Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lord Janvrin and Lord Morris of Aberavon

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Janvrin (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I support the case for strengthening oversight as put forward in Amendments 46 and 73, and I add my voice to those questioning the case for prior judicial approval of criminal conduct authorisations.

I speak not as a lawyer or practitioner but as another former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, where we had plenty of evidence of the importance of covert human intelligence sources. I share the view that we need to get the balance right between, on the one hand, constructing a rigorous legal framework to support the activities of our intelligence and security agencies while, at the same time, still giving them the practical operational flexibility to carry out their difficult work effectively.

I have listened carefully to the strong arguments in favour of prior judicial authorisation. It is, as has been pointed out, what is required for other activities of the intelligence services and police. Should we not follow the practice of communications interception or search warrants? There are important differences. The person authorised to tap a phone or search a premises will be a public servant: an agent of the state. The person being given a criminal conduct authorisation may be a private citizen—possibly but not necessarily—from the margins of society, acting almost certainly from a complex set of motives and probably knowing that they are putting themselves in danger.

In the first case, authorisation seems to be essentially a judgment about compliance with the law. However, a criminal conduct authorisation requires, in addition, personal knowledge of the agent concerned and human relationships involved in complex circumstances. It is about making a judgment, possibly urgently, on human motivation, limitations and behaviour, and about operational context and risk. Therefore, on balance, I share the view that the handler or controller is better placed than a judicial commissioner to make that judgment call on what should and should not be authorised. Obviously, I am in no way against judicial authorisation in principle; it is about getting the best decision.

I would add a small point. For the handler to know that he or she is the authorising officer makes him or her more clearly accountable. It concentrates the mind to sign something off. As my noble friend Lord Anderson observed, it also concentrates the mind to know that your decision will be scrutinised immediately and rigorously. I therefore strongly share the view the present oversight arrangements should be significantly strengthened in the ways put forward in Amendments 46 and 73 to allow immediate scrutiny by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. My noble friend Lord Anderson and colleagues from the Cross Benches have spoken with much greater experience than me on the need for real-time oversight. I find the arguments persuasive. Indeed, there may be a case for giving judicial oversight powers more teeth—perhaps along the lines of Amendment 47 or something similar.

Finally, I said at the outset that we are looking to get the balance right between a robust legal framework and operational flexibility. Obviously, this applies across the Bill. I ask the Minister to consider whether, by strengthening significantly the oversight arrangements, she will mitigate some of our other concerns around, for example, immunity or the serious crimes threshold in this important Bill.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendment 14. I was sorry that I was unable to attend Second Reading. I was sitting on a sub-committee of the EU Select Committee and was therefore unable to welcome the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, and congratulate him on an impressive maiden speech. He gave the impression that he had been introducing Bills in your Lordships’ House all his life.

I welcome the Bill, which provides for authorising offers to be given express powers to authorise criminal conduct that would otherwise be illegal. They carry a heavy responsibility, hence the need for supervision. Given the history of direct government intervention in coal mining disputes many years ago, I look forward to debating amendments in the names of my noble friends dealing with trade unions. Powers given

“in the interests of the economic well-being”

of the state will need close scrutiny. I am proud that, in a small way, I was able to give a little legal advice to the south Wales miners during the miners’ strike—for the most part, pro bono—many years ago. During my time as a law officer for England and Wales, and separately as Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, although the Attorney-General has general oversight and appropriate clearance, I was not troubled on any issue arising from the Bill. As the House will know, law officers have general oversight and supervision of the offices of state concerning both the rule of law and other matters.

I wish to endorse and reinforce the points made by my noble friend Lord Rosser in his Second Reading speech about the need for judicial oversight prior—I emphasise “prior”—to the event. There is no argument that there should be supervision. The only issues are, first, who should supervise, and secondly, whether it should be post or prior the event. I believe that the arguments for proper prior supervision are fundamental. In our legal processes, we have judges available 24 hours a day. This particularly includes the long vacation— indeed, any time, any place, throughout the year. They can adjudicate from home if necessary; I am told that that is not unusual. Provided a judge is given the right information, a proper judgment can be given. The same applies down the line to the magistracy, which performs a very vital role. Before a warrant is issued, evidence in one form or another is given and judicial authority is given.

I was never involved as counsel on these procedures during my time as a criminal practitioner, but I can give a personal example of the availability of magistrates on family matters. My wife sat for 18 years in the London juvenile courts. Part of her duties involved the care of children who were, or might be, vulnerable. I recall many occasions when I had to leave the sitting room of our London house at the request of a welfare officer so that she could hear evidence, hear witnesses sworn in and adjudicate, pending the following morning when a proper courtroom could be convened. It was vital that there was availability. My point is that there has never been an issue with non-availability of a court sitting at any level. The Minister is not very persuasive in his brief comment in Column 1046. I need to be persuaded why you can have judicial intervention and a judicial decision in so many other fields but not in this one.

We are dealing with very serious matters. Authorising criminal conduct is important and a departure from the ordinary rules of law. If there is any problem about the security clearance of a particular judge, I would be surprised if that could not be achieved. If a High Court judge cannot be trusted, who can? It would not be beyond the administration of justice to have a panel of designated judges with experience in this field who adjudicate from time to time and can authorise the necessary activities.

This brings me back to the key question: who is to guard the guardians? This is not to denigrate the experience of the highly trained authorising officers, nor the retrospective—I emphasise “retrospective”—oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Prior judicial authority is the best safeguard to ensure that, where there is a departure from the rule of law in ordinary circumstances, there is proper supervision of the activities.