Great British Energy Bill

Debate between Lord Howell of Guildford and Earl Russell

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 54 in this group and signal our support for Amendments 51, 53, 57 and 58. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for his excellent introduction to this group of amendments and for setting out everything so ably.

Jumping to the end, it appears to me that the settled will of the Committee is that something should be done on this issue; I suggest one way to achieve that would be for the Government to bring forward their own amendment before Report. It might be that further collective discussions happen between now and Report. Everyone has a slightly different way of doing this, and I do not think that anyone has the answer—it is something that needs more work. However, the settled opinion of the Committee seems to be that there needs to be some check on this part of the Bill.

I said previously that the Bill is a little too short for its own good. I understand the Minister’s concerns about having lists and the problems with them, and why he does not want them. We are in favour of the Bill and we do not want to stand in its way. This is a manifesto commitment that the Government are delivering. However, as it stands, it has numerous issues. No timescales are provided for when it must be done. Although there is a condition to lay this before Parliament, as has been said, there is no parliamentary process to scrutinise, question, amend, approve or reject the strategic priorities. There is a condition to consult the devolved Governments, but, if they all unanimously said that they had the same problem with the strategic objectives, there is no way for Parliament to know that that happened, and there is also no way for them to reject or change the strategic priorities. It feels a bit unusual to be in this potion, because we are being asked to scrutinise and approve the Bill but we do not have the strategic priorities in front of us.

I welcome the constructive engagement that the Minister and his Bill team have had with us to date. He has been clear with us that these strategic priorities are being written and prepared. I recognise the need for urgency and that they are a new Government, but, ultimately, we are being asked to approve something when we do not know what it is. Indeed, the organisation itself has not written the strategic priorities, so the organisation does not know exactly what they are yet. That is a difficult position to be in.

However, there are ways forward through all of this. This quandary needs to be resolved through collective compromise and a meeting of minds. At a minimum, there need to be some guard-rails. Some general principles need to be laid out, including what will be in the priorities and a general sense of the outputs that GB Energy will be responsible for. That can be done—we can find a way to do that collectively. It should be done on Report.

Between now and Report, I would welcome the chance to have a conversation in which we can talk about this collectively. I do not want to delay Report—that is not the answer to this—but the Minister could put forward a draft publication for us. There could be draft heads of terms on what the current thinking is for GB Energy and the Ministers about what will and will not be included, as well as what has already been excluded. The Minister could give verbal assurances to this House from the Dispatch Box on some of these matters.

Finally, this amendment is my hard backstop, because it requires a resolution in both Houses. I will keep it in reserve. To be clear, in the final group of amendments, I have Amendment 122, which requires that the strategic priorities are “laid before Parliament”. I also have Amendment 123, which requires that they are laid and approved by Parliament, and Amendment 124, which is maybe more of a compromise on these issues. It would mean that the Bill cannot come into force

“unless a document setting out the thematic headings of the statement of strategic priorities have been laid before Parliament”.

Maybe somewhere around there is where we might be able to coalesce. In any case, this is an issue that needs further work and constructive compromise. My sense is that there are some concerns about these matters on all sides of the Committee. In the first debate on the Bill, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, mentioned that this needs to be in the Bill—I welcome that statement. I look forward to working with the Minister to find a solution.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, I was going to stand aside from this debate early in the process because of the mountain of expertise that is building up on all sides of this Committee against many aspects of the Bill. It is not our job to turn it down in this House, but it is our job to try to improve and rescue some of the bits that may be particularly dangerous and damaging, of which there are several that we will no doubt come to. I was going to stay silent, but my noble friend Lord Effingham’s splendid speech touched on so many of the fundamental problems that are so obvious in this exercise—setting up this kind of body with this kind of money.

We have of course been here before. We went over this again and again in the 1960s, with the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, when almost exactly the same arguments were used. Many of us on all sides—it was not partisan—questioned whether that bright idea of Harold Wilson and a Mr Cant, one of its designers, would work. I hope now that we leave our mark of doubt and scepticism about whether this whole approach works.

The IRC failed because the belief prevalent among economists at the time was that if you built big and created such things as British Leyland, size would deliver. Unfortunately, size did not deliver and there was a mood and a realisation—this was long before the digital revolution—that size might have diseconomies, as was then proved with projects such as British Leyland, a disaster from which Japanese inward investment 10 or 20 years later saved us. That was the third reason why I was not going to say very much at this stage.

I apologise for being a few minutes late for the Minister’s excellent speech on the last set of amendments, but there was a gap, something which he did not mention. My noble friend Lord Hamilton intervened about Sizewell. The Minister then produced the standard line on Sizewell, but he did not mention money. Yet money is the whole issue in organising our resources for the energy transition to come, which will be fearfully expensive, particularly if we have to leave unused a very large chunk of intermittent supporting energy—nuclear and other sorts—for the 3,000 hours every year when the wind does not blow. Until we get to the hydrogen stage, which we are a decade or so off, I suspect, that will leave a big gap to fill with otherwise idle machinery—which is very expensive indeed if it is not earning or producing. None of that has been touched on yet. The more that I listen to this, the more I see that we are heading into a nightmare of expenditure problems and dilemmas.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, with his ruthless clarity, hinted that this is the way things are going. The only saving grace from here is to have a system of accountability, a strategy and a clear and honest recognition of the colossal dilemmas ahead and the timescale, particularly for nuclear. Perhaps we will not discuss nuclear very much, although there are related amendments, but the issues of not only cost but timescale have been totally ignored.

There is chatter around, although even the Government estimate that Sizewell C will cost about £20 billion, as opposed to whatever Hinkley C is now running at. My bet would be that it is much nearer to £20 billion than £30 billion, but never mind about that. The question is: who has the money? The Government have not got it. Governments all across the world, and certainly our Government, are underwater on debt, understandably reluctant to tax more and not really able to borrow more. It will have to be done with the private sector, but the private sector will not touch something like Sizewell C, which is a dodgy EPR design that has not worked well anywhere in the world so far.

The timescale for Sizewell C is probably the mid to late 2030s. The alternatives of the new technologies in nuclear—I am sorry to bring this into a non-nuclear discussion—are massive. Rolls-Royce is talking about being able to deliver clean green electricity by 2030 or 2031. No one, even a super-optimist, believes that Sizewell C can touch our electricity supply before 2037 or 2038; I bet it will turn out to be 2040 or later still. These things have not been touched on yet, so goodness knows how we will deal with them as we come to all the amendments lying ahead. The one saving grace is that we would have a chance for both Houses and those who are informed about these things to point out at every point some of the further dangers and damages into which this entire structure will slump.

That is what one has to add at this stage. I am afraid that the Minister will not be pleased to hear that ahead lies a vast pile of questions and doubts about this project and the philosophy behind it—a philosophy of setting up large, semi-state-owned or state-owned organisations to push through things that apparently cannot be produced by the private sector alone. The philosophy simply does not work in the digital age. It did not work with the IRC before the digital age, it will not work in the digital age, and it will not work in the AI age. The nature of the economy is quite different from even 20 or 30 years ago. These are the problems which now have to be addressed, and they certainly will not be addressed by this.

I am afraid that we are heading for a lot more amendments on the detail of everything I have said. In the meantime, both the amendments that have been debated are excellent and should be accepted by the Government as part of the vital need for Parliament to have a regular, continuous, accountable and effective say, maybe with a special Select Committee. We invented Select Committees in the 1960s and they worked very well for departments. The Select Committees here are excellent and produce superb reports. Maybe this is an area where we need to beef up our own penetrating techniques on Select Committees and reports, to ensure that there are no more blunders ahead. I would bet $100 or more, if I was a betting man, which I am not, that there are plenty of blunders coming along, written into the Bill as it stands.