(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I want to follow up on what my noble and learned friend Lord Hope said. He referred to proposed new subsections (4), (5) and (6), which deal with the devolved Administrations, but of course Clause 3 deals with our central Parliament and thus the English position, and exactly the same point arises.
My further concern is that, assuming that we did not have that apparent bar on any question of judicially reviewing Ministers of the Crown, it would be very difficult to see by what sort of touchstones any legal challenge would work. Proposed new subsection (1) says:
“Ministers of the Crown and the devolved administrations must pay due regard to the welfare requirements of animals”.
Heaven knows, I hope that I am as anxious as the rest of the House about the welfare of animals—certainly, my cat would never forgive me if I were not—but, as I understand it, the only substantive provision in this proposed new clause is subsection (7), which requires an annual report, although that is obviously a separate and discrete obligation. However, I am not quite sure how judicial review in this context would work or, without it, what is envisaged in the way of Parliament exclusively holding Ministers of the Crown to account. It is all rather abstract and I am a little unsure of how it is intended to work.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Trees, has introduced the amendment in his characteristically persuasive manner. He has an exemplary record in the area of animal welfare. As a senior veterinary surgeon, he has enormous professional knowledge and, above all, personal courage in being prepared to speak up about what are often controversial matters. I have had the privilege of working with him on a number of areas of welfare: the welfare of animals at the time of killing, or WATOK, regulations; meat labelling; the export of live animals and so forth. Therefore, I like to think that my commitment to an appropriate standard of animal welfare is not in question, and I believe that a reading of Hansard would show that.
However, as I have told the noble Lord, I am afraid that I cannot support him this evening. We are discussing the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which is focused on the process of disentangling this country from the European Union, not on the shape of policy post Brexit. Special issues such as animal sentience, important and vital though they are, are not really part of that withdrawal process. However, I can promise the noble Lord that when we come to discuss animal sentience and welfare in legislation focused on the policies of the new world, I shall be right there with him to ensure that there is no diminution, weakening of or sliding away from proper standards of animal welfare. On that, the noble Lord, Lord Trees, can count on my full support. But not, I am afraid, on this amendment this evening.
(7 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI want to address only Amendments 58 and 59, both of which I oppose, to new Section 336B on page 28 of the Bill. That section deals with an application under the previous section to extend the moratorium period, which has to be dealt with as soon as is practicable. New subsection (3) says that the court,
“may exclude from any part of the hearing … an interested person”,
or “anyone representing that person”. We see that formulation again in new subsections (4) and (6). They are the people whose presence or otherwise at the hearing is in question.
New subsection (4) allows for a particular application, that certain specified information may be withheld from the interested person or representative, but that order can be made only under new subsection (5), if the court is,
“satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that if the specified information were disclosed”,
something bad would happen—that either,
“evidence of an offence would be interfered with or … the gathering of information …would be interfered with”,
or somebody would be injured, or,
“the recovery of property … would be hindered, or … national security would be put at risk”.
In that situation, new subsection (6) comes into play. Unlike new subsection (3), which we looked at earlier, where the court “may exclude”, in this instance—because it relates to an application under new subsection (4)—the court inevitably “must” direct that the interested person or his representative be excluded. With the best will in the world, I cannot see how we could sensibly leave out new subsection (6), which puts a requirement on the court which is not to be found in new subsection (3), which deals with the general position. Nor would it make any sense whatever to substitute “may” for “must”. You have already got “may” in new subsection (3), but for this situation, “must” is the appropriate direction to the court for the order to be made. I respectfully oppose those amendments.
My Lords, I support Amendment 72, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. It has been common ground in our discussions this evening that the volume of SARs is rising all the time. There are now over 1,500 a working day and it slightly defies belief that those are all getting anything like the attention that they should. Those of us who have had experience of this find that the National Crime Agency is extremely reluctant to allow any inhibition on its ability to call for SARs at every level. It should be possible to have discussions about automatically asking for a time limit—not that the information could not be asked for subsequently—of 25 or 50 years. One of my most recent PEP inquiries involved events 53 years ago. I simply cannot believe that collecting that sort of information is a good use of my time or the bank’s. There would be a great deal of virtue in my noble friend trying to persuade the NCA that some focus was a good idea. Getting the focus that is badly needed, and things like time and a de minimis figure, would make the whole system much more effective. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is a first step towards that and is worthy of serious consideration.