Business of the House

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Goldsmith

Wednesday 4th September 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

To be clear, is the noble Lord proposing this on the basis that there will be an agreement to get the Bill, when it has actually been published, through in time before Prorogation? If so, that is very helpful.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I will just make my position clear on behalf of these Benches in returning to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. I am very much in sympathy with the points made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds. All I will say is that I am willing to play my part as the leader of these Benches in trying to reach an accommodation as to how we resolve these proceedings without having to go through all the amendments one by one. However, I stress that this will happen only if those on the Government Front Bench are prepared to engage with, no doubt, the Bishops’ Benches, myself and the Opposition. It will not work without the willingness of the Government Front Bench.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Goldsmith

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said in reply is in my experience absolutely right. To a judge, the word “relevant” requires him to look at the issues that need to be decided. It is a much tighter word than “appropriate”, and is used frequently. In case law, one searches for the point that is directly relevant to the point at issue. It may be that legal terminology is best adopted because that is what judges understand. It is a different kind of word from “appropriate”, which judges do not normally use. Therefore, I suggest it is a better word to use in this context.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, given the time, it may be relevant, appropriate or even helpful to try to wind up this particular debate, although not in such a way that undermines the very real importance of the amendment.

I want to underline two aspects. The first aspect is legal certainty, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is very important, for example, that in considering cases where retained EU law is in question, people and businesses are able to recognise that if there are decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union that are relevant, then it is likely—though not an obligation—that the courts will take them into account. They can order their affairs on that basis, and that is a critical part of legal certainty. It seems right, therefore, that this amendment, to which I have added my name, gives direction or guidance that where such decisions are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law they should be paid regard.

The second principle is the independence of our judiciary. It is right in this context to refer to the shocking instance of the attack on our judiciary that took place at the time of the Article 50 decision. It was shocking not just that our judiciary was referred to in such terms by a popular newspaper but that it was not immediately defended and the accusation rejected by the Government, including Ministers whose job it was to do so. In dealing with this particular amendment we have to be alive to the risk that if after exit day a judge chooses—because he or she believes it right or relevant to do so; whatever word you want to use—to make reference to a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that judge is not then subjected to a barrage of criticism and the accusation, “How dare you take refuge in decisions of this hated institution, one which we have left, in making decisions on this law?” It is important that we should look at this carefully and make sure that judges are protected.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Goldsmith

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord knows that I took Article 1 as an example only because it is the very first article in the charter. I have respectfully invited noble Lords to look at the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, where the committee goes through each of the articles and through what the Government have said in relation to them, and identifies where they find place already in existing, enforceable UK law, and where they do not. It is where they do not that we are concerned with, and where they do not that there will be the very gap that the Prime Minister has said should not exist.

There is the further problem that, even if the rights survive, they will survive without the enhanced status and protection that they currently have. They have an enhanced status at the moment because of the 1972 Act and because of EU membership, but from the date of this Act they will only survive in a delegated form and be amendable by delegated legislation. They are not protected from being amended or removed by delegated legislation.

Compare the position in relation to the ECHR and the Human Rights Act. The Bill says in three places—in Clauses 7(7)(e), 8(3)(d) and 9(3)(d)—that the Human Rights Act is protected from amendment or revocation. The classic civil and political rights, but no more, which are, rightly, protected by the HRA, are protected from being amended other than by primary legislation to which this House and the other place have specifically agreed after proper scrutiny. However, none of the rights underlying the charter will be protected in that way, unless they find themselves within the ECHR, which is only some of them. That is unacceptable for many people.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I find this very difficult to understand. If you look at the charter, you find reference to the Union in item after item. It begins with a series of rights, but as soon as you penetrate further you find that it is closely related to membership of the Union and things that are guaranteed by its law. If I understood the noble and learned Lord correctly, he wants the charter to be brought in and protected against that kind of amendment in the same way as the Convention on Human Rights. This charter will have to be largely rewritten if we introduce it into our law, but it is not designed for the kind of situation we are facing after Brexit. It is designed for use within the Union and to be interpreted by the CJEU. I simply do not understand how the system is intended to work if it were brought into our law in the way the noble and learned Lord is suggesting.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord will recall that, whenever he opposed me with that argument from his position in the House of Lords or Supreme Court, I did my best to try to explain why there is an error in his thinking. With respect, I do the same here. If one takes, for example, one of the rights in the charter which does derive from Union law, is it to be said that although it is going to be transposed into our law as an EU retained law, it will no longer be subject to any of the protections that it has at the moment through being subject to the charter? It does not mean, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, suggested, that all UK law will be subject to this protection. It does mean that that law which is currently subject to that protection will continue to be so unless and until it is amended. That is the way that one gives effect to the intention that the law should be the same the day after Brexit as the day before.

I want to underline that we are talking about the extent of substantive protections; other protections and their extent; and the lack of enhancement of rights. These are all distinct points. I will also refer to the loss of the effect of charter principles. Noble Lords who have studied the charter will know that as well as rights there are principles. The principles are more aspirational, but they guide the legislator and that is a useful thing to have. Even leaving that aside, the other items I identified—the substantive protections, their nature and their enhancement or lack of it—are all things which mean we will not have the same protections after exit day as we have at the moment.