Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Barker

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support Clause 9. During this debate, I found myself challenged by our preference for not regarding this as a surrogate for talking about whether people are for or against abortion. At times I have noticed that there seems to be a link between those who oppose this clause and those who oppose abortion. This will not always been the case, but noble Lords who have spoken have often mentioned it. My heart finds it hard to contemplate abortion, but my head says that it is probably reasonably pragmatic in our society, and we have to accept it.

The reason for this clause seems to be the inconsistent application of police discretion around the country. The resources of each institution affected by the protests mean that they cannot always approach a civil injunction or remedy. As the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, mentioned, it ends up being a lottery as to whether or not women in different parts of the country are protected. This is not good for anyone.

I support Clause 9 and I will reject the review, not because reflection is inherently a bad thing, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, but because I take this to be a wrecking amendment rather than something which is intended to develop the proposal. If I am wrong, that is my error, but that is how I felt the argument was being developed.

The basic proposal is about stopping interfering with women as they go to an abortion clinic. I do not understand the argument about needing to offer them advice at the point at which they approach a clinic. If the point is to offer advice on whether there are alternatives or whether they should even be contemplating abortion, this must be the least efficient process that anybody has ever devised. There has to be a better method than standing in the street, potentially shouting—we have seen examples of this—to engage with a woman at the point at which she is very vulnerable, just before she is potentially going to receive treatment, to try to persuade her not to do it. There has to be a better way. If this is the only way in which any protester can think to engage, they are in error. It is not a reasonable approach. It causes the majority of people to think that carrying out this type of protest in this way should be stopped.

People have described it as a conversation. I do not accept that. It is not a conversation—it sounds like a one-way monologue; it usually sounds like intimidation and, certainly, like bullying. For me, it is something that should certainly not be tolerated in a just society. I cannot support that.

There have been examples offered of where the police have intervened when people were merely praying; I think the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, mentioned this. I would be surprised if a police officer did that but, if there are examples, we ought to examine them. Let us get to the bottom of it. That would have required a member of the public to complain and then for the officer to attend. I do not think they would just have turned up of their own volition to intervene in an event around an abortion clinic that someone had not complained about in the first place. I would like to understand more about that, but I do not think this clause is designed to stop people praying. It might be designed to stop people congregating together in such a way that it intimidates people at what may be their most vulnerable time.

The argument about this being an absolute prohibition of protest in just one very small part of the country is a fair argument. I think all of us would say that, if that is going to happen, it should be in a very small part —and perhaps no part—of the country. It is an absolute argument. I could have accepted that, but my reasons for not doing so in this case, and why I believe Clause 9 is a reasonable approach, is that the harassment that is being suffered is gender-specific. Only one half of society will generally be affected by this type of influence or advice: the women of our society. It is also time-specific; it is a point at which women need this advice and at a time when they are in most peril, either personally, by conscience, or physically, and that seems to me to be a time when we should give them most support. Finally, it is at a place about which they have no discretion; they have no discretion about where they will seek support. They have to go to a hospital or a clinic. These places are identified and the women become vulnerable because they are identified as they approach them.

I would generally support an absolute prohibition of stopping protest—but in these places, at these times, for the women of our society, I support this clause. It deserves our support in protecting the women who need it.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I made an extensive speech at Second Reading so I shall confine myself to just a few points of reflection on the debate today. First, the rest of the Bill is about protest; this is about the harassment of people seeking a legal health service to which they are entitled, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester reminded us. There are those of us who believe that women have the right to access those services freely and safely. Our amendments try to ensure that this whole clause addresses just that and, indeed, narrows it down. There are those who do not believe that such a service should exist or that people should be able to access it. They have very much exaggerated what this clause is about and its potential implementation. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, said in her introduction that all the evidence is that this activity does not stop access. I have no knowledge of any such evidence, and she did not give us any, but I have to ask: if it is not effective, why do people continue to do it, day after day?

A number of noble Lords rested their cases on the 2018 review. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and myself have been informed by the providers of services and the thousands of women who attend those services and report to us that the current system of local PSPOs is not working, and they are continuing to suffer harassment as a result. So we need to be quite clear about the motivation behind the amendments but also their effect.

The noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, was one of the many people who gave a passionate defence of free speech. She said you cannot pick and choose. I say to her that, uniquely among all healthcare services, abortion services are targeted specifically. That is why we have to seek remedies, which we would not otherwise wish to do. The reason we are doing this is that, over the last two years, influenced by America, and influenced and funded by the same organisations that overturned Roe v Wade, there has been a change and an escalation.

I listened carefully to a number of noble Lords who made emotive comments suggesting that we wish to “criminalise prayer”. In the case of a single person in silent prayer, no, we do not; in the case of a church where every member turns up, week in week out, to stand directly in the path of women trying to access a service with the avowed intent of frustrating their access, yes we do.

One amendment that nobody has talked about at all is our Amendment 87, which talks about the definition of interference. I urge noble Lords to go back and look at that. I include the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, because, when he objects to the phrase about “persistently and repeatedly” occupying something, that again comes from the experience of clinic staff and users. People come day by day to undertake their activities in the doorway of a clinic.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am not objecting to the idea behind that clause; all I am saying is that the wording seems to me a bit defective because the word “occupies” does not have a target. I am sure that it could be better expressed; if it were better expressed, I would be content.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

I very much welcome the noble and learned Lord’s help in trying to find a suitable wording for what we are seeking to do. I want to inform your Lordships’ House of what is happening: there are individual acts that, one by one, may not be intimidating but, put together in a pattern with a deliberate aim, they are.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, that I am glad he was there with my colleague David Steel in 1967, but we are in a very different place now. Back in 1967, clinics were not having to deal with harassment as they are now.

High Speed Rail (West Midlands-Crewe) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Barker

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 9th November 2020 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)]

I call the noble Lord, Lord Framlingham. No? Perhaps we can come back to the noble Lord. I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I endorse everything that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, based on his experience as a member of our committee.

The noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, mentioned that, proportionately, more woodlands are affected by this project than in the case of HS2 phase 1. One should not be surprised about that, because it takes a long time to get out of the built-up area around London, and quite a long time before its begins to reach the much more urban countryside through which this phase passes. Therefore it is a feature of this particular phase that we encountered a lot of countryside, a lot of farmland, and indeed woodlands.

The noble Lord was perfectly correct and the statistics are these: 10 areas of woodland are affected, of which about 9.8 hectares will be lost due to the project. Most of them are quite small but there is a particular one, at Whitmore Wood, where a substantial amount will be lost but there is a good deal of replanting and enhancement going on to make up for that.

As far as the issue of net gain is concerned, we discussed that at some length with the Royal Society of Wildlife Trusts. To endorse the point that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, made about the sensitive way in which HS2 was approaching these issues in our inquiry, we did have quite a lot of discussion about how net loss and net gain could be addressed. It was counsel for HS2 who suggested perhaps a nuanced approach to this issue would be appropriate and, based on what he said, in our report we encouraged HS2 to continue that approach. Shortly afterwards, a written assurance was given to that trust, which the trust has accepted.

One of the problems with going too far with promoting net gain is that before you get very far you find yourself having to acquire more land. That would be acquiring more land from hard-pressed farmers who are already losing a substantial amount of land as a result of the line itself and its associated works. We were very cautious not to be led too far down that path. One has to bear in mind, too, that a community development fund has been set up that would enable other landowners who feel that they can give up part of their land to obtain funding to make up the loss of woodland that is due to the scheme. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, with great respect, is absolutely right about the sensitive way in which this matter has been dealt with by HS2, so far as we can see in the material that was before us at the inquiry.

There is, however, one matter I would like to express concern about: the woodland indirectly affected. We were not asked to examine any of these, but the kind of effects that are likely happen would include vibration and dust from the movement of a very large number of vehicles over a substantial period. This is something to be careful about, considering the impact on woodlands that have not been taken down but are in the vicinity and where wildlife exists that may be very disturbed by what is going on. There is certainly something to be said for the thinking behind this particular amendment—I am talking about Amendment 9—with regard to the indirect effect on other woodlands in the very attractive area through which this particular line is going to pass.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, will have to unmute himself in order to join us. If he cannot unmute at his end, I am afraid the technicians cannot do it this end. Sadly, I think we are going to have to wait for another amendment for a contribution from the noble Lord. I call the next speaker: the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Barker

Tuesday 2nd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, as the Minister will recall, I had the privilege of chairing the Joint Committee that conducted pre-legislative examination of what was then called the Protection of Charities Bill. I cast my mind back to a year ago, when our committee was still sitting and considering the terms of our report. It is a pleasure to see some members of my committee in the House this afternoon. It is against that background that I pay my own tribute to the Minister and his Bill team for bringing the Bill to this stage: we are now truly at the last lap. One of our main concerns was that there should be no delay in the legislation we were examining. It is a great pleasure to see that matters have been taken this far forward with the changes made.

The only amendment I wish to comment on—I do not want to arouse too much controversy about this—is Amendment 2. I listened with great care to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, said and I appreciate the concern on the point she mentioned. However, the one feature I stress is that we did not as a committee have the chance to examine Clause 9. As the noble Lord said, that was introduced to the Bill on Report. It is the kind of clause that, speaking for myself, we would have wanted to examine with great care because of not only its implications on the point that the noble Baroness made but also its width. It is completely unqualified. If it had been more precisely targeted, we might have been a little more inclined to support it. I rather suspect that a clause as general as this would impose a very great burden on the Charity Commission. To a large extent, because of the protection of charity law generally, the clause would not be needed. I stress that I speak only for myself but I am relieved, against the background of what I have mentioned and having heard the Minister explain the reasons for it, that this amendment has come forward. I very much support it. My main point in rising to speak at all was to express my thanks and appreciation for the fact that we are now at this stage, in effect bringing the matter to an end.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the Minister on getting his first piece of legislation through to its conclusion. I thank him also for the way in which he took us through the amendments today.

I will concentrate initially on one aspect of these amendments that has not so far been discussed: Amendments 3, 4 and 5, dealing with matters to do with the rehabilitation of offenders. I and other members of the committee had great sympathy with the case made to us by the charity Unlock about the problems that this Bill would pose particularly for charities that specialise in the rehabilitation of offenders. Their great concern was that up to approximately 50,000 people in this country with past convictions would find themselves now unable to take part in the process of being a trustee, even though they had committed those offences some considerable time ago and had managed to rehabilitate themselves. Last week in court there was a ruling on the matter of the severity of minor offences and their duration in relation to people having to make declarations. I rather suspect that, if that judgment is upheld, this legislation will have to be revisited fairly swiftly. I simply draw that to noble Lords’ attention.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Barker

Tuesday 23rd June 2015 Grand Committee

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, good afternoon. I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, to his first Committee. No doubt he has been briefed extensively and told that these are occasions on which their Lordships are allowed to do absolutely anything they like. I think this is the point of maximum terror for the spokesperson, although I am sure we will treat him gently.

This might well seem the most pedantic amendment that noble Lords have ever seen but we are dealing with charity law, are we not? Let us start as we mean to go on. However, it is a rather important amendment. I want to start the Committee’s deliberations by trying to ensure that, throughout our proceedings, we do not stray into the realms of viewing this legislation simply in terms of the extent to which it adds to the arsenal of weapons at the disposal of the commission and without thinking of the impact that some of these measures can have on trustees.

When some of us undertook the work of the scrutiny committee, under the able chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, we were presented with witnesses who were, by and large, people with professional interests from around the charity world. At times, we rather lost the sense that on the end of this legislation will be individual trustees, the majority of whom we know are perfectly decent and honest. Just a few are not.

On the committee, we considered at some length whether this power to issue a formal warning was really necessary. In the end, we were persuaded that on balance—it was on balance—perhaps the Charity Commission could make fair and good use of it to issue a warning rather than open a statutory inquiry and go through all that that entails. Simply having the power to issue a warning to trustees where it was considered that the actions in which they were engaged presented a fairly low-level risk to the charity or to charities in general is absolutely fine. I agree with that. However, it is still a public warning. It is still something likely to cast a shadow over, if not leave a stain on, a person’s reputation. The majority of trustees hold the commission in very high regard. They take very seriously the actions of the commission. For the majority of trustees the prospect of a public warning would actually be quite difficult for them personally if not professionally.

We deliberated long and hard, and were influenced a great deal by the wisdom of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. He argued that this was meant to be a proportionate response to very minor misdemeanours, albeit recurring ones, and because this is not meant to be a draconian power, we should not allow an appeal mechanism, making the process a bureaucratic nightmare. I agree, but that makes it all the more important that trustees are alerted in good time that they may be the recipients of a warning, giving them a chance to put right their failures. That is what this power is supposed to be about—the prevention of fairly minor misdemeanours.

For that reason, it is important to ensure that people know where and when the warning will be published. It is one thing for a notice to be published on a part of the Charity Commission’s website, where only those of us who are sufficiently intrepid or boring to make our way will find it. It is quite another for it to be published prominently somewhere in a local paper, for example—if local papers still exist—in an area in which the charity operates. That could have quite a profound and damaging effect on the charity’s reputation.

In putting this apparently small and fussy amendment before your Lordships, I am trying to echo the points made by the Charity Law Association which thinks that trustees ought to be given fair notice that they will be subject to this so that they can try to put matters right. If we do that, this power will serve to act in the preventive way that was envisaged rather than being a rather heavy-handed hammer to crack a nut. In that spirit, I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there is a great deal that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said with which I agree. Perhaps I can take this opportunity to pay my own tribute to the work that she, along with other Members of your Lordships’ House who are present, did on the committee. There is a great deal of force in her point about the importance of the notice that is being given to trustees as to what the Charity Commission wants to do with regard to publication. However, I have a concern about the removal of the word “how” and the substitution of the words “when and where” for this reason: when you think carefully about what the words really mean, the effect of the amendment is to narrow the amount of the information that is required by the provision. There are other things built into the word “how” which are not there—the manner in which this is to be done, and how often, are two examples. One point that the Charity Law Association raised with us and is in a memorandum it sent to us in connection with the Committee stage of the Bill is the element of publicity itself and whether anonymity is to be given to the trustees who are the subject of the publication. If one restricts the amount of information simply to “where” and “when”, it leaves out the possibility of further inquiry as to the precise way in which this is to be done.

I appreciate the word “how”. After all, a three letter word seems very weak but, if you think about it, it is actually quite a powerful word because it embraces so much within it. If you read that together with what is in subsection (6) which enables people to make representations as to “how”—I repeat the word “how”—the publication is to be done, one can see that it gives scope for a good deal more inquiry.

I have huge respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—I am entirely in sympathy with what she is seeking to do—but I would respectfully suggest that “how” is probably the best word to use. If it is to be replaced by something else, then there would need to be more in it than simply “where” and “when”. I find that a little untidy, which is why I suggest that we leave the word “how” as it is.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barker]

I am sorry; I thought that they had been grouped together. I apologise to the noble Baroness.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I will say a word or two about Amendment 7, which seeks to add a new “case K”, where:

“P has been found guilty of a sexual offence or has been placed on the sex offenders register”.

I will sound a note of caution about this amendment, for a variety of reasons.

The previous cases listed, some of which are the subject of other amendments, deal with incidences of dishonesty, failure to observe court orders and things of that kind. They cast doubt on the probity of the individual managing trust funds and are reasons for thinking that there might be some mismanagement of the funds. Indeed, terrorism is added, for reasons that we all understand. What is being introduced here is something that is not generic to the others, although it deals with an undoubtedly very disturbing social problem, which is people who abuse children, although it is not confined to child abuse, which I will come back to in a moment. There is a question of whether it is right to bring other criminal offences into the automatic disqualification field. One can think of other cases—extreme violence, for example. Crimes of violence are not listed here. There may be other crimes of a kind that society would regard as repugnant, but they are not listed here either. I have some doubt as to whether it is right to put the sexual offences chapter into the automatic disqualification field.

There are other reasons for being concerned about the wording. There are two chapters here. First, there is being found guilty of “a sexual offence”. There is no qualification as to how serious that offence may be. Anything that falls within the broad chapter of sexual offences would be included here, some of which may not require or justify a sentence of imprisonment at all. Then there is “the sex offenders register”. The position is that a person is placed on the sex offendering register as a matter of law if a sentence of 30 months or more is passed. So far so good: you are dealing with the more serious categories to justify being put on that register, but the initial part—conviction for “a sexual offence”—does not include everything.

There is a feature of the register that has been cured by order, but which caused concern in a case on which I sat in the Supreme Court. An 11 year-old boy who had committed a sexual offence—a very serious one, because he was sentenced to more than 30 months’ imprisonment or detention—was placed on the register. As it stood at that time, in 2010, the presence of his name on the register was without limit of time. It is an indefinite feature.