Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

Yes, I will conclude, but it is remarkable that, earlier in the evening, I noted speeches going to more than 20 minutes. I have just come in at the wrong time, I suppose, but I will draw my remarks to a conclusion and make way for some others.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I support this proposal and do so conscious of the fact that, listening to some of the voices from Northern Ireland we have heard today, I am being asked to decide how I should approach the issue on the basis of sympathy for the way in which some of the citizens of Northern Ireland—those represented here—feel they have been dealt with by the British Government in the context of the whole negotiation relating to the EU, the GB and Brexit. I remind myself, though, that this is not a matter of sympathy. I spent a lot of my professional life having to decide cases where, if I could, I would have found the other way. But if the law required me to find a particular way, whether I liked it or not I was required to do so, so I did. What we are dealing with here is a treaty between the United Kingdom and the EU, not between the EU and Northern Ireland. I am sorry to say that, but the issue I am addressing is the treaty between our country and the EU.

Can I just get rid of Clause 1? It is a modern and unwelcome phenomenon. If you look at it, it says nothing. It is just a piece of PR, not legislation at all. We have too many Bills that include pieces of PR which do not take the legislation any further, and that is why I object to it. We should not have clauses in Bills that say, “This is a jolly good idea. This is what we’re going to do”, but more important are Clauses 2 and 3.

There have been criticisms made by the Advocate-General of the necessity argument that has been so thrown at him by, among others, the Constitution Committee. I know this has been said before, but I remind the House that necessity is not available, as it

“may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if”

the state in question has contributed to—not caused—“the situation of necessity”. Well, we have. We march into the negotiation and sign the agreement. We broadcast the agreement as having got Brexit done, for political reasons. We do not look at the consequences to, among other places, Northern Ireland—and we have not looked at it. There were voices in Northern Ireland who, to my memory, were saying, “This is a very dangerous step to be taking.” We either did not look at it or, worse, looked at it and thought “It doesn’t matter; we will get Brexit done.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, I shall comment briefly on the important remarks by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge. I referred earlier to the fact that the opinion of international lawyers is more complex and variegated than, say, the first 10 speakers in the House this afternoon appeared to know. One of the most important figures here is Professor Alan Boyle, emeritus professor of international law at Edinburgh, who has given evidence to committees of both Houses. At one level, his analysis is close to that of my noble and learned friend, Lord Judge. As I understand it, his view is that the Government ought to apply Article 16 at this moment.

We have been talking about this for years. I can remember, three and a half years ago, sitting down with the noble Lord, Lord Caine, looking at Article 16 and having an initial conversation about it. The Government have, at various times, been close to applying Article 16. They did not know then how fashionable it would become in this House to say that it is the way out. Had they known that that was going to happen, I am sure they would have done it, but civilised opinion said, “That is a terribly British thing, you can’t do it.” Amazingly, there has been a change of attitude now.

The point that Professor Boyle made, and which was not made by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge or anybody who has spoken for Article 16 this afternoon, is based on the idea that he accepted the underlying logic that the approach of the Bill to protect the Good Friday agreement was correct. There was a problem that the obvious features of the Good Friday agreement —strand 3 in particular, on the east-west relationship—are not being respected in the way the protocol was working.

It is pretty well documented, historically, how that situation arose in negotiating terms, but my point is this. My noble and learned friend, whose skills are so admirable in this matter, is just following a route that was followed for some hours today, which is to say, “Why do the Government not implement Article 16?” I more than half understand it. I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Caine, and I suspect that at certain times in the last few years he might have thought that might not be a bad idea either. That is not the point. At this moment, politically, we just cannot do it. We have a serious negotiation with the EU. I have said this before: you cannot walk in and suddenly say, “Oh, by the way, chaps, we are now throwing this on top of your heads”. The moment has gone.

Further, the advocacy offered in this House is weakened by the fact that, for the majority of those people who have suddenly discovered what a wonderful device it might be, it is not accompanied by what Professor Alan Boyle did, which is to say that the saving of the Good Friday agreement is critical. He defended it on the grounds that it might be a step we have to take, and he accepted that there is a conflict between the way the protocol is working and that original international agreement, which we also have a duty to uphold.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

I understand the argument, although I do not agree with it, that if you employ Article 16 in the middle of negotiations, they will be spoiled. However, if you employ this Bill in the middle of negotiations, will the negotiations not be torpedoed even more?

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, we know for a fact that that is not so, as the Irish Foreign Minister has told us—maybe I am the only person who reads the Irish Times—that this Bill will not torpedo these negotiations. I am certain the Irish Government and the EU do not like it, but we know for a fact that this Bill is not torpedoing negotiations.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

In that case, how do we know for a fact that Article 16 will torpedo them?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, if the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bew, is so powerful, why has he failed to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who started his remarks by saying that he has no faith in any of these talks resulting in any agreement for two or three years at least? If the noble Lord, Lord Bew, cannot even persuade the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, he may struggle to persuade others who may be a bit more sympathetic to his arguments.

The noble Lord, Lord Bew, knows that I like and respect him, but let me scotch this point about Article 16. The Government insisted that they were working in the joint committee when others on the Conservative Benches were saying they should dump that work and trigger Article 16. We on these Benches said, “Let the joint committee process do its work, because that is what the Government negotiated in the agreement.” Now we have heard in Committee in the Commons that talks have been exhausted—no more on the joint committee; instead, we are bringing unilateral legislation. So the noble Lord will forgive me for being a bit cynical about the Government’s position. On the one hand, they are saying that they are using the joint committee and therefore will not trigger Article 16, and on the other that they are no longer in the joint committee and need unilateral legislation. I am afraid it does not match. That is perhaps at the heart of why there is still uncertainty over the Government’s proposals.

At the outset, I say that I am a borderer and live in Scotland—I was going to say that therefore I sympathise, but that sounds deeply patronising. I understand many of the arguments, as I said earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, because I raised them in the debates. We opposed the Government because we could see the situation was not only going to be detrimental but would effectively remove rights. But that is not something that our Benches or this Bill can resolve.

I respect both noble Lords who spoke with passion about this, but I put it to them that they and Suella Braverman cannot both be right. The new Home Secretary is on the record saying that this Bill will make citizens in Northern Ireland “second-class citizens” —this Bill, not the protocol. She is arguing for this Bill to be amended. She said in her article in the Times that she had argued that while in government. She is now back in government, so I do not know what will happen with the Government’s position in this Bill on a dual regulatory system, but maybe the noble Lords can inform me later on.

If the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, is arguing so strongly that this Bill will not have Northern Ireland operating under two systems, it is incumbent on him to bring amendments to it to remove the dual regulatory system and Clause 11 when we get to it. I look forward to debating those amendments, because he surely cannot support measures in this Bill which would allow Ministers to enforce EU rules on traders within Northern Ireland.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, it may assist the House to know that we from these Benches can confirm our support for the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, and the amendment we have just heard.

If we are to scrutinise legislation properly in this House—which is our constitutional duty—there is also a duty on us to highlight areas where we are prevented from doing so because the Government have not presented sufficient information. There is clear precedent for this. We did so on the Professional Qualifications Bill, when the mood of the House was reflected to the Minister in very clear terms that accompanying information was devoid of sufficient information and that we would not progress discussion of it unless further information was provided. To his credit, the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, provided that. We stated in clear terms when the Government presented more than 350 government amendments to the Subsidy Control Bill shortly after they introduced it that they needed to bring further information. To his credit, the noble Lord, Lord True—now the Leader of the House—indicated that the Government would change their position and allow for more debate.

The Government have not sufficiently responded to the desires expressed both at Second Reading and by the committees of this House for further information. They have not responded properly to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report, which was excoriating in its condemnation of the use of regulation-making powers. As we have heard, the Government have failed to bring forward an impact assessment to show their own estimate of what impact policy options taken to present the Bill will have. The House will recall that I quoted from the original impact assessment of the protocol legislation, so it is fair to ask for the successor legislation, which will have equally profound implications, also to have impact assessment information. The Bill itself is extremely controversial, and it will have an impact on the business community, society, trade and the wider economy. Therefore, an impact assessment is vital.

This is not just a debating point. The Cabinet Office in its 2022 Guide to Making Legislation is very clear on what the requirements are on departments when they bring forward legislation. Section 13, on impact assessments, says:

“The Government has international obligations in free trade agreements to conduct impact assessments on regulation that has an impact on trade.”


Clearly, this Bill has such an impact. It goes on:

“A development, options or consultation stage impact assessment must be submitted alongside any bids for legislation, and a final proposal stage impact assessment must accompany requests for collective agreement to the policy in a Bill.”


The guide says clearly:

“The final impact assessment must be made available alongside bills published in draft for pre-legislative scrutiny or introduced to Parliament.”


When the Advocate-General for Scotland replied to me at Second Reading, he said that the Bill did not have an impact assessment but that

“full details of the new regime will be set out in regulations”. —[Official Report, 11/10/22; col. 767.]

That is just not good enough. We need to scrutinise these now.

On delegated powers, I remind the House that the Constitution Committee report concluded in paragraph 29:

“In examining clause 9, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee concluded: ‘[l]egislation has preceded policy development rather than vice versa’. We agree and recommend that clause 9 be removed from the Bill.”


We will discuss this later, but the essential point is that legislation should follow policy development, not vice versa. The Advocate-General said in response to the Second Reading debate:

“Since the Bill was introduced, we have consulted extensively with businesses and other key shareholders on the underlying details of the regime … There have been over 100 bespoke sessions with over 250 businesses, business representative organisations and regulators.”—[Official Report, 11/10/22; cols. 767-8.]


But on what? We do not have proposals in front of us. The Government’s own code of conduct for consultations states that they should be based on public questions. I have not seen a consultation document. I have not been able to find any draft regulations on which the Government have consulted. I have not been able to see any details of how the new regime might operate in practice, and we have not been presented with an assessment of what the responses are in order to shape views of costs. There is no footnote to the Cabinet Office document from this year that says, “None of this applies when a Minister so decides for political purposes”.

The Minister seemed confident that draft regulations will solve the problem, although he and the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, did not spell out in detail what they will be; we will hear that later in Committee. I remind the House that we have been furnished with draft orders before, when we asserted our desire to receive them. However, at Second Reading, the Advocate-General contradicted himself. In defence of the Government’s legal position, he said that

“the peril that has emerged was not inherent in the protocol’s provision”,

but, later, he said that

“the problem lies in the protocol and not in its application”.—[Official Report, 11/10/22; cols. 764-68.]

I suspect that a witness contradicting himself in court might have been pounced on by a certain advocate, but we in this House need to see the draft regulations if they are the fix for the root causes, as the Minister said.

Finally, we need formal reporting. We need detail on where the negotiations stand and what the current areas of consideration are. In Committee in the Commons, the then Paymaster-General said:

“I am not sure how much more could be done in terms of negotiation … Good faith negotiations to resolve the issues with the protocol have already been exhausted.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/7/22; cols. 383-84.]


I think the whole House was encouraged by the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, at the start of Second Reading, when he said that the talks have resumed and are of a positive nature. However, we need full updates with technical papers so that we can properly scrutinise this legislation and so carry out our constitutional duty.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise to the House for being unable to speak at Second Reading. I put my name down but realised that I could not be present at the end of the debate. If noble Lords will accept my apology, I assure them that I will not now make a Second Reading speech; I will simply summarise what I believe to be the case: that, as proposed legislation, this is a lamentable Bill.

If we want a careful, detailed analysis of the issues in and chronology of this case—I recommend that we do, if I may say so—the report from the House’s Library is absolutely magnificent. I personally thank those who prepared it; I recommend it to your Lordships. Everybody wants to have a say, so I am not going to add to the long list of things that are required, but can I suggest three more?

First, the Constitution Committee has just reported. The power of its report is not merely in that it repeats the concerns expressed by the delegated legislation committee on the Henry VIII aspects of the Bill; it directly addresses the Government’s contention that there is no problem with the lawfulness of the Bill. The Government have so far treated the report from the delegated legislation committee with scant respect. We have not had an answer to it. We should not proceed with this Bill until such time as there is an answer to the delegated legislation committee’s report and to the Constitution Committee’s report. These are our committees. They are cross-party, and the reports speak for the committees as a whole.

My second concern is that there is litigation afoot. A judicial review of the protocol has been taken and is due to be heard in the Supreme Court on 30 November. My question is this: has any attempt been made to expedite the hearings so that they can come on more quickly and we can have the Supreme Court’s answers to the issues raised instead of saying, “Well, we’re going to have to wait for that decision so we must act quickly because we’re having to wait too long”?

Thirdly, a number of infringement processes have been taken against us by the EU. It would helpful if we could see our responses to those. We need to know where we stand in the formal proceedings taken by the EU that we are in contravention of our treaty obligations. They are not a matter of privacy. I understand that negotiations must be conducted privately and there is confidentiality attached to them, but surely not for our Government’s response to the EU’s requests for infringement processes to be looked at.

In the end, I am very glad that this issue will not be taken to a Division today. That is sensible, particularly because all sides of the House need to understand what the problems are with the Bill and why it is, in the word which I used at the time of Second Reading, which I did not take part in, a lamentable Bill.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, the effect of these amendments, whether one agrees with their precise wording, is to give the new Administration time to pause, to reflect, and to consider the best way of dealing with the issues that arise from the protocol. The new Administration need that time. There is no doubt that the way that the protocol is being implemented causes considerable practical difficulties for Northern Ireland, particularly for trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. These difficulties, which would be exacerbated if the protocol were to be implemented in full, are real. A solution to them must be found.

There is agreement across the House that the best solution could be an agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union. We are told that discussions are taking place. I hope that the new Administration will give fresh impetus to those discussions, and that it will not take what might be described as a theological approach to those negotiations. It appears to be the position of His Majesty’s Government that changes to the text of the protocol are essential. However, it may be that a solution to the practical problems which exist can be provided by other means. The European Union has a long history of creative interpretation of the texts of agreements, which has often stood it in good stead in arriving at practical solutions in one field or another—and it should be encouraged to do so here.

We all hope that those negotiations succeed, but we must face up to the possibility that they may not succeed. If that turns out to be the case, I hope that the Government will look again at the possibility of dealing with the practical difficulties by invoking Article 16 of the protocol rather than through this Bill.

I think that my noble friends on the Front Bench will recognise on reflection that the explanations that they gave at Second Reading for not proceeding by Article 16 were—how can I put it?—rather less than convincing. Presumably it was precisely to deal with difficulties of this kind that Article 16 was inserted into the protocol. It is a perfectly legal route if the preconditions in the article can be satisfied. If they cannot be, there is certainly no justification for this Bill.

I do not need, or propose, to repeat the arguments against the application of the doctrine of necessity in these circumstances, which I and others advanced at Second Reading. I urge the Government to think again. I hope these amendments will prove to be unnecessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords—oh, I give way to the noble and learned Lord.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

Thank you very much. Just so that we are not met with the argument that we never show legal advice as it is confidential—that there is no obligation to show it and we never do—and bearing in mind that I support the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in arguing that Clauses 2 and 3 should not stand part of the Bill, I have some simple questions.

First, do the Government agree that the provisions of the Good Friday agreement are placed at the very front of the protocol? If the worries about the Good Friday agreement are the problem, then what is the answer to the protocol affirming that need to protect it? Secondly—this is not about legal advice—have the Government considered, and if so in what way, using Article 16 of the Northern Ireland protocol itself? I spell it all out: nothing to do with international law, just within the realms of the actual protocol. If not, why not? Thirdly, what is the necessity for Clause 13 removing the Court of Justice from the European Union’s oversight role in the determination of disputes over the withdrawal agreement? That does not involve giving legal advice; it involves informing the House. Finally, and I am sorry to ask this of an individual Minister because it is a matter for every Minister, have Ministers given thought to the possibility that they have contravened their obligations under the Ministerial Code to comply with the law?

I ask those four questions on the basis of what is contained in the Constitution Committee’s report. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has raised them already, but can we just have specific answers to those questions, because without them Clauses 2 and 3 simply cannot stand?

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I thought my days of trying to beat the gun had left me behind a long time ago. I apologise.

I wish to speak in support of Amendment 3 and am glad to see that the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, is back in his place. I have a recollection, and no doubt he will correct me if I am wrong, that on one previous occasion when this issue was raised, he expressed some sympathy for the idea that the legal advice should be made available. We have heard already in these proceedings that there is not a lawyer in the House who does not think that the Government are acting illegally and that, I suppose, is a pretty unusual state of affairs.

We have also seen that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee observed at paragraph 4 of its report:

“The Bill represents as stark a transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive as we have seen throughout the Brexit process. The Bill is unprecedented in its cavalier treatment of Parliament, the EU and the Government’s international obligations.”


Given that the chorus of legal responses in the House is against the Government, perhaps the most notable being that of the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, and given the extreme criticism of the Government contained in paragraph 4, I respectfully suggest that the convention that legal advice is not made public should be set aside on this occasion. It is a convention; it is not a rule of law. If I may put it so, this is a case of such novelty and importance that it justifies the setting aside of the convention.

I also understood my noble friend Lady Ludford to be raising some questions about the issue of necessity. The Advocate-General will recall that in the course of his long response at Second Reading, he referred to the case of Slovakia against Hungary. I took the opportunity to read that case, and what we discover is that it is not in point at all. It was a case where both states were in breach of legal obligations and the international court called on them both to carry out their relevant treaty obligations. That is nothing to do with the issues which we have before us. But the noble and learned Lord was not satisfied with Slovakia; he went to Canada in 1995. He prayed in aid decisions taken then by the Canadian Government in relation to the Grand Banks and their overfishing, but there was no question of a treaty on that occasion.

If these two cases are offered as support for the notion that this case is one where necessity is justified, I would respectfully suggest that they do not support that thesis. The Government will have to do something rather more if they are to establish any question that necessity arises in this matter.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I should have opened those other amendments, and it is an error on my part that I did not. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, because he has done a bit of the work that I should have done.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

If the noble and learned Lord decides to open them, which I would welcome, I would like to respond generally. So far, this debate has rushed along, and we were rather waiting for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to tell us why he strongly supported all these amendments, and then we will answer them.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The reason I did not tell noble Lords why I strongly supported all these amendments was because I made a mistake and did not realise that they were in the same group until the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, mentioned it. I apologise to the Committee for that error.

May I just go through them? I have done Amendment 268, which concerns Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act. The next is Amendment 286, which proposes to insert a new clause into the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and would exclude the admission in evidence, whether by the prosecution or the defence, of any sexual behaviour of the complainant with a third party, for the purpose of showing consent or lack of consent, while leaving evidence of sexual behaviour with a third party admissible if it is relevant to any other issue in the case.

In addition, it sets out a further requirement that, where such evidence is sought to be introduced in relation to an issue other than consent, that material must be more probative than prejudicial, and it sets out the considerations the judge must have regard to in considering that extra requirement. The purpose of this amendment is to give the clearest possible signal that evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant with a third party—that is, not the defendant—should be regarded as completely inadmissible on the issue of consent. This is important because it is intended to mark a change from the past, where all too often such evidence is admissible in circumstances where it is of very limited probative value, and the ability of that evidence to be admitted makes people—complainants—incredibly wary of coming forward and making complaints. This is the legislature giving a clear signal that it wants a change in relation to that. That is why it is there.

--- Later in debate ---

I apologise for not opening these issues before. They are very important and I hope I have assisted the Committee.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I once tried a case where the most compelling evidence was given by a black woman who alleged that a white dentist had raped her. His case was that, as she sat in the dentist’s chair, she undid his fly and started sucking his penis. Her answer to the question put to her was, “I would never do that with a white man”, and it was compelling. If there had been evidence that in fact she had, that very compelling piece of evidence would have lost some of its compulsion. We have to be very careful not to send messages through legislation—messages we all share—because that is not the point of legislation.

I should add that there are plenty of times when evidence is inadmissible in law which may be probative, but there are, as far as I am aware—I cannot think of any; perhaps I will be corrected if I am wrong—few times where evidence which may assist the defendant is deemed inadmissible. That is an important step.

My other intervention is that, deep down in all this, there is a rather alarming—strange, really—new idea, which is that the Secretary of State should involve himself or herself in some of these important decisions. Let us look at the arrival of a friend, or an advocate’s friend—it does not matter what we call it; I personally wonder why that is necessary, when the prosecutor is supposed to be there as a minister of justice. I am looking at paragraph (e) of proposed new Clause 43A which would be inserted by Amendment 289. Why on earth should the Secretary of State be making regulations setting out procedure relating to hearings or appeals under this section? There is a perfectly good Criminal Procedure Rule Committee which produces Criminal Procedure Rules and is referred to in paragraph (b). With great respect, this has nothing whatever to do with the Executive. This is about the way cases are being conducted in court. Therefore, if there are going to be regulations, they should be produced either by primary legislation here or by the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee addressing the issues.

On Amendment 291, I am even more alarmed. Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause gives the Secretary of State the power to decide which judges may hear which cases. We do not allow that. It is an essential division that there is an Executive and that cases are tried by judges; the Executive have no say whatever in which judge will try which case. It would be very strange: “I think I would like Mr Justice So-and-so, or Mrs Justice So-and-so, to try this case”. It is unheard of.

More importantly in relation to the judiciary and to the whole of Amendment 291, I can confirm as a matter of certainty—I suspect this has been true since the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was Lord Chief Justice—that judges are not allowed to try cases involving rape or serious sexual offences unless they have attended Judicial College training and continue to be refreshed in the various ways in which the law, the principles, the understandings and insights have been developing. As I say, though, my real concern is that if this is going to be statute, then for heaven’s sake, it should not be in the hands of the Secretary of State.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Judge Excerpts

Thursday 13th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, the gracious Speech records the Government’s intention to strengthen the constitution. Well, hurray—we all agree. But we all agree provided we remember that the whole point of any constitution is to establish and maintain the rules which govern the exercise of political power. The gracious Speech goes on to record the Government’s intention to

“restore the balance of power between the executive, legislature and the courts.”

Hurray, we all agree, provided we remember that, in a democratic society, the Executive should be subject to control by the legislature and governed by the nation’s laws, made in the place where they should be made.

So it is all fine: we are all agreed that the gracious Speech catches all the problems that we have—on this issue, at any rate—and we can go home. I am sorry, but I rather regret that I cannot avoid the suspicion that the Government’s real objective is to strengthen the control of the Executive over the constitution and rebalance the constitution yet more favourably for the Executive. When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, talked about “tried and tested”, my suspicions were confirmed.

As the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, has just said, the Executive is already too powerful. Today, the most alarming imbalance in our constitution is between the Executive and the legislature. In April 1780, the Commons passed a resolution deploring the fact that

“the influence of the Crown had increased, was increasing and ought to be diminished.”

In 2021, take out the word “Crown”, put in the word “Executive” and that is what we have.

Demosthenes himself could not have persuaded everybody to change our constitutional arrangements and wake up to the reality in only five minutes, so I shall just identify a couple of specific issues. In doing so, I want to go way back before Henry VIII to the medieval concept of the royal prerogative.

I should like to begin with the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I understood the arguments in favour of that legislation, but the harsh reality of political life is that it did not work, as the past five years has demonstrated. Therefore, the Government propose that we go back to something “tried and tested”: the Dissolution process should be restored to more or less the way it was before the Act was passed, and should be—good Lord—a Prime Ministerial decision. In constitutional theory, it is open to argument that that particular prerogative might be open to the monarch of the day actually saying no to the Prime Minister, but that is bunkum. The monarch cannot possibly tell the Prime Minister that she will not grant him a Dissolution if he wants it. It would be catastrophic for the monarchy and, indeed, the constitution. Anyway, the Crown should not be there to provide protection against the misuse of executive power.

So the answer is simple, is it not? The Dissolution process should be in the hands of the body whose dissolution is being proposed. In our system, the Government of the day would probably win, but in a balanced constitution they should not both conceive the proposal and have exclusive control over the outcome and, in effect, dismiss the legislature, including the part of it that has been elected in a democratic mandate.

On Prorogation, the protests against the decision of the Supreme Court were voluminous, as were the protests against the issue even being considered by the Supreme Court. Would noble Lords believe it: as a former judge, I understand the protests? I understand Article 9, which is an imperative part of our constitution. What the protests tended to overlook was that the Prime Minister was proposing to make an executive decision that Parliament should be prorogued for five weeks in the very middle of the Brexit crisis. Parliament was, in effect, being inconveniently troublesome. So Prorogation would happen. It was Charles I who kept proroguing difficult Parliaments and look what happened to him.

I simply recall that the argument against the courts considering the issue would have been far more persuasive if Prorogation were a decision by Parliament or even the House of Commons. There must be curbs on such executive power. Restoring the prerogative and removing the courts altogether from the process simply hands power to the Prime Minister of the day unilaterally to shut down Parliament and close down our democratic process or, at any rate, put it on hold—without Parliament even being there to question, let alone reject, it. What are we doing with unconstrained powers these days?

Our constitutional arrangements should not be based on medieval concepts such as the royal prerogative. I can see the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, wearing a wimple; I can see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, putting on a tabard; but how many of your Lordships would like to have your escutcheon marked? Do noble Lords know what their escutcheon is? I do not know what mine is, but it is a medieval concept. We really must get rid of ideas such as the wimple, the tabard and the escutcheon from our constitutional arrangements.

I am afraid that my five minutes are up. I wish that I could have gone on for longer.

Rule of Law

Lord Judge Excerpts

Thursday 10th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con) [V]]

My Lords, first of all, the Minister presenting this Bill has given a certificate of compatibility pursuant to the Human Rights Act; that has been done.

As regards the further issues raised, it will be for Parliament to determine whether, at the end of the day, it decides to pass this legislation. That is a matter for Parliament, and the Ministers have presented the Bill to Parliament for those purposes.

[Lord Judge (CB) [V]]

My Lords, given that, by the Executive’s own assertion, they propose to break the law in a specific and limited way, are they to be exempted from the basic principle that the rule of law, which includes adherence to international treaty obligations, binds all of us? If so, where will this violation of constitutional principle end?

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con) [V]]

As I previously indicated, my Lords, there are exceptional circumstances that arise, from time to time, when we find ourselves with a tension between our domestic legal regime and our obligations at the level of international law. There are also occasions when we find some conflict between different international law obligations. We adhere to the rule of law, but we understand the need to try to resolve tensions that may emerge if, at the end of the day, we do not have a post-transition agreement and determinations from the Joint Committee.

Sentencing Bill [HL]

Lord Judge Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 25th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB) [V]]

My Lords, today I feel the beginning of the relief of the Victorian poet who reminded us:

“That even the weariest river

Winds somewhere safe to sea.”

For many years now—certainly since the start of the millennium—criminal justice has from time to time provoked periods of political and consequently legislative frenzy. Indeed, we can shortly anticipate a new manifestation, telegraphed for us in the Conservative Party election manifesto. But this is an apolitical Bill that has nothing to do with party politics and simply addresses the chaos created by endless legislation, both primary and secondary, that has directly or indirectly impacted on the sentencing decision.

It will not make the sentencing decision for the judge or magistrate any easier, but what it does—and we are indebted to the brilliant imagination of Professor Ormerod and his team at the Law Commission and to the parliamentary counsel, who identified pinch points—is to enable the court to get exceptionally convoluted technicalities right. It does so by clean-sweeping the technicalities into a code.

Strikingly, the Bill ensures that no one will be at risk of being sentenced to a heavier penalty than could have been imposed at the date of the commission of the offence; this is obviously fundamental. Retrospectivity is prevented. Equally strikingly, the code is drafted in such a way that any future legislation relating to sentencing and procedure can be pitted into the code. This is a living document, capable of flexible amendment, so a gauntlet is thrown down to us parliamentarians to make sure we adopt it.

Any judge trying criminal cases will appreciate how typical this single example from my own experience is. The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment 12 years ago. The issue for him is: how long? When will I be out? Naturally, he asked his lawyers how long it would be. When he arrived in prison, calculations were made on the basis of the then legislation and he was told that his release date would be such and such. That is told to every prisoner on arrival, because it matters to him and the prison authorities, so he knew. As his release date approached, some bright individual within the prison or the Home Office wondered whether that release date was right. It was checked by the prison authorities, the Home Office and eventually a judge; it came to the Court of Appeal. From among the various options, we made a decision. We decided that he had been kept in custody too long, wrongly imprisoned.

I am sure your Lordships will forgive me if I quote what I said then. I do so because I would not change a word of it now. I said that

“elementary principles of justice have come … to be buried in the legislative morass. … It is outrageous that so much intellectual effort, as well as public time and resources, have had to be expended … to discover a route … to what should be … the simplest and most certain of questions”.

This Bill will clear up that morass.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

During the rehearsal for this afternoon, I was asked to say my piece, and I used two words. I said, “Henry VIII”. Just in case it was not apparent to anybody who heard me say that,I was trying to convey, as I did on 17 March, when the rather claustrophobic shades of the pandemic were closing in on us, that the Bill unnecessarily invests excessive power in the Executive and does so by secondary—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

My Lords, the Committee is having some problem in hearing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I wonder whether his connection is stable.

[Lord Judge]

Shall I start again?

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

Perhaps start again, or perhaps go at least two sentences back.

[Lord Judge]

I will try again. On Henry VIII, I was trying to convey that the Bill unnecessarily invests excessive powers—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

Lord Judge, I am afraid that there is a problem with your connection. I suggest that we move to the next speaker and hope to come back to the noble and learned Lord at the end of the list, by which I hope his connection will be better. If that is acceptable, I ask the broadcasters to please unmute the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

: My Lords, I am hoping to call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, in a second, but, before doing so, I should say that after the noble and learned Lord I intend to call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whose contribution we were not able to hear earlier. I understand that his connection is now properly established. I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon. Is he with us? I think we must assume that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, will not be joining us at this time. Is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, available?

[Lord Judge]

Can you hear me?

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

I can certainly hear you, Lord Judge.

[Lord Judge]

Good. Do you mind if I ask whether you heard anything that I said when I started last time?

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

In the interest of making sure that everybody hears everything that the noble and learned Lord has to say, perhaps I may suggest that he starts again from the top. I think that would be preferable to trying to start in the middle.

[Lord Judge]

I thank the Deputy Chairman very much. I apologise to those who have already heard me say this but, when I was tested at the rehearsal to make sure that my machine was working and I was well plugged in, my only response was “Henry VIII”. It was a wonderfully short speech. Effectively, it said what I wanted to say. However, just in case anybody does not know what I meant, I was intending to convey my view of the Bill, as I did on 17 March at Second Reading, when the awful, claustrophobic shades of the pandemic were closing in on us. Having listened to the debate and read the report of the Constitution Committee, I summarised my view of the Bill by saying that it unnecessarily vests excessive power in the Executive by means of secondary, not primary, legislation. It is a very simple principle and it is wrong. At the time, I submitted to the House in what I hope was my characteristic way—understated—that it was not exactly regulation-light.

The result of reading the report and listening to today’s debate—I do not wish to add to the many wonderful contributions that have been made—is that I can be less circumspect this time: this Bill is now heavy. It is overweight with regulation.

Why can we not be realistic about what the affirmative process actually does? It is not a means of controlling the Government. When, in 2015, a go was had at trying to stop a Conservative Government using Labour Government legislation to achieve £4.5 billion-worth of change to fiscal issues, it was apparently regarded as a constitutional outrage. That is us. As far as the Commons is concerned, unless something has happened very recently, it is 1979 since it rejected an affirmative resolution. That suggests that if we are honest with ourselves, the affirmative resolution process, even the super-affirmative, is not nearly as good as every Government of any colour always says it is supposed to be.

The fact of the matter, although I cannot identify a particular Henry VIII clause here save and except the usual ones about amending and getting rid of primary legislation, is that, from his underworld, Henry VIII has hacked into departmental computers. Alternatively, he has been inserted—resurrected and put into departmental computers. We must be very careful about attaching so much weight to the use of secondary legislation that might affect individuals’, companies’ and organisations’ rights. That is really all I want to say at this stage. I will say something about the regulations relating to the creation of criminal offences, but I support the concerns that have been expressed all round. Thank you very much for helping me to get that through, Deputy Chairman.

Vagrancy Act 1824

Lord Judge Excerpts

Thursday 23rd April 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for his further question. The review, which was led largely by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, has essentially been completed. However, in light of the work being done in respect of Covid, it has not yet been reviewed by Ministers, although we will seek to bring it forward as soon as possible. I would acknowledge that the language of the 1824 Act is archaic, albeit that the meaning is clear. I should reiterate that we have no desire to criminalise those who are simply sleeping rough, but the provisions of the Act also apply in respect of, for example, begging and persistent begging. We have consulted with all the interested parties, including local authorities and the police, in order to determine a way forward.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

If Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act, which was enacted after repeated harvest failures created an army of the dispossessed, were presented to us today, beyond the archaic language to which the noble Lord, Lord Young, has already referred, we should reject it as being vague and uncertain, and arguably tarnished with an improper reverse burden of proof. If we would not enact it, why should it remain on the statute book for a minute longer?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I do not accept that the essentials of the provisions of Section 4 would not be worthy of enactment today. The provisions are of assistance to local authorities and indeed to the police. I understand that, quite often, the police are able to suggest the possibility of prosecution under Section 4 as a means to persuade those who are homeless and those who are begging to seek assistance either from drug and alcohol hubs or by seeking to claim benefits. It therefore remains of use in the view of some authorities.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Lord Judge Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 17th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, has had the courtesy to show me a draft of what he is going to say. In view of the fact that he will say everything that I would have thought of saying, and rather a lot more—and will do it rather better—I shall be brief. But I would like to say before he speaks that I agree with him. In particular, I agree that this is sensible legislation. We need to have these arrangements. But I have a particular reservation about vesting power in a Minister, using secondary legislation apparently to change the entire law of arbitration as it works in this country. That needs to be examined, and the noble and learned Lord will no doubt develop the point.

The reason I am speaking is of course because we are dealing with secondary legislation, and this is yet another example of proposed legislation that is not exactly regulation-lite—I spell that “lite” because I want to show your Lordships that I have even seen Diet Coke. This is not diet regulation. We have one clause, then a second clause which is simply a regulation-making power, then we have 66 pages, perhaps more—yes, we come to page 68—and then we find the mother and father of Schedule 6, which is more regulation-making powers. Dare I ask the Minister a question? It has been a long day, and he has had to listen to a lot of speeches. Is Schedule 6 tucked away because it is shy of showing its face? It could just as easily have been part of a major structure of the Bill, not a schedule. But that is a minor detail.

Schedule 2 is not so bad. It is certainly better than Schedule 6. As the Minister said in opening, it attracts, or would attract, the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. However, as noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, just explained, the Constitution Committee took a view that that did not provide all the answers to everything. Therefore, we have a measure of parliamentary control over Section 2 and the use of the regulations there, not none, which is therefore rather better.

I have simple questions about Schedule 2. What will the powers be used for? Why are they needed if the powers in Clause 2 are as clear as they are and are subject to the controls which the Minister suggested? I want to know what possible thought the Minister has in mind about why we need a Henry VIII clause. “Has it just come off the computer? Let’s stick a Henry VIII clause in.” Amending primary legislation is precisely what Henry VIII clauses are about. The House has heard me on numerous occasions on this topic. I will not entertain the few of your Lordships who are here tonight about it, but I would like the Minister to see whether he could help us with it. Beyond that, I have no further observations to make. We need to be careful about how we run our legislation through regulatory mechanisms.

Sentencing (Pre-consolidation Amendments) Bill [HL]

Lord Judge Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie)]

My Lords, I take the opportunity to pay tribute to the Law Commission and parliamentary counsel for their work on this Bill, not least for their continuous efforts to ensure that it accurately reflects recent changes in the law. I wish to record the Government’s thanks to the noble Lords who served on the Bill’s Special Public Bill Committee in the last Parliament under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I am sure that I speak for all members of the committee in thanking those who provided evidence on the Bill, but in particular Professor David Ormerod, who has done so much work in this field. We hope that the Bill marks the first step in cutting through the complexity of the law in this area, and I look forward to the imminent introduction of the sentencing code Bill.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

Perhaps I may say a brief word in acknowledging the debts of gratitude to which the Minister has referred. The Bill, when it is enacted, will vastly improve the administration of criminal justice. It is long overdue and thank goodness it is now nearly there.