Covid-19 Update

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

The Government have taken these measures as a precaution and we will constantly review them as we get more data. We have already committed to reviewing the measures after three weeks. If the data becomes available and we are clear about whether or not this is effective, we may well have an announcement before then, but we have committed to reviewing this within three weeks.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister say what steps will be taken to enforce the regulations being made? I ask the question because Transport for London has been saying for weeks that the wearing of masks is required on London transport. I am a regular passenger on the London Underground, and something like a quarter or even a third of passengers are not wearing masks. It is all very well making regulations, but they need to be enforced.

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord makes a valuable point. One of the points I made previously about enforcement on public transport is that it puts staff in a difficult position. We therefore have to be careful about how we do this. When giving advice, you assume that some people will not follow the advice, whatever you do. It has been found that most people will wait until it is mandated on public transport, sadly, rather than doing it of their own volition. The police and police community support officers can take measures if members of the public do not comply, and I am sure the noble and learned Lord will have seen a number of police and community officers.

We are clear that face coverings reduce the risk, and until now we have followed scientific advice. We are now adopting a precautionary approach and taking precautions. Some may argue that it is overly precautious, but we feel that it is the right balance. None of these things is binary, and we want to make sure we balance the steps we take with the data we receive.

Covid-19: Response

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 19th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bethell]

The noble Baroness is entirely right: this epidemic has demonstrated, if it needed to be demonstrated at all, the key role that pharmacists play in the health of the nation. I pay tribute to the role of pharmacists in providing support and filling the gap after GPs’ surgeries have closed. I reject, however, the idea that they have had no support. PPE has been provided, any pharmacist is prioritised as a key worker, and we will continue to offer support and to help grow this valuable sector.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, is there not a danger of sending out mixed messages? The Statement begins by celebrating what has been achieved together by flattening the curve, but the devolved nations in the UK are still behind the flattening of the curve achieved in London. It then says that, thanks to the resolve and shared sacrifice of the British people,

“we are now in the second phase of this fight.”

This is not so in Scotland, where I live. We are still firmly in lockdown and likely to remain so until June. Should those who prepare these Statements not be a bit more careful in their choice of language? Is there not a risk to those who live in Wales and Scotland if people who live in England are misled into believing that those other parts of Great Britain are in the second phase of the fight too?

[Lord Bethell]

I first pay tribute to the devolved nations for working so closely together, as characterised by the very close work of the four CMOs. The noble and learned Lord is entirely right that different parts of the country move at different paces—the disease does not respect national boundaries in any way—but public health messages have to be clear to be effective. It is difficult to speak in terms of one region or another being in different phases of the disease, but I completely accept his point that local variations may well be necessary. When they are, and if it is possible, we will have to shape our communications to that cause.

Wuhan Coronavirus

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 11th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford]

The travel advice, as it stands, is against travel to Hubei province, and against all but essential travel to China. There is no advice against other travel. People should be reassured that there is no problem there.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I could follow up on that very subject. This afternoon the set of barristers’ chambers to which I belong advised any of its members who had returned from any of the named countries to self-isolate, irrespective of whether they were showing symptoms. I think that is because it is so difficult, at the beginning, for the symptoms to emerge to a point at which somebody realises that they have reached the stage of being able to transmit the disease. This set of chambers has taken rather an extreme measure; maybe others are doing the same. Do I gather that that is not yet the CMO’s advice? On the other hand, would the CMO be considering whether the advice should be not just to self-isolate if symptoms develop, but for people returning from such places to self-isolate anyway as a precaution?

[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford]

I am sorry that I had not noticed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—who is of course also an excellent legal mind— sitting right behind the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. We are very grateful for the precautionary measures being taken by a number of individuals and organisations. However, the advice from the Chief Medical Officer and SAGE is proportionate. At the moment, the available evidence is that transmission while asymptomatic is very unlikely. That is why the advice stands as it is: where the risk is highest and where transmission is sustained, people should self-isolate immediately on return—which means on return from Wuhan and the rest of Hubei province. On return from other areas where transmission is less sustained, people should self-isolate on the arrival of symptoms.

Health Service Safety Investigations Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 29th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I should like to take advantage of speaking in the gap to return to a point that the Minister touched on briefly in her opening speech. It relates to the position of the devolved institutions. The background to what I want to say is provided by Clause 40, which provides that, subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Act is to extend to England and Wales only. There is an exception for Scotland and Northern Ireland in relation to Clause 18, but that does not relate to the point I want to raise.

The National Health Service, thank goodness, extends throughout the whole of the United Kingdom. It does not require a great deal of imagination to suppose that incidents that require investigation could affect the safety of patients in Northern Ireland and Scotland as well as in England and Wales. Although the Bill is very careful in Clause 2(4) to say that the apportionment of blame is not the purpose of the investigation, the fact is that the reports under Clauses 22 and 24 will contain information that may be of close interest to those who are pursuing proceedings in civil courts—possibly criminal courts as well, but mainly civil courts, I think—seeking damages for things that have gone wrong.

That brings me to Clause 25 and the point I wish to draw attention to. Clause 25 provides that, subject to subsection (3), reports under Clauses 22 or 24 are not to be admissible in any proceedings which are determining civil or criminal liability. But that is subject to the ability of the High Court to order that they shall be admissible provided that the balance is properly struck, for the reasons set out in the clause. That clause extends to England and Wales only, not to Scotland and Northern Ireland. The matter of concern to me is that unless there is an equivalent provision in those jurisdictions providing that information contained in these reports is not to be admissible, they will be admissible. Unless there is a prohibition on it, they will be admissible according to the ordinary rules.

The noble Baroness said that memoranda of understanding were being entered into with the devolved institutions, but I would like to be reassured that it goes further than just an understanding. One requires hard legislation to follow the line that Clause 25 very properly takes in these matters. It may be that the Minister can assure us that the memoranda of understanding extend to an undertaking by the devolved legislatures that they will provide equivalent legislation. If not, there may be something to be said for extending Clause 25 to Scotland and Northern Ireland. One understands, of course, the problem of getting any legislation through the Northern Ireland legislature in present circumstances.

My point really is to be absolutely sure that the carefully constructed provisions in Clause 25 are matched in Northern Ireland and Scotland, as well as in England and Wales.

Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I think that the noble Lord is right in saying that we are establishing a precedent, but I have been looking at the word “example”, and wonder whether the Minister has examples of this kind of legislation being used elsewhere. I cannot think of any. I examined the withdrawal Bill, which was very wide-ranging, and as far as I can recall this phrase does not appear in it even though it contains many provisions about delegated legislation. It would, therefore, be helpful to me if it was demonstrated that this is not the kind of precedent that has been described. In general, however, I congratulate the Minister and her Bill team on going a very long way to meet our objections in later parts of the Bill. I am, however, worried about this bit of it and would like to be reassured.

[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for tabling Amendment 3 and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for Amendment 5, both of which seek to place limits on the powers in the Bill.

I will first address the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, on Amendment 5, and clarify the purpose of Clause 2(2). We have had some debate about this already but this will be helpful. Clause 2(2) is intended to be an illustrative list of examples of the type of provision that may be included in regulations made under Clause 2(1). It is not itself intended to be a delegated power. The intention has always been to be prudent and transparent in the use of the delegated legislation, and the list was included to be helpful, by demonstrating the types of provision that the regulation-making powers at Clause 2(1) could enable, in order to effectively implement international healthcare regulations in the same way as under reciprocal healthcare regulations. This is not uncommon in primary legislation.

The list is reflective of the kind of provision already included in our current, more comprehensive, reciprocal healthcare arrangements with the EU, and it is intended as a guide to how the powers in Clause 2(1) can be exercised. Regulations under this clause need to be able to do everything that they might need to do to provide healthcare outside the UK, or to give effective agreement. I described in some detail during our debate on this clause in Committee why each of the descriptive lists were included and what they would be used for.

This amendment could mean that future Administrations would be unable to effectively implement reciprocal healthcare agreements with the EU, individual member states or other countries. The reason for this, which has already been alluded to in the debate, is that we have not yet concluded those negotiations and so it is not possible to rule out what we may need to provide for in regulations to give effect to an agreement. In addition, it would not be appropriate to circumscribe in the Bill the Government’s negotiating mandate with the EU, EU member states or countries outside the EEA and Switzerland.

The examples in Clause 2(2) are not exhaustive, but they are useful pointers to aid understanding of how Clause 2(1) is capable of being exercised. I think they have served their purpose, given that we have had such robust debate about them. They offer additional transparency and assistance in understanding how the regulation-making powers in Clause 2(1) would work for the purpose of implementing reciprocal healthcare agreements. This is not an unusual statutory construction; there are examples of where regulation-making powers are accompanied by illustrative lists of what may be included in regulations in order to provide assistance in the understanding of what the powers are capable of doing. As to whether those illustrative lists include the words “for example”, I have an example from Clause 11(2) of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, which states:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may, for example—”,


include paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). That is perhaps a helpful example for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

As this important policy area continues to develop and progress both in the EU and outside the EU, it is appropriate for the Government to be able to respond to protect the continuity of care of those already in receipt of reciprocal healthcare, as well as to explore whether we would like to extend it to others. Were we to accept this amendment, it would, as I said on the previous group, restrict the implementation of reciprocal healthcare arrangements to current processes. That is clearly inappropriate when implementing dynamic agreements in which there are two parties.

Regulations under Clause 2(1) need to be able to do everything they might need to do to provide for healthcare outside the UK or give effect to a healthcare agreement. One small example of why it is right that the Government retain the ability to do this is developments in IT or new technology. As technological change continues to gather pace, it is right that the Government should be able to make the best use of those changes and ensure the most effective and efficient systems for the people accessing these arrangements. That is why we might need to bring in another regulation-making power. I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, as a former Health Minister, would agree that technology has the power to change the way people access healthcare and can make a real difference in people’s lives, especially perhaps those who are restricted from accessing healthcare because of long-term conditions or distance from services.

While the illustrative list at Clause 2(2) does not expressly make reference to this matter, it may well be necessary to make arrangements to ensure that the most effective and efficient technological processes and systems are incorporated into the implementation of future reciprocal healthcare agreements. The Government are working, through this Bill, to ensure that we have the necessary ability to implement future international healthcare agreements with both EU and non-EU countries.

Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, speaks to concerns about the breadth of the powers in the Bill. Clause 1 follows a long line of general payment powers found in primary legislation, further to the Public Accounts Committee’s concordant that government expenditure should flow from a specific Act of Parliament. It is a free-standing payment power and needs to be so. Notwithstanding that, we have deliberately chosen to include a power in Clause 2(1) that can be used to support the exercise of the payment power. Therefore, it is not possible for the Government to accept this amendment. Indeed, the DPRRC recognises that general payment powers are not delegated powers.

As I said in my response to this amendment in Committee, the Bill is making good progress through Parliament but clearly will not have Royal Assent until later this month. So, with the best will in the world, we will not be able to lay regulations until the summer. However, in the undesirable, unprecedented situation of no deal, we may need to use these powers before then. That would be specifically for a scenario concerning citizens’ rights agreements with the EFTA states and with Switzerland, which will protect reciprocal healthcare for people living in those countries on exit day, or in other specified cross-border situations.

It is good news that we have operative agreements in the context of no deal, as they will guarantee healthcare for those covered by them. It is likely, though, that we will need to use the power in Clause 1, together with Clause 4, to temporarily implement those agreements. We cannot therefore accept the amendment because we would not be able to protect the healthcare arrangements of people in those countries. We will bring forward further detail in coming weeks when we can be clearer about bilateral agreements, and on the need for any further arrangements. I hope that noble Lords will agree that the Government must have the ability to provide for people at this unprecedented time. I emphasise that stand-alone funding powers such as those in Clause 1 that operate without the need for delegated legislation are not unusual—so this is not being brought in simply because of a no-deal situation.

I have listened carefully and considered the comments of noble Lords about concerns about the scope and breadth of the power. That is why we have sought to address concerns about it, with a large package of amendments to which I have already referred. We have specifically limited the delegated powers and the scope of what can be done under the Bill, and provided additional parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms and greater transparency.

Finally, I will speak to government Amendments 6, 7 and 8. They are in direct response to the concerns raised that regulations under the Bill could be used to confer functions on anyone, anywhere. It is understandable that noble Lords raised the possibility that the regulation-making powers in Clause 2 could be extended to confer functions on private bodies. There is not and has never been an intention to confer functions on private bodies in order to implement reciprocal healthcare arrangements. This was always the case but, given the concerns raised, we are taking action to make this clear.

The proposed government amendments limit Clause 2 to the operation of Clause 2(1) to ensure that any conferral or delegation of functions may only be to a “public authority”. The definition of “public authority” is a person who exercises a function of a public nature. This ensures that public bodies maintain autonomy over how services are procured, contracted and delivered. When making regulations to implement such healthcare agreements, we wish to confer relevant functions on appropriate public bodies according to their part, giving them clear legal responsibility and an operating mandate. Our amendment does not prohibit us from doing this.

I therefore hope that noble Lords will withdraw or not move their amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I have already spoken warmly about the efforts by the noble Baroness, Lady Blackwood, and referred to us having a little touch of Blackwood in this House. Let it continue. I should like what has happened today to be habit-forming.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Perhaps I may add a few words to those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I was particularly concerned by Clause 5(3), as the noble Baroness may remember, and am delighted to see it removed because, as worded, it gave rise to a lot of problems. Together with the other amendments proposed, there is considerable improvement and I am most grateful.

[Baroness Thornton]

I tabled an amendment in this group. First, I join the noble and learned Lords and all noble Lords in saying thank you very much to the Government and the noble Baroness for removing these Henry VIII powers, which cause so much heartache in this House—we really do not like them at all. I tabled Amendment 21 because I should like an explanation. Given that our Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee have several times said that they find the negative procedure rampant in the Bill, and that the British Medical Association has also voiced its concern about legislation being subject to the negative resolution procedure, in the interests of accountability, I need to ask the Minister to explain to the House the justification for negative procedure throughout the Bill. Should it not be subject to the same level of scrutiny as in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, for example?

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 26th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords, I offer my support to my noble friend’s amendment. All of us know—with due respect to the lawyers sitting among us today—that when you have more than a few lawyers, you get more than some factorial of opinions. My noble friend’s amendment was drawn up in consultation with both the care sector and human rights lawyers—hence we have more than one view. We believe that where we are is the right view.

The Minister stated that it was not always possible to use plain English in legislation. That is patently not the case. I point the Minister to the Care Act, another piece of legislation that affects the care of vulnerable adults. It was written from top to toe in plain English.

There is a call for this amendment to be clear. We have already heard today that the double negatives used in the government amendment are not easily understood. It does not read well; it is not comfortable. It needs to be clear, in positive rather than negative language, and able to be understood by a lay person or a carer. This amendment has the backing of the care and health sector bodies, and so we support it.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, this is a very difficult area. I agree with all the noble Baronesses who have spoken, in so far as they stress the problems of trying to identify what one means by “liberty” in this area, particularly regarding mental health. A number of cases have come before the courts, both in this House when it was sitting in its appellate capacity, and in the UK Supreme Court, where I sat and grappled with this problem myself. I support the government amendment which seems much more consistent with the way the Strasbourg court has interpreted Article 5.

There is a great deal of case law that has been developed over the years as to the meaning of “liberty” in its various contexts. The point that comes out very clearly from a case called HL v the United Kingdom—it went to Strasbourg following a decision in this House in a case called R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust—is that account has to be taken of a whole range of factors when you look at the word “liberty” for the purposes of the article. The court says that in the end it will always come down to a question of degree and intensity, regarding whether what has been going on really is a deprivation of liberty or merely a restriction. It is trying to devise a dividing line between these factors that one is searching for in looking for a definition.

The court said it decided not to try to define the world “liberty”, because it was so difficult to find a workable definition that would apply to all circumstances. What you tend to find is the approach that the government amendment takes, of saying what does not fall within the article in a given case, and what does. It is a safer way of proceeding, rather than trying to, as the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness does, lay down in clear terms what the “deprivation of liberty” amounts to. The problem is that if one looks at the way in which that amendment is framed, in future cases the courts are going to find it very difficult to see whether Article 5 is consistent with what is in the amendment. Then there is the problem of the court having to declare an incompatibility, which then has to be sorted out by some further amendment.

The safer and most useful route is to anchor the amendment to Article 5, as subsection (1) of the government amendment does; and then, for the guidance of those who have to deal with these difficult issues, set out some clearly defined areas where they are not at risk of it being said that they are in conflict with the article. I do not find the provisions set out in the subsections that follow difficult to understand.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for allowing me to ask a question about the comments of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and its grave reservations about the formulation which the Government are putting forward.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am not surprised; we are all grappling with a difficult area. Based on my own experience, and my reading of the Strasbourg decisions, the Government’s approach is the safer one to adopt. Before the noble Baroness stopped me, I was trying to say that there are situations where the use of a double negative is a perfectly intelligible way of proceeding, so that criticism does not seem particularly strong. I suggest that we follow the Government’s approach for the reasons I have given, especially because of the way it anchors the proposed section to Article 5 itself. We are always going to come back to the Strasbourg court and the way it interprets the article. We do not have the final word on this, I am afraid, because of the way the convention is framed, the way we have subscribed to it and the way we apply the decisions of the Strasbourg court.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy (Con)]

My Lords, this is a challenging and complex Bill and this topic is possibly the most complex of all. Before considering the merits of the two approaches, it is worth reflecting on the fact that a huge amount of work has gone into the development of the government amendment and that in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I signal our gratitude to that work, and to the contribution of many people who grappled with a difficult and challenging area, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out. I am certain that all those people had the right intentions.

Speaking from the Back Benches, having shepherded the Bill on an interesting rollercoaster ride through this House while I was a Minister, there are two questions which I have to satisfy myself on. The first, and less important in a sense, is whether this fulfils the promise which I made the House that the Government would bring forward a definition. The second—much more important—one is whether the Government have provided an operable definition that will be useful in reality, which is, after all, what we want. My noble friend the Minister gave a robust exposition of the merits of the Government’s amendment. It is certainly the product of a huge amount of work, some of it when I was in the department, and offers clarity and precision. It also offers a way through on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. There has been a great deal of disagreement on what the right, positive definition ought to look like, so going for a negative one—I think it was described as an exclusionist definition—offers a way through.

The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, made an important point about the complexity of language and whether this is intelligible. We need to draw a distinction between who will be using the Act and who will be using the statutory guidance that will flow from it. The Act will mainly be the subject of scrutiny by lawyers and others who are able to cope with double negatives and such things, in a way that I cannot. More importantly, these will be—and are being—distilled into case studies of how this would operate in practice. That is what will be practically useful for cared-for people, their carers and those who are supporting them. Perhaps when my noble friend responds to this debate she will say a little more about how the statutory guidance which will bring this to life will be scrutinised.

The key question is whether the definition that the Government have provided will be usable in the courts and compatible with the ECHR. I believe that it is but, more importantly for this House, the opinion of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, is that it performs that function. On that basis, I am happy to support the approach taken by the Government, not only because it satisfies the commitment I made to this House but, more importantly, because it provides an operable definition that will be useful to those who have to grapple with it every day.

Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 21st February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

If a defect was pointed out in a statutory instrument, I would consider that a matter for stopping it going forward. Most of the arguments I have heard in recent times do not point to any mistake in an instrument. They are more theoretical. I do not wish to examine them in detail—I have done that once—but it is important. That is what was proposed when these instruments were originally laid. It is much easier to amend an instrument by taking it back and starting again than with an Act of Parliament. That is the appropriate procedure for correcting a defective instrument, and it happens, not necessarily formally, but quite often instruments are withdrawn when a mistake is pointed out; they get round to writing it again and hopefully the second time it is improved.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, it is perhaps worth mentioning Amendment 28 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, which was covered by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, because he directs our attention to a quite extraordinary provision. On page 3 of the Bill at line 40, we are asked to approve Clause 5(3), which allows regulations to be made amending, repealing or revoking,

“primary legislation … for the purpose of conferring functions on the Secretary of State or on any other person”.

That is extraordinarily wide. I can understand conferring powers on the Secretary of State but why “on any other person”, given that the subsection then adds “(including conferring a discretion)”? That really is the most extraordinarily broad provision, which should be looked at very carefully.

[Lord Patel (CB)]

I thank my Convenor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for bringing attention to my amendment. I will be briefer than brief because the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, not only introduced my amendment but spoke to it. My purpose in tabling Amendment 28 was to bring attention to exactly what the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord have just said: it is an extraordinary power to take. I fear that it is this kind of power that led the Constitution Committee to suggest that the only way for Parliament to scrutinise the Bill subsequently might be to introduce such a draconian provision as a sunset clause; I say draconian because I am worried that it may have other implications. As I said on Monday, I worry that that will affect what the agreements in the future might do, particularly with the EU. But we will no doubt have another opportunity to discuss that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lansley]

But subsection (3) is clear: this is a power to amend primary legislation,

“for the purpose of conferring functions on the Secretary of State … to give effect to a healthcare agreement”.

The noble and learned Lord will know that that at least limits the scope.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, raises an interesting point. It is something that should be clarified by better drafting. Splitting things into subheads, as is done frequently throughout the Bill, tends in some ways to open up the arguments to which the noble Lord, Lord Patel, has drawn attention. As I think I have mentioned to the Minister outside the Chamber, the way these provisions are drafted in this cumulative form is rather unfortunate because if they are read together in a single sentence they can be narrowed down, whereas if they are separated out it suggests that paragraph (a) has a life of its own, so one may wonder what “any other person” can possibly refer to. I hope that the Minister will take these points away and ask the draftsmen to look more carefully at how the Bill is drafted, particularly when using that style of drafting.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a very powerful and useful debate to have as a precursor to the one we are about to have, where we will again address the nature of the powers in the Bill. I enjoy it very much when noble Lords such as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, use the words “rather unfortunate”. Of course, in House of Lords-speak, which the Minister will become accustomed to, it is a very serious thing to say of a piece of legislation that its drafting is rather unfortunate. I want to say how much I appreciated the interventions from the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, to whom I always listen most carefully.

My noble friend Lord Foulkes referred to discussions that may take place outside this Chamber on whether statutory instruments should be referred back, but actually we know from the past that, when your Lordships become exercised about a statutory instrument, we see threats in the press about our existence and, “How dare they!”. That is a serious problem, so I think there is an issue that we need to address that is broader than just this Bill.

Penrose Inquiry

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Thursday 26th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness makes a very important point. NICE guidance on the first of the new hepatitis C drugs is expected in June this year. Pending that, in April last year NHS England introduced an early access scheme for the new hepatitis C therapies. Over 700 patients have now been treated as a result of that policy, including some of those who were infected by blood or blood products in the 1970s and 1980s. NHS England is considering a further early access policy to include patients with cirrhosis, which it is aiming to have in place in the first half of this year. I think that should be of comfort to many patients.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Earl for repeating the Statement. He may be aware that the report was very badly received by the public in Edinburgh, which is a source of concern. One of the people, no doubt someone affected by the disaster, was shown on television burning the report. Against that background, and appreciating of course that this is primarily a Scottish matter, will the noble Earl take steps to ensure that the Statement itself and some of the reassuring remarks that he and indeed the noble Lord opposite have made are drawn to the attention of the media in Scotland, as the more it can be put across that this is a valuable report that has done a great deal of work and sets a basis for further study, the more the public will be reassured? I would be grateful if the noble Earl would do that.

[Earl Howe]

I am happy to undertake to use my best endeavours in that regard.

Health: Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, it is customary on these occasions to congratulate the first speaker on having obtained the debate to which we are privileged to listen. However, I think that it might also be right on this occasion to commiserate with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, partly because of the small number of noble Lords who have put down their names to speak but also because, in a way, much of the force of what was to be discussed was taken away by the debate to which she referred, which took place on 10 March, last week. There were 10 speeches on that occasion, including a speech by the noble Baroness herself, a speech by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and a speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who I am glad to see in her place. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, indicated to me earlier that he thought he would be unable to be present this evening, although I see that he is in his place just now, for a while at least.

As the debate today is directed to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Cheshire West case, I felt that I should step into the breach and put down my name, but I emphasise that I have no expertise in mental health law, nor do I have any knowledge of the operation in practice of applications for authorisation under Section 16 of the 2005 Act or the deprivation of liberty procedures under Schedule 1A for those detained in hospitals and care homes. Given those shortcomings, I felt it might be helpful if I said a few things about the judgment itself, about the test which it lays down and, as far as I can, on what is to be done about the case, although I am not sure that I can answer all the questions in the noble Baroness’s exam paper which she set before us a few moments ago.

The judgment itself is very interesting from the juridical point of view because it is one of those rare examples of the court going further than the Strasbourg court has done. There is a great deal of debate about the relationship between the United Kingdom courts and the Strasbourg court, and most of those debates concentrate on the other side of the coin, which is giving effect to or following Strasbourg, when people say that we should be more robust and not do so. This is a quite different thing. This is stretching the application of the convention rights beyond what Strasbourg has thought it right to do and has yet had to consider by cases that have come before it. There are some who point out that that gives enormous power to the judges to, in effect, create law. This is perhaps an example of that. I am not criticising the court for doing that, but it is an interesting example of a rather unusual situation.

It was a majority decision of four to three—a borderline decision, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, said, but a decision it was. I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord that it is not for us to say how we would have resolved it. We take the decision as it stands. It is worth recording that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, who wrote the leading judgment for the majority, was without doubt the best qualified of all judges to express an opinion on the subject. She has made a study of mental health law over many years and is the author of a leading textbook on the subject. She is also pre-eminent among our judges in her understanding of human rights law. The issue could not have been in better hands so far as the law was concerned.

It is a feature of that case, however—it happens from time to time when one looks at decisions taken by judges—that they were not concerned with the practical implications of their judgment. They may give guidance, but it is not their responsibility to see how that would be done, what it would cost or what has to be done to give effect to it. In a sense, that is their luxury. Their task is to say what the law is. The matter is then passed to the Executive—the Government—to find the money and give effect to what the law requires. That is where we are now.

There are questions, of course, as to what the law as laid down in the judgment requires. The essential point, which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, mentioned, is that the situations do not enable one to distinguish between people of sound mind and those of unsound mind. Human rights are the same for everyone. The word “everyone” appears repeatedly throughout the European convention. There is a difference between a mere restriction and a deprivation of liberty. It is a question of fact and degree. Of course it depends on the situation of the person concerned. The situation where a person is detained on the authority of the state in a hospital or a care home really does not give rise to any problem, because it is obvious that that is a deprivation of liberty. In that case, the DoL procedures must be applied.

The difficult cases are those with which the judgment was especially concerned: people of unsound mind in benign situations with foster parents in a home setting, on the one hand, so that they can lead as normal lives as possible, or with live-in carers, on the other, for the same reason. Addressing that issue, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, said that the concept of physical liberty is the same for them as for anyone else, regardless of their mental or physical disability. The right at issue is a right not to be deprived of that physical liberty—whether that person is free or not free to come and go as he or she pleases. Where a person is by reason of an action taken by the state—I emphasise that we are talking about state interventions, not interventions by parents exercising their ordinary parental responsibilities—the question is whether that situation is one where they can properly be said to be deprived of their liberty. That is so however benign the environment they are in and irrespective of whether they actually want to break loose and leave the situation on their own initiative. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, put it in paragraph 56,

“it is the constraints that matter”.

However, the question is still left in the air as to how far this judgment goes. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, addressed that issue in his speech last Tuesday. He said:

“It can fairly be said that the facts of those three cases represent about the furthermost examples of what the English courts …would conclude involves a deprivation of liberty”.—[Official Report, 10/3/15; col. 632.]

When one considers the nature of the places where those concerned were living, the noble and learned Lord must be right about that. Indeed, he also said that the borderline between restriction and deprivation of liberty is quite a narrow one. Those cases lay at the extreme limits.

The facts will vary from case to case, and one has to face the situation that the facts of those two cases must not be taken as definitive. Indeed, when the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, was writing about this she said that we should err on the side of caution in dealing with the situation of people of extreme vulnerability. It is quite striking that she rejected an invitation to lay down an acid test for the deprivation of liberty. What she did instead was to set out certain things that are not relevant. For example, the person’s lack of objection is not relevant. The normality of the situation in which they are placed is not relevant. The reason or purpose behind a particular placement is not relevant. But what we do not find in the judgment is an answer to the kind of questions that, understandably, the noble Baroness is raising as to where exactly the line should be drawn.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, did venture on this point, too, but I am not sure that I agree entirely with what he said. He made a distinction between long-term placements of unsound mind and situations in which people are placed that are the result of a terminal or emergency situation. I can agree with him about terminal situations and emergency situations, because the timeframe is necessarily short, but I am a little uneasy about the phrase “long-term placements”, which was a point addressed by the noble Baroness. One could have situations that are meant to be temporary but involve the deprivation of liberty. They may be quite short term—a matter of two or three weeks or a month or so. In those cases, it looks as though, if there is a deprivation of liberty, the procedures must be applied. That illustrates the problem pointed to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, about trying to draw any kind of precise line to be able to say when a situation is caught and when it is not. Each case must be taken on its own facts.

The question then is what needs to be done. I recognise that there are limits to what the Minister can say in the dying days of this Parliament. He cannot commit very many people to what can be done in the next two or three weeks. But one or two points may be made and he may be in a position to say something about them. The first is in relation to the Government’s reaction to the Select Committee report, which was mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. The paragraphs that are relevant in that response are paragraphs 7.26, 7.27 and 7.31. I will not read them out because they are available to everyone. But the Government get full marks for accepting that there is a pressing area that needs attention in the matter of community care arrangements of the kind involved in the case of Cheshire West. There is a pressing need here and a new legal framework needs to be designed in order to deal with that problem.

The difficulty I have is that the solution that has been adopted is to ask the Law Commission to undertake a review. It is recognised in paragraph 7.27 that this work will not complete for a few years. That seems to come close to kicking the matter into the long grass. I quite see that one wants some kind of informed approach to this issue but to look at dealing with it in terms of years rather than doing so in the relatively short term seems to be rather unfortunate. Surely something could be done more immediately. The point is raised in a paper on the impact of the judgment circulated by the Local Government Association, which draws attention to the increasing burden on councils which are already concerned about the affordability of the Care Act and calls on the Government to commit fully to funding all the burdens that rest upon them. The association also calls for a change in the law for people lacking capacity who need supervision and need to be in supported living environments. It wants action to be taken in the short term in various respects to enable the matter to be addressed.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made the same point at the end of his speech last week and I endorse exactly what he said. Can the Minister explain a little more whether any thought is being given to addressing these problems as a matter of urgency rather than waiting for a matter of years for the Law Commission to report and no doubt further years after that for further legislation to be introduced?

Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 24th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Baroness for giving way. Can she explain to the House what advantage there would be in referring the matter to which she is now addressing her remarks to a Joint Committee? Take, for example, compliance with the statute that already exists where the regulations are ultra vires. Surely that is a matter for determination by a judge and nothing that your Lordships can say in the House today, or indeed that a Joint Committee could say in its report, would resolve that issue in a way that would tie the hands of a court. I rather suspect, although her knowledge is greater than mine, that the position is exactly the same in Europe. Therefore, I cannot see that referring the matter to a Joint Committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, asks us to do, would advance it except simply to delay the decision on the issue, which would ultimately have to be taken by a court.

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

My Lords, the issues in relation to how the charter impacts upon the legislation that we are discussing have not been sought out, have not been argued and have not been developed. One of the essential issues, if we are to do something which everyone agrees is novel, different and important internationally, is that we have to be confident that we are on solid ground because if we are not, we give a disservice. There are two things. One is that the research that is still awaited and, as was mentioned by the right reverend Prelate, is to be forthcoming should be available. The second is that these issues in relation to the charter could be properly articulated. I looked quite carefully to see whether this has already been done. Had that already been looked at, and was there an answer in the letter of the 17th that the noble Lord issued? Were all the worries that I have—I am afraid that there are about 20 pages of them—dealt with? However, they have not been. So the question comes back: why the haste?

Everybody agrees that we have to get this right and having worked so hard and so long, and knowing of the pain that many have already spoken about, what a cruel thing it would be to do this and then say that the legal basis upon which it was founded was flawed. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is right that if in the final analysis the arguments we articulate and which go through the Select Committee are not sufficiently sound, the only way in which the sagacity and value of these legal principles can be tested would be in a court. That is what would happen.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Does the noble and learned Baroness also agree that until the regulations are made, the matter cannot be tested because courts do not deal with hypothetical arguments? The regulations have to be made, so if this issue is to be properly tested in a court the first step is to make the regulations.

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

My Lords, there are two steps. I would argue that the first step is that if a Select Committee is able to deal with all these matters in the proposal currently before us in draft, and which would today go into regulations, would be the basis of the Select Committee’s examination. If that basis is found to need some minor alteration or amendment, it would be that amended version which would then come before this House and form part of the regulations. That would be the issue that would likely be tested if there was still disagreement.

My hope would be that the concerns that have properly been raised could be dealt with by the Select Committee, particularly if we were to persuade some of the noble and learned Lords who had perhaps served in the Supreme Court in the past to lend us some of their expertise on that Select Committee. One of the advantages that we have in this House is of having that level of expertise. That is why we could do this in rather a short compass. First, I do not agree with those who think that this issue should be kicked into the long grass. It should not. Secondly, I do not believe that a Government of any complexion, as has been said in this debate, who had a very well reasoned and consensual Select Committee report would hesitate from implementing it.