. Two days have been devoted to constitutional affairs, with 54 speakers contributing principally on the question of reform of your Lordships’ House. Tomorrow we have a day devoted to education, culture, home affairs, health, law and justice and welfare, a single day of debate during which 69 noble Lords will try to make their contributions. Members of both Houses in this great Parliament need to be sensitive to the feelings, anxieties and needs of the people of our country at this time. This Bill as currently presented does not enjoy consensus and it would be wise to withdraw it.

Draft House of Lords Reform Bill

Lord Kakkar Excerpts

Tuesday 1st May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kakkar]

My Lords, I, too, join other noble Lords in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Richard, on the work of the Joint Committee on scrutiny of this draft Bill for proposed House of Lords reform. Yet, coming at this Bill as I might as a surgeon preparing for major operation, I am forced to ask what the indications are to justify major constitutional surgery. Is it that your Lordships’ House has failed and continues to fail the people of our country? Is it that, as has been stated by the Deputy Prime Minister, your Lordships’ House is an affront to democracy? If it is the former, what is the evidence that your Lordships’ House has failed to undertake appropriate scrutiny and revision of legislation that we have received from the other place?

What action might be taken to ensure that, in future, your Lordships are better able to fulfil the purpose of scrutiny and revision of legislation? If, however, it is the latter—that your Lordships are an affront to democracy—it is unclear what evidence there is that the proposal in the draft Bill adds to democratic accountability. The proposal is to elect 80 per cent of the second Chamber on a term of 15 years, with no opportunity for those elected representatives to present themselves once again to the electorate for scrutiny of their record, creating a system whereby the elected representatives have no contact with their constituents while discharging work on behalf of those taxpayers who are paying for them to sit in this Parliament.

The second obligation of any surgeon preparing for a major operation, and of any responsible politician preparing for major constitutional reform, is to ask whether the benefits proposed outweigh the risks. The important work of the Joint Committee has highlighted the consensus that Clause 2 is insufficient. In future, work must be done to define properly the powers of an elected second Chamber, to understand how those powers might be exercised and how the relationship between two elected Chambers would be handled, and in particular how disputes between the two Chambers might be resolved.

The noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, rightly identified 60 bicameral Parliaments around the world with an elected second Chamber. The question is how many of those Parliaments have no written constitution, no written definition of the powers of the two Chambers and no written protocol for the resolution of disputes between those two Chambers. The Joint Committee took evidence from Australian Senators, and that evidence is instructive as it touched on the question of a resolution of disputes between the two elected Chambers in the Australian Parliament. If we look back to 1975 and the Australian constitutional crisis, we see that the presence of a written constitution was acutely important. The then Speaker of the House of Representatives in Australia wrote to Her Majesty as head of state requesting intervention. The private secretary to the monarch was able to respond that the written constitution made the position clear and that there was no need for any particular intervention.

It seems very unwise to proceed with the creation of an elected second Chamber unless the important issue of the powers of the two Chambers, how disputes are to be resolved, the potential role that the Supreme Court may play in resolving disputes, and therefore how Parliament may be secured as sovereign in future, are properly defined before a Bill is brought for further scrutiny before this Parliament. However, important opportunities have been identified for a way forward. To make progress with necessary reform at this stage, the Joint Committee report and alternative report, the report of the Leader’s group on working practices and the Bill part-way through its passage in this Parliament in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Steel, all have important elements that could be extracted and brought together to offer useful legislation that could rightly justify parliamentary time being used in an effective and cost-effective fashion for the benefit of the people of our country.

The Prime Minister, speaking on the “Today” programme last week, indicated that House of Lords reform could proceed only if there was consensus. Those who have the privilege of leading our country and have particular responsibility for constitutional reform need to be sensitive to this debate, the Joint Committee report and the alternative report. They must ask themselves, having heard what has come out of this important phase of pre-legislative scrutiny, whether the proposed Bill for House of Lords reform justifies prime legislative time in the forthcoming Session of Parliament. They need to exercise the judgment that many professionals, including surgeons when deciding when to operate, have to exercise, because they have responsibility to the people of our country. They must ask themselves whether the competing demands of needing to hold the coalition together by using Lords reform as the glue to maintain some form of cohesion outweighs the needs of the people of our country to secure a long-term settlement for an effective Parliament that can serve their needs not only in good times but in times of crisis—and, more acutely, a Parliament that will focus on the issues that are their principal concerns today.

The Prime Minister, answering an urgent Parliamentary Question yesterday, repeated in your Lordships’ House by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, said that,

“the country wants to hear about jobs, investment, living standards and the great challenges we face, like debt”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/4/12; col. 1243.]

Those of us who have the privilege to sit in this place and the other place need to be acutely sensitive to those wise words and act accordingly.