European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, as a co-signatory to the amendment, I want to make a short contribution in support of the reference by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, to the work of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and to pay tribute to our legal advisers, who are not only expert and experienced but amazingly diligent. The noble Lord referred to the committee’s work on the Bill, but he did not make direct reference to paragraph 93 of our third report to the House, the last sentence of which reads:

“The Statute of Proclamations 1539, which gave proclamations the force of statute law and later gave rise to the term ‘Henry VIII power’, was repealed in 1547 (after the King’s death earlier that year)”.


I have not been able to do the necessary follow-up research but, as I understand it, our 16th-century predecessors put around the statute of limitations some additional restrictions that are not in this Bill. As a former Member of the other House, I think that it would be extraordinary if the two Houses of Parliament allowed this to go through. It may seem a minor matter, but in terms of precedent it is extremely important. If we let it through, it seems that we will not have done our job as well as our 16th-century predecessors.

The work that is done by the Delegated Powers Committee is well respected in your Lordships’ House and I am delighted that that is the case. In saying that, I want to make sure that Members of the House know that we have the advice of some extremely assiduous lawyers. I think that the advice that we give the House usually benefits from that. I am not always a huge fan of lawyers, but in this respect I think that we are very well served.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, we come to the next stage of the slow journey of this Bill through the House. I shall look at Clause 9 again and address the issue of what the Act of proclamations provided, but just as a footnote I remind the House that the statute provided in categoric terms that a proclamation could not overrule a statute. One tends to overlook that. Everyone is absolutely riveted, are they not? Schedule 5—what an exciting topic to come to first thing in the morning. The problem, though, is that tucked away in this schedule, as frequently happens, is an issue of principle. That issue is, simply, and I support what the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, says, that we are giving an unnecessary, or inappropriate—I do not mind which word we use for these purposes—surrender of power to the Executive. We really must break that habit.

[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, to go slightly beyond the terms of the amendment, as foreshadowed in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the issue of principle appears to extend to giving the Government the power not only to decide whether something is to be published but to decide whether they are satisfied that it is retained direct EU legislation. Following the debate on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, about clinical trials regulation, there have been exchanges and meetings.

Apparently, I am wrong about that. I am told that at some point I will get a blow-by-blow explanation. The Minister sighs, but no one has actually explained. There is a contradiction between the drafting in the Bill and the Explanatory Notes. The Minister is looking at me as if I am stupid. I am sorry about that, but we need to know the criteria by which the Government will precisely decide whether an EU measure is retained EU law and, preferably, have a list of those measures. That would be transparent. We need both the criteria and the list. We cannot just leave it to the Government to decide not only whether they publish but whether an instrument is retained EU law. This has massive consequences in the real world, as does the clinical trials regulation. Researchers are leaving the country because they do not know whether we are going to continue to apply EU law. This is not nothing; it is an important matter.

Wales Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th December 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Judge]

63: Clause 60, page 49, line 5, at beginning insert “Subject to subsection (2A),”

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I shall not speak to Amendments 63 or 64, but I shall speak to Amendment 65. As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, reminded the House, I had the privilege of being Lord Chief Justice of Wales for some time and I regard this as a constitutional question. I also recognise that at this time of the night, a speech like that of Welsh-born Henry V before the Battle of Agincourt—or before the walls of Harfleur—will not do very much for anybody, so I will confine myself to a few choice words, but maybe more than I intend.

I make this speech because this provision is simply a constitutional aberration. Here we are in the mother of Parliaments, an institution where the principles so movingly crafted by Abraham Lincoln on the blood-soaked field of Gettysburg, about government for the people by the people and of the people—democracy—is embodied. Yet we are to provide a Minister of the Crown with powers to amend, repeal, revoke and modify—perhaps I can use the word “disapply” to cover all those—any primary or secondary legislation. We do it all the time in what are called Henry VIII powers and we all let it happen. We should not, but we do—so let us face the fact that there are Henry VIII powers in this provision.

Secondary legislation can overrule primary legislation, but this is the malevolent ghost of King Henry VIII wandering through the valleys of Wales because, at least in the provision as it stands, if the primary legislation of this Parliament is to be overruled there are going to be regulations which would empower this House to overrule it. I disagree with the process but it is up to Parliament, and Parliament provides it. The necessary regulations are subject to parliamentary approval or annulment, but—this is the crucial but—the regulations that would empower the Minister to disapply legislation of the National Assembly for Wales are not subject to the equivalent control by that Assembly. We seem to have been discussing this legislation all day yet any part of it—primary, secondary, tertiary or whatever it may be—can be wiped out by a Minister without any consultation with anyone at the National Assembly for Wales. In other words, we would wipe out the enactments of a democratically elected Parliament that we call the National Assembly.

If I may say so, I find a ministerial diktat that is given such powers quite astonishing. It is astonishing that it is considered here in the mother of Parliaments. There is not a scintilla of control of the Executive envisaged in these provisions, which is why I describe them as a constitutional aberration. I am sorry to use strong language and I know I am not before Harfleur, but it is an insult to the democratic process which this Parliament created when the National Assembly for Wales was created. That is my prime concern, but I am concerned, too, about the legislation itself.

Can we just remember that this is open to question as a piece of legislation? Clause 60 as it stands is inconsistent with the spirit and arguably, I suggest, with the precise language of Clause 2. If Parliament is normally precluded—as it would be for the reasons we have discussed this afternoon—from legislating about devolved matters without the consent of the National Assembly, why on earth should a Minister or the Executive, not Parliament, be given wide-ranging powers, including powers to disapply primary legislation of the Assembly by secondary legislation without any consent, without so much as a “by your leave”? There may be political consequences, but in law that is what we are being asked to consider.

I know that the Minister, who has dealt with me with the greatest possible courtesy, will no doubt point out that that is what happens in Scotland. So it does. We should be embarrassed that we allowed it to happen. The fact that it happens in Scotland does not alter the fact that it was an aberration there and will be an aberration here. I beg to move.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in his excellent opening statement on Amendment 63 and the amendments grouped with it. I shall speak to my Amendments 64 and 71 and to Amendment 65, to which I added my name.

Amendment 65 may be the most effective amendment in this group. The amendments seek to ensure that the National Assembly for Wales has primacy when it comes to secondary legislation in areas of devolved competence and to removing Westminster’s powers to undermine Welsh devolution through what are known as Henry VIII powers. It is worth reading out the amendment:

“Page 49, line 7, at end insert—

‘(2A) The Secretary of State may not make regulations under subsection (2) unless the National Assembly for Wales has passed a resolution approving a draft of the regulations”’.

That seems a very reasonable thing to do. When these points were put forward in Committee, I found the Minister’s response, particularly to the points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, to some extent disappointing and perhaps a little misleading. The Minister argued that Acts of Parliament and Acts of the Assembly should be treated equally in areas of devolved competence. The Minister characterised the argument as being about equality, although no one appeared to be using that word to describe the intentions of these amendments. It is not a matter of equality; it is about establishing the supremacy or primacy of laws created by the Assembly in Wales for Wales. The Minister argued that a number of Welsh Assembly Acts require amendments to Westminster Acts and that a statutory provision to create more accountability for secondary legislation would shift the balance too far in favour of the Assembly. However, as my noble friend Lord Elis-Thomas highlighted, we are talking about two very different scenarios. The Assembly is simply amending Westminster Acts, which are the legislative framework on which Welsh law has been built for centuries. In contrast, unwanted attempts by Westminster to amend Assembly Acts are simply interventions in what should be an area of unquestionable authority for the National Assembly for Wales. It therefore seems quite a misnomer to say that any attempts to use Henry VIII powers to undermine Welsh law are a matter of equality. The issue is about ensuring that Welsh Assembly Acts have the respect and legal standing that they deserve.

I shall also briefly address a further point raised by the Minister. He argued that Clause 53 will be used to address “minor” or “consequential” issues only. It was argued that any wholesale changes to this process would create unnecessary complexities for these necessary but uncontentious pieces of secondary legislation. He will be able to see from Amendment 64 that by including the word “minor” in the appropriate line of the clause, I have addressed that issue. I hope he will acknowledge that and perhaps accept the amendment.

I understand that, as with primary legislation, AMs are afforded the right to vote on a consent Motion for any changes to Westminster orders and regulations which infringe into areas of devolved competence. This is called Standing Order 30A and is referred to by the abbreviation SICM for statutory instrument consent memorandum. However, this is only agreed to by convention, and recognised only in Assembly standing orders. It has absolutely no legal standing—even less than the somewhat pathetic standing given to the Sewel convention by including the word “normally” in the Bill.

The Assembly cannot rely on the kindness of Westminster to ensure that it can continue to exercise the powers we have fought so hard for it to have. Will the Minister therefore accept the advice of so many legal and constitutional experts and recognise that it is no longer acceptable to have these arcane and undemocratic clauses in the Bill—or, for that matter, in any Bill of this nature? A way out of this totally unnecessary mess would be to require the National Assembly’s agreement to the use of any statutory instrument by Westminster. At a stroke, that would resolve the issue. If the matters are as uncontentious as the Minister claimed them to be, there would be no difficulty in getting that Assembly agreement.

As things stand, I can well see this matter becoming a dominant one, which could well lead to the National Assembly refusing to pass a legislative consent order in relation to the Bill. If that were to happen, it would be a direct consequence of the Government refusing to apply even-handed common sense and instead running terrified of upsetting the Scots by giving Wales this additional power. We have been told time and again that just because something is appropriate for Scotland, it is not necessarily appropriate for Wales. In this instance, the boot is on the other foot, and for the sake both of the self-respect of our National Assembly and of the even-handed resolution of disputes between Westminster and Cardiff Bay, I urge the House to accept this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I thank the Minister. I think that the proposals that he has put forward are politically very wise but, legally—and I mean this with no discourtesy —they are completely irrelevant. But I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 63 withdrawn.

Wales Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 23rd November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I have the privilege of being a member of the Constitution Committee, but I speak on my own behalf. I do not have the privilege of being a Welshman but I have the privilege of looking at a statute; I have the privilege of remembering what a baleful influence Henry VIII was on the history of Wales, and his baleful influence looks as though it will continue. The 1536 Act was intended to crush the Welsh nation and the Welsh language. The devolution process was intended to row back hundreds of years of history.

We are being invited to give Henry VIII powers to a Minister, by secondary legislation, to amend, modify, repeal or get rid of—whatever language we care to use—primary legislation. I have a very strong view on this, and shall address the House interminably about the besmirching effect on our constitutional arrangements of such clauses. However, I do not have to stop there in this instance. If Parliament chooses to give Henry VIII powers to the Minister, that is Parliament’s choice, but here it is giving Henry VIII powers to a Minister to reject, modify, get rid of or dispose of the legislation of the National Assembly—in other words, to eradicate, nullify or replace a statutory provision, enacted by a democratically elected legislature of our United Kingdom, on which the people living in Wales will have acted while the particular legislation has been enforced, and all without any consent from the Assembly. That seems an astonishing insult to the democratic process. The affirmative procedure that will undoubtedly be suggested as the solution does not—I say this with great respect—address the democratic deficit.

The solution to the problem involves having another look at Clause 2 and transposing it into Clause 53. I do not need to spell this out. It is perfectly obvious that the consent of the Welsh Assembly is needed. I reject in Clause 2 that weasel word “normally”, which has all sorts of connotations that are not helpful to the analysis. There is another word beginning with “n” which should take its place: never.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 120 and 120A, first to Amendment 120, standing in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Murphy of Torfaen and Lord Kinnock and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson. It is a very straightforward amendment. Clause 2 introduces a new requirement that Parliament,

“will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Assembly”.

That was at the heart of the amendments that have just been addressed. It is an admirable clause, and its logic should surely apply to the Bill as well. In other words, the Bill should not come into effect—which is what the terms of Amendment 120 spell out—without the legislative consent of the Assembly. That is all it is asking for. I know that the Minister has worked very closely with Welsh Government Ministers, and his officials with theirs, so it seems to me that there should be no objection on his part to this amendment. Indeed, I hope he will respond in a conciliatory way because in that way, I think, he will also expedite progress on the Bill.

I turn to Amendment 120A, standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen. It will ensure that the Bill cannot come into force unless the Treasury has laid before each House of Parliament a document which sets out a fiscal framework for Wales agreed by the United Kingdom Government and the Welsh Government. As Your Lordships are aware from my speech at Second Reading, I am deeply sceptical that Wales will benefit from income tax devolution and fearful that Wales will actually lose out. The Treasury will not permit much-needed borrowing powers for Wales unless these are set against the revenue-raising powers that this Bill provides for. The First Minister desperately needs that borrowing to invest in infrastructure—from new roads and rail links to relieve chronic congestion, to new hospitals and schools. What is more, the Treasury will not otherwise provide the cover it could so easily do at such minuscule interest rates as currently exist for that infrastructure investment. I think this is financial smoke and mirrors—Treasury subterfuge. Yet the Government have trapped Wales between a rock and a hard place.

I am suspicious that Wales is being badly short-changed by this income tax devolution, which is what I seek to address in this amendment. It is not about the substance of devolution, because that has already been debated, but about the fiscal framework that accompanies it. We do not yet have sight of the fiscal framework to accompany tax devolution, though we are grateful to the Minister for promising, in answer—and on the record—to my question on Second Reading, that we would be able to scrutinise it very carefully by Report. I am also grateful for his recent letter on the subject. All I can say is that it will have to be a mighty, mighty generous fiscal framework to Wales to persuade me to support it. The Treasury in a generous frame of mind will be a novel experience for us all. I speak as someone who, like my noble friend Lord Murphy, has negotiated with the Treasury as a Cabinet Minister on behalf of Wales.

Therefore I wish to put a series of arguments to the Minister which will need to be fully addressed by the fiscal framework. In the time that he has left to tidy up that framework, I hope he will address them.

I draw first on the authoritative 2010 report of the Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales, chaired by Gerald Holtham. The key point is that Holtham acknowledged explicitly the risk that Wales’s income tax base might grow more slowly than the United Kingdom’s income tax base—that is to say, the risk of differential tax base growth. If that happened, the Wales budget would shrink relative to the UK as a whole and the degree of redistribution to Wales from richer parts of the UK would reduce.

Holtham noted that one option could be to index deductions from the block grant to the growth over time of the devolved tax base in Wales. This would completely offset a devolved income tax in Wales and eliminate any risk arising from differential tax base growth. Other options would only partially eliminate this risk. So Holtham came up with a compromise, concluding in paragraph 5.25 that the,

“best compromise appears to be very infrequent reviews of the tax bases of the devolved administration and a consequent adjustment to deductions from the block grant”.

Such reviews and adjustments would require negotiations between the Wales Government and UK Ministers. Holtham suggested reviews every 12 to 15 years. Frankly that is far, far too long a period in my view, especially with the outlook for the British economy looking so uncertain with Brexit, as the Chancellor confirmed in his Statement today.

Holtham made no recommendation for any kind of Treasury assurance to ensure that Wales did not lose out. The Holtham report simply recommended that the block grant should be reduced by an equivalent amount in the first year of the new system and that in,

“subsequent years, the size of the block grant deduction should be calculated to reflect the growth of the relevant income tax bases across the UK as a whole”.

That leaves the Wales budget open to being squeezed due to the Wales income tax base growing at a slower rate than that of the UK as a whole, with no guarantee that the Treasury would top up the block grant to fill the gap, meaning that Wales could certainly lose out. Holtham recommended that the block grant should be based on a needs-based formula that would determine budgets across England, Wales and Scotland. The three most relevant factors determining need would be demography, deprivation and costs.

Based on past spending in England, Scotland and Wales, Holtham recommended that Wales should receive £115 per person to spend on devolved activities for every £100 per person spent on comparable activities in England. Will that be achieved by the fiscal framework—I hope that the Minister will reassure me—or will Wales be left with a funding gap? Holtham acknowledged that, had his needs formula been applied in 2010-11, Wales would have received only £112 for every £100 spent on devolved activities in England, due to weaknesses in the Barnett formula. This would have left Wales with a shortfall, a funding gap of about £400 million. Will the fiscal framework eliminate that gap?

I also refer to the report by the respected Wales Governance Centre, Income Tax and Wales, published in February this year. On page 4 of the executive summary, it chillingly warns that,

“the method chosen to reduce the Welsh block grant to account for the additional Income Tax revenues has the potential to cause losses of hundreds of millions of pounds each year to the Welsh budget”.

Hundreds of millions each year—that is a massive risk, surely; a serious risk of hospitals and care homes closing, teacher numbers being cut, and local government budgets being savaged still further on top of the current round of austerity. Those issues need to be addressed in the fiscal framework.

The Wales Governance Centre draws attention to important developments since the Holtham and Silk commissions. UK Government decisions to raise the personal tax allowance have drawn disproportionately more of Welsh incomes out of the income tax base than across the UK as a whole. So while UK income tax receipts have grown by 6% across the UK since 2010-11, the equivalent figure for Wales is only 2%—worryingly, only one-third of the UK figure. That is because Wales has income levels below the UK average. Fifty-five per cent of all taxpayers’ income in Wales comes from individuals earning less than £30,000 per annum compared with 42% across the UK.

When in November 2015 the previous Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the Government’s decision to drop the referendum requirement for income tax devolution to Wales, he also declared that they would protect the Welsh budget by introducing a floor underneath Wales’ relative per capita funding, to save it from any so-called “Barnett squeeze”. But lack of clarification about this proposed Barnett floor has prevented the Wales Governance Centre from checking in detail how it might interact with income tax devolution and subsequent block grant adjustments—so we just do not know. The floor may be flawed, but nobody can tell.

Wales Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) : House of Lords
Monday 31st October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, as a former Lord Chief Justice of Wales and England, I want to make just a couple of points. The word “normally” in Clause 2 is a weasel word. It does not mean anything very much in legislative terms. I am perfectly well aware that it is in the Scotland Act, but what is this supposed to mean:

“the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate”?

Who decides what is normal? If the Parliament of the United Kingdom decides, the Assembly is ruled out.

I am particularly concerned about Clause 2 in the context of Clause 53—

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

My Lords, with respect, I think that this is the next amendment.

[Lord Judge]

The Minister may well be right, but I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas, talking about “normal” in the context of Clause 2. At some stage I want to make the point, so perhaps I may just finish making it, because I do not want to take long about it. Please can we look at the matter in the context of Clause 53 and, in particular, Clause 53(6) concerning statutory instruments, powers vested in the Secretary of State, affirmative resolution, and so on:

“unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament”?

It totally omits reference to the National Assembly for Wales, yet in Clause 2 we are told that the Government will not normally legislate without the consent of the Assembly. Somewhere along the line, this bridge has to be crossed.

[Baroness Morgan of Ely (Lab)]

My Lords, I tabled Amendments 4 and 5 to establish a justice commission for Wales. Like the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, I apologise for not having the legal background or brilliance of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Judge, to speak as I would like on the amendments, but I will do my best.

The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, made some relevant and serious points which need to be considered. It is premature to establish a separate legal jurisdiction for Wales, but there is without question an issue that needs to be addressed. I shall briefly summarise the background and explain why the commission is needed and what it would achieve.

There is clear consensus among constitutional and legal experts that there is a problem here that must be addressed. The creation of the National Assembly as a legislature with primary legislative powers, operating within a single jurisdiction of England and Wales, creates a situation which will throw up difficulties in the medium to long term. That single legal jurisdiction, to quote from those who have promoted this Bill in the other place, “has served us well”. Yes, it may have done that, but it has served us well in different times. It served us well when the laws that applied across England and Wales were the same laws—when this place was the only legislature that could enact the laws of the jurisdiction. That is no longer the case and has not been for some time.

It is worth emphasising the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas. There is no question but that the UK’s Government’s anxiety to protect the joint jurisdiction is the source of many problems in the Bill. We accept that some constraints have been removed, but there remain many reservations and restrictions whose primary purpose is to protect the consistency of law across England and Wales. The problem is that that consistency no longer exists: the horse has already bolted. The reality is that there is already a growing divergence of law which is the inevitable consequence of legislative devolution. The law on education, planning, the environment and social services is now fundamentally different in Wales. Without reform of the jurisdiction to reflect this divergence, there are risks to the rule of law and the administration of justice. By necessity, a single jurisdiction involves a single body of law that extends across its territory. A single jurisdiction implies that the law is the same across that territory. The laws of England and Wales—already vast—must now absorb the increasing divergence between laws that apply only to Wales and those that apply only to England. This is highly complex, so how can we be sure that the citizens will understand the law or even that solicitors, barristers and judges will apply the correct law? This is not a debating point: these are real practical risks and they are increasing.

This issue demands a serious response and the UK Government see no need for concern on the grounds that this single jurisdiction has served Wales well. That misses the point. The shared jurisdiction served Wales well for four and a half centuries when Wales did not have its own legislature. That is no longer the case. The single jurisdiction is out of sync with the way that Wales is governed. It has not caught up with reality. But it is okay, because we have a glimmer of hope. All is going to be fine because the Ministry of Justice has set up a working group—what in Wales we call a committee—of Whitehall officials. The noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, referred to this. Its birth was not auspicious: it was a party to which the Welsh Government were apparently invited but had not received their invitation. Never mind: it has now met, but we and the Welsh Government are in the dark as to its progress. Will the Minister enlighten us on some key points in relation to that working group? How many meetings has the group held? What engagement has there been with legal practitioners who understand the day-to-day realities of practising law in Wales? What is the work programme and when can we expect to see the report? Will we have it before Report stage?

It is an incredible coincidence that today, when we are debating this, the Welsh Government have received an invitation to the working group’s second meeting. That is great news, but we should be concerned that that progress is not a serious way of demonstrating a commitment to the fundamental importance of this work. This is why we think it is important to bring forward a commission on which the Welsh Government have equal status and to which they are able to bring their expertise and that of those who have real knowledge of the Welsh justice system. We have no confidence that this informal working group will be capable of producing a serious response to the challenges I have outlined. Maybe it will: let us see if we can see something before Report stage. It is important to have a much more credible mechanism for taking this issue forward which will be independent of government and consist of senior judiciary and other practitioners who already have the authority and expertise required. Such a mechanism would provide a forum for developing solutions to problems that cannot be avoided and would be transparent in producing an annual report on progress against an agreed remit.

For all its flaws, one of the positive impacts of this Bill is that we have had to focus our minds on this key issue. It is clear that the single jurisdiction is no longer fit for purpose in its current form. What exactly should come in its place and how it should operate are questions that necessitate detailed analysis of the situation and the evidence of the problems caused. Much thought needs to be given to what is the right way forward. The relevant body should comprise those with most experience of the problems, and legal and constitutional experts adept at finding solutions. These problems will not go away. The proposed commission would provide a mechanism for addressing them. That is the purpose of this amendment. I hope that the Minister will support it.