Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I find myself in the same position as my noble friend Lord Anderson and I would like to add just a few words to what he said.

One of the points made in the Explanatory Notes—and I am looking at paragraph 21—is that:

“The diverse circumstances of possible cases make it difficult to assume that any one remedy or combination of remedies would be most appropriate in all circumstances.”


My noble friend Lord Pannick invites us to address subsection (1), read together with subsection (4). If one asks oneself what these provisions are driving at, one has to bear in mind that there is a whole range of diverse circumstances, some of which may affect private individuals very much indeed; in which case, one would be very concerned that their remedies were not being cut out. Other cases deal with administration and circumstances where individuals probably are not affected at all, but the good administration or even the security of the country is very much at stake when a quashing order is made.

I hope I can be forgiven for coming back to the case of HM Treasury v Ahmed in 2010, which I was involved in. I mentioned it at Second Reading and when I was addressing this subject at an earlier stage. It is worth dwelling on that case because it is an illustration of a circumstance where the clauses that are under attack by these amendments could be valuable. It was a case where the Treasury had pronounced an order to give effect to our international obligations under the United Nations Act 1946, designed to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists. That was our international obligation and, understandably, the Treasury made the order. But when the case came before the Supreme Court, it was pointed out that there was no parliamentary authority for such an extreme measure. The Supreme Court unanimously decided that the order should be set aside.

I suggested in the course of the hearing and, indeed, at the end of my speech—the leading speech in the main case—that we should suspend the effect of the order to give time for the Government to remedy the situation in order to avoid the terrorists dissipating their assets. The risk was that the banks that were holding the assets under the order that was under attack would release them under demand from the terrorists. Clearly, that would not be desirable.

I was overruled by six to one for a reason which, I think, demonstrates why these provisions are needed. My noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood was in the majority of the six against me so perhaps he can explain more fully what their reasoning was. As I understand it, they were saying that if you quash the order you are declaring what the law always was; in other words, the Treasury order was of no effect at all—that was the effect of the order—and, as I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, said, it would indeed undermine the effect of the quashing order to suspend it because it would be suspecting that there was something wrong with the decision to quash the order.

I could not understand that and I still cannot understand the sense of it. Indeed, one of the broadsheet papers, having spotted what was going on, asked: has the Supreme Court gone mad? I remember that certain people were rather discomfited by that but it was a very strange thing to do because there was no question of the banks releasing the money. But it was just as well to suspend the order so that they would be comforted by the fact that we were not actually making the order until Parliament had come in and produced a proper remedy to sort it out.

There you are. If you look at subsection (4), the “impugned act” was this order and what I wanted to do was to, in effect, allow the impugned act to be maintained—or, as subsection (4) puts it, “upheld”—so that the matter could be corrected. I cannot see anything objectionable to exercising the power in subsection (1)(b) in a circumstance of that kind. I wish we had had that power available to us at the time. It would have made my life a good deal easier in our discussions. It was not there and any idea that the common law could do that had really been exploded by the decision of the majority.

There is a problem and it would arise time and again if people were looking at the majority decision. There are, or could be, cases where for the protection of the public and in the interests of good administration the possibility of suspending the effect of the order so that the impugned act is regarded as valid until the defect can be corrected will be valuable. I suggest, with great respect to my noble friend, that it would be unwise to remove these provisions from the Bill.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I feel I have to rise at this juncture. I supported Clause 1 at Second Reading and continue to do so today. Like other noble Lords who have spoken since, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I suggest, puts the case against the clause altogether too high. I say that Clause 1 and the powers that it confers on the judiciary valuably would add to the judges’ discretion, their powers to do justice not just to the claimant in a particular case but on a wider basis. I, too, was in the Spectrum case—Lord Nicholls’ case with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and others—and it was not a case in which we thought at that stage and in that context we should exercise this power, assuming we had it, to develop the law.

I am going to disappoint the Committee because I have insufficient recollection—I shall come back to this on Report, I promise or threaten—to deal now with the point from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. But I see the force of what he says and, in a rather different context, I, too, wish to reminisce. I go back even further, a quarter of a century, to a case called Percy v Hall. It was so long ago that Mr Keir Starmer was the second junior with a very white wig. It was a case about by-laws in respect of Menwith Hill, a listening post, a secure station for GCHQ and the Americans, and the by-laws, not surprisingly, precluded public entry.

Voyeurism (Offences) (No. 2) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the Bill. I have seen something happen to a man’s kilt that was almost exactly as described by the noble and learned Baroness and equally embarrassing.

With great respect to those who tabled the amendment, I am not quite sure that they have found a solution to the problem they have identified for a reason I shall try to explain. New Section 67A has a number of subsections and, as I read it, subsection (1) describes the action of the person and subsection (3) describes the purpose for which the action is being taken or resorted to. The trouble with “invading the privacy of B” is that those words describe the action. The words in new subsection (1)(a),

“operates equipment beneath the clothing of another person”,

is an example of invading the privacy of that person by operating something beneath their clothing.

Therefore, I wonder whether the amendment is entirely right. The purposes are set out in new subsection (3) and my problem is that the wording of the amendment describes acts rather than purposes. We are in Committee and it might be worth reflecting on the aim—which I quite understand is being properly addressed by the words suggested.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, fully support the underlying objective of this legislation, and apologise for not having played a part in any of the earlier processes.

Reading these amendments today has given me pause for thought along the same lines as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead. My noble friend Lord Pannick describes this as a manhole or loophole in the legislation that can be got round. However, the whole point, surely, of new subsection (2)(c) is to limit the application of this provision. You look for a purpose and then you define the purpose in new subsection (3). However, if you include within that any invasion of the privacy of B, frankly, you might as well strike out the whole requirement for a purpose. Whether, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope said, this is to be regarded as a purpose at all, if you do what is set out in new paragraphs (a) and (b), inevitably you are invading the privacy of B. Therefore that makes it otiose to have any reference to a purpose at all; it is unlimited.

As for an unlimited provision, I am agnostic—or hesitant—as to whether that is a good idea, but it is no good persuading yourself that you are consistently with a purpose and then accommodating the amendment.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 21st May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, if it is not improper to say so, I hugely regret the decision of the Speaker in the other place not to have permitted the Government to suggest other solutions to this problem without the need to override the overseas territories’ sovereignty rights. However, we are now faced with the Commons amendment and, although I recognise how powerful the speeches of all those who have supported the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, have been, and although I am deeply sympathetic to the overseas territories for the wholly undeserved insult to which this provision now appears to expose them, for my part I hope that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, will not be pressed. If it is, I should, regretfully, feel unable to support it. This is not an appropriate occasion for yet another vote in this House that would override the considered view of the elected Chamber—after a full debate, which I read in Hansard this morning—moreover, in circumstances in which it would be bound most mischievously to be misrepresented as a vote by a privileged, unelected body intent, no doubt in the view of some, on preserving opportunities for the continued secretion of illicit funds abroad. It would be a wholly false slur on us, but I fear that it would be placed upon us by many. I hope that this is not judged an unduly pusillanimous approach.

Assuming the new clause is agreed, one can only hope that, two and a half years hence, it will not have proved necessary to make the contemplated Order in Council and, accordingly, that we shall never learn whether the opinion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on its prospects were it to be challenged by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, was or was not correct.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate. With respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, we owe a debt to the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, for tabling his amendment, because it has given us an opportunity to set the record straight. I hope that those in the affected overseas territories will take some comfort from the points in the very powerful speeches that have been made right across this House to express the great dismay at what happened in the other place.

I emphasise the opportunity that the noble Lord has given us to express our feelings, and personally endorse entirely what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, who set out very fully the arguments for supporting the noble Lord, Lord Naseby—although I know he will not press his amendment to a vote. It is very important, as I am sure the Minister will agree, that we have debated this and made the House’s position absolutely plain—while regretting that we have to accept the decision of the House of Commons.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Thursday 3rd March 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I just want to make one or two short points. It is interesting that although the noble and gallant Lord is perfectly correct that it is not the practice in the United Kingdom for there to be any statutory limitation on prosecution for crimes other than summary crimes, it is quite commonplace in the civil law countries for there to be limitations. So our allies in France or Germany, for example, would, I suspect, be protected by a limitation of the kind proposed. I am not suggesting that we should adopt that philosophy, which is quite contrary to our practice, as we can see in cases of historical child abuse. I wonder, however, whether the wiser course, rather than going into the area of limitation, which is so difficult and would be seen as an invitation to start doing this for other crimes, would be simply to have a blanket immunity for our servicemen when engaged in military operations, of the kind that I think used to be the case—I stand to be corrected—before the law was changed some years ago by the previous Armed Forces Act. This is certainly an important point to consider, but I favour doing so not by way of limitation but by way of exclusion entirely for acts of that kind while engaged on military operations, while making it quite clear that we are not dealing with cases of one serviceman on another—let us say of one serviceman assaulting another, stealing from him or things like that.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, as I indicated at Second Reading, I, too, am entirely sympathetic to the general feeling underlying this amendment. As the noble and gallant Lord has said, he is not wedded to this language. I am not clear, for example, whether,

“engaged in military operations outside the United Kingdom”,

would include peacekeeping operations in Northern Ireland, or matters of that character. However, I also see the basic difficulty, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope indicates. This is certainly contrary and alien to English law down the years. We recognise the problems of delay, and if you can show plain and incurable prejudice through delay, you might well get the cases struck out. One would hope for a measure of fastidious thought before anybody launches prosecutions in these cases. It is deeply offensive to people that, in relation to the problems in Northern Ireland, amnesty was given to a whole lot of terrorists, but there is still a risk, apparently, on the part of the soldiers who were acting on our behalf.

I am a bit troubled by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope’s suggestion of a blanket immunity. What happens if there is a clear case of murder on the face of it? Should we really, with ample evidence and so forth, say that there can be no prosecution? I do not know: would Sergeant Blackman have taken the benefit of that? One must have regard to where these things go, but I certainly hope that the Government will give very sympathetic thought to this. A clever and ingenious lawyer might be able to find some formula whereby what I suspect all of us here feel could be reflected in some form of protection for those on active service abroad.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak to this amendment; I ought to be better prepared. Down the years, I have often been involved with coronial law. Indeed, I was Treasury Counsel in the early 1980s when for the first time it was decided, contrary to my argument, that there could be an inquest in this country in respect of a death abroad. It was the Helen Smith case. She was the nurse who fell from a balcony in Jeddah on to some railings and impaled herself. There was long, fraught litigation in the early 1980s. Since then, this area has developed hugely and has been complicated and clouded by the impact, reverting to where we were earlier in the week, of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the need, in certain circumstances, for an Article 2-compliant investigation into a death.

I confess that when I first read the proposed new clause, I rather thought that that essentially is the present law. I shall listen, fascinated, when the Minister tells us exactly what the present position is in terms of inquests in respect of such deaths as are encompassed here. Certainly, I understand that the coroner will be informed in every case. There will always be an inquest, and he will always determine by what means the death occurred. The phrase “and in what circumstances” may be more contentious because this is a very technical area and I seem to recall that that phrase has been the subject of a good deal of specific litigation about exactly what it encompasses.

There is routinely an inquest in these cases. As I understand it—but this is very much anecdotal—the result of our now having and retaining a chief coroner is that these inquests are now heard by a comparatively limited number of coroners and essentially they deal with these matters in a way which is regarded as essentially satisfactory on all sides. That may be a misunderstanding of the position, and I know there was a problem some years ago when coroners were thought to be seeking to investigate way beyond the scope of what ordinarily would be permitted in terms of inquiring into military supply and matters of that sort, but I thought it was now under control. However, I shall say no more. I do not think this is a very useful contribution. I shall listen to what the Minister says.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, there is one aspect of this amendment to which I think I should draw attention. It arises because of its scope. The amendment applies to every violent or unnatural death of every person subject to service law within the United Kingdom. The coronial system does not apply in Scotland. I do not know whether it is the intention that we should extend the coronial system to Scotland in the case of every violent or unnatural death, but the system which applies in Scotland is very simply this: every death of that kind is reported to the procurator fiscal of the area in which the event occurred. There is then an exercise of discretion because it does not follow that every death is subject to an inquiry. It is a matter for the procurator fiscal, possibly with the advice of a law officer or his counsel, to decide whether it is in the public interest that there should be an inquiry. If there is such an inquiry, it goes not to a coroner but to a sheriff, who does indeed determine by what means and in what circumstances the death occurred. It is there that the public interest is served because if there is something to learn from the event, the opportunity is taken through the accident inquiry to determine the circumstances and in some way to improve practice or inform the public about how events of that kind could be avoided in future.

As I listened to the debate I wondered whether that system applied in the case of persons subject to service law. I think I am right in saying that when one reflects on the tragic events on the Mull of Kintyre, when a Chinook helicopter flying from Northern Ireland to Scotland with a number of very senior people on board crashed and everybody was killed, that event was dealt with under the Scottish procedure. I would have thought that that procedure is perfectly adequate to cope with all that one would expect from events of this kind and the need for the circumstances to be inquired into.

There are two features that need to be stressed. First, not every death of this kind is the subject of an inquiry because it is only if the public interest requires it. On the other hand, where the inquiry is resorted to, it is a full inquiry, with the results that I think the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is looking for; that is, the lessons to be learned from the evidence that is laid. I wonder whether he really does intend that every death—even a road accident, for example—occurring north of the border should be subject to this system; or, to take another example, whether training exercises in the Highlands, where unfortunately deaths do occur due to the very severe weather on mountains, should be subject to the coronial system. I think the Scottish prosecutors—the procurators fiscal, I should say—would rather that they retained control of these events and dealt with them under the Scottish procedure, which they would believe is perfectly adequate to provide the lessons that people need to avoid these events occurring again.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, support this amendment. The Bill as a whole is manifestly directed—all the earlier debates have indicated this—to encouraging people to volunteer and take part in generally beneficial activities. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, made plain, this clause would apply if you have a claim against your accountant. Perhaps he is a wonderful accountant and has looked after everybody else enormously skilfully over the years, but on this particular occasion when he is looking after your affairs, Homer nods, falls fast asleep and costs you an enormous amount of money, for whatever reason—perhaps he was going through a messy divorce at the time. He is insured. Is it really to be suggested that what he has done for everybody else is relevant and can deprive you of your claim? It is absurd.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, another feature of this clause occurs to me: how one is supposed to apply it when the issue of contributory negligence comes up. This is one of the problems that the court must have regard to, but we are not told in this very brief provision to what purpose one is examining. I assume that it is whether the individual or body concerned is liable at all, but assuming it is liable, how does one apply it in the context of contributory negligence? I do not believe that that aspect has been thought through at all.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Tuesday 11th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I supported the Government on the clause at Second Reading and again in Committee and on Report. At the risk of wearying your Lordships and displeasing, yet again, those who procured the original amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I support the Government again on their proposed amendment and I resist that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

For my part, I, too, accept that this reformulation is in substance no different from its predecessor. Because it avoids the explicit language of guilt or innocence, it may be regarded however, as better able to resist what at one stage was suggested to be its vulnerability to challenge under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

I do not propose to repeat all the arguments that I canvassed in support of the Government’s approach at the earlier stages. I now make just three basic points. First, there is all the difference in the world between, on the one hand, a person’s right to be acquitted and thereafter presumed innocent whenever there is any lingering doubt as to his guilt and, on the other hand, the right to monetary compensation for his incarceration pending that eventual acquittal. On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, reminded us all, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, reminds us again, that it is better that 10—the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, says 99—guilty men go free than that one innocent man be convicted. Of course, that is so and it is integral to our criminal justice system, but it by no means follows that it is better that 10, let alone 99, guilty men get financial compensation rather than that one innocent man goes uncompensated. That illustrates the total distinction between the presumption of innocence and the right to go free if there is any doubt at all about the safety of one’s conviction and, on the other hand, the right to monetary compensation for the period of incarceration until that innocence can be established.

Secondly, the present formulation put forward again by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is, as has been explained, essentially that of the majority in the Supreme Court in Adams—a majority of five votes to four. The then Lord Chief Justice, my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, who, alas, cannot be here today, and I were in that minority of four. The majority preferred it to the test of the minority that the claimant should have to establish his innocence. In truth the majority’s formulation is a fudge—indeed, an unprincipled fudge. None of the parties in the case argued in support of it—not even leading counsel who appeared as interveners for Justice. They were all arguing for compensation to be paid to all those whose appeal eventually succeeds. Now no one pursues that absolutist view. Of course, under this fudge, compensation would still be required to be paid even to those who, albeit entitled to succeed on their appeals, can nevertheless be seen clearly to have committed the offence.

I have given various examples of this at earlier stages. Today I shall give just one. Let us suppose that a defendant confesses his guilt and in his confession discloses facts of which only the perpetrator of the crime to which he is confessing could have knowledge. Later, however, on a late appeal, he is able to establish that that confession was induced by, for example, a promise that if only he would confess his guilt he would get bail. Once that is established the confession has to be set aside as one induced by guilt, even though it is self-evidently true as a confession. He is entitled to succeed on his appeal but is he really to be regarded as entitled to compensation, which could run to hundreds of thousands of pounds? I would suggest not.

My third and final point is on certainty. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has made this point. I should have said earlier that, alas, I missed the first few minutes of his speech as it never occurred to me, in common with one or two others, that this Bill would be reached at the stage that it was. I apologise for that but I think I heard everything that he said that needed to be heard by somebody supporting his case. The proposed formulation is very far from easy to apply. Perhaps a good illustration of that is the tragic case of Sally Clark—a case about which the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, spoke more than once at earlier stages of the Bill. It is a case which raises considerable and understandable emotions. On my reading of that case—I believe this to be correct—the Court of Appeal never went further than to say that on the fresh evidence that had come to light a jury might well not have convicted her. It was not said, in the words of the proposed amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the fresh evidence showed—let alone showed “conclusively”—that the evidence against her at trial had been so undermined that no conviction could possibly have been based on it. Maybe, in the light of all the material, the jury would have convicted; maybe it would not.

If it is said that I am wrong in my understanding of that case, it just goes to show that the proposed formulation will lead, not to the desired clarity and certainty in the law, but to further protracted litigation on this issue. As the Minister said, based on the Court of Appeal judgment, it is perfectly simple for him to form a view —yes or no—on whether, in the light of all the material, this defendant was indeed innocent of the charge and therefore whether or not it was a clear miscarriage of justice in that sense. The elected Chamber rejected this House’s amendment first time round and I respectfully suggest that we should not challenge it again.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I had the advantage of listening to the whole of the Minister’s address with great care. I respectfully say that it was very well put across. However, I remain of the view, advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the Commons amendment should not be accepted. I have spoken on this matter on a number of previous occasions, so I will make a few short points.

I agree entirely with the Minister that the issue before us is what is meant by the phrase “miscarriage of justice”. This still remains in Section 133 of the 1988 Act because in this Bill we are adding a new subsection to try to explain what the basic rule, set out in subsection (1), is all about. Therefore one has to consider how that works out in practice, given the nature of our criminal appeal process. In effect, it is an element of working out the court’s function in the appeal and the position the Secretary of State must take, given the material in the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, has confirmed that the Court of Appeal does not have to ask itself whether the appellant was innocent: it has to consider whether the conviction was unsafe. No one is suggesting that that should be the test applied when working out whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. The problem with the test which the Minister is now suggesting and which is in the Commons amendment is that it is striving for something which is, in nearly every case, almost impossible to demonstrate. I prosecuted for four years in the course of my career at the Bar and secured a number of convictions. It frequently occurred to me that we—by which I mean the jury, the prosecutors and everyone else who was looking on—were not there. It is so difficult to work out what actually happened: one can only proceed on evidence. The Crown’s function is to demonstrate guilt as best it can on the evidence but it is extraordinarily difficult to work out whether somebody did not commit the crime and put it in a positive way in favour of the accused if you did not actually see what happened when the crime was committed. You have to rely on other people to demonstrate that fact. That is the basic problem with the test being suggested.

In my judgment in the case to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred, I recorded that when Article 14 of the covenant, from which we take the phrase, was being discussed it was suggested that the test of innocence should be put in to elaborate what was meant by miscarriage of justice, but it was not put in to the final draft. The matter was considered then but it was taken out and we are left with a phrase which we now have to construe and apply.

Without going on any further, I suggest that a better way of approaching it would be to tie the phrase, as carefully as we can, into the way our criminal process works, in a world where there can rarely be absolute certainty. We cannot achieve mathematical certainty in our system of criminal justice: we are not expected to. Because of that, I suggest we take the practical approach embodied in the phrase proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I support his amendment.

Costs in Criminal Cases (Legal Costs) (Exceptions) Regulations 2013

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Monday 20th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I greatly welcome the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to his new Front Bench role. I have long been among his many admirers on the Bench and have benefited over many years from his invariably helpful and thoughtful submissions. I have not always been able to accept them, and it is just possible that I will not feel able to accept them tonight in regard to these amendment regulations.

The regulations remove legal aid from borderline cases. Borderline cases are those where there are no further identifiable investigations able to be carried out, yet where it is still not clear that the prospects of success are better than 50:50, but nor is it clear that they are worse than 50:50. The reason that neither is clear is because there is a basic dispute as to the law, which has yet to be clarified or developed in this particular way, or as to the facts or expert evidence.

It is absolutely critical to recognise and bear in mind in the course of this short debate that under the existing funding scheme—the scheme it is now proposed to abolish—borderline cases are funded only if they are either of significant wider public importance or of overwhelming importance to the applicant. In other words, the cases to which it is now intended to deny future funding will be either those with implications for the relationship between the state and a substantial number of individuals, or those that impact on such fundamental interests as an individual’s life, liberty, health, housing or something of that character. Surely, these cases are ones that must therefore justify a broader merits test than the bald test simply of establishing that there is at least a 50:50 chance of success.

I suggest that they justify funding so that the critical, disputed question—whether that be of the law, fact or expert evidence—can be clarified. However, instead of that, under these amendment regulations, those cases are to be condemned, deemed to be cases where the prospects of success are “poor”, or less than 50:50.

When I spoke last July on the Motion moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, to take note of the effect of a whole raft of proposed government cuts in legal aid funding—which included those we are now discussing—I urged the Government to take particular note, among the innumerable responses to consultation, almost all of which were opposed for a variety of reasons, of the consultation response prepared by ALBA, the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar Association, of which I was once privileged to be president. ALBA’s arguments were and remain cogent and convincing, not least as to the borderline cases. Among the material that ALBA presents is a 2012 study by Doughty Street Chambers—chambers that are prominent and highly respected in the field of public law and from which the just retired Director of Public Prosecutions came—showing that in the three years until then, borderline cases had achieved a substantive benefit for the funded party in between 47% and 56% of those cases, which was an average of just over 50%. I repeat, those cases are by definition important cases that affect either the public at large or the vital interests of an individual. Therefore, they are not cases from which the Government should be withdrawing funding. The suggested savings are uncertain; the price of achieving them is altogether too high.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I join everybody else in welcoming the noble Lord to his position on the Front Bench—a very public-spirited move on his part, I am sure, but immensely encouraging to others who deeply regret the fact that the Lord Chancellor can be chosen in a way that removes his presence from this House and in a way that does not require him to have had legal experience. We have suffered somewhat from the lack of the sort of experience that the noble Lord can fortunately bring. It is a significant step forward and to be immensely welcomed.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for his Motion of Regret, which gives us an opportunity to express our regrets at this measure. I spoke, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, in July. One of the things I said was that I hoped we would not have a succession of Motions of Regret because I hoped that these things would come up in the form of public Bills that we could then debate in depth. Unfortunately, that has not happened so I am afraid that we will have a series of Motions of Regret, one after the other.

I shall try not to repeat what others have said but the first point on which I want to comment is the borderline test itself, particularly the use to which it has been put. I have a feeling that it has a sort of arithmetical sense to it. When one talks about a borderline case, people at conferences will ask: is it above or below 50%? That is fair enough; that is what the test really means. If it is 50%, it is on the borderline. However, the problem, as has been explained by so many others, is that these things do not measure themselves arithmetically.

That brings me to a series of questions about how this will work in practice. How will fairness be achieved up and down the country? I understand that decisions are taken by independent funding adjudicators who look at the papers. We are not dealing with a single individual—it is difficult enough for one person—but one can imagine a series of people in different offices applying their minds to this test. Is any guidance to be given on how to approach the question of arriving at the borderline? If there is to be guidance, will it be made public so that we can comment on it and make suggestions, particularly if the system is to be reviewed in the future? There is then the very important point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf: will there be any element of discretion or shading in a situation where it is difficult to say that it is exactly at 50%? Can one, for example, have a margin of error in favour of granting legal aid, as against not doing so? It is that kind of guidance, if the Minister could explain it, that would help to flesh out how this will work in practice.

The problem with the test, as has been said already, is that it introduces an unequal playing field. The state on the one hand, with all its resources, is in a position to apply a different test on whether or not it wishes to contest the claim, whereas the individual is caught by this very exacting test. There is the vital point about the development of case law. I recall a series of cases, which have already been mentioned, but because I was involved I dare to mention them again. There was the case of Purdy, but it was preceded by that of Pretty, who is unfortunately no longer alive. That was the original assisted suicide case. It was a very difficult case in which to say that she had a 50% chance of success. In fact, she lost. She went to the Strasbourg court and lost there again, but the advantage of her case was that it helped us to begin to develop jurisprudence in this immensely difficult subject, which all Members of this House will have to discuss again before too long. It cleared a lot of the ground, which made it easier to grapple with the Purdy case when it came along.

Then there were the succession of cases, to which the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has referred, in the field of social housing, which were also very difficult to predict. I bear a personal responsibility for this because I sat with Lord Bingham and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nicholls, and, I think, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, all of whom took one view. Three judges went one way but I turned the case around. Three others followed me and we were a majority of four to three. Who could have predicted that? Everyone knows—this is a commonplace criticism of the Privy Council jurisdiction in the Caribbean—that you need to know who the judges are and the way cases vary. How can one predict when it depends so much on personalities in cases that are so narrowly balanced, as they so often are in the highest courts?

The last point to which I want to draw attention is one of the difficult areas of our law, which has been repeatedly commented on. What do you do as judges, particularly in the senior courts, when you are applying Section 2 of the Human Rights Act, which refers to having regard to decisions of the Strasbourg court? Some of us have been fairly inclined to follow Strasbourg; others have not, in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who asked the other day in a lecture why we should do that. He said we should take an independent view. Again, one will have to guess what the judges are going to do with that jurisdiction, whether there is to be any change and who will be sitting on the panel. One can predict, looking at the Supreme Court today, who will vote one way or the other. That makes this whole idea of the borderline test extremely difficult to accept unless there is to be some really rigorous guidance, which I hope the noble Lord may be able to comment and guide us on. I would respectfully support the Motion that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has moved.

Criminal Defence Service (Very High Cost Cases) (Funding) Order 2013

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Wednesday 11th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I do not think I have any relevant disclosures to make. I have not had a private client for some 34 years since I followed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, as Treasury Counsel, and I shall never have another.

This very afternoon, in answer to a Question about our trade prospects with China, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Livingston, said:

“The UK legal sector is a great strength … the rule of law and support from professional services are very strong. I will certainly seek to champion the legal sector going forward”.

I believe that I quote him accurately. I just wish that he would share his views and commitment with the Lord Chancellor.

For many years the criminal Bar has been the poor relation of the various specialist Bars. Over the past decade it has already suffered a series of cuts in public funding. Of course it does not earn for the Exchequer the riches that, for example, the commercial Bar earns when acting, very often on both sides of the litigation, in commercial disputes. However, I argue that the work undertaken by the criminal Bar is altogether more important than most commercial work. Most commercial cases result ultimately just in the adjustment of companies’ balance sheets and book entries; they rarely affect the quality of people’s lives. The outcome of criminal cases, by contrast, is generally critical to real people; usually their very liberty is at stake. More than this, the strength of the rule of law, and indeed public respect for it, depends above all else on the proper administration of the criminal justice system.

Very high cost cases, the subject of the swingeing further cut in fees under consideration here, are generally the most demanding of all the cases in the criminal calendar, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has explained, and usually, and appropriately, they are undertaken by the elite of the criminal Bar. There already exist few financial attractions for those contemplating practice, or indeed already practising, in crime at the Bar. If you impose these additional cuts, that elite will fall away.

The Attorney-General himself is said to have acknowledged at a recent Bar conference that he no longer expected people of excellence to come to the criminal Bar. Consider, if you will, the effect of that upon the future quality of those who practise at the very heart of the criminal justice system. Consider its impact on recruitment, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has made plain. Consider its impact on the rule of law, and consider its inevitable consequences in terms of the future judiciary. Where shall we find the next generation of criminal judges? What indeed about the present position, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, with current cases going hopelessly awry because, understandably, Counsel are on occasion declining to continue with cases with their fees savagely and retrospectively cut?

Of course I recognise that the Ministry of Justice has many calls upon its budget and that we live in harsh economic times, but I just cannot accept that these difficulties justify cuts so inevitably and gravely damaging to the criminal Bar, to the administration of justice and to the very rule of law. If drastic economies in the legal aid budget are required, and if they must be found in relation to the kind of cases in question here, better far to my mind that the department revisit a measure long ago suggested but, regrettably, hitherto rejected: the ending of the automatic right to jury trial in complex and protracted fraud cases. Indeed, it is my own clear opinion that not merely would this save countless millions of pounds of legal aid funds, it would also make for better justice.

That, of course, must be for another day. In the mean time, let us surely strive to safeguard rather than destroy the quality of the existing criminal Bar. Let us annul, not merely postpone, this order and these regulations. I, too, support the Motion.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, along with others, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for tabling these Motions so that we can debate these important measures. I should make it clear that I have never practised at the English Bar and never sat in an English court. My experience has been of practice, both civil and criminal, north of the border. However, although I have never sat in an English court, I have sat in a United Kingdom court, have had some experience of dealing with criminal cases and think that I can speak with some authority in support of the points which have been made so effectively by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood.

A cut of 30% on fees previously set by the Government surely must be regarded in the present financial climate as severe. I appreciate, of course, that the Minister and those for whom he speaks in this House have very little room for manoeuvre, given the cuts that already have to be made across the entire department. However, it would help if the Minister in his reply were able to put these two measures into their overall context. As I understand it, we are dealing here with cases that take a very long time and provide the advocate with the benefit of continuity of employment throughout a long period. As has been pointed out, these are complex cases which require unusual amounts of work outside the court room and are, in comparison with rates elsewhere in the system, better paid. I could therefore perhaps understand it if the strategy behind these measures was to reduce the cost of legal aid at this level, so as to keep any reduction at the lower levels, with which we are not concerned this evening, to an absolute minimum—or even to preserve the existing position at the lower levels. After all, it is at the bottom of the scale that there is real hardship. One hears not infrequently that the costs of travel and other overheads exceed the amounts payable as fees to the advocate. If there is any margin over that, it is often very small. I would be grateful if the Minister would say whether this is what the Government have in mind, and give us an assurance that there is no question of cuts of this dimension being made elsewhere across the system. That would be some reassurance to those who are deeply concerned about what the Government have in mind in the overall planning.

I will direct my remarks to the amendment set out in regulation 3(5) of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) Regulations 2013, as the provision which it seeks to insert affects the advocate’s freedom of contract. The standard terms already provide for their amendment within the terms of the contract. There is a contractual power to do this, but it is not entirely unqualified; this is not the place to debate how extensive that power is. However, when it comes to altering the terms for payment, I suggest that it is a question of degree. The stage may be reached when the amendment proposed, purportedly within the contract, is so great that it cannot be altered without the advocate’s agreement. In that situation, if agreement is not reached, the advocate would have a right to terminate the contract.

That leads me to consider what the effect would be if the amendment goes through. As I understand it, it would tie the advocate who agrees to this form of contract to the rates set out in Schedule 6. That being so, those rates can then be amended by a further order without the need for the advocate’s agreement. There is no need to alter the contract: what one does is to look at the schedule and alter the schedule by a further order. Once the advocate is tied in to such a contract, he or she has no escape from it, however much the reduction in the rates may be. As there is every prospect, if one is realistic, that the cuts now proposed will not be the last, the stage could be reached when the rates will become wholly uneconomic—indeed, some may say that this stage has already been reached. That amendment is a profoundly unattractive change in the existing arrangement. I do not understand why it is there and I suggest that the Government are taking a great risk by proceeding along these lines.

Members of the Bar, after all, are not civil servants. One of the strengths of the Bar, vital in our modern democratic society, is the independence of each one of its members from each other and from anyone else. That is an essential part of the system, which lies at the centre of maintaining the rule of law, which we all believe in. One of the characteristics of their independence is that advocates cannot be forced to accept terms to which they have not agreed or which they find unattractive. That leads directly to the consequences—to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, drew our attention —which could be very far reaching and very damaging. Those already engaged in work of this kind might be well advised to withdraw from their contracts, lest they be sucked into an ever increasing pattern of cuts. There are many who might be attracted to this kind of work in other circumstances who would not wish to subject themselves to the reformed contract where they are subject to change without any further amendment of the contract itself.

I therefore have this further question for the Minister: what assurance can he give to those who may be willing to accept employment on these amended terms as to what the future holds for them? This is very relevant to the issue of recruitment. Schedule 6, as I have suggested, is open to further amendment. Are we to expect further cuts in these rates next year or is it proposed to do so within the life of this Parliament? If so, what further opportunity will there be—indeed what opportunity will there be at all—for consultation before any further amendments are proposed? What opportunity will there be for an advocate to withdraw if he decides that the rates that are then proposed are so completely unattractive that he is not prepared to carry on with that work? These are questions that all those engaged in this kind of work would wish to be answered and I hope very much that the Minister will be able to do so.

Lastly, on the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, about jury trials, I come from Scotland where, as it happens, there is no right to a jury trial. It is up to the prosecutor to decide whether the offence should be tried by a judge alone in the sheriff court, with a sheriff and a jury, or in the High Court with a jury. The length of sentence is affected by that decision, but there is no reason why a case of very considerable complexity should not be tried before a single sheriff. The accused has no right to object to that. It raises the issue as to whether there is not considerable force in the point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, that we are reaching the stage where a jury trial in some of these cases may need to be reconsidered.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I come back briefly to the point about discretion. Of course it is right that the court will have discretion as to whether to grant an injunction. In the case of an application made without notice, the clause is perfectly clear; it gives wide discretion to the court as to what to do. My concern is that if the court decides to make an order, where is its discretion if you remove the provision in Section 49 to restrict the publicity that is given to it? It is that element of discretion that I think concerns the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness. There are two discretions here. One is certainly there, very properly, in the way that the whole of Part 1 is drafted as to whether orders are to be made. It is the particular point about the discretion as to whether publicity should be given that is of concern.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (Non-Afl)]

My attention is drawn by my noble and learned friend Lord Walker to paragraph 123 of the Explanatory Notes, which indicates that, even though you are getting rid of Section 49, you are left with the discretion under Section 39 of the same Act. Paragraph 123 states:

“However, section 39 of that Act does apply to these proceeding and gives the court the discretion to restrict the publication of certain information in order to protect the identity of the child or young person, for example: his or her name; address; school, etc”.

Therefore, with great respect to the Minister, his answer lies in Section 39.