Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Chakrabarti

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 17th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment B1, as an amendment to Motion B.

I have asked for a further amendment in lieu to be put down, because I have raised important issues which need to be resolved before the Bill finally passes. As has been mentioned by the Minister, the Act will come into force on the day on which the Rwanda treaty enters into force. This means that your Lordships are being asked to say that, as from that very moment and without more, Rwanda is a safe country. That is not all, as Clause 2 states that from that date, every decision-maker, including the Secretary of State himself,

“must conclusively treat the Republic of Rwanda as a safe country”.

That is so, whether or not the treaty has been fully implemented, and whether or not Rwanda ceases to be safe some time in the future. The Secretary of State, just like any other decision-maker, will be locked by the statute into the proposition that Rwanda is a safe country, with no room for escape. In other words, it is no use his advisers saying that things still need to be done before all the protections and systems that the treaty provides for are in place. Nor is it any use his advisers saying that as these arrangements have broken down, Rwanda can no longer be considered safe. The Secretary of State is required by the statute to disregard that advice. He has no discretion in the matter. That is what the word “conclusively” in Clause 2 means.

The Minister has told the House several times that the Government are not obligated by the treaty to send anybody to Rwanda if the facts change. That may well be so, but that is not what the Bill says. The Secretary of State is bound by the statute to ignore any such changes. He is required by Clause 2 to treat Rwanda as safe, conclusively, for all time. If the Minister will forgive me, his head is buried in the sand, like that of the proverbial ostrich.

My amendment seeks to add two provisions to Clause 1. Before Rwanda can be judged to be a safe country, the mechanisms that the treaty provides for must be put into practice. Ratifying the treaty is an important step, but that is not enough. As has been pointed out repeatedly, the situation on the ground is still being developed. The treaty must be implemented before Rwanda can be considered safe. My amendment seeks to write into the Bill a provision whereby Rwanda cannot be treated as a safe country until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a statement from the independent monitoring committee that the key mechanisms the treaty provides for have been created. It provides that Rwanda will cease to be a safe country for the purposes of the Act if the Secretary of State makes a statement to Parliament to that effect. In other words, it provides the Secretary of State with the escape clause he needs if he is to escape from the confines of Clause 2, should that situation develop.

I remind your Lordships of what Sir Jeremy Wright said in the other place when my amendment was being considered there on 18 March:

“But it is simply not sensible for Parliament not to be able to say differently, save through primary legislation, if the facts were to change … the Government … should give some thought to the situation of the Bill…it must be right for Parliament to retain the capacity to reconsider and if necessary revise it”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/24; cols. 679-80.]


Developing the point this afternoon, he said that I was wrong in my then amendment to give it to the monitoring committee to decide whether Rwanda was safe, as this should be a matter for Parliament. I agree with him and, as it happens, I have already deleted the reference to the monitoring committee from this part of my latest draft. What I am proposing now is that it be left entirely to the Secretary of State to decide, although he would no doubt seek the advice of that committee.

Sir Bob Neill and Sir Robert Buckland, both of whom spoke in favour of my amendment last time, also spoke in support of it this afternoon. Sir Robert Buckland accepted that there needs to be a system by which it can be verified that the treaty has been fully implemented. He said that to do this would reduce the possibility of legal challenge. He said that a reliable method of doing this was to use the monitoring committee set up by the treaty itself. He also said that there needs to be a mechanism for dealing with the situation if Rwanda is no longer safe, without resort to the time-consuming method of primary legislation. That is what my amendment seeks to provide, and as to the question of what happens in the future, my system is flexible: the Secretary of State can come to Parliament and say that Rwanda is not safe. He does not need primary legislation, so the Act is still there, and he could come back when the situation is cured to say that Rwanda can be regarded as safe now. It provides not only an escape clause but flexibility to enable the Act to continue if necessary, without the amending legislation.

The Commons reasons set out in the Marshalled List are exactly the same as last time. They state that my amendments are “not necessary” because the Bill comes into force when the treaty comes into force, and that

“it is not appropriate for the Bill to legislate for Rwanda adhering to its obligations under the Treaty as Rwanda’s ongoing adherence to its Treaty obligations will be subject to the monitoring provisions set out in the treaty”.

No doubt that is so, but that still fails to face up to what I am saying on both points.

In short, the coming into force of the treaty is not enough. We need confirmation and verification that it has been implemented before we can make the judgment that Rwanda can be considered safe. It simply is not sensible for Parliament not to be able to say differently, save through primary legislation, if the facts were to change.

I regret that I have had to press my points yet again. It is not my intention to obstruct the operation of the Bill in any way. My amendment is necessary to make sense of the Bill. It is modest, simple and easy to operate. The other place needs to think yet again.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is an absolute privilege to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. There are three Motions left: B1, C1 and D1. Motion B1, as we have heard, is the parliamentary sovereignty amendment—that, if I may say so, is what the noble and learned Lord has just described. If the Bill is about restoring sovereignty to Parliament, then Parliament must have an ability to scrutinise the ongoing future safety of Rwanda. Forgive me for paraphrasing.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is an enormous pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I declare an interest as a former and retired Home Office lawyer and therefore there is a small pension that is being administered by some private company. The important point about that declaration is that when I was a Home Office lawyer in the 1990s, working on matters that included asylum, there was a moment when a particular failed asylum seeker who was removed was shot on arrival in their home country.

I make that point because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has made the detailed, forensic point so clearly, but as we move into this part of the Bill and start considering non-suspensive appeals, interim relief and what should happen to someone while there is a dispute about the safety of the place to which they are being sent, that is the story that hangs in my mind, and that is really the best contribution that I can make to the Committee’s thinking when we think about non-suspensive and suspensive appeals, and when we think in due course about my own group of amendments, which is about interim relief from domestic courts and international courts.

To facilitate the swift progress of the Committee I will do something that seems counterintuitive. The Government Chief Whip, who is returning to her place, gave us some very good advice about the Committee not liking reading. Which day was that on exactly? Was it Wednesday or Thursday? Was it this year or last year? I understand that point but this is not a filibuster; this is a very short, pithy quote from the JCHR report, which makes the point better than I could about what is wrong with the particular provisions dealt with in this group.

Noble Lords will find the quote on page 105 of the blockbuster JCHR report, which we will not all be able to read in its totality. Paragraph 333 says:

“Making human rights claims ‘non-suspensive’”—


non-suspensive means that you can appeal from the place you say are not safe in; it is perhaps not the place you say you will be shot but the place you might be sent to where you will be shot or otherwise persecuted—

“can only be consistent with our human rights obligations if pursuing those claims from the destination state is viable”.

This is from the JCHR, which is an all-party committee of both Houses. It continues:

“We are concerned that this has not been established for the states deemed safe for removals”.


That was one of the many excellent points made by the noble and learned Lord. It goes on:

“The threshold required to establish a suspensive claim based on serious harm under the Bill, and the requirement for ‘compelling evidence’ to support it”—


for those desperate refugees—

“puts at risk of removal those who have genuine human rights reasons why they should not be removed. Furthermore, allowing the Secretary of State to redefine ‘serious and irreversible harm’ by regulations opens up the possibility of increasing disparity between the protections against refoulement in domestic law and those to which the UK is committed in international law, including”—

the Minister’s favourite—

“the ECHR. We urge the Government to reconsider its decision to make human rights claims non-suspensive, and the extremely high threshold imposed to establish serious harm suspensive claims. The meaning of ‘serious and irreversible harm’ should not be open to amendment by regulations. Clause 39 should be removed from the Bill”.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I have three amendments in this group: Amendments 101, 110 and 113. Two of these amendments, to which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has added his name, are about the meaning of words. They are words to which the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, drew attention in her opening remarks on this group.

Amendment 101 directs attention to the definition in Clause 38(3) of the serious harm condition. The Bill says that this requirement will be satisfied if the person faces a

“real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm if removed from the United Kingdom … to the country … specified in the third country removal notice”.

Amendment 113 directs attention to the requirement in Clause 41(5) that a serious harm suspensive claim must

“contain compelling evidence that the serious harm condition is met in relation to the person”

making the claim. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for drawing our attention to the reference in the JCHR report to the word “compelling” and its consequences.

So far as

“real, imminent and foreseeable risk”

is concerned, we suggest that that phraseology is unnecessarily complex. If a risk is imminent and foreseeable then one would say it must be a real risk and not a hypothetical one. Conversely, if the risk is real then it would follow that that is because it is imminent and foreseeable. These words are unnecessarily complex. It would be better, we suggest, to delete the words “imminent and foreseeable” or, alternatively, delete the word “real”. The real question is whether the word “real” adds anything if the other two words are satisfied.

As for the word “compelling”, there is an important question in addition to the fundamental point raised in the JCHR report as to what exactly “compelling”, in Clause 41(5), is dealing with. Clause 41(5) is telling the asylum seeker what his or her claim must contain. There are various requirements set out, and the first is that it

“must … contain compelling evidence that the serious harm condition is met”.

The first question is who is to judge that the evidence in that claim is compelling? The clause begins by telling us that the Secretary of State must consider the claim, before the end of the decision period, and make one of the following decisions:

“that the serious harm condition is met … or … that the serious harm condition is not met”.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord German. In arguing for Amendment 4, I have already suggested why I think Clause 1 should be replaced by a clear commitment to key international obligations and a requirement that the Bill be read accordingly by officials, Ministers and the courts. However, whether or not noble Lords eventually agree with Amendment 4 down the road, Clause 1 in its current form must not stand part.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who is no longer in his place, rather smelled the rat earlier. Clause 1 is not some innocuous attempt to repeat the Long Title and extrapolate it into the body of the Bill. Instead, it is a direction to the courts to ignore international obligations in favour of the Executive’s purposes—they are executive purposes because we are part of Parliament and we have not finished with the Bill yet. Ignoring international obligations was the subject of so much of the earlier proceedings of the Committee and I do not think anybody put the problem with that better than the noble Lord, Lord Patten, with his peanut analogy, to which I am sure many people will return for a very long time.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, rather nailed it, if I may say so, by pointing to the particularly perverse nature of subsection (3). Language once crafted by the great Sir Edward Caldwell, the former First Parliamentary Counsel, for the purpose of ensuring human rights compatible interpretation via Section 3 of the Human Rights Act is now being appropriated—or, to use the eloquent language of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, subverted—for the purposes of ensuring that human rights are violated. For those reasons alone, Clause 1 should not stand part.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to come back to the points I raised in the first group, because they are the basis for my support for the argument presented by the noble Lord, Lord German. I agree with very much of what he said.

I have two points. The first is why we have to have Clause 1(1) in the Bill at all. As the Minister explained, nothing hangs on “unlawful” or “illegal”. They are tendentious words and I find it uneasy to know what they mean unless they are properly defined. The Minister was not prepared to give me a definition which tied them down to what is in the Bill. I do not see why he is not prepared to do that. His answer was one which I think any parliamentary draftsman would give him, which is that nothing hangs on them because the words do not reappear elsewhere—but that does not remove the need for a definition.

The other point comes back to what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has been saying about the combination of subsections (3) and (5). I find them really quite sinister. During the passage of the REUL Bill, we debated the need for parliamentary scrutiny in the face of an aggression by the Executive to reform the whole body of retained EU law without parliamentary scrutiny. Here we are again: the Executive assuming to themselves control over the convention without recourse to the courts. Indeed, there are other provisions in the Bill which exclude any kind of judicial scrutiny at all. That is taking matters a very long way and setting an uneasy precedent.

I would much rather this whole clause was taken out for these reasons. They give rise to real concerns about where this country is going, and indeed where legislation of this kind is going, in the future.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Chakrabarti

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and a daunting privilege, as always, to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. My views on the necessity and desirability of this proposed anti-terror-style legislation are no secret. But whether noble Lords are for or against this Bill—whether they are for or against its new offences, including thought crimes, stop and search powers, including without suspicion, and banning orders, including without conviction—all noble Lords must agree that the concept of “serious disruption” has been used throughout the Bill as a justification and trigger for interferences with personal liberty.

So, “serious disruption” should be defined. However, His Majesty’s Government resisted any definition at all, all the way through the Commons stages of the Bill and in this House, until this late stage, notwithstanding attempts by some of us on this side to provide a single overarching definition very early on, in Committee, and despite even senior police requests for clarity. What a way to legislate, bearing in mind that we are here at all only because of late amendments to last year’s bus—sorry, Bill—the police et cetera Bill, which would have had this whole Bill dropped into it, again at a very late stage.

Just over a week ago, via a Sunday afternoon No. 10 press release—because No. 10 press officers never rest on Sundays—and with no amendment even attached to that press release, we learnt that there was to be some sort of definition so that

“police will not need to wait for disruption to take place”.

The government amendments and signatures to amendments from other noble Lords were not published until about 24 hours later, so there was a whole media round of debate the next morning—this was before the conviction of Police Constable Carrick—concerning unpublished amendments. I hope that the Minister will tell us when he first knew about this new approach of having a definition, and why it was heralded by press release rather than discussion in your Lordships’ House.

As for the substance of the issue, government amendments are confusingly piecemeal and set the bar too low before a number of intrusive police powers and vague criminal offences kick in: “more than minor” hindrance is not serious disruption. More than minor is not serious enough. They cannot be serious.

I face more than minor hindrance in congested London traffic every day or even when walking through the doors and corridors of your Lordships’ House at busy times. The definition of civil nuisance at English common law involves “substantial interference” with the use and enjoyment of my property. Should it really be harder to sue my neighbour for polluting my private land than it will be under the Government’s proposal to have my neighbour arrested for protesting against pollution in the public square? Obviously not—or at least, not in a country that prides itself on both civil liberty and people’s ability to rub along together and even disagree well.

Instead, the single overarching and more rigorous Amendment 1 defines “serious disruption” as

“causing significant harm to persons, organisations or the life of the community”.

That is the overarching definition, and it includes “significant delay” in the delivery of goods and “prolonged disruption” of access to services, as set out in the Public Order Act 1986. To help the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the concept of prolonged disruption is already in the 1986 Act as amended by last year’s bus, the police et cetera Act, so that is not a novel concept. We are really talking about significant harm instead of more than minor hindrance. I urge all noble Lords, whether they are for or against the Bill in principle, to vote for that.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I would like to speak next because my amendments have been mentioned and it is probably best that I explain what they are. I stress that the amendments under discussion are not my amendments: they are Amendments 5, 14 and 24 in this group, which substantially repeat amendments I tabled in Committee. There is a certain amount of revision of the words but essentially, I am making the same point as I did in Committee. They seek to give effect to a recommendation by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who, as I speak, is still a member of that committee, for adding his name to the amendments.

The committee noted that the three clauses concerning locking on, tunnelling and being present in a tunnel—the offences that are the target of my amendments—use the term “serious disruption” to describe the nature of the conduct that the Bill seeks to criminalise. The committee noted that this could result in severe penalties, such as providing the basis for a serious disruption prevention order, and took the view that a definition should be provided. On that issue, I think there is a wide measure of agreement across the House—perhaps with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—that a definition is needed because of the nature of these offences and the consequences that follow from them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

So there is agreement that a definition is needed because of the nature of the crime and the consequences that follow from it. The committee noted that a definition was given in Sections 73 and 74 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has referred. Those sections deal with the imposition of conditions on public processions and public assemblies. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seeks to adopt the same definition for the purposes of the Bill.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry to be a hindrance to the noble and learned Lord, although I hope no more than a minor hindrance. The concept of “prolonged disruption” is a tiny part of the definition, but my noble friend Lord Coaker’s Amendment 1 does not replicate the definition in Section 73 of the 1986 Act. The new overarching principle that we would introduce with Amendment 1 is

“significant harm to persons, organisations or the life of the community”,

and that is not in the 1986 Act. It is not the provision that is limited in that Act to processions or indeed assemblies.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness and accept her correction. Of course the catalogue that follows is very much the catalogue that we see in the 2022 Act, and it was that which took our attention in the committee. Our view was that the definition is not suitable for use in the Bill because of locking on and, especially, tunnelling. The committee said that the definition should be tailored to the very different defences with which we are concerned in the Bill, and recommended that the meaning of the phrase should be clarified in a proportionate way—for a reason that I will come back to, because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, mentioned that point—in relation to each offence. That is what my amendments seek to do. I suggest that they are more in keeping with what the Constitution Committee was contemplating than the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

I have tried to provide definitions that are tailored to each of those three offences and are short, simple, proportionate and easy to understand. After all, this is a situation where guidance is needed for use by all those to whom the offences are addressed. That audience includes members of the public who wish to exercise their freedom to protest; the police, who have to deal with these activities; and the magistrates, before whom most of any prosecutions under these clauses will be tried.

At the end of my speech in Committee, my aim was to invite the Minister and his Bill team to recognise the importance of the issue and, if my amendments were not acceptable, to come up with a more suitable but just as effective form of words. As noble Lords can imagine, as we so often issue invitations of that kind and those words were uttered more in hope than expectation, it was rather to my surprise that on this occasion my hope was realised when the Bill team began to take an interest in what I was seeking to do. I am grateful to them and to the Ministers in the other place and in this House for the discussions that then followed, which helped me to improve and finalise my wording. I cannot claim that I have found an absolutely perfect solution, but I think what I have done is achieve the best that can be done. Certainly, it is very much better than the alternative that is before your Lordships.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

These are the words we are dealing with. “Significant” is the word in the Amendment 1 and it is defining “serious disruption”, but we are trying to find words that define what we mean by “serious disruption” in the case of these three offences, which is my point. I come back to the point that the important word is “more”, because I am trying to establish the threshold at which it is right that the police should intervene. The problem with “significant”, of course, is that can mean different things to different people in different contexts.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I think the difference between us is that the noble and learned Lord is suggesting that there is a binary: there is “minor” and there is “significant”, and therefore anything “more than minor” must be “significant” or—forget “significant”—“serious”. To understand the intention behind our amendment, one needs to think about “significant harm”—“harm” as in damage. Harm and damage, and significant harm and damage, are well understood in the law, as he knows. As for his concerns about the long list, it is a replication of provisions previously in the 1986 Act for assemblies and processions. To reiterate, it is a non-exhaustive list of examples. The crucial part of our definition is “significant harm”. I think an ordinary person on the street would understand “significant harm” as more serious a minor hindrance or one iota more than a minor hindrance.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I was looking to identify the threshold at which one reaches the point where, on my approach, one moves beyond a minor disturbance to something that becomes significant. That is why I use “more” for the point at which, I suggest, given these particular offences, it is right that the police should then intervene. I asked the question: once one reaches that point, in the case of the tunnelling, why should that go on and on? People are arguing about whether we have reached the stage where the harm is caused is significant without the further guidance of being directed to the point at which it becomes significant.

The problem with the words that the noble Baroness is addressing to me is that they can mean a range of things within the compass of the word “significant”. I am trying to direct attention to the particular offences and consequences that follow from the activities being carried on. That is why I suggest that “more” is the most important and significant part of my formula.

As for locking on, the other of the three offences, I do not have a long catalogue of things that may be affected. There is always a risk that something might be missed out, so I have tried to capture what is put at risk by the omnibus words “their daily activities”. But here again, the threshold that I am seeking to identify is to be found in the words

“more than a minor degree”,

for the reasons that I have explained. Again, the question is: why should the police wait any longer once that threshold is reached?

I come back to the point about proportionality that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, mentioned, and the reasonable excuse point. Proportionality is very important and the threshold has to be put into the right place, because we need to consider at what point the interference with the convention rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association becomes disproportionate.

In its judgment in the recent Northern Ireland abortion services case, delivered last December, the Supreme Court said in paragraph 34:

“It is possible for a general legislative measure in itself to ensure that its application in individual circumstances will meet the requirements of proportionality … without any need for the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.


In other words, there is then no issue for a jury to consider or a magistrate to address his or her mind to; it will have been sufficiently addressed if the issue identified in the legislation is in the right place.

As to whether that is so, some guidance can be found in a decision of the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg court in a Lithuanian case called Kudrevičius in 2015. That case was about a demonstration by farmers, of which a number have happened in recent years. They had gathered in a number of groups to block the traffic on a number of public highways. The court said that in that case the disruption of traffic that resulted could not

“be described as a side-effect of a meeting … in a public place, but rather as the result of intentional action by the farmers”—

in other words, they were intending to disrupt the highway—and that

“physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities”

of others, the court said,

“is not at the core of”

the right to freedom of assembly. That in itself, however, was not enough to remove their participation entirely from the scope of the protection.

That is the background for what the court then decided. It said that “Contracting States”, which included ourselves,

“enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in their … taking measures to restrict such conduct”

and that the farmers’ intention—a serious disruption of the highways to a more significant extent

“than that caused by the normal exercise of the right of peaceful assembly in a public place”—

was enough to enable the Court to conclude that the criminal sanction which was imposed there was not disproportionate. That is an example of a case which went across the border from being a side-effect of what was happening to something that was a deliberate obstruction of traffic, which is what locking on is all about, and a deliberate interruption of, let us say, the HS2 development, which is what the tunnelling is all about.

My approach also has the support of a decision by the Divisional Court in March last year in a case called Cuciurean. That case was about tunnelling. It affected only a small part of the HS2 project, it lasted for only two and a half days and the cost of removal was less than £200,000. However, the prosecution for aggravated trespass was upheld as not amounting to a disproportionate interference with the protester’s rights. I am sorry to weary your Lordships with those references, but, having looked at those and other case law, I believe that the position I have adopted in these amendments strikes the correct balance for the proportionate treatment of the rights we are talking about.

Of course, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will not press his amendment—although I have no doubt he will feel he should—because I believe it is not fit for purpose. It is not right to introduce a general definition of that kind, which is perhaps all right for one of three offences but is completely out of place for the other two. It is not good legislation. We try in this House to improve legislation. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, I do not think his amendment improves it. On the contrary, I suggest that my amendments do improve it and, when the time comes, if I have the opportunity to do so, I will seek to test the opinion of the House.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendment 308 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge and shall say a few words in support of what he has just said. It was quite clear from the reply by the Minister to the previous group that these words, “serious disruption”, are the key to the proportionality of the clauses that we are considering. They are absolutely central to the whole proportionality of the scheme. Of course, if something does not amount to a serious disruption, the police take no action; if it does amount to that, within the ordinary meaning of the word, the police have authority to do so.

I mention that because, while I support entirely what my noble and learned friend has just said, there is an element of risk here, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, hinted at in his comments in the last group. It is the risk of lowering the threshold. Why else is the power being taken? If it is not in the present Home Secretary’s mind to lower the threshold, the risk is there. It is for that reason that I suggest there is a risk here that should be avoided.

There is also the point about the clarity of the legislation. One element of the rule of law is that the law should be accessible, and the more you attempt to define words by regulation and not in primary legislation, the more inaccessible the true meaning of the words becomes. It is not a way to go down—it is unnecessary, as my noble and learned friend said—and I hope very much that the Government do not proceed with this scheme.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The noble and learned Lord is exactly right about this constitutional problem, but there is a further point to be made. In this context, it is not just the usual problem of allegedly unclear legislation that is then going to be sorted out by regulation later, and the relationship between the Executive and the legislature not as it should be. It is also in danger of interfering with police operational independence. To be explicit about this, my fear is that the police will take whatever view they take of what this legislation means in certain circumstances and do their best—and if a Home Secretary of the day, even well into the future, thinks that the police are being too lenient towards protesters, or perhaps there is a commotion in the media, regulations will be used further to define what “serious” and “disruption” mean so as to mandate the police effectively to be more heavy-handed than the natural meaning of the words would suggest.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Chakrabarti

Report stage
Tuesday 13th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I wish to offer whole-hearted support to Amendments 1 and 6 which were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, also put his name to Amendment 1, and the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Boyce and Lord Dannatt, put their names to Amendment 6.

First, I wish to say something about the statement to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has referred. I was going to comment on it later in the context of the new duty of care in Amendment 14, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has taken the trouble to read the statement in full, and it is therefore no doubt fresh in the minds of noble Lords, perhaps this is a convenient moment to express two considerable concerns that I have in relation to the statement by the Secretary for Defence. The first is in relation to legal aid and the second is in relation to mental health support.

In relation to legal aid, there is a very serious ambiguity—perhaps not even an ambiguity, perhaps a straightforward gap—in the support that is being offered to service personnel in relation to legal aid. I refer your Lordships to the part of the passage that reads,

“where the chain of command accepts funding responsibility, this is means-test exempt and therefore no personal contribution will be required. The Armed Forces Criminal Legal Aid Authority will act as a conduit for the provision of publicly funded legal representation on behalf of the chain of command including all aspects of the financial and case management, however”—

I emphasise “however”—

“if available evidence suggests the individual was doing something clearly outside the scope of their duty then it would not be appropriate for that person to receive this chain-of-command funding.”

So this non-means-tested automatic funding that does not require a personal contribution is not available to personnel and veterans facing the gravest peril from investigation and prosecution. This is hardly comfort to those to whom this Bill is supposed to be addressed. It is those who face the gravest allegations who principle suggests should have the greatest legal support, for it is those who are facing charges that they were doing something clearly outside the scope of their duty who are losing sleep at night as they may face dishonourable discharge and very serious criminality and consequence. This is the very group who are being let down and denied automatic non-means-tested legal provision. I have to disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, about the Defence Secretary’s statement offering very much comfort at all to serving Armed Forces personnel or indeed veterans for the reason I set out: those in greatest jeopardy are left with least protection by way of legal aid.

Secondly, in relation to mental health provision, we know and the statement makes clear that to put someone in harm’s way in these circumstances is almost automatically to expose them to great jeopardy in relation to their mental health. Here is an ambiguity rather than a clear gap because at various points in the passages of the statement referring to mental health provision there are caveats about “where needed” “pathways in the community”, “best practice” and “local population needs”. I do not know what these words mean and no doubt the Minister will be able to clarify them in a moment, but to me it looks as if, subject to signposting and pathways, these people are being left, broadly speaking, to take their chances in a Cinderella part of the NHS. It does not seem clear from this statement that all serving personnel and veterans are given automatic mental health support. It is all “subject to clinical needs” or “subject to local population needs” and all of those caveats. That is what I would have said later about the need for the duty of care in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt.

Returning to Amendments 1 and 6, Amendment 6 and the proposed new clause seem to me to address exactly what the Bill was supposed to: the problem of delayed, shoddy and, therefore, repeated investigations, which cause so much concern to members of the Armed Forces and veterans. Tackling this head-on, with some comprehensive statutory provision to push investigations to be timely and adequate, is a very good idea. Of course, the amendment has very distinguished and gallant supporters.

In relation to Amendment 1, respectfully, I could not disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, more than I do. It replaces the presumption against prosecution with a very common-sense consideration of fair trials and whether they have been compromised by the passage of time. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, says that you cannot expect a prosecutor to make those determinations and that it is not appropriate, but this is what prosecutors up and down the land do every day. It is completely within, and absolutely core to, a prosecutor’s duty to consider whether it is possible, in light of the passage of time and the possible deterioration of evidence, for the accused to have a fair trial. This would be crucial to both the evidential test and, indeed, the public interest test, which all prosecutors have to consider. If that is the case—if these are normal prosecutorial factors—this might lead some noble Lords to ask why they should be put in the Bill. They should be because we have been told repeatedly during the passage of the Bill to date that a lot of what is required is comfort—clear statutory comfort to personnel and veterans that they will not be let down by the system and that they will be protected.

Putting this fair trial consideration, and including the passage of time, alongside the new provisions offered on investigations is a very good idea. As others—the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, in particular—have said, the five-year rebuttable presumption is rebuttable. Perhaps with the triple lock it is very difficult to rebut that presumption, but it will still leave concerns in the minds of personnel and veterans that a lengthy or late investigation may lead to a prosecution. It is so much better to protect people in the way offered by those who tabled these amendments. It is a far greater protection against late, shoddy and repeated investigations than the so-called triple lock that is causing so much concern. Normally, when employers and people seek to protect those who have been under especial pressure at work and in their service, it is support, not immunity, that is offered. That is the common-sense approach offered in these amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I add my support to Amendment 1, to which I have put my name. As a former prosecutor, I do not think that the task it sets the prosecutor is likely to be all that difficult, given that it must proceed on the information available to the prosecutor at the time the decision has to be taken. It may be that the information is relatively slender at the very beginning, when he is considering whether to bring proceedings, but such as it may be, it is the information that he should take into account. If one considers the stage at which proceedings are continuing, which this clause also covers, he is likely to be in possession of a good deal more information. So I do not think that there is anything wrong in the wording of Amendment 1. The essence of it lies more in what it takes out than the simple wording of what it seeks to put in. What it takes out is the presumption. I have no difficulty with the way in which the presumption is expressed in Clause 2, but I do object to it in principle.