(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it is a pleasure to open on this group of amendments, which in many ways builds on the first group. This Bill is light on the use of technology and on the use of intelligence between the regulators which are spread across the financial services landscape. As my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe said in responding to the first group, in many ways the Bill feels as if it is written for a time which is already rapidly evaporating. There are new payment mechanisms and new financial instruments. In fact, there are new products which are already dominating key parts of the market.
It would seem to make sense to have provision for more intelligence-sharing across the regulators, and indeed the broader landscape. Modern technologies are deployed by both participants and bad actors in this arena. Thus, it would seem to make sense to have combined activity, connected action and shared intelligence among the regulators and, within that, to bring technologies such as AI and others to bear in achieving it. I look forward to the debate on this amendment and others in this group, and to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I should like to speak to Amendments 64B and 69AA in this group, which are in my name. They direct attention to matters arising from the provisions in Clause 14 that are of great concern to the Law Society and the Law Society of Scotland. I apologise to the Minister for their late arrival; they are based on draft amendments that were not sent to me until Monday of this week. I am grateful to the Table Office for its help in drafting them at short notice.
The background to these amendments is as follows. The Law Society and the Law Society of Scotland are both regulatory authorities. Their current regulatory roles include responsibility for supervising compliance by solicitors, in their respective jurisdictions, with the UK’s anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing frameworks. They are, therefore, supervisory authorities of the kind referred to in the amendment to Section 49 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, as set out in Clause 14(2).
However, the regulation of anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing is only part of the responsibilities that these two societies exercise as regulators. Solicitors play an important role in tackling economic crime. The societies’ roles as AML supervisory bodies are a key component of their functions as regulators of the solicitor profession. This is a task that both societies take very seriously. I am told that the Law Society of Scotland employs a team of dedicated specialists with detailed, up-to-date knowledge of the trends in economic crime and the risks that are associated with the provision of legal services; I have no reason to think that the way in which the Law Society of England and Wales handles its responsibilities is any different.
The effect of the amendments proposed in Clause 14 would be to transfer, through regulations that we have not yet seen, the front-line AML supervision of the solicitor profession to the Financial Conduct Authority, as the single professional services regulator. The Law Society believes that this will amount to a seismic shake-up as to how law firms and their AML/CTF obligations are regulated, which risks sending shockwaves through the sector. It also says that adapting to this change has the potential to divert attention, resources and time from supporting clients and developing solicitors’ businesses, with effects that it would be quite hard to cope with.
The Law Society of Scotland strongly opposes this change. Its point is that it will lead to the duplication of systems of regulation. On the one hand, the society will continue to have its role as the profession’s regulator; on the other hand, there will be the FCA. Solicitor firms, large and small, will have to deal with them both in future, increasing the time spent and the cost of being regulated. This will bear heavily, especially on small firms in the remoter areas of Scotland, which often operate on very narrow margins. The population is thinly spread in these areas, as are the firms that exist to provide essential legal services there to the people who need them. Much will of course depend on how the FCA approaches its task, but anything that might lead to the disappearance of these firms due to the consequences would be very much to be regretted. That is what lies behind the Law Society of Scotland’s objection.
The Law Society of England and Wales, for its part, is concerned that, without a clear statement of their position by the Treasury and the FCA, Parliament is being asked to legislate for powers to enable the detail of the reforms to be enacted that remain unclear and which the sector has not yet seen.
My Amendment 64B focuses on the points that are of particular concern. I shall mention in relation to each one, as briefly as I can, the questions for which answers are sought from the Minister. Proposed new subsection (1C)(a) asks that the regulations be “proportionate and risk-based”. The question is whether the FCA intends to import its banking model into the process for all solicitors’ firms, small as well as large, or instead to take a risk-based approach. Should not the supervision in regard to this profession be tailored to the risks posed by the different sectors within it? Firms vary from the very small, with perhaps just one partner in a remote part of Scotland, to the very large international firms found in the City of London. How will the Government ensure that the small high street firms up and down the country are not disproportionately burdened by the system that they propose to operate?
Proposed new subsection (1C)(b) seeks appropriate protections for legal professional privilege and client confidentiality. Can the Minister confirm that nothing will be done under Clause 14 that will weaken legal professional privilege, which has a vital role in securing access to justice? The Solicitors Regulation Authority of the Law Society of England and Wales at present keeps all LPP material confidential. It may be used only for investigation and enforcement proceedings against the solicitor or the firm that it regulates. It may not be used in relation to proceedings that may be taken against its clients. Will the FCA follow the Law Society’s practice? Will it also accommodate the duty of confidentiality that underpins much legal work? Further, will it respect the obligations of the solicitor or the firm to the court?
Proposed new subsection (1D) seeks to avoid duplication. It is feared that the Treasury will introduce a broader system of regulation than the current regime, with the risk that this will duplicate the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s oversight, create unnecessary burdens and delay routine transactions. What practical mechanisms can be put in place to prevent solicitors from being subjected to overlapping requirements from both the FCA and the SRA?
Proposed new subsection (1E) calls for an impact assessment. How can the appropriateness of these powers be judged without seeing the underlying regime? Will the regulations be accompanied by assessments of their impact on those to be subjected to the system of supervision for which they provide? What estimate has been made of the compliance costs for these law firms? Will the powers be compatible with the way that legal services are regulated in Scotland, which has a different legal system from that in England and Wales?
My Amendment 69AA asks for a review of AML and CTF supervision within three years and a report that includes an assessment of each of the points to which I have drawn attention. I do not expect the Minister to answer my questions this evening. I have set them out because I hope that they may form the basis of some discussion, if the noble Lord is willing to meet me at some point before Report to go over these thoughts at greater leisure and in more detail.
My Lords, I add some comments to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has said and what he is trying to achieve. I put on record my interests in the register as a chartered accounts and chartered tax adviser—I am very well versed in the burdens, I suppose, of the AML regulations in smaller practice. These are burdens that we all suffer almost daily if attempting to move money between one very regulated institution in the UK to another very regulated institution in the UK. We have all suffered it: you transfer funds from one to another, yet the receiving institution asks the same questions all over again, including proofs of source of funds, as the original organisation, in the UK, asked when you put those funds into that institution.
Frankly, the AML regulations have got out of control. We could do it in this Bill, and I think it is time to streamline what has become a real blockage in the UK. I had a quite ridiculous situation recently in purchasing a property: they wanted proof of funds for a transaction that I conducted in 1992. I struggled to find it, because it had long gone through the shredder, as one might imagine.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI hope that I will be equally quick on this amendment, as there are points of more substance and principle to be debated later.
We discussed Amendment 3 in Committee. Essentially, it relates to a set of circumstances in which trademarks and GIs—geographical indications—may come into conflict and the circumstances in which the Secretary of State can make a decision that there would be confusion between the two. The point is that the GIs should be compared to existing trademarks and registered trademarks; to circumstances where, on the date which the GI is submitted, there are applications for the registration of trademarks; and, as the legislation refers to, where trademarks are “established by use”.
My problem is that nowhere in trademark legislation do the words “established by use” appear. My noble friend’s letter to me of 10 January said that “established by use” refers to unregistered trademarks. We appear to be putting into statute the concept that where a trademark has been used, it can be established but not registered, and I am not sure that that is helpful. What is more helpful would be to indicate that the Secretary of State should have a discretion to look at a GI that may come into conflict with an unregistered trademark—there are such things—and where confusion would result. My noble friend says that they may just use a trademark once, and the fact that it had been used once at some point in the past may lead to this confusion. As the legislation is drafted, the Secretary of State would actually have the discretion to judge these matters and to say whether confusion would arise. If a trademark has not been used prior to that date in any substantial way, I think the Secretary of State could ignore it and say that the GI has a meaning that people will readily understand.
I have a problem with the term “established by use” and think that “in use prior to that date” is more straight- forward and has the meaning we are looking for; “established by use” runs a risk of establishing that, in law, trademarks can be established by use. That is not something that the trademarks legislation currently admits of. I am not an expert in intellectual property matters, but I have talked to one or two who are, as we do in this place. I think there may be a problem with this, but I stand to be corrected by my noble friend. For the moment, I beg to move Amendment 3.
My Lords, I cannot claim any expertise in trademarks or their registration, but I think there is force in the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. The expression “established by use” is slightly vague, whereas the words that the noble Lord would substitute—of it being actively “in use prior to that date”—make the point rather better. I support the amendment, for what it is worth, in the interests of clarity.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is right: the Trade Marks Act 1994 at no point uses the words “established by use”. However, the Act makes specific provision for registered trademarks, whereas those established by use—as the noble Lord said—would presumably be unregistered and, therefore, subject to common law through the concept of passing off. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s comments on passing off and whether that covers it.
I want to pick up the main point of this amendment and, specifically, geographical indications. I think this may be the only time on Report that we will be able to get some words into Hansard on that. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, picked up the technical part, but there is a wider set of issues on geographical indications on which I am interested to hear the Minister’s response.
When this agreement was announced in October 2020, the then Trade Secretary Liz Truss MP promised that 77 specialist UK food and drink products would be guaranteed protected geographical indication status, along with the seven that were carried over from the previous EU-Japan trade deal. The former DIT Minister said that the protections would be in place by May 2021 for all 77 new products, which included many iconic British brands, such as Scottish beef, Cornish pasties and Welsh lamb—to name but a few. The DIT also boasted that, thanks to Liz Truss’s agreement, the UK would benefit from fast-track processes for securing brand protection that would not have been possible under the EU-Japan deal. It said:
“The EU must negotiate each new GI individually on a case-by-case basis”.
The EU has added 84 extra products to its protected list since October 2020, including a number in the last few months, but I understand that Kemi Badenoch’s department has not yet secured brand protection for a single one of the 77 products originally promised. The number of EU GIs with Japan now stands at 299, which offers them protection, while the UK is still stuck with only the seven protected products inherited from the EU-Japan deal. Given this, how can UK producers of geographically indicated products be confident in the measures contained within the CPTPP?
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs Minister for the Department for Business and Trade, I am glad to be leading this debate. As my noble friend Lord Callanan promised several times, we are committed to ensuring that the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny is applied to all SIs utilising the powers in the retained EU law Act. I am pleased to commence today’s debate just as we commence our ambitious REUL reform programme.
I thank the SLSC for its report on this instrument. We have acknowledged the committee’s recommendations and have now revised the Explanatory Memorandum, adding a link to the line-by-line explainer into the document.
This instrument will revoke a further 93 pieces of retained EU law found to be obsolete or inoperable. This continues the work already begun by the retained EU law Act in tidying up and bringing further clarity to the statute book. Indeed, one of the key purposes of the retained EU law Act was to bring legislative clarity. Redundant retained EU law remaining on the statute book only causes unnecessary complication and confusion.
It is the duty of all responsible Governments to make our law as clear and accessible as possible, and therefore we must continue to identify REUL that is redundant or inoperable and ensure its removal from the statute book. This instrument is another step forward in that work.
These regulations will also preserve seven pieces of retained EU law that are on the REUL Act’s schedule for revocation at the end of 2023. Further analysis of the legislation listed in Schedule 1 to the REUL Act by UK government departments has established that these seven pieces of REUL must be preserved to maintain the current policy position for one of a number of reasons.
There are, for instance, plans to reform legislation in the area of merchant shipping, but until that reform process has been completed, there is a need for legislative continuity, for which reason one piece of REUL is being preserved. Three pieces of legislation have been identified by the Northern Ireland Civil Service as requiring preservation because their revocation would represent a policy change that cannot be agreed in the regrettable ongoing absence of an Executive. These three instruments are preserved for Northern Ireland only, while the four instruments identified by UK government departments will be preserved to the extent that they apply across the United Kingdom.
This SI represents a further step in the Government’s programme of retained EU law reform. We have already set out a range of ambitious reform plans, including on working time reporting requirements and streamlining the rulebook for wine. We will continue to use the powers in the retained EU law Act between now and June 2026 to reform and replace unnecessary regulations, providing regular updates to Parliament on our progress. The reform agenda is a crucial part of this Government’s agenda. We are committed to ensuring that REUL is reformed to be fit for the UK, reducing unnecessary burdens on businesses and helping them grow, while also reducing costs for businesses and consumers. I assure the House that this SI is just the beginning. I commend the regulations to the House.
My Lords, the Minister has said that the work is just beginning, and I understand that there is an enormous amount of work still to do. Can he give us any impression of the amount of work that has been done by the devolved Administrations, who have obligations to perform under this statute as well as the UK Government?
Contemplating Part 1, I wonder whether there is anything else that needs to be attended to, bearing in mind that the power being exercised in Part 1 expires at the end of this month. Time is short and the pieces of legislation listed are the product of oversight. It is nice to see that being corrected, but is there a risk that something else may be discovered, and is there time to unravel the situation enough to cure the problems that might emerge?
Otherwise, I think the work done is to be commended. It is good to see that the Act is being put into operation in the way the Minister has described.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, are your Lordships not being given a quite impossible task today? I have made a rough count, and in Part 2 of Schedule 2 there are 56 Council decisions or regulations that are sought to be revoked. The Minister describes it in general terms, saying they are to be revoked because they are redundant, obsolete or inoperable, but we do not know the reasons behind these revocations; we have not had the opportunity properly to examine whether we agree that they should take place.
I will ask the Minister one simple question, referring to Part 1 of Schedule 2. The first measure to be revoked in its entirety is the Alcoholic Liquor (Amendment of Units of Measurement) Order 1992. The restriction on the use of alcohol seems to be something of importance. Will the Minister kindly tell us precisely why that particular legislation is sought to be revoked?
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I have some very real concerns about the impacts of the new failure to prevent offence on small and medium-sized entities. If my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s Motion E1 is agreed to, I think it could be very significant. I believe that the other place was wise to restrict the offence to larger companies only. Setting the threshold at the micro-entity level would still leave very many small and medium-sized entities within the scope of the offence.
I did try to find out how many companies would be affected. My noble friend the Minister said 450,000 companies would be brought within the net of the offence. According to Companies House statistics, around 3.1 million active companies filed accounts last year. Of those, 1.6 million were for micro-entities, and would therefore be excluded, but 1.4 million were for small companies that took advantage of the audit exemption. That, very broadly, is the group of companies that would benefit from the changes made by the other place; it is obviously rather more than 450,000. Whatever the number, there will certainly be regulatory costs for those companies, whether 450,000 or 1.4 million. My noble friend the Minister has given his estimate of what those costs will be. I have never placed much faith in estimates made by Governments of the direct costs of regulatory burdens that Governments try to impose. I generally put a multiplier against them to arrive at a more realistic figure.
However, I believe the most important cost is the opportunity cost that is imposed by regulation. Every time a new regulation is imposed, the people who run small businesses have to spend time away from thinking about their core activities, which should be wealth-generating. Every moment spent thinking about whether they have reasonable prevention procedures in place, or implementing those procedures, is a moment spent not thinking about how to grow the business or how to make it more profitable. Large companies have specialists to cope with all this. Small businesses often have no one beyond the proprietor of the business itself, but they are the very people who are supposed to be spending their time growing their businesses, thereby helping the UK economy to grow—and my goodness me, do not we need growth in our economy?
The cumulative effect of incremental regulation on individual businesses is huge, as any small businessman will tell you, but the cumulative opportunity cost for those businesses of missing out on that growth, and the impact that will have on UK plc, simply cannot be ignored when we are looking at any form of legislation that imposes burdens on businesses. I urge noble Lords to accept the pragmatic solution that the other place has put forward.
My Lords, I am greatly assisted by the correction made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks; I had great difficulty in understanding the amendment on first reading. Now that he has corrected it, I would like to say from the point of view of a Scots lawyer that there is nothing startling in the proposition that is made. We in Scotland are quite used to the normal routine that law enforcement agencies are not liable in costs for the proceedings that have been taken, probably for the reasons that the noble Lord has clearly expressed.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, we have benefited from two extremely detailed and learned speeches proposing Motions E1 and H1. On Motion E1, I am exercised by the idea that there is an opportunity cost in checking whether you are preventing or causing fraud. That seems to be a strange discussion. The analogy made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, with HSE and health and safety, is a good one: yes, it is a cost to make sure that you are doing something safely but it is a much wider benefit. The notion that 95% to 98% of the business community should be allowed not to consider their impact on fraud because that would get in the way of their growth is strange, because that growth would then be predicated on very shaky circumstances. I am not persuaded by the counterarguments, but I have been persuaded strongly by the noble and learned Lord.
Similarly, on the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, causing agencies to be too tentative and restricted in how they go about prosecuting people is an important issue. It is clear from what we have heard from the outside world that this gets in the way of prosecutions. It also causes the prosecuting authorities to go for low-hanging fruit—that is, easier propositions—and avoid harder and often more severe prosecutions. That is a chilling effect which we should be worrying about when we look at this issue.
These two important amendments have been trimmed in the light of the rejection of the last set by the House of Commons. Noble Lords and Baronesses on these Benches will be happy to support them, if and when they are moved to a vote.