Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration

Lord Hutton of Furness Excerpts

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hutton of Furness (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall certainly be supporting the Motion in the name of my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition. We have heard some excellent speeches on all sides of the debate this evening, but I will add one or two thoughts of my own. I know it has often been said of these debates that everything has already been said but not everyone has said it, so I will take my ha’porth now and add a few thoughts on this extremely challenging moment for our country.

It is true that our country and our Parliament are more divided and polarised today than at any time in living memory. Our politics have never been as toxic. I am not sure we have faced a graver or more serious challenge to the future of our country and its prosperity in the last 50 years than we do today. In short, we are in a hell of a mess. We do not have to look very far for the reasons. The 2016 referendum was both a triumph of democracy and a colossal failure of democracy. It was a triumph of democracy in that it produced a huge participation rate and turnout. Hundreds of thousands or millions of people voted who do not normally vote, and that is an amazing thing. But I fear that it was also a serious failure in our democracy. Many people were seriously misled about Brexit, and the advocates of the UK remaining inside the European Union ran an entirely negative and inevitably doomed campaign.

So how can we bring ourselves back together? Can we do that? I think it is clear to all who have taken part in this debate and have watched the news and followed events in the last few months that we will not be coming back together as a country under the terms of the Prime Minister’s agreement. That is pretty clear. She has at least managed to unite Brexiteers and remainers in opposing it. Sadly, the agreement reflects many serious errors of judgment, negotiations and communications. It has inevitably led us to this low point in our history. Invoking Article 50 when we did, with no plan and very little planning, was one of those mistakes. Her speech to the Tory conference in 2016, her later Lancaster House speech and her red lines—which effectively prioritised the ending of free movement over every other objective—were catastrophic errors. There has been a complete failure—we have heard a repetition of that today—to understand the perspective of other member states of the European Union in this process. We have been living in cloud-cuckoo-land. These are huge errors for which, I am afraid to say, the Prime Minister cannot escape criticism. I believe she has pandered throughout to what the Chancellor of the Exchequer recently called the “extremists” in her party, and it is now far too late to stand up to them.

There could never be any such thing as frictionless trade if we were to leave the European Union and refuse to accept free movement and the jurisdiction of the European court. We chose to believe something else—that the European Union would eventually concede to everything we wanted if we simply refused to budge. This is the Davis-Johnson strategy, and it was pitifully inept. When this strategy failed, the inevitable compromises enshrined in this agreement were seen by the extremists as a betrayal. What a farce. A no-deal Brexit championed by the ardent Brexiteers would effectively involve a British Government reneging on their clear legal commitments under existing EU treaties and breaking the Good Friday agreement. This is absolutely unthinkable.

The Government’s fundamental problem is this: the Prime Minister, who we all wished well in these negotiations, is now trying to appeal very late in the day, at the last possible moment, to the centre ground—to people like me, who wanted to respect the outcome of the referendum but who want us to leave on the best possible terms. Sadly, her scorched-earth policies have destroyed that centre ground.

Now that we have all digested the terms of the Prime Minister’s agreement, at least 21 months of voiceless rule taking leading, at best, because of her red lines, to what can only probably be described as a bog-standard free trade agreement at some indeterminate time in the future, it just does not represent a good enough deal. We remain, sadly, as divided as ever. Exhortations for us to come together will not work because this deal is not good enough.

It is pretty clear to all of us, and I am sure we know this in our hearts, that the Prime Minister will have to put a different policy to the House of Commons if she seriously wants an agreement to leave the European Union to be accepted. There is no alternative in front of us, so I think the Article 50 process will have to be suspended. If she cannot get House of Commons agreement for a deal, I see no other option than a general election or a second referendum. That will not be straightforward. Ivan Rogers said quite rightly in his excellent speech at Liverpool University that there was nothing likely to be more toxic for British politics than a second referendum. He might be right that there would be nothing more toxic than a disorderly Brexit.

UK and EU Relations

Lord Hutton of Furness Excerpts

Tuesday 12th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hutton of Furness (Lab)]

My Lords, I bring the attention of your Lordships’ House to the interests I have declared in the register. I am chairman of the Nuclear Industry Association. It probably follows on from that that no one will be surprised to learn that I will confine my remarks largely to the decision which Ministers have made to take the United Kingdom out of membership of the European Atomic Energy Community. These follow the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley.

It is probably true to say that the decision to leave the Euratom treaty was one of the unintended consequences of the referendum. I do not recall a single supporter of the leave campaign banging their fists on the table and saying: “The UK must leave the Euratom treaty”. No one mentioned it, and for a perfectly good reason. The UK’s membership of this treaty has been the bedrock on which our nuclear industry has thrived and to which it owes its pre-eminent position today as one of the leading nuclear nations trading in goods and services, fissile and other material around the world. It has been essential for the growth of our nuclear industry. It is worth a little bit of context: the nuclear industry makes the same contribution to the UK economy as aerospace does, in terms of jobs, wealth creation and the taxes it pays to the Treasury. We should do all we can to protect and secure this strategic industry.

I welcome the publication of the Government’s position paper on exiting the Euratom treaty. It sets out six high-level principles and it is very difficult to pick an argument with any one of them because it is all common sense. No one in their right mind wants to see such an industry compromised or its trade around the world affected by a rash and badly implemented decision to leave this fundamentally important legal instrument. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, the principles are fine but there are still two fundamental problems at play. First, how are we going to achieve these principles in the most effective way? There is nothing in the position paper which gives an answer to that. Secondly, and more significantly, how are we going to do all the things which are necessary to do that in the 18 months that we have left before we leave the treaty?

It is worth reminding ourselves what we have got to do if the Government’s high-level principles are to be secured. We have got to agree a replacement voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority. It would be useful if the Minister could tell us when she envisages this being in place. The particular problem is that we are going to have to renegotiate a number of nuclear co-operation agreements with our nuclear partners: the Euratom community itself, China, the United States, Canada, Australia, South Korea and Kazakhstan. What progress has been made on these new bilateral agreements? As a lawyer, I always study the precedents. Looking at the precedent established in the United States, in particular, these nuclear co-operation agreements have the status of international treaties and have to be approved by the United States Congress. Any student of politics will tell you that there has never been a treaty like this agreed by Congress in 18 months. So what do we do?

We clearly also need to clarify the validation of the UK’s current bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements with Japan and other states. Has that process begun yet? The Government must also set out the process for the movement of nuclear materials—goods, people, information and services—to be agreed, when we leave the treaty, with the Euratom Supply Agency. Have we made any headway with that? We have to agree also a new funding arrangement for the UK’s involvement in future fusion research and under the wider European Union nuclear R&D programme—

[Lord Robathan]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord who speaks with real authority on this. I understand the Swiss are associate members of Euratom. Would that be one way forward?

[Lord Hutton of Furness]

It certainly could be one way forward, but it has been ruled out by Ministers to date. It might well be that the best outcome is some form of associate membership. No one in this House, or outside this House, wants to see any harm done to the nuclear industry by leaving the Euratom treaty. But, if we are going to avoid that outcome, Ministers will have to show considerably more pragmatism than they have done to date in making sure harm is not caused to the industry in the way that the Article 50 negotiations are handled. The most obvious need of all, given the difficulties in negotiating these agreements, is that we do not actually leave the Euratom treaty until all the nuclear co-operation agreements are in place and are legally robust.

Trade in nuclear goods and services is different to trade in goods elsewhere. Unless there is a clear, robust legal framework for the movement of goods and services in nuclear materials, in most jurisdictions that we trade with, that trade becomes instantly illegal. It is a cliff edge which is much more apparent and real than the consequences and dangers of exiting the European Union without an agreement on future trade arrangements under Article 50. This is the ultimate cliff edge. If there is no agreement with other nuclear states within the 18-month period we have left, we are in a serious position. I urge the Minister and her colleagues in the Government not only to confirm tonight that they are willing to be pragmatic and look at extending the transitional periods of membership of the Euratom treaty, but to keep this House more fully updated on the progress of these important negotiations.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Baroness Anelay of St Johns) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. We have certainly heard, I will not say a full range of views, but pretty much everything that has been said in the past year has been said in a different way today—and with verve, because this House deeply cares about these matters. So do I, and so do the Government. That is why I said at the beginning that I wanted this to be part of the parliamentary engagement that builds up so that we have feedback.

I was discussing that this morning with the noble Baroness the Leader of the Opposition, as she was kind enough to mention in her opening speech. I felt that it was not just a case of having debate after debate—although we will have them. Other Members throughout the House can promise that we will, because they will put down those matters for debate. I said that I really did want to hear from Peers. That can be done in several different ways, not just in the more structured ways such as debates, Questions for Short Debate or Statements, but I want to find a way that will enable all noble Lords to feel that they have had the opportunity to participate—and I hope that the sturdy nearly 50 who have done so today will continue to stay with it throughout. In fact, I think that they will promise that they will. Thank goodness, because that is what we intend to do with the negotiations.

That is the whole point about this process: it is a negotiation. The frustration that I can feel in the House about the fact that we cannot be more open about the detail is a frustration that we too feel. We would like to be more open too, but the very nature of negotiations, and the confidentiality, works for the participants on both sides—both for the European Commission and for us.

Whatever has been painted in the press about hostility, and whatever comments have been made about people’s character, there has been a really good relationship between the negotiators on both sides. I was grateful for the earlier reference to the fact that Michel Barnier has paid tribute to the professionalism of the UK negotiators, and I pay tribute to the professionalism of the EU negotiators. We are very fortunate in how they do their work, often against a background of sniping from the press. I shall not comment on other criticism, but there certainly has been sniping from the press, and it continues.

I must say how pleased I was to hear from my noble friend Lord Bridges today. I was much happier to hear from him when he was sitting beside me, but if I cannot have that, having him sitting behind me will just have to do for the moment. I wish him continued success in his new life—I shall not say “next life”, because that sounds as if I am expecting him to pop off.

Critically, this is a serious matter of parliamentary involvement. May I pick one specific item up immediately? The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said that she thought there had been a change in our view of our commitment to a meaningful vote. That has not changed. “Expect and intend” has always been the position that we have taken, and the reason for that is a practical one. I asked, when I went to the department, why those words were used. I am afraid the reason is straightforward, if one thinks about it. We do not dictate the date on which the European Parliament holds its vote. If it suddenly decided to do that while this House was in recess, we would have to seek the advice of the House. We do not recall Parliament in such circumstances. So clearly, we expect and intend. We are talking about next autumn, and we do not know when the European Parliament will have its vote. We want to have our vote before it does. That is exactly what we set out, and I do not think I can be clearer than that. “Expect and intend” means that we are maintaining our commitment to Parliament.

Our commitment to Parliament is certainly to assist with scrutiny wherever we possibly can. I was worried that the noble Lord, Lord Newby—I nearly said “my noble friend” again; I am getting back into bad habits, or good ones, perhaps—somehow thought that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State had given a commitment to the Select Committee to appear after every round. He did not. He gave a commitment to work out the balance of the way in which that reporting could take place. We have a very strong sense of our responsibility, which he has stated repeatedly in his letters to chairs of committees, and we want to carry it out. However, there are committees in both Houses, and he has just accepted the invitation to appear before the newly formed Brexit committee in the Commons. We will continue to service committees as best we can. The way in which my department is set up to deliver the negotiations means that the officials who support Ministers who appear in front of committees are also the negotiators. Therefore, when they are doing their absolutely valuable work here to support parliamentary scrutiny, it necessarily has an impact on negotiations. So it is balancing that while making sure that we do not let Parliament down, because that is not the way forward.

Nor shall we let down the devolved Administrations, and we do not intend to do so. There has been engagement throughout. There can always be more—of course, there can. It is not a case, of course, that the devolved Administrations are part of the negotiations, because they do not have that competence in the constitutional sense, but we have engagement and that will continue. As I mentioned last week in this House, very shortly there will be another meeting of the specialised JMC that it just invites the devolved Administrations to talk about the European negotiations. There is the other committee, which I have the honour to chair, that looks at European issues more broadly.

Throughout all of this, I understand some of the frustrations of noble Lords. I will continue to look for ways of finding where we can give more information in a more timely way. By the way, the publication date is the date on the papers. They are published to assist with the negotiations. It is not done just to make life difficult for this House when it is about to have a debate. It is because it has been timed to coincide with some of the negotiations that are going ahead.

Throughout there has been a determination from both the UK and the Commission that we should come to an agreement that is good for both of us. There is not hostility on that, and there is certainly not foot-dragging.

I was asked specifically whether the negotiating dates had been changed. Indeed, they have, but it is a joint agreement between the UK and the European Commission to start the fourth round on 25 September. The reason why is to give time for the negotiators to have more flexibility to make progress in the September round, which was highlighted in the August round. On some of the issues discussed there, we are close to reaching legal text status. I hope at some stage to be able to set that out, but clearly that would be an advance. It may not be on some of the high profile issues, but it is certainly on issues that are core to all the discussions we have had. It is right that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has called for some flexibility in making sure that, if we need to have more dates to continue negotiating, we should find a way of doing that. We stand ready to work with the Commission to find more dates to do so.

Looking at some of the issues that were raised, clearly Northern Ireland was very much first on the list for so many people. The noble Lord, Lord Jay, rightly asked, “What next?”. If I can assist him in some small part—I wish I could tell him that everything has been resolved, but it is a case of getting it right throughout—what I can say is that there is a high degree of convergence on the key issues of the common travel area and safeguarding the Good Friday agreement, and we are working on how the text should look.

What has been agreed on the Good Friday/Belfast agreement is that we will carry out further joint technical work. The noble Lord will realise the implications of that, and it means that we will take steps forward. There was agreement on both sides on the benefit of further technical discussion on the GFA—protecting citizenship rights enshrined in the GFA and the permanent birth right of the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as British, Irish, or both. We both agree that that should continue. So, again, these are technical steps. When I asked where we were not converging, the answer was none. We are converging on all the major issues, so that is the, “What next?”.

There were three particularly important speeches today—those of the noble Lords, Lord Hutton and Lord Teverson, and my noble friend Lady Bloomfield—in that they addressed the issues of Euratom in a very practical way. The question was put again: why are we leaving Euratom when clearly we all agree that its work is essential and we need to be part of it? Again, I repeat what my noble friend Lord Bridges and I have said. We are leaving because Euratom and the EU share a common institutional framework, including the European Court of Justice, a role for the Commission and decision-making in the Council, which makes them uniquely legally joined. Because of that, when we leave the EU, we have to leave Euratom at the same time. We have said that we want to look very carefully at how we form an agreement to still be able to carry out the responsibilities we have heretofore.

The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, raised the issue of associate membership. We are looking at what we want to achieve rather than the mechanism; that will be important. What it will be called I cannot say, but certainly there are alternatives available, including bilateral agreements. The noble Lord raised some extremely interesting and very helpful points.

My noble friend Lord Ridley exposed some of the misinformation in the press about what leaving Euratom really means. It will not mean that the UK loses access to radioactive isotopes for medical use. I refer to that because I thought his speech was exemplary in giving detail on those matters.

Euratom is one of the separation issues being discussed. They are confidentiality, access to information, privileges, immunities, pending cases before the ECJ and, indeed, Euratom. In some of those areas we are now ready to move towards legal text.

[Lord Hutton of Furness]

I am exceptionally grateful to the Minister for giving way. Before she moves on, will she confirm that the UK will not leave the Euratom treaty until and unless those replacement bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements have been negotiated and are in place?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, the fact is that as we leave the European Union, we will leave Euratom. What I can say to the noble Lord and to the House is that a lot of work has been done, not only with respect to Euratom but with other international obligations, to scope out exactly what all our international agreements mean, whether any need to be replaced and, if they do, how they would be replaced and how that would be affected by our leaving the European Union. So although I cannot say specifically that the two would be contiguous, because we will leave Euratom on the date we leave the European Union, we are in the position whereby we cannot negotiate new agreements until we have left the European Union. However, we can carry out technical exploration of such agreements. Therefore it is important to know what kind of agreements we need to reach. Above all, we are making sure that we do not in any way compromise our current position as members of the European Union. We gave that undertaking and we will keep to it.

I was asked about the transitional implementation period. My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe looked very closely at that with great interest, because it is all about making sure that we enable those who are in business, as well as everybody else, to know that they do not have to go through the same process more than once. If we are leaving the European Union, they will not have to keep changing their processes in business. We have certainly heard from business about what an implementation period needs to look like. Different businesses think of different periods. We have said very firmly and clearly that an implementation period is something that we will need to negotiate with the European Union but that we do not see it going beyond the date of the next election. Of course, we are not in a position to be able to discuss the terms of an implementation period until we have reached the next stage, which is to look at what our future relationship with the European Union will be. Clearly, if anyone wishes to stay in both the single market and the customs union, it means that they have to accept the four freedoms. The Commission and the EU 27 made it very clear early on that those freedoms were not divisible.

There was a lot of strong feeling about the customs paper not being clear enough. By the way, I reminded myself the other day that blue-skies thinking was the way in which Apple started its rather special business; it is a way of testing out new ideas that can really take off and work. The real reason we put in alternatives is because that is what you do in a negotiation—test out alternatives.

I turn to money. I was challenged on many occasions to say that we should simply tell the European Union how we were going to work out what we owed. It is a two-way street: the European Union also has obligations to the UK. We recognise that we have obligations with both an international legal basis and a moral one. I am sure that noble Lords will have read the paper put out by the European Union. It is three and a half sheets of paper, two of which simply describe the fact that the UK owes something. It says that the debts ought to be shared out among all the people who need to take a share, without actually quantifying or saying how they were going to calculate that, or giving an idea of how they value certain premises—the wherewithal of the European Union. What is the value of the obligation that is owed? What it did do, which is helpful, is to carefully list, on one and a half pages, a whole load of reference to treaties and regulations saying, “This is the legal basis for us demanding money”. Not how much money or how it should be divided up, but why it wants some money.

I recognise how vital this is to the other EU 27. They face losing the third largest net contributor to the European Union. They have been given a bald choice: either they get less in the way of infrastructure funds, or they pay more. Neither is a particularly attractive option for them—and they have been told that, if they can find a third way to solve the problem, they should let the Commission know. This is a problem—these are our friends, and we want Europe to continue to succeed, so I understand the difficulty. However, our duty to the British people is to challenge the European Commission and say: “You say that that particular section of a treaty confers on the UK an obligation to pay. Let us first of all test that legal basis”. That was what was happening about two weeks ago. We were challenging the legal basis, not in a hostile way, but as lawyers do, by simply saying: “How does this work”? That is at the core of why there has been so much anxiety in Brussels. It is because we have different ways of doing things, not because we do not want to reach agreement. The UK way of doing things is to analyse, challenge, then agree. I promise this House that that is what we will do.

We have had two speeches from noble Lords who nearly always make me want to think and think again, as they did tonight. The first was my noble friend Lord Bridges, who said that we have to think what kind of society we want to build in this country as we leave the European Union. My noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford carefully set out how it is important to have an eye to the future and said that we need to challenge what that future is like. How do we look at the reform of institutions across Europe, which we have helped to build but which need to be resilient for the future? Whether it is Europe, the UK or this House, all of us want to be resilient for the future.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hutton of Furness Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Selborne (Con)]

My Lords, I was lucky enough to serve on the Select Committee under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, and I now chair the Science and Technology Committee. We are revisiting this issue at present, looking at developments since the 2011 report. One of the recommendations, which was not fully implemented by the Government, but on which, nevertheless, there was a bit of progress, was that a strategy board be set up to advise government in the long term—and nothing could be more long term than a nuclear energy strategy. An organisation was set up called the Nuclear Innovation and Research Advisory Board. NIRAB was set up on a limited term of three years and produced its final report in February—last week, in fact—which is a survey of civil nuclear research in this country. I echo the question of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs: what will follow NIRAB? While in principle it is often a good idea for advisory boards and strategy boards to have a built-in termination—otherwise, they go on for ever—in practice we do need continuity of thought. That has clearly been lacking. Indeed, there has been no thought; that has been part of the problem. Successive Governments kicked this into touch. Nuclear research was an issue that, until recently, simply was not addressed adequately.

In its February report, NIRAB pointed out something totally obvious that nevertheless needs saying: that international collaboration is the main route for developing nuclear technologies. Of course, there are a number of ways of undertaking international collaboration, but we are quite a small player, however much we manage to build up our dismally low nuclear capability compared, say, with the 1960s, when we were indeed a large world player. We have been overtaken by a number of countries. If the industrial strategy, which has nuclear as one of its 10 pillars, is to be implemented, we have clearly got an awful lot of catching up to do.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, that the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, slightly failed to note that, although we joined Euratom before the European Union evolved from the EEC, the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008—which I must admit had escaped my notice—joined Euratom and the European Union at the hip in some way. A lawyer can explain to me the implications of that but paragraph 18 of the Explanatory Notes explains that we have to withdraw from the European Atomic Agency Community, Euratom, because it is now part of the EU in legal terms. Be that as it may, it is absolutely clear that we have to have a relationship with Euratom and with other organisations around the world which are collaborating.

One such collaboration, again thinking long term, is the Generation IV International Forum. This is looking very long term, leapfrogging through to new technologies which have still to be developed—we are thinking about the year 2030 and beyond. At the moment, the NIRAB report describes us as only participating as an inactive member—that was the case in 2011—through the subscription to Euratom. When the Government responded to the Select Committee report, they said, “We don’t have to worry about joining the Generation IV Forum if we want to remain connected to the emerging technologies, because we are members of Euratom”. Clearly, that answer does not work anymore if Brexit is going to happen and we are going to leave Euratom. We clearly need quite quick answers.

I agree entirely that this is not controversial. The Government are the first to say that we simply have to develop a nuclear strategy and a nuclear capability, and we have to collaborate. If, for legal reasons—and I do believe they are only legal reasons—we have to withdraw from formal membership, surely when the Minister responds he can tell us, without prejudicing any negotiating position in this case, exactly what ideal situation we would like to achieve.

[Lord Hutton of Furness (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall say a few brief words in support of the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has moved this evening. Before I say anything further, I should bring the attention of your Lordships’ House to the interests I have declared in the register. I am the chairman of the Nuclear Industry Association here in the United Kingdom.

I do not think there is any doubt at all that membership of the Euratom treaty has brought very significant benefits to the UK nuclear industry and, in doing so, has served some vital strategic interests of our country. Unlike membership of the European Union itself, which remains a polarising and deeply divisive issue in our country, I have not heard anyone mount any argument at all—ever, at any point in this process—in favour of leaving the Euratom treaty. I get the very strong sense that the position of Her Majesty’s Government has come very late in this process. Having looked at how these two treaties have become intertwined in recent decades, the Attorney-General, giving advice to the Cabinet, has clearly favoured separation entirely, so that as we leave the European Union we face this rather grim and desperate situation where we might find ourselves without any internationally recognised nuclear safeguards operating in the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am most obliged to the noble Lord for his second sight, because I was about to address that very point.

In the context of the referendum, people voted to leave the European Union institutions. They voted to leave the European Parliament. They voted to leave the European Commission. They voted to leave the Council of Ministers, and they voted to leave the European Court of Justice. They spoke in terms of reshoring their sovereignty and the supremacy of UK law. You cannot leave those institutions if you remain within Euratom.

It is the Government’s view that, once we have left the European Union, we will seek to engage with the members of Euratom, just as do many other nuclear-enabled countries around the world, by way of nuclear co-operation agreements. However, once we have left the EU, substantive negotiated changes to the Euratom treaty would be needed if we were to continue participating in Euratom, whether on a permanent or temporary basis. Not only is it difficult to see how that can be done given the commonality of the institutions, but it is extremely doubtful that the remaining 27 member states would be willing to take on such negotiations, particularly for a temporary change. Therefore, when we formally notify of our intention to leave the EU, we will also commence the process for leaving Euratom.

Let me be clear: the United Kingdom supports Euratom and wants to maintain continuity of co-operation and standards. As many of your Lordships have quite rightly stated, the nuclear industry is of key strategic importance to the United Kingdom. Therefore, we want to maintain our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom and, indeed, with all of our other international partners, which we do by means of nuclear co-operation treaties.

We maintain that the UK remains a world leader in nuclear research and development, and there is certainly no intention to reduce our ambition in that area. We fully recognise the importance of international collaboration in nuclear research and development, and we will ensure this continues by seeking alternative arrangements for our collaboration in international fusion research and development projects.

Reference has already been made to the JET project, which is based in Oxfordshire. At present, the financial commitment to JET runs to 2018 and there are proposals that that should be extended to 2020. We are committed to seeing that extension.

There is also the ITER project, which is to be based in France and is not limited to Euratom members; it is hoped that that will be operational by 2025. Again, we can foresee a commitment to further fusion research in that context.

[Lord Hutton of Furness]

I really did not want to interrupt the Minister; he has been very candid and helpful. Is it the Government’s intention to seek associate membership status of the Euratom treaty in order to continue to participate in the research programme at Cadarache?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not at present, as I understand it, our determined intention to seek associate member status, but that will be a matter for discussion in negotiation.

Let us be clear: this is an area where there is enormous mutual interest. It is not just the UK as a supplicant, putting its hand out. We are one of the world’s leaders in nuclear research and development. We have something to offer our partners, just as they have something to offer us. That is how we see it: a continuing partnership, albeit one in which we cannot credibly continue with the institutions of the EU, which are central to the operation of Euratom itself.

[Lord Hutton of Furness]

But the only way that non-EU members of Euratom have been able to contribute and participate in the research programmes has been through associate membership.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I fully appreciate the noble Lord’s point. That is why we will engage with Euratom and its members in order to determine continuity. Whether it will be by associate membership or by means of some additional agreement has yet to be determined.

A number of points were raised about whether we can maintain trade and standards. We trade, we have safety standards and we intend to maintain them. We had the opportunity to secure mutual recognition of our standards and trade by means of international nuclear co-operation agreements.

I have been asked by a number of noble Lords about the question of strategy and consultation. Let me be clear: we are at the beginning of this process, not at the end of it. We appreciate the need to develop a clear strategy in order to implement our desire for continuing co-operation with Euratom going forward.

A number of particular questions were posed with regard to where we were on certain issues of strategy and relationships with other international nuclear partners and how we intended to demonstrate the development of our forward strategy for nuclear research and development. The noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, raised the question of how important this was in the context of the proportion of our energy that is actually provided by nuclear installations. I understand that the figure is 17%, rather than the figure he quoted.