Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I had the honour, with the then Leader of the House, to present to this House the 1981 Bill which became the Act. We certainly understood that it was a very drastic power which enabled citizenship to be taken away. Therefore, it was only right that notice should be required, and provided for, in Section 40(5) of that Act. It included the need to make clear to the person affected that the application was on. It used the last known address as a possibility. However, the more that difficulties arise, the more it is seen that something further is required. Therefore, it is right that Section 40(5) should be amended. I think that the amendments, as now proposed—and subject to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, if, as I hope, the Government will accept them—are an acceptable way of dealing with this very delicate matter.

I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, that the real and ultimate protection is in the independent judicial review by the special court for that purpose. It is essential that, as this nation is subject to many different ways of being attacked, we should be protected as much as possible. This is a very sensible way to do it, provided that the Government are prepared to accept the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I spoke in Committee and, obviously, after two and a half hours then and 50 minutes now, one is in danger of ending up with—in that famous phrase of the football manager—a sense of déjà vu all over again. I will try to avoid that and just raise a couple of points.

I listened very carefully to what was said by the noble Baronesses, Lady D’Souza and Lady Bennett, and the right reverend Prelate—and I am not a lawyer. I also listened again to my noble friend Lady Warsi—having heard her passionate speech at the earlier stage—and the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik. I did not see the provisions of Clause 9 as an attack on people, and particularly not an attack on a particular part of our community. I saw the clause as a defence of the values that tie us all together and the glue that binds our society: the tolerance, freedom of speech and economic opportunity that has brought people to this country over the years, some more recently than others. That has been the essence of the attractions that have brought people here.

However, I was extremely concerned, and pointed out in Committee, that there was a gap in the arguments using the phrase

“conducive to the public good”.

I was worried about that, but I said—and still believe—that there is a need for the Government to protect the citizens of the country and that that is the overriding proposition we need to follow. Do I find the issues of Clause 9 easy? I do not. Do I wish we did not have to have Clause 9? I do so. But there are evil people about and wishing will not make it so. I thought in Committee, and still think now, that the underlying purpose of Clause 9 is right.

I pointed out in my speech then that, without the informed consent of the population of the country, the respect for and the importance of the rule of law become undermined. The travellers on the Clapham omnibus would regard some of the issues that have been raised this afternoon—such as having to send a courier into an extraordinarily dangerous country and put his or her life at risk—as a perverse outcome.

I recognise that there is a gap. I said that I hoped there would be some opportunity for smoothing some of the sharp edges in Clause 9 as originally drafted. As a non-lawyer, it seemed to me that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, answered the points that were made. Can it answer all the points? No, but it answers them effectively. It seems to provide a means to smooth the corners or close the gap—whichever metaphor you wish to use.

I would support the Government, whatever happened, as I think the underlying purpose of Clause 9 outweighs the disadvantages. However, I hope very much that my noble friend will be able to see the advantages of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and will be able in that way to make the compromise that I think makes the argument unanswerable.

Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2019

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Monday 20th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I well understand the need for this order in respect of the application that has been made, but innovating the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act to any extent can be done only as a matter of principle. It cannot be done ad hoc for a particular inquiry. Therefore, what is the principle under which it would be allowable in respect of this inquiry? The answer is that it is required to fulfil the inquiry’s remit. Only that would justify it. The application says, “We cannot fulfil the remit we have been given unless we are allowed to examine this matter”.

In my submission, it is extremely difficult to have an ad hoc system. The system ought to be governed, as the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act is, by principle. It is very difficult not to agree with the principle where an inquiry has been set up by a responsible Minister under the Inquiries Act with terms of reference which require that a particular matter should be looked into for the inquiry’s remit to be fulfilled. That is the principle which enables the noble Baroness to agree that it should be granted in respect of the police inquiry but not in others. It seems to me that if it is justified in the police inquiry, the reason for that must be examined. The reason is that it is required to fulfil the remit of the inquiry.

I feel sad in a way that this instrument is necessary, because I thoroughly agree with the principles of the rehabilitation Act, which are extremely necessary and desirable. After all, people should have the benefit of forgiveness by society if they possibly can, and that is what this is about. On the other hand, once you have to justify an exception, the principle by which you justify it must be what you state as the basis of it. Therefore, while I understand the point that has been made, the way in which the instrument has been drafted makes it clear that this happens only in a case in which this exception to the Defamation Act is necessary to fulfil the inquiry’s remit.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I am a member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which considered this order, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Cunningham, who I am happy to see in his place. I understand clearly the reasons why the undercover policing inquiry—which, as it stretched back into history, had to look a long way back—needed to be able to consider early offences. However, as the committee inquired, and we were concerned about how this might be applied and how it might affect individuals, we began to see the extent to which this narrow point might affect individuals in the future in an unattractive way. Therefore, although it is dangerous to take on an ex-Lord Chancellor, I say to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay that I do not reach his conclusion, which is that one change should justify a change across the piece.

A lot of the points that I wanted to make have already been made, so I shall be brief. However, first, these are public inquiries, so a person’s conviction, no matter how trivial or long ago, may well be revealed. We drew the attention of the MoJ to this, and its response to us, quoted in the third bullet point of our report, was quoted pretty extensively by my noble friend in her opening remarks. It is, perforce, fairly general, as it is bound to be, and somebody looking to it for protection might wonder how it will be interpreted in the event, given the wide powers the chairman has to interpret where the public interest and private interest overlap. The MoJ went on, in the fourth bullet point of our report, to say that of course a person had some redress in the sense that they could always apply for a judicial review of the decision. That appeared to be largely fanciful. The idea that an individual, swept up into an inquiry like this, would have the time, resource, energy and confidence to seek a judicial review is not realistic, particularly since it would have to happen quickly. Once the name is out, the point of the judicial review is completely lost.

This is not the only place in the regulations which shows a lack of realism. Paragraph 7.5 of the Explanatory Memorandum says:

“The disclosure and consideration of the spent convictions and cautions will not affect any ex-offender’s protection against disclosure when applying for work”.


However, once a person’s identity is revealed, inevitably their positioning in a job interview is worse, or at least affected. In real life, if a recruitment committee is looking at two people of equal skills, and one has a bit of a black mark—it may be a small one which happened a long time ago, but nevertheless it is a black mark—there will be an inevitable tendency for the recruitment committee to decide not to take a risk and choose the other candidate, to the detriment of the person who has been swept up by these regulations we are talking about today.

The Minister justified this by saying that there was a lack of parliamentary time and that there would be bureaucracy and inflexibility if we required individual SIs to allow for exceptions to the Inquiries Act. However, as has been pointed out, so far there have been 23 in 12 years, so one application is not a huge use of parliamentary time to allow for something which offers better protection to individual citizens, who may have done something quite stupid or silly when they were young—which of your Lordships could look in the mirror tomorrow morning and say, “I’ve never done anything silly”? In many cases, we just have not been caught doing it. We therefore need to think more clearly about this. The case for widening the remit, especially without offering better protection and anonymity to individuals whose offences may have been trivial and long ago, has not been effectively made.