Adult Social Care

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Forsyth of Drumlean

Monday 20th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, if the Government are moving in the right direction, why have they yet again delayed the implementation of the Dilnot report? Why have they taken no notice of the report from the Select Committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, in 2019, which clearly gave the Government the route forward to deal with this perennial problem?

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

Answer.

Health and Care Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Forsyth of Drumlean

Lords Hansard _ Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 16th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I would like to put a point to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. He said that his amendment simply provides time for Parliament to consider an assisted dying Bill. I note that proposed new subsection (2)(a) also says that the Secretary of State should

“respect that this is a matter of conscience”.

But a draft Bill is a draft Bill. It will be prepared by a government department; instructions will be given by solicitors, after consultation with Ministers, to parliamentary counsel; and that Bill will eventually be approved by Ministers in the relevant department and put before Parliament. There will be a Minister in charge of the Bill. Whatever mechanism is chosen—maybe a Joint Select Committee of both Houses—to consider the draft legislation, the Minister will be in charge and will be seen by the public to be driving through a Bill. If the noble Lord had said in his amendment that more time should be given for the Private Member’s Bill, I would have supported it. Businesses managers clearly need to take account of the obvious wish of this House to have more time to debate it—

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

I do not want to prolong the debate but, for the sake of clarity, I will say that the issue here is that this is a complex subject—as has been pointed out. It is a Private Member’s Bill, and the Government would provide support for that. It is not a government Bill, and it is not being piloted by the Minister. This is clear from the amendment. It could not be, because the Government then would not be neutral, as they should be, on a matter of conscience.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. However, his amendment says:

“The Secretary of State must, within the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, lay before Parliament a draft Bill”.


In my book, a Minister laying before Parliament a draft Bill is in charge of that Bill.

High Speed 2 (Economic Affairs Committee Report)

Debate between Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Forsyth of Drumlean

Thursday 23rd January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Goldsmith on a superb maiden speech. We very much look forward to his contributions to the House in the future.

I apologise, as I am suffering from a cold; my noble friend Lord Ridley told us yesterday that Darwinian principles meant that his cold would find another host, and I fear that he has been proved correct in that respect.

Five years ago, the Economic Affairs Committee, under the excellent chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Hollick, raised serious questions about the cost of HS2, the methods used to appraise the project and other priorities for rail investment in its 2015 report The Economics of High Speed 2. In January 2019, the committee followed up this inquiry and published a new report in May last year. Sadly, we found that the Government were still no nearer to providing satisfactory answers. We therefore concluded that HS2 required a major rethink. Before I explain our conclusions, I thank the committee staff who produced the report: Sam Newhouse, Ben McNamee and Lucy Molloy.

I begin with the question of how urgently we need HS2 in relation to other rail investment priorities. In 2015, the committee suggested that rail infrastructure in the north of England should be the priority. We asked the Government to consider whether investment in northern rail infrastructure should be prioritised over HS2. Beyond a business case for Northern Powerhouse Rail, no such assessment of the relative merits of doing so was ever carried out. Five years on, commuter services in the north of England remain badly overcrowded, unreliable and reliant on ageing Pacer trains built on the cheap using frames from Leyland National buses.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sorry to intervene on the noble Lord—I will not do it again—but I cannot understand why his committee does not seem to have looked at the West Midlands and the issues there.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

If the noble Lord allows me to make my speech, he will perhaps get an answer to that.

The Government’s response to our report stresses that the Northern and TransPennine Express franchises will deliver over 500 brand new vehicles and retire all the existing Pacer trains. Yet, in spite of the Government’s confidence, Pacer trains remain in widespread use today. Allow me to stress that Pacers were initially given a lifespan of 20 years when they were introduced as a stop-gap in the 1980s. Forty years later, many are still with us.

Overcrowding continues to be far more severe on commuter services than long-distance services. We heard evidence that fast long-distance services are among the least crowded trains that serve the cities on the HS2 line. For example, just 4% of passengers stand on the Virgin Trains West Coast to Manchester, whereas there has been a doubling of demand for local services into central Manchester in the last 15 years but only a 50% increase in passenger capacity. HS2 will do very little to help these long-neglected commuters travelling into cities in the north. In fact, the main beneficiaries of overcrowding relief from HS2, when it is finished, will be London commuters who use the west coast main line. Chris Stokes, an independent rail consultant, described HS2 as

“a very expensive way of dealing with the Milton Keynes-Euston commuter peak.”

Simply put, the HS2 project is a poor reflection of the UK’s rail investment needs—I hope that addresses the noble Lord’s question.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

Do not tempt me.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

There is, fortunately, a programme in place to help these commuters: Northern Powerhouse Rail would create faster and more frequent lines between Liverpool and Manchester, Manchester and Leeds, Sheffield and Manchester, Leeds and Sheffield, and Leeds and Newcastle. It would reduce journey times between northern cities substantially. To give just two examples, the journey time from Liverpool to Manchester would reduce from a maximum of 57 minutes to just 26 minutes; likewise, Newcastle to Leeds would be reduced from 95 to 58 minutes. Such improvements to journey times would increase access to a wider jobs market between northern cities that are currently very poorly connected.

Representatives from northern regions who gave evidence to our inquiry generally agreed that both HS2 and the Northern Powerhouse Rail programme were absolutely crucial to the north. Since the publication of our report, there has been fierce debate—to put it mildly—on whether both programmes are needed. First, the Government, under the previous Prime Minister, stated in their response to our report that HS2 needs to be in place first. In August, the new Government commissioned a review into the viability of HS2, chaired by Doug Oakervee. New details from a leaked version of his report—apparently delivered before Christmas but still unpublished by the Department for Transport—were revealed this week and appeared to indicate only qualified support for the project.

The recently published dissenting report from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, argued that HS2 is the “wrong and expensive solution” and that priority should be afforded to Northern Powerhouse Rail and Midlands Connect instead. Stakeholders from the Midlands and the north of England, however, have made clear in their response, once again, that both programmes are needed. We urge the Government to provide clarity on this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, made it clear: if the Government have £150 billion, they can do both; if they have only £50 billion, they need to choose.

In the view of the Economic Affairs Committee, HS2 phase 2b and Northern Powerhouse Rail should be combined into a single programme to allow investment to be prioritised where it is needed most, and funding for the northern powerhouse needs to be ring-fenced and brought forward where possible, otherwise the north of England will continue to be short-changed by the Government’s plans. The Government stated in their response that they would “carefully consider this recommendation”. We hope they do so.

Our report also considered the planned costs of HS2 and examined the method by which the Department for Transport determines whether the project provides value for money. The leaked version of the Oakervee report found that more work is needed to assess the scheme’s impacts on regional growth and that it is “hard” to say what economic benefits will result from building it. Suffice it to say that providing clarity on the costs of HS2 has never been one of the Government’s strengths. The first estimates for the costs of HS2 were published in February 2011 by the department under the then Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond. The estimated cost for the full network was given as £37.5 billion. Then the department, under the following Secretaries of State, Justine Greening and Patrick McLoughlin, put forward two updated economic cases in January 2012 and October 2013. The estimated cost rose first to £40.8 billion and then to £50.1 billion.

Moving forward, the department’s 2015 spending review set the funding envelope for HS2 at £55.7 billion, in 2015 prices. Adjusting for construction price inflation since 2015, this funding envelope increases to £59 billion today. The estimated costs, however, were shown to have increased to £65.2 billion. Yet fear not; in 2017 the department, now under Secretary of State Chris Grayling, published a financial case with all assumed efficiency savings calculated into the model, estimating that the full cost of HS2 would be £52.6 billion. The committee was told that spending to date on the project was £4.3 billion.

Since the publication of our report, there have been even more conflicting estimates of the costing range for the project. In August 2019 HS2 chairman Allan Cook published an official stock-take of the current status of the programme, in which the total funding range for all costs and risk was estimated at between £72.1 billion and £78.4 billion. Yet following this the Secretary of State for Transport, Grant Shapps, clarified these costs to Parliament in a Written Statement on 3 September 2019:

“Adjusting by construction cost inflation, the range set out in Allan Cook’s report is equivalent to £81 to £88 billion in 2019 prices”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/9/19; col. 7WS.]


Now, according to the leaked Oakervee report, the cost of the project could rise to as much as £106 billion. Adding to the confusion, the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, suggests in his dissenting report that the total cost will in fact be £115.8 billion.

This confusion absolutely tallies with what the committee heard from Sir Terry Morgan, the former chairman of HS2 Ltd, who told us that “nobody knows yet” what the actual cost of HS2 will be. Most pointedly, the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, concluded that

“Parliament has been seriously misled”


about the costs of HS2. The committee also had serious reservations about the cost-benefit analysis used in determining whether HS2 provides value for money. The results of the latest cost-benefit analysis for HS2, published in July 2017, show net benefits of £92.2 billion and net costs to the Government of £39.8 billion. Following the familiar theme of confusion that has arisen throughout the project so far, the leaked Oakervee review suggests that the cost-benefit ratio has fallen from £2.30 to £1.50 for every pound spent. The committee did not find the methodology used credible for either the project’s costs or its benefits. The model does not account for the transformative effects on employment and population that new infra- structure can provide, because it assumes that land use in the surrounding area is fixed. The Government’s response to our critique was disappointing. They accepted the limitations relating to the treatment of land-use changes but offered no indication that they would carry out new analysis.

Our second reservation concerns the methodology and evidence used to calculate the value of travel time. These measurements have improved since their first iteration—when they forgot that people can, and quite regularly do, work on trains—but they are still questionable. They used surveys asking business rail travellers hypothetical questions about how much they would be willing to pay for quicker journeys. The committee did not believe that a few hundred interviews carried out on station platforms were a robust evidence base on which to base a calculation of the benefits that a potentially £80 billion new railway will bring.

Finally, our report shows that the estimated benefits of HS2 are highly dependent on forecast numbers of business travellers using long-distance rail. Our central concern on this point is that the evidence used to forecast the number of business travellers using HS2 is based on data that is 15 to 20 years old. Not only do the numbers not correspond to the most recent data from the national travel survey and the national passenger survey, but relying on out-of-date data is neither a robust nor rigorous basis for evidence-based policy-making. We therefore recommended that new analysis of the project is needed. This must take into account the transformative effects of new infrastructure on the benefits of the project. It should revise the assumptions behind the values of travel time, and the demand forecasts should be revised ahead of this new analysis. We recommended that this analysis be published in full alongside the business case by the end of last year. The Government have accepted that the data is out of date and stated that updating it is part of the department’s latest research priorities. We strongly urge its publication as soon as possible.

In 2015 we recommended that the Government should review the cost saving from lowering the maximum speed of the railway and terminating the line at Old Oak Common rather than Euston. Yet again, the Government failed to consider our very reasonable recommendations. Our follow-up examined the two ideas again in detail. HS2 is being built to accommodate trains that run at a maximum of 400 kilometres per hour, with trains initially expected to run at a maximum of 360 kilometres per hour. Trains that can travel at that speed do not exist. When we asked why the railway was being designed to that specification we were told it was in order to make it future-proof. We heard evidence that strongly questioned the design speed, including one piece of evidence that described the maximum speed as “an engineer’s pipe dream” and “close to ludicrous”.

Allow me to stress, on this point, that in phase 1 trains can operate at 360 kilometres per hour on a mere 68-mile stretch between Amersham and Birmingham. Reducing the maximum operating speed to 300 kilometres per hour would add an extra 10 minutes to a journey between London and Manchester, but the cost savings for the whole project could represent up to £1.25 billion once longer-term operational and energy costs are accounted for. Based on this evidence, we see no reason for HS2 to be built to operate at 400 kilometres per hour.

Once again, we are disappointed that the Government have ignored our recommendation to assess the cost saving that could be made by terminating the HS2 line at Old Oak Common rather than Euston. The Government and HS2 Ltd cite a 2011 report from Atkins as the evidence base for rejecting our proposal. Notwithstanding the fact that it was written at the start of the last decade, that report assessed only the reduction in benefits and made no estimate of the possible cost saving. The Government must consider both. We argue that what matters for the termination point is not the single point in central London, but the connections that enable passengers to quickly arrive at their destination. The evidence we saw shows that onward journey times to final destinations using the Elizabeth line from Old Oak Common appear to be comparable to, or better than, continuing from Old Oak Common on HS2 to Euston. Euston is not “central London”.

We have therefore recommended that the redevelopment of Euston station be removed from the scope of phase 1 of HS2 and that Old Oak Common should operate as the London terminus for phases 1 and 2a. Doing so will allow time to determine whether Old Oak Common could operate as the London terminus for the entire HS2 network, and the potential costs or savings that that would involve relative to a terminus at Euston. Our report is an appeal to the Government to conduct a major rethink of the full HS2 project. A new appraisal of the project is urgently required. The Government must act to ensure that the benefits of HS2 are not geographically uneven and do not entrench the uneven economic divide between north and south that already exists.

I was very struck, in our discussions in the committee, by the words of the former Chancellor and Transport Secretary the noble Lord, Lord Darling. He said, “These projects are all the same: they run over budget and in the end the bit at the end gets cancelled.” The bit at the end is the east-west rail structure which is so desperately needed now in the north of England. I beg to move.