European Court of Human Rights: Khodorkovsky Case

Lord Judd Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judd]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, on raising this important matter in this debate. We should put on record our appreciation of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Rights for the work that it does on this issue and the material results of its research, which are made available to us.

There are 13,600 people serving prison terms in Russia for what are described as economic crimes. The routine criminalisation of business disputes is all too symptomatic of the weak rule of law in Russia. Entrepreneurs are too often jailed on trumped-up charges by manipulative investigators and judges. Only 1% of cases in Russian courts result in acquittal. Indeed, the workings of a court in Russia have been described as “telephone justice”, with external pressure all too evidently exerted on judges to produce a particular verdict.

The noble Lord has spoken well about the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The oligarch has spent a decade in prison after two consecutive trials—the second said to be more legally questionable than the first—but just as he is due to be released next year there are sinister hints that a third case could be on the way. The heaviest hint came in the form of the release of a documentary from the once independent but now wholly tainted television channel NTV, alleging that the oligarch was behind the murder of the mayor of Nefteyugansk in 1998. Putin himself has alleged several times that Khodorkovsky has blood on his hands.

He is not alone, a point that the noble Lord made forcefully. As he reminded us, there was the case of Sergei Magnitsky and his posthumous conviction for tax fraud, having died in prison after terrible experiences at the hands of the authorities. William Browder was also convicted of tax fraud in absentia and sentenced to nine years. He plans to appeal. The Yaroslavl mayor, Yevgeny Urlashov, was also recently arrested in the middle of the night. The former member of the United Russia party was elected last year as the city’s mayor. In local elections this autumn, he was preparing to support candidates from a new party started by billionaire Brooklyn Nets owner Mikhail Prokhorov. He has been accused of taking bribes and a judge has ordered him behind bars until 2 September.

We have all been heartened to hear of the release, pending appeal, of Alexei Navalny after intervention by Putin. However, there is a good deal of room for suspicion that this may all be cat and mouse—that, in fact, he will stand in elections that will be fixed, he will be defeated and he will then be more severely treated in court than before. The objectives of the President will have been achieved.

All this is bad enough, but we also have to look at it in the context of other things that are happening in Russia at the same time. There is, of course, the terrible crackdown on NGOs, which are standing up for human rights and humanitarian issues. As of the end of June, at least 62 groups have received warnings or orders to register as foreign agents or have been taken to court by the authorities. Of seven groups already taken to court, five have lost administrative cases and have been ordered to pay fines and register. At least one has been closed. Another 15 organisations that received direct notices of violation from the prosecutor’s office may face administrative charges if they fail to register as foreign agents. Authorities have warned at least 38 groups to register as foreign agents if they receive foreign funding and plan to carry out what are described as political activities, which would be seen in this country as very legitimate lobbying, on the issues that concern them.

The treason law expands the legal definition of treason in ways that leaves broad room for officials to arbitrarily interpret and selectively apply it against individuals engaged in routine discussions with foreign counterparts or presenting human rights reports to international conferences. Russia’s public assembly law, adopted in 2012, dramatically increased the maximum penalty for violating rules regulating protests and introduced new restrictions on public protests. Russia’s constitutional court has ruled that several of the law’s provisions were unconstitutional and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has found that the amendments represent a step backward for the protection of freedom of assembly—and indeed urges Russia to repeal or revise key provisions. Libel, decriminalised at the end of the Medvedev presidency, has been recriminalised.

Some argue that these sad and disturbing trends in the administration of justice started with Putin’s re-election as president in 2012, in response to the protest movements in 2011. Personally, I do not accept this. It may have accelerated them, but there was far too much indefensible myopia in the West to what has been going on since the end of the 1990s. I was for some years rapporteur to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the conflict in Chechnya, with its inevitable consequences for Dagestan and Ingushetia. All I can say is that the numerous disappearances, the torture, the intimidation of witnesses, the home burnings, the indiscriminate bombardments and the extra judicial killings—not least of brave journalists and human rights activists such as Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova, who tried to speak the truth—were cruel and terrible and provided ample evidence of the ruthless distortion of so-called justice.

Attempts to pin down the Russians became frustrating in the extreme. We would repeatedly be told that an investigation would be initiated but seldom, if ever, did we hear of the completion of such an investigation, with those responsible brought to justice. There have been 200 European Court judgments against Russia with reference to the North Caucasus, the majority involving multiple violations of the European convention. The lamentable inadequacy of official investigations in too many of these cases has been on a scale that indicates a systemic and continuing failure. Recently, Putin has certainly been shoring up his political base by mobilising reactionaries, nationalists and xenophobes. He puts his public money where his purpose lies; the salaries of the riot police have been doubled.

In conclusion, to the cynics who say, “But what on earth can be done about all this?”, lots of things can be done. One is to make sure that far more frequently, far more vigorously and in many more cases what is happening is brought to public attention and a stand is made. The Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe must stop pussy-footing around and pursue Russia relentlessly in carrying out what has been ruled necessary by the European Court. It raises these issues, but it does not pursue them as vigorously as it should.