Chilcot Inquiry

Lord Hurd of Westwell Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I entirely agree with that. It is a huge inquiry, which is one reason why it has taken so long. Perhaps the noble Lord has seen Sir John Chilcot’s letter of 20 January in which he said that they had served longer on the inquiry than any of them had anticipated. It has been longer than they expected. One of the issues for the inquiry on historical child abuse currently being set up is that the number of cases over a very large number of years that it is being asked to cover is almost daunting for an inquiry of that sort.

[Lord Hurd of Westwell (Con)]

Can my noble friend give the House an assurance that when the report is finally published it will contain an adequate section explaining precisely what have been the difficulties and obstacles in the way of producing the report earlier?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, it is an independent inquiry, but I will ensure that that gets back to the inquiry itself.

Chilcot Inquiry

Lord Hurd of Westwell Excerpts

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, we all regret the delay, but I wish to stress that this is not unusual for inquiries of this sort. I know that we were all looking at the al-Sweady inquiry as part of our Christmas reading. That took five years to report on two battles in one afternoon and cost £24 million. The Baha Mousa inquiry, looking into the death in UK custody of one Iraqi civilian in September 2003, took three years and cost £13.5 million. This inquiry has been looking at nine years of British policy and operations within Iraq. It is not entirely unexpected, therefore, that it has turned out to take a long time.

[Lord Hurd of Westwell (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that my noble friend’s point is at the heart of this whole matter? This has dragged on beyond the questions of mere negligence and forgivable delay; it is becoming a scandal. This is not a matter of trivial importance; it is something to which a large number of people in this country look anxiously for the truth. Is it not time that the Government exerted themselves to make sure that that reasonable demand is met?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, we all regret the amount of time that has been taken. I think in retrospect, as an outside observer, that it might have been a good thing to have recruited a larger staff at the beginning of the inquiry, because the sheer volume of the documentation that the inquiry found itself looking through was much greater than had originally been anticipated. It is, however, an independent inquiry. The Government will receive the report. The one decision that the Government will then take is when it will be published. It is up to the chairman of an independent inquiry to decide when and how it completes its report.

Ukraine, Syria and Iran

Lord Hurd of Westwell Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hurd of Westwell (Con)]

My Lords, has my noble friend seen some rather disturbing press reports today about rows and ructions within the group of Syrians who are opposed to the Assad regime? This has happened before and it may happen again, but how does my noble friend assess the cohesion of the anti-Assad forces in Syria?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

That is a very difficult question to answer in some ways because, as the noble Lord well knows, there is a very large variety of fighting groups. Indeed, in north-eastern Syria in the past week or two the moderate forces in the opposition have been fighting radical jihadis to expel them from ground otherwise occupied by the opposition. However, my experience of the Geneva II talks so far is that the representatives of the Syrian National Council have been more coherent and more constructive than some had predicted in advance. We are doing all we can to support the Syrian National Council in being an inclusive body, including Kurdish and Christian representatives, women and so on, and in strengthening its links with the moderate fighting forces on the ground. Of course, the picture remains extremely unclear. It is currently very difficult to get around inside Syria for obvious reasons, but we are a little more confident than we were that there is a reasonable opposition willing to work for a transition regime, through which we and others can work.

Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons

Lord Hurd of Westwell Excerpts

Thursday 29th August 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hurd of Westwell]

My Lords, I listened very carefully to my noble friend’s opening speech and I thought that it was extremely impressive, but so far I am not persuaded that the Government have made a case for the action that they propose. Therefore, I am glad that we do not have to rush to a vote today on the crucial issue of military intervention. Many of us would have great difficulty in supporting the Government. However, things change and move, and perhaps the situation itself will change.

We have argued in this House over and over again about many things connected with the duty to protect and the rights and wrongs of intervening in other people’s internal affairs. I do not want to go over all that to some extent weary ground. However, I should like to make one or two points.

As regards the Security Council, of course we have reached the point where it is not regarded as absolutely necessary in all circumstances, regardless of the possibilities of veto and so on, to have a Security Council resolution. All that one can say is that, first, we will not get one on this matter and, secondly, our case in the world will be substantially weakened because we will not get one. That has to be taken into account.

Secondly, I want to mention the idea of punishment. It is a curious notion, but one that is perhaps inevitable. However, it does not really make sense. It implies that there will be no response to the punishment and that the Assad regime, its friends and supporters will simply sit back and take whatever punishment we are giving. That is most unlikely. We therefore need to feed into our computer the likelihood—the possibility or, I would say, the probability—that some kind of reaction to our military action will take place.

I want to concentrate, finally and briefly, on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, has just made. The aim of military intervention must be to improve the lot of those who are suffering. There is no doubt about that suffering; we see it every night on the television. It is ghastly and intolerable but our action, if it is to be effective, must be proportionate, and must be in line with and help the people who need it. I cannot for the life of me see how dropping some bombs or firing some missiles in the general direction of Syria, with targets probably some way removed from the weapons that we have been criticising, will lessen the suffering of the Syrian people. It is likely to increase and expand the civil war in Syria, not bring it to an end.

If I felt that military action would lessen—not today, tomorrow or the next day, but in the long run —the suffering of these people and bring closer the day when that civil war comes to an end, that would change my whole attitude. I am not opposed to intervention on principle. There have been, as the noble Lord, Lord Jay, mentioned, cases in which we have successfully intervened, but this is not likely to be one of them. That is my judgment. Unless we are actually going to bring some help or prospect of improvement to the people who have been suffering these fearful attacks, we would be better to hold off.

This is a fairly desperate conclusion because it leaves one open to the charge that one is doing nothing. Of course that is not so. There is a mass of activity, diplomatic and economic, that we could and should undertake. We should surely have cured ourselves by now of that fearful habit of going into military action with our eyes half shut and without thinking through the consequences. My noble friend said that we are not going to take sides; but we are going to take sides. That is exactly the point, and the people whom we are assisting will be pleased and others outraged. To say that we are not taking sides seems a completely unreal proposition: we are deliberately taking sides in a civil war. That is an example—or it would be because we have not done it yet—of the lack of thought, insight and perception that has led us, over and over again, to throw ourselves into battles with the odds somewhat loaded against us and without us, as Parliament, having really thought through the consequences of what we are aiming at.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, it is inevitable that this debate looks to the past. Some of the parallels that are being drawn with past events are absolutely right. Some of them—in particular I single out what is being said about Iraq—are not necessarily helpful parallels. However, there is a parallel that matters. Just as it was essential in relation to Iraq that two conditions were satisfied, so they must be satisfied if there is to be military intervention here. I identify those two conditions as: any action must be lawful, but must also be right. Those are not the same. Being lawful is a necessary precondition to military action, but it is not enough on its own. Equally, being right and moral may well be essential, but it is not enough on its own.

My contribution to this debate is to focus particularly on the issue of legality, on which we now have, in the note from the Government, a statement of their position. I notice how it is described as a statement of the Government’s position and is divided into two parts. The first is legal principle which identifies in what circumstances military action may be lawful and the second considers whether the conditions that are set out are met. There is an important difference between them. On the first issue, I agree, or Members of this House would agree, that the primary and preferred approach or basis for legal action would, of course, be a United Nations Security Council resolution passed under Chapter 7. Will it happen? I suspect that all noble Lords in this House believe that it will not because of the existence of the veto.

Is there, therefore, another basis? This is where this potential conflict differs from Iraq as there is no pre-existing Chapter 7 resolution that could be relied upon. The Government say that humanitarian intervention would be the legal basis. That is a controversial doctrine, although more and more accepted. It was the basis on which action was taken by NATO in relation to Kosovo and the bombing of Serbia. Generally that would be recognised as justified, I think by many people in the world, and increasingly by international lawyers, although there is no basis for it in fact in the United Nations charter. However—this is essential and I am glad to see that it is made clear in the Government’s statement of legal conditions—certain conditions must be met.

First, the purpose of the humanitarian intervention must be just that. It is for humanitarian purposes. It is to prevent further humanitarian catastrophes. It is not to punish. Even though there are breaches of international law if chemical weapons are used, that does not justify the use of force for punishment. It must be to prevent further humanitarian catastrophes. That means, in itself, that one needs to be satisfied as to what has happened. Was there a chemical attack? Did it take place? Was it the result of action by the Assad regime? Critically, if action is not taken, is there a likelihood—I would say a strong likelihood—that that may be repeated? I will come back to that application.

[Lord Hurd of Westwell]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. He will have seen reports, as I have, that the terms of reference of the inspectors now in Damascus precludes them, as the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, reminded us, from pointing a finger. They are not in the business, and would not be allowed to get into the business, of allocating blame or responsibility.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I did not want to deny the noble Lord the opportunity of saying something given his previous position, but he is not dealing with a point that I am making. I am not saying that UN inspectors have to say what has taken place, but one must be satisfied that that is what has happened. Secondly, the use of force needs to be a measure of last resort—you need to try everything else first—and thirdly, it needs to be proportionate. One needs to understand what that means. Proportion is not just about the same degree of force that someone else has used. It means that you are using no more force than is necessary in order to achieve your objective. The objective here would be to prevent a further humanitarian catastrophe of further attacks using chemical weapons, if that is what has happened.

When I look at the second part of what the Government say and at the JIC report, I start to have some concerns. For example, on the issue of who is responsible for the attack which took place, I find it convincing that it was the Assad side for the reasons that are given. Was it, on the other hand, the Assad regime at the very top? I notice that the JIC report says that it is believed that authority has been delegated to commanders. I have seen press reports suggesting that there may be a rogue—perhaps that is the wrong word—commander acting on his own initiative. One needs to know, because if that is what has taken place, the chances of it happening again are different from the chances of it happening again if a decision was taken at the centre. That is just one example of what one needs to analyse.

I need to conclude given the limited time. I am glad that we and the House of Commons do not have today to make a decision, because I am concerned that the answers to these questions are not yet fully given. One would need to look at the evidence. I take the point that you can never be absolutely sure about these things and should not try to be, because that is a way of shirking responsibility, but you have to make a good-faith judgment, on evidence, as to what the situation is. If and when this matter returns, the other place and this place will want to ask the question: are we satisfied, on good-faith evidence and in a good-faith judgment, that this action is necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and is no more than is needed to achieve that result?