Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Myners

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lady Noakes I have some difficulty in understanding the thrust of these amendments. I see the issue of the nomenclature, which may be unfortunate, but I have to say, as a director of a company, that keeping under review and overseeing are almost one in the same. I do not see the difference between those two functions. It is absolutely clear that keeping under review and oversight are running on similar tracks.

The dangers behind the noble Lord’s amendments are that we are starting to find a way of dividing responsibilities. We are moving from clear lines of responsibility to a situation where a sub-committee of the board, as appears in the Bill, is starting to dictate the pace of the board itself. That is an unworthy, unnecessary and potentially dangerous development.

[Lord Myners]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendment. The decisions on the aggregation of power within the Bank of England are now set. The Government are clear in their determination to achieve that.

In my view, no one form of regulatory architecture can be assuredly more successful than others. Looking around the world at what happened with the global financial crisis, we saw many different structures of regulatory architecture come under strain. Some point to the twin peaks system associated with Canada as evidence that the Government’s current thinking in this area is consistent with a model that appeared to work better there than in other jurisdictions. However, if one wishes to understand why Canada did not experience the same harsh consequences of the global financial crisis, as in the United States, Europe and the United Kingdom, one finds the answer in matters other than regulatory architecture—including the nature of the economy and control of lending and leverage—which are inherent in the Canadian system and distinct from those followed elsewhere.

If we are going to aggregate this power in the hands of the Bank of England, we have to ask ourselves questions about checks and balances because we learnt from the failure of individual UK banks and institutions that, in almost all cases, there was an overly dominant individual in charge of the organisation that failed. That is the big lesson, which the FSA has not picked up completely in its reports on the collapse of RBS and HBOS. However, it is a clear lesson, whether it is Sir Fred Goodwin at Royal Bank of Scotland or Mr Adam Applegarth at Northern Rock; and similarly Mr Crawshaw at Bradford & Bingley and Mr Cummings, Mr Hornby and others at HBOS.

Are we creating an architecture here in which we are putting too much power in the hands of one person? I think we are. I was a member of the court for four years and have seen how it and the Bank operate. One must be careful not to extrapolate from the behaviours of the existing incumbents of senior positions in the Bank and members of the court into the future, but a very clear lesson to me was that the court just could not be effective at corporate governance, as both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, referred to earlier. The court cannot be effective in that way. When I was a member in 2007, three members of the court sought to escalate matters to the Treasury about the Bank’s management of liquidity and of risk. It simply was not possible for my two colleagues and me to register with the Treasury or anyone else, in any meaningful way, our concerns about the Bank’s failure to understand the risks that were accumulating in the system.

Are we creating a structure now in which that could not happen again in the future? I do not think we are. We are not clear as to the role of the court. We give it some responsibilities but very little power to influence the responsibilities that we give it. We must ask important questions about the constitution and membership of the court to ensure that, in future, it is not simply a ceremonial body that is, on the whole, discouraged by the governor from asking questions, but something that at least approaches the independent challenge that one would expect—

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords—

[Lord Myners]

I will give way in a moment to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who has had his opportunity. We must look to create a body that is capable of appropriately challenging the current governor and governors in the future. I am not sure that this is necessarily seriously advanced by the language we are using here. Perhaps I will anticipate the point on which the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, wishes to intervene by saying that he is quite correct about perhaps dancing on the head of a pin when it comes to whether these are questions about supervisory roles or oversight. However, it is absolutely critical that we ensure, in this Bill, that the court is able to appropriately challenge and check the authority that this Bill places in the hands of the governor. We have learnt painfully in recent years about the consequences of coping with a dysfunctionality between the governor and members of the court. I give way to the noble Lord if he still wants to come in.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

The noble Lord was quite right. I understood the force of his polemic and the seriousness of the point he was making but could not see how that is in any way addressed by adding the word “overseeing” to “keeping under review”, which seems to me, as he indicated, to be a distinction without a difference.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I am slightly concerned at the proposed obligation to conduct an annual review. The role of directors is constantly to keep a strategy under review and to see whether it is still relevant. However, to impose this would impose a burden. A proper strategy review is an extremely expensive and far-reaching undertaking. It would be far better to have a backstop of a three-year requirement and rely on the good judgment and good sense of the directors, in particular the non-executives, to call for more frequent reviews as and when they are needed. It is inconceivable that we would go through the sorts of events that we have been through since 2008 and that non-executives would sit and say, “We do not need to look at the strategy”. It is part of their role to do that and we should rely on their judgment, not on process, with a backstop of the three years, as proposed.

[Lord Myners]

My Lords, I will pick up on a term in the final sentence of the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. He referred to relying on the judgment of the non-executives. Many issues around the court will depend on the quality of the people appointed, and how they conduct themselves. A slightly less than perfect structure, superbly implemented, is likely to give a better outcome than a perfect structure that is poorly implemented. The Minister on a number of occasions referred to best corporate practice. Can he envisage any situation in which a corporate board performing effectively would not carry out an annual review of strategy? Every board of which I have been a member has had an annual strategy session to look again at past strategy and in many cases endorse or modify it in the light of circumstances. Regardless of what we say here, court directors seized by their legal responsibilities would almost certainly want to carry out an annual review. Does the Minister agree with that observation?