Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Horam and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Horam]

I totally agree. I said on a later clause. Here, we are dealing with a situation where the actual result would be highly unlikely to make any difference. The noble Lord’s point would not occur because obviously they would hope to win their case. Here we are dealing with cases where it would be highly unlikely to make any difference at all and therefore the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, does not arise.

There is abuse which I think is doing the rule of law and judicial review damage. That is a real problem. How does this Bill affect that? There is a suite of measures here to deal with the treatment of interveners, financial transparency and lowering the bar slightly in meritless cases where it would make no difference to the eventual result. That is a complex series of measures and we do not really know—I do not suppose the Government know entirely—what effect they will have but clearly it is an attempt to remedy abuse. Remedying abuse in this case would serve the purpose of government. It would certainly help judicial review because it would diminish the impression that people have, rightly or wrongly, that it can be used and abused in the way I have described and is happening up and down the country. You could argue that it would not really detract from judicial review but in many ways would improve its performance. I say to my two Conservative colleagues that one aspect of being a Conservative is that very often you want to improve things for the sake of keeping them as they are. It is a classic Conservative position. I would not regard it in any way un-Conservative to be asking to improve these matters rather than defending the status quo, warts and all.

I think there is a serious problem here. The Government are addressing it. Noble Lords may disagree with the way they are addressing it. I think that the Government need some understanding of where they are coming from. In response to the views in the other place, they have listened and changed their position; not here, I agree, but in later amendments. I wholly agree that the discussion in the other place was truncated and in many respects very unsatisfactory, as has been pointed out. None the less, between the two Houses, we are beginning to get to a more rational and sensible position that acknowledges that there are problems and tries its best to find a way through without damaging judicial review.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

The Government have repeatedly characterised this clause as being concerned with cases involving procedural irregularities only. Indeed, the Minister used the term “technicalities” as a diminutive, which is inappropriate. Such terms are inaccurate in relation to this clause. At very best, they are inadequate. These are public law cases concerned with unlawful conduct of the Executive where an organ of government has ignored the law in taking or carrying out decisions.

With the greatest respect to my noble friend Lord Horam, I must say that his assertion that the system of JR is rife with widespread abuse is unsupported by the evidence. Nor does he take into account the fact that judicial review is, at its heart, about decision-making in accordance with law. Nor does he take into account the fact that, certainly over recent years, judges have made it very difficult indeed, in the exercise of their discretion, for unmeritorious cases to get permission to proceed.

I do not regard this clause as merely protecting government from the effects of minor procedural errors that have made no difference to decision-making. I regard it, as do other noble Lords who have spoken, as an attack on the rule of law and an attack on parliamentary democracy. To take the example given by my noble friend Lord Lester, where a statute is passed by Parliament, often after discussions such as the ones that we have had on this Bill, which requires that the Government consult before making a decision, it should not be open to government to flout that requirement imposed by Parliament and then claim an immunity from judicial review on the basis that a lawful consultation would have made no difference to the outcome of the decision-making so that permission and relief should be withheld. That is the heart of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben.

The public interest amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reflects an amendment that I moved in Committee. If carried, and if this House insists on it, a court will not be compelled to say, where a government department has acted unlawfully, that the decision would have been the same anyway and therefore permission to apply for judicial review must be refused and relief must be withheld. The court will instead be able to say that the decision was illegal and, before it can be properly made, the Government must follow the law—quite simply because that is what the law requires. That is the rule of law. That respects the will of Parliament. That gives effect to be principle of government accountability. This House has a constitutional duty to be very careful indeed when what is happening here happens—when the Executive seeks parliamentary sanction for breaking the law, as this clause does. I shall support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Horam and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I hope your Lordships will forgive me if, like other noble Lords, I preface what I say about the amendments in this group with a few general remarks about the proposals in the Bill for the reform of judicial review. In his Second Reading speech, the Minister described judicial review as,

“one of the most important means by which government and other public bodies can be held legally accountable for their decisions and actions”.—[Official Report, 30/6/14; cols. 1541.]

As Frances Gibb, the legal editor of the Times, reported in today’s edition, he stressed that the Government regarded judicial review as,

“terribly important and we are not trying to get rid of it”.

If that is right, we should have little difficulty, as a result of these debates, in persuading the Government to accept amendments to the proposals and to the Bill to ensure that judicial review is not threatened, as I and many other noble Lords believe that currently it is.

I suggest that the Government ought to respect the following six principles. First, judicial review exists for the purpose of enabling the citizen to hold the Executive to account. Secondly, of its nature, judicial review is a public law remedy. It follows that there is often, although not always, a significant public interest in ensuring that a judicial review case is heard and determined over and above the private interests of the citizen or citizens who bring the application.

Thirdly, judicial review cases, of their nature, attract support from numbers of concerned citizens and organisations—sometimes campaigning organisations—with an entirely legitimate interest in the issues involved. Fourthly—perhaps this is not a principle but part of the factual background—judicial review inevitably is often unpopular with government. It is therefore important that Parliament and the courts should be astute to ensure that it is not stifled by unduly restrictive procedures or rules. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, used the word “sensitive”; I suggest that is an entirely apt description of the requirement.

Fifthly, because financial gain is often not the primary purpose of judicial review cases, it is important that they can be brought without undue expense and without unacceptable financial risk for those who bring them, often out of public concern.

I believe that the sixth principle can be expressed very simply. It is this: trust the judges. Because, constitutionally, judicial review exists for the courts to hold the Executive to account, the best way of ensuring the robustness of that review procedure, and of gaining and maintaining public confidence in the procedure, is for the judges and not the Executive to be trusted to administer it.

I turn to Clause 64, which, as your Lordships have heard, seeks to ensure that any judicial review proceedings that can be classed as academic must fail. The test the clause seeks to apply is whether an unlawful decision by an arm of the Executive has, in fact, led to a “substantially different” outcome for the applicant from that which a lawfully reached decision would have produced. If it is “highly likely”—I repeat the criticism of that phrase—that the unlawful conduct has not made such a difference, the Bill proposes that leave to apply for judicial review must not be given. If leave is given and it turns out that the case is academic in the sense I mentioned, relief must be refused.

I accept that there may be purely academic cases that should not proceed to a hearing, even where it can be established that no part of the Executive has acted unlawfully—but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, pointed out, the courts already have a discretion to refuse permission or relief in such a case. However, I know of no convincing evidence that in practice a significant number of cases is, or has been, brought in which it can fairly be said that the unlawful decision-making at issue must have made no difference to the outcome for the applicant.

However, the real issue here is whether the fact that a case turns out to be academic in that sense should inevitably lead to its being dismissed. I suggest that there will often be a public interest in having the conduct of the decision-maker examined and, if necessary, overruled if the decision made turns out to have been unlawfully made—even where it may be said to have made no difference.

My noble friend Lord Carlile mentioned the question of a lack of consultation where the repeat exercise, when consultation is properly carried out, may lead to the same result. However, to condemn the lack of consultation and to refuse relief in spite of it is, I suggest, entirely wrong. There is also the question of cases where points of law need clarification or where points of procedure or fact need establishing, and need establishing in the public interest, even where a decision might have made no difference.

Therefore, the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Carlile seek to make the refusal of relief in a case that turns out to be academic discretionary rather than mandatory and to add an extra condition for the refusal of relief. Relief, we submit, should be refused only if an application is both academic in the sense proposed in the Bill and such that the public interest or the overriding objective of dealing with a case justly does not require that it be determined. Our amendments would apply those tests both at the permission stage and at the relief stage in the High Court and in the Upper Tribunal.

I am not among those who hold the view that Parliament should never legislate on the subject of judicial review. It is the right of Parliament in our democracy to do so, and in that I differ slightly perhaps from the arguments put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. However, I suggest, along with him, that we should be extremely careful before restricting by legislation the right of the courts to intervene in unlawful decision-making by organs of government where the court considers it appropriate to do so.

I can add only that the way in which judicial review has developed over the past few decades has demonstrated the very considerable respect for the breadth of discretion by executive decision-makers. It would be appropriate for the Government now to show similar respect for the need for discretion to be exercised by the judges.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords—