Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Judd
Main Page: Lord Judd (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Judd's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 25 because it seems essential for us to have safeguards in place if we go down this road at all. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, spoke very convincingly on this matter. I am glad to support her on this and I do not suppose it will be the last time in my parliamentary career that I support her in her initiatives. While we are debating this group, I want to say how much I applaud Amendment 12 by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, and Amendment 19 by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. In the operation of our society and our legal systems, we need some clear-cut cornerstones about what is permissible and what is not. I like the forthright language that they use in their amendments because it cuts out all the grounds for rationalising and talking ourselves into situations where we should not be at all. The point is that vulnerable people of the kind described in the amendments, and children, should not be involved in this kind of activity.
We are signatories to the conventions on the rights of children, and we have reaffirmed on many occasions our commitment to them. Are we just sentimentalists or are we real? If we are real, and if we want to give muscle to our expressed sentiments in those directions, that becomes very applicable in this kind of activity. We are also signatories to, and have frequently expressed our adherence to, the European Convention on Human Rights. I would always go further in this context and say that what matters even more is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the reasons why it was put in place. Again, if we are serious and not just sentimentalists, it is in matters of this kind that adhering firmly to the principles set out in those conventions becomes so important.
All these matters become particularly poignant—it is interesting that we have not dwelt much on this—given what is happening on the other side of the Atlantic. All of us, particularly perhaps in this Chamber, operate in the context of a political family in which it is expected and assumed that certain rules of decency, honesty and integrity will apply. We cannot be certain that will always be the case. I have always felt this about legislation: what matters is not just the people who are in place at the time of the legislation is passed, but how firmly that legislation establishes principles that it would be difficult for anyone who comes afterwards to vary. For that reason, it is significant to look at events in the States and wonder, when we talk about the kind of society that we want to be, whether we are really taking seriously our obligations, duties and concern for children and young people who have perhaps been asked to undertake activity that is very much against so much that is established as the norm for behaviour that is required in our society, for all the reasons that we have discussed on many previous occasions on this legislation. If we take those responsibilities seriously, we need the firmness of Amendments 25 and 19.
I am sure that I must be among many Members on all sides of the House who are deeply fearful about the implications of what is happening on the other side of the Atlantic. At moments such as this, where we still have the context of our own society—thank God—we need to be explicitly clear about what is acceptable and what is not. I cannot say more strongly that it is not acceptable for children to be involved in activity of this kind. That is the point: it is not acceptable; it is not something we can rationalise our way out of by saying that there are exceptions in this particular case. There are not; it is a principle that children should not be involved in such activity. Similarly, when we think of what vulnerable people have been through mentally and physically and all the traumas of their life, it is not acceptable to involve them in any way in activities which may have serious implications for their stability and well-being and for their safety.
From these standpoints, I am very glad that we have this group of amendments before us. I again say that the noble Lords, Lord Young and Lord Cormack, have been exemplary in stating a principle on which the rest of our activity should be founded.
My Lords, as the speeches that we have been listening to in this debate have made so very clear, this surely is the most difficult part of the Bill and, as we search for a solution, for each of us making up our own minds this group presents a real challenge. The solutions range from an absolute bar—the “clear-cut cornerstones”, as the noble Lord, Lord Judd, has just described it—on granting authorisations to anyone under 18, in Amendment 12, and anyone under 16, in Amendment 19, to which the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Cormack, spoke so movingly, to the more nuanced and carefully worded procedures proposed in Amendments 23, which would require the prior approval by a judicial commissioner, and Amendments 24 and 26, which have no such requirement.
I entirely recognise the force of the principle that the child’s best interests are paramount, and I appreciate the attraction of a clear and simple absolute bar—a red line—by reference only to a person’s age. That is right when dealing with, for example, the age of criminal responsibility, but I am not so sure that it is right here, where we are being asked to balance the protection of the best interests of the child against the need to protect the public against serious crime, such as that perpetrated by county lines where children are, sadly, so much involved. Recognising that a child’s best interests are paramount does not entirely exclude the possibility of looking at all the circumstances and balancing the interests of the child against other interests, as judges have to do from time to time, but of course it has a crucial bearing on how that exercise is carried out.
Looked at from that point of view, I suggest that one can take account of the fact that children do not all have the same circumstances, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has said. Also, the facts and circumstances may differ widely as to nature of the case and the extent of any risk of physical and psychological harm to the particular child who may be involved—I was interested in the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, based on her own experience of the Scottish Bar. The fact is that we are not in possession of all the information that would guide those taking such decisions. I would therefore prefer to leave the door open for the use of children in strictly and most carefully limited circumstances, taking every possible care in full recognition of all the risks, rather than closing it firmly against their use in any case whatever. Had Amendment 12 been qualified in some way, by reference, for example, to “exceptional circumstances”, I would have found it easier to accept, but, of course, as soon as one adds such words, one has to explain what they mean. That is why I am drawn to Amendment 24, to which the noble Lord, Lord Young, has also put his name. It contains that qualification and then defines what such circumstances are. I pay tribute to the clarity with which it is expressed.
Then there is government Amendment 26. It seems to fall short of what is needed, not only because it lacks that qualification about exceptional circumstances but because it lacks the protection which Amendment 24 would give to vulnerable individuals and victims of modern slavery, whom we must also consider. I look forward to listening carefully to what the Minister has to say in support of her amendment, but, for the moment, my preference is for Amendment 24 and for supporting it if the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, presses it to a vote.
Lastly, I am grateful to the Minister for her letter of today’s date about territorial extent. As she may tell us later on, she informs us in it that the Scottish Government have confirmed that they will recommend to the Scottish Parliament that it should withhold its consent to the Bill. It was for the Scottish Government to take that decision and we must respect it. I am sure that the Minister is right, respecting the Sewel convention, to remove from the Bill the ability to authorise participation in criminal activity for devolved purposes in Scotland. It is not for us to question the decision of the Scottish Parliament and she is right to proceed in that way.
My Lords, I rise—as it were—to support Amendments 27, 28 and 29. These are important. We are dealing with very grave matters, as we have frequently emphasised in our discussions, and it is essential that they are in the hands of bodies and people who are part of organised, disciplined and accountable elements in our state. For that reason, these amendments are self-evidently necessary.
I also commend the amendment that deals with people in the armed services who can authorise. This should be limited to the police in those services. It is very important that those involved in the work should be part of that disciplined body. I am not happy with a situation in which we use Tom, Dick and Harry to do work on our behalf. That is not healthy in a democracy and it is not in the spirit of everything we are about. We need to make sure that professional people are doing this work who, we hope—I emphasise “hope”—understand that they are doing it in the cause of defending democracy, freedom, accountability, the rule of law and justice. I am glad to support these amendments.
My Lords, this group of amendments is of particular interest to me as, when we first looked at the Bill in Committee, I had great difficulty in understanding why the provisions of this clause extended to the Food Standards Agency and Environment Agency. I was fortunate to have a helpful briefing arranged by my noble friend the Minister. I also looked back to the evidence we took almost 10 years ago in the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee in the other place, when the “horsegate” incident arose—in which horsemeat was passed off as beef and other types of meat. Regrettably, this is a potentially multi-million-pound business, as is fly-tipping, which is the bane of public life in rural areas. As I see it, if this is organised crime perpetrated by criminal gangs, one of the only ways we can tackle it, provide evidence and bring successful prosecutions is by granting agencies the tools under this clause.
I requested case studies and I understand that this is early days and that the provisions obviously have not yet applied—perhaps my noble friend could confirm that. However, it is envisaged that the provisions under this clause would enable the Food Standards Agency to tackle the type of fraud that was experienced in the horsegate scandal and prevent it happening in the future—one hopes, at the earliest possible stage—and the Environment Agency to use the intelligence to bring a successful prosecution in incidents of fly-tipping and other forms of illegal waste disposal.
Against that background, I would like these two agencies to remain in the Bill. I presume that my noble friend will able to confirm in the absence of current case studies—which I understand to be the position—that Parliament will have the opportunity to review the arrangements through the annual IPC report. It would be helpful to have that understanding. If we were to delete the agencies entirely, as is the purpose of Amendment 27, or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, eloquently outlined, to prevent officers of these two agencies granting CCAs, we would be tying their hands in what is a seriously fast-moving crime.