UK Strategy Towards the Arctic (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 9th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome this opportunity to debate this excellent report regarding the UK’s strategy towards the Arctic. I share the view that this has been a somewhat neglected area and is now of increasing strategic importance, as the report clearly lays out. Obviously, the report was completed and published under the previous Government and was not intended to inform the current ongoing strategic defence review. However, it is more in the context of that review that I want to offer some observations, and I do so because since the publication of this report the strategic context has moved on.

Regardless of the specifics of how the situation in Ukraine is resolved, my view is that the position of Russia looks weaker. It is facing the reality of its own military limitations. By contrast, the relative strengths of European NATO are becoming more apparent, particularly given the additional membership of Finland and Sweden and the upward trend in defence spending of many NATO countries. Moreover, the advent of a Trump presidency looks set—I would say, wholly justifiably—to coerce all of NATO in Europe, including the UK, into assuming an ever greater responsibility for its own security. I am not suggesting that the threat from Russia has gone away. I am suggesting that it is now increasingly likely to manifest itself as malevolent activity below the threshold of formalised warfare, the human and material costs of which are huge.

In this changing context, there may be considerable good sense in the UK reimagining its commitment within NATO, and doing so in ways that play to our natural military strengths and permit the necessary enhancements to national resilience, doing so in a manner that might just be affordable within a defence budget of 3% of GDP.

The SDR will undoubtedly confirm that some of our defence expenditure is non-discretionary: most obviously, the deterrent. We must also now recognise our vulnerability to the threat of ballistic missiles, a threat to which events in both Israel and Ukraine have now sensitised public awareness. We obviously need to invest in those areas which give us a technological edge, especially where automation and autonomy relieve the pressure on physical numbers. But, more fundamentally, a strategic choice needs to be made in respect of where, within a newly configured and energised NATO, we should develop and focus the more conventional elements of our force structure. In deciding this, we need to better evaluate the balance between conventional deterrence and the active interdiction of sub-threshold threats. We need to do this in a way that is orchestrated on a NATO-wide basis.

To me, although it pains an infantryman to say it, logic and geography suggest that we should consider focusing on a leadership role in the maritime and air domains of NATO’s northern flank—a flank which should be envisaged as including the Baltic, High North, Arctic and north Atlantic. We should adopt an operational posture that is a combination of conventional deterrence and the active interdiction of sub-threshold—particularly subsea and airborne—threats. We should build on the innate dependencies and mutual trust born of our leadership of the Joint Expeditionary Force, which now needs to be renamed, and we should build on this in respect of capability development and procurement.

Because cost pressures will dictate, we should probably worry much less about mustering a significant high-readiness land commitment to central Europe, a contingency which, in societal terms, we seem, on a national basis, either disinclined to or incapable of embracing, and for which many continental partners display far greater national urgency due to geographic realities. This does not mean that we do not need an Army: far from it. The combination of national resilience, national regeneration and constitution, and what I would call focused lethality, which I use as a term for a more technically enhanced set of specialised forces, will more than justify a significant force structure.

But I simply cannot see how, in the changing strategic environment and with the cost pressures that seem set to remain, we can continue to delude ourselves that we are much more than a regional power, albeit one that more than delivers its fair share of regional security, particularly when the nuclear deterrent is costed in. I appreciate that these remarks fall well outside a more disciplined commentary on our strategy towards the Arctic but, to me, the true excellence of the report lay less in what it specifically said and much more in what it teasingly forebode; namely, that the security dynamics of the Arctic and northern Europe are now more interconnected and that the Arctic itself is potentially far more contested. The report offers the strategic defence review much food for thought regarding our national strategic options.

G20 and COP 29 Summits

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

The noble Baroness will have seen the clean power objective—the plan that will be coming out before the end of the year—which I think will address many of these concerns. I understand her concerns about the last COP just gone, but we have to build on this. There are two alternatives: either we give up and walk away saying, “We did not get what we wanted, so why continue?” or we just have to keep going, because each time progress is being made. The noble Baroness will know that nothing happened for 11 years about the issues that were agreed in Paris to proceed on carbon markets; at this COP, we finally agreed the rules, so progress is there. It is not enough, and it is not fast enough, but that is why we have to keep on going. The noble Baroness will see that we are making progress on clean power. To respond to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, we have already started working with Brazil about what will happen at the next COP. Perhaps I am just an optimist, but I think we just have to try to make progress at every stage we possibly can.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I heard what the noble Baroness said about the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia. Surely the strategic issue to be squared within the treaty is not the security of the base but the permissions of the US forces stationed there, particularly the B52 bombers, to prosecute operations from there without being subject to any form of a red card from the Mauritian Government. Can she confirm that the wording of the treaty is sufficiently clear that American operations mounted from Diego Garcia will not in some way be prejudiced?

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord raises an important point. We are confident that the treaty does provide those assurances. That was part of the discussions which took place during the last Government prior to the treaty being signed.

Afghanistan

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Wednesday 18th August 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB) [V]]

I agree with all those today who feel sorry for the plight of the Afghan people, and for the service men and women who died or had their lives badly damaged by service in that country. The American decision to withdraw military support was a dreadful one and the resulting chaos should be of no surprise. But, rather than criticise American decisions or show anguish for Afghanistan’s future, I want to use my time to reflect on our own national outlook—our ambition in overseas military involvement, particularly in the context of the recent integrated review, which described an international security situation in which we were already engaged in a battle for ideas, truth and human values.

Some in this House will know enough of military theory to recall Clausewitz’s famous trinity: a trinity of society, government and the Armed Forces which, if any great national endeavour is to be successful, needs to be in harmony. A bond of mutual trust and support has to exist between the elements of the trinity, or the nation will lack the integrity and resolve to see an endeavour through. My own close involvement in the two most recent national campaigns, in Iraq and Afghanistan, has led me to believe that the United Kingdom never remotely enjoyed the beneficial advantage of a trinity in harmony.

Indeed, neither of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan ever enjoyed the unreserved support of a British society that doubted their strategic wisdom. They quickly became unpopular wars, and society’s emotional relationship with its Armed Forces became one of sympathy rather than support. Secondly, once the British Government of the day had sensed society’s prevailing view, damage limitation rather than national resolve became the principal ingredient of strategy. Within Whitehall, troop reductions and military extraction became the true metrics of success. Thirdly, as I closely observed, there existed an unhealthy level of mutual suspicion between military advice, often in pursuit of greater resources, and political judgment demanding the exact opposite.

I fear that the Government’s recent integrated review gave little thought to the state of the Clausewitzian trinity in the UK. I therefore worry that, although we retain an aspiration to be a global Britain, we currently lack the national preconditions to support such an ambition. Our military budget remains primarily invested in the totemic platforms of a bygone age. We cannot afford the aid budget which underpinned much of our global moral standing; our diplomacy seems focused on losing friends, not making them; and our societal instincts are tending to the view that charity begins at home.

I say all this while continuing to believe that the United Kingdom is a wonderful country, a great place to live, a model of tolerance, the envy of many and with the latent qualities to achieve great things when the conditions are right. But the situation unfolding in Afghanistan should teach us the sobering lesson that only when we can combine national integrity, good friends, adequate resources and resolute intent will we be able to succeed in any endeavour that demands prolonged commitment and sacrifice. The one that now confronts us—a global struggle for ideas, values and human decency—must be seen in that light. If we do not, we really are in trouble.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)]

I call again the noble Lord, Lord Flight. No? I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hooper.

Integrated Review

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Wednesday 17th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

As I say, I think more details will be announced on Monday. As the review says, we believe that we need to stop thinking about the strength of the Army purely in numbers of soldiers and focus on how it is equipped and what we want it to do. For instance, we believe that, with this additional investment, the Army will be transformed to meet the threats of the coming decade. We will ensure that our soldiers have the best equipment in the world, including new vehicles, drones and cyberspace capabilities. As I mentioned earlier, and would just like to reiterate, there will be no Armed Forces redundancies as part of any restructuring. We are incredibly grateful for the fantastic work our Armed Forces do, and we want to provide them with effective kit and tools so that they can undertake their important work around the globe on our behalf.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I congratulate the Government on the sophistication of the review document, much of which I thought was excellent. However, the real challenge is in translating that document into an effective strategy, particularly one that is so fundamentally reliant on allies and alliances. Therefore, from a defence perspective, I ask the Minister: to what extent has the strategic bet on technology, digitally enabled capability, autonomous systems and novel nuclear options been harmonised with NATO deterrence doctrine and with the force structure development of close allies, or is it currently a wholly national initiative?

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

Obviously as the strategy and the way we work roll out, we will be working with allies. But in the development of this review there was thorough engagement with our allies and partners abroad, and also with civil organisations and businesses. We facilitated 11 round-table discussions and workshops, and had input from more than 100 external experts from 23 countries. The call for evidence which helped to inform the review received more than 450 submissions, so we are very conscious about our relationships with our allies. We have talked to them as we have been developing the review, and we will of course continue to work with them in order to deliver the ambitions we set out within it.

Covid-19: Road Map

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

My noble friend is right and, like the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, I pay tribute to everybody involved in this fantastic effort. As my noble friend will know, more than 17.7 million people across the UK have had their first dose. Our target remains to offer the first nine priority groups, including everyone over 50, a vaccination by 15 April and all adults over the age of 18 a vaccination by 31 July. It is a fantastic target and we are confident that we will meet it.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

I draw the House’s attention to my relevant interests in the register, both as Constable of the Tower of London and as a trustee of Historic Royal Palaces. I welcome the publication of the road map out of lockdown, but it will appear to many completely counterintuitive that the nation’s museums, art galleries and heritage sites represent both a greater health risk and a lesser social benefit than those venues termed “non-essential retail”. Can the Government please publish the scientific data on which that judgment is based? As a reinforcing question, if the early data were to show signs of improvement, might the Government be prepared to revisit that decision so that, come the early May bank holiday, the nation will have cultural alternatives to outdoor drinking and trips to the zoo?

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

I can certainly assure the noble and gallant Lord that the design of the road map has been informed by the latest scientific evidence and is a balance between the societal and economic impact of lockdowns and restrictions and the risks posed by the virus. As I said in response to a question from the noble Lord, we will make an assessment against the four tests at every point of the data, but there will be five weeks between each step.

Integrated Review

Lord Houghton of Richmond Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

I thank my noble friend. He is absolutely right that we must look across all our capabilities to ensure an integrated response across the board to the threats and opportunities of the modern world. He is also right to emphasise the importance of the Commonwealth and the Indo-Pacific region. One of our greatest strengths is our alliances, along with our deep ties with the nations of the Commonwealth. We will continue to work closely with them, and of course the Indo-Pacific is the fastest-growing economic region in the world, so it is a crucial transit point for global trade, and a home to UK allies and trading partners. They will be at the forefront of our thoughts.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the Statement last week is to be welcomed, albeit I think that it brought relief rather than jubilation to most defence and security experts. However, I too thought that the style and content of the Statement were somewhat disappointing. It is potentially a missed opportunity—little more than a hubristic announcement of a list of new defence capabilities. Will the integrated review itself give more evidence that the capability choices that have been made are matched to reconsidered strategy, particularly in the areas of modernised deterrence, national resilience, an integrated approach and—dare I say it—a more effective use of strategic information?