Electricity System Resilience (S&T Committee Report)

Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my membership of your Lordships’ Science and Technology Committee and thank our chairman, the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, for his skill in guiding us over some complicated and, for some of us non-scientists, rather stretching terrain.

Among the gifts that we like to think we possess as a people, there is a special cluster on which we pride ourselves: strategic thinking, horizon-scanning and forward planning. The subject before us, I regret to say, does not sit easily within this pleasing self-image for when it comes to the divine spark of electricity, we all too often believe “It’ll Be Alright on the Night”. We are an all-right-on-the-night nation in so many areas, including this one. Our optimism is sometimes burnished by our belief that just over the horizon lies a technological and scientific breakthrough that will match cheapness with abundance, leading to a bright, well-lit future that takes care of itself for generation upon generation, while avoiding harming the planet as a bonus. I am of course talking about nuclear fusion, which I remember reading about as a boy in the late 1950s.

In January 1958, science and energy journalists were invited to Harwell to be briefed on Project ZETA, the Atomic Energy Authority’s nuclear fusion experiment. They were enthused—they really were—and news of it fired up the national newspapers and straddled the globe. The Prime Minister, Mr Harold Macmillan, was on a Commonwealth tour at the time and when he reached New Zealand its prime minister, Walter Nash, asked Macmillan how ZETA worked—a testing question for a classical scholar. As the British high commissioner, Sir George Mallaby, recorded:

“‘Well’, said Mr McMillan, looking vaguely about him, ‘You just take sea water and turn it into power’”.

He paused for effect before adding:

“We are pretty good at sea water”.

We are still waiting for the promise of fusion to be fulfilled. Some experts think it might now be a mere decade away; others reckon that another 40 years should do it. All the rest of us can do is live in hope that the shining hour will come.

This evening I should like to concentrate, first, on the need for a consensual, long-term strategy for electricity supply, as outlined so well by our chairman. I am pleased that this will be central to the work of the new National Infrastructure Commission, for which I generally have high hopes. Secondly, I should like to anticipate briefly the array of threats that we may face as an advanced society, ever-more dependent on an uninterrupted supply of electricity.

There are certain thresholds that a country cannot afford to reach, let alone to cross. Electricity supply is one of them. As the committee’s report notes, last winter:

“National Grid procured extra capacity to raise the capacity margin from 4.1% to 6.1%”,

to,

“guard against a potential shortage of electricity”.

The committee stressed that it was,

“a matter for concern … that this extra capacity was put in place at short notice, at considerable cost, and in a way which conflicts with the decarbonisation agenda”.

The report goes on:

“This should not be allowed to happen again; it is not acceptable for an advanced economy, hugely dependent on electricity, to sail so close to the wind”.

As the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, emphasised, the committee also noted that but for the economic slowdown which followed the financial crash of 2008,

“capacity margins would have been much tighter”.

I must confess that it is a mystery to me why this question has lacked the bite it deserves in the Cabinet and across Cabinet Committee rooms over several Governments. In political terms, there are few surer or swifter sappers of public confidence in a Government than serious interruptions to electricity supply, as those of us who lived through the 1970s winters of discontent remember all too vividly.

In its own way, security of power supply is a first-order element in the defence of the realm. Indeed, given our justified anxieties about the nature and scope of future cyberattacks, it will rise higher still up the hierarchy in the risk register. Already, we are facing between 150 and 200 serious cyberattacks on government and business every month. Those wishing us serious, widespread and swift harm in the future will go for the electricity grid first. Our ever-greater reliance on the internet and on the coming internet of things will no doubt bring great and accumulating economic advantage, and improve personal consumption and comfort, but the risks will rise too.

I am a natural consensualist but not, I hope, an indiscriminate one. I am convinced that a sure and safe electricity supply is an area where consensus is justifiable and desirable. By all means let us have our arguments about the ingredients of our energy mix, and the respective roles of the state and private suppliers, but the evidence presented to the committee during its inquiry demonstrated a near-universal belief that electricity supply is, and must remain, a managed market in the United Kingdom. Muddling through, however smartly, is not enough. The problem we are dealing with today requires an enduring national effort, ranging from sustained political attention to large-scale investment, energetic R&D on the possibilities of electricity storage, the development of interconnectors with our neighbours, as other noble Lords have mentioned, and as many cyberdefences as our scientists and technologists can provide.

Short of a devastating solar event—which we considered, for reasons of completeness, I am sure—about which we could do very little, remedies are very much in our own hands. Let us seize them and avoid our becoming an outage society. If in future we go into the dark, our people will be unforgiving, and they will be right to be so.

[Lord Teverson]

My Lords, just before the right reverend Prelate speaks, I want to apologise to the House. I think I referred to “the noble Earl” when I meant the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, when I addressed the House. I apologise for getting my titles wrong.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield Excerpts

Wednesday 14th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alderdice]

My Lords, I have listened with some care to what previous noble Lords have said. It has been very thoughtful and I am not surprised that the noble Lords, Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Armstrong, take the view that they do. They are exactly the kind of recommendations that any good senior civil servant would give to the Prime Minister, which is, “Hold on to whatever power you have because it seems little enough at times”. I understand that.

But it is a mistake to suggest that the response of the other place is disrespectful. I do not think that it is. It is disagreement. There is a fundamental disagreement between those who take the view that a fixed-term Parliament is in the interests of the Parliament and of the people and those who take the view that it would be best to stick with what we have. Of course, this House and the other place felt it completely appropriate to have fixed-term arrangements in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Most other places around the world think that it is a good idea. It is not outlandish. Colleagues in the other place and noble Lords on the other Benches stood for election to the other place. It is not something that came suddenly out of the blue, like getting rid of the Lord Chancellor, for example. That was not thought through terribly enormously or consulted on. There is a disagreement. Some of us take the view that a fixed-term Parliament where you elect someone and say, “You will be elected for this period of time to do this job”, is the right way to do it.

The question that has now been raised is, “Is the amendment that has come back from the other place a fair and reasonable one or a scrawny child?”. It does not seem to me unreasonable that one should wait for the passage of two terms of Parliament, which is after all what we are talking about. To simply return to the question in a month or two tells you nothing about whether this approach is reasonable. Sometimes one has to take time to think one's way through and see if what you have is genuinely a change for the better or worse.

It is clear that there is an intellectually honest disagreement. Noble Lords here have understandable points, but it is not the case that the Government are seeking to be disrespectful. Rather, they are saying, “We do not agree with this and so, having listened to what the House of Lords has said, we have said that we appreciate that but we think that post-legislative scrutiny after two mandates is a reasonable way to address the issue”. I appeal to noble Lords to see it in that light and give the other place the primacy that is appropriate in this context.

[Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield]

My Lords, I listened with great attention to the Minister a moment ago and I think that I detected an anxiety on his part that the royal prerogative on the dissolution of Parliament would somehow be thrown into confusion. Her Majesty the Queen graciously places her prerogative at the disposal of Parliament every time the question arises. She always has and always will. I hope that the Minister will elaborate on the anxieties if indeed I am right to detect them in what he said, but I cannot see the problem about the Queen's personal prerogative of dissolution being revived on a vote of the House of Commons if the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is passed. There is no constitutional dilemma at all here. Perhaps he has better advice than I have and perhaps he could elaborate in a moment or two.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, I do not intend to take up much time of the House. Our position remains the same. We support the amendment. It still seems to us to be a practical and sensible proposal that is generous to the Government and gives them their five-year term of this Parliament but takes account of the substantial concern and suspicion that there is about the Bill across both Houses of Parliament. Noble Lords may have seen that, last week in the House of Commons, at least seven Conservative Members of Parliament voted against the Government on this issue.

What is Her Majesty's Government's argument? Put by a junior Minister at the Cabinet Office, the honourable Mr Harper, last week, it is effectively that the Cross-Bench amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is unconstitutional. Anyone reading Mr Harper's speech from last week and looking at the ridiculous amendment proposed by the Government would be struck by the frankly patronising, even insulting, manner in which he addresses the Cross-Bench amendment. It is perhaps a little cheeky for a junior Minister to attempt to patronise two ex-Cabinet Secretaries, a very distinguished ex-Speaker of the House of Commons and one of our leading constitutional legal experts, but that is what he chose to do. That insult, or patronisation, pales into insignificance compared with the pure chutzpah in this Government protesting about the way in which constitutional change takes place. If the right reverend Prelate will forgive me, it is a bit like Satan preaching against sin.

Where, both in this Bill and in its now notorious predecessor, the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011—whose absurd consequences we can all see this week, and the Liberal Democrat Benches more than most—was there, first, any pre-legislative scrutiny? Secondly, where was there any draft legislation? Thirdly, where was there any suggestion in the Conservative Party’s manifesto for the last election of supporting fixed-term Parliaments? Indeed, I recall—and I am sure the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—the Prime Minister himself, before the election, insisting that there must be a general election whenever a new Prime Minister took office. That is the complete opposite of what is proposed in this Bill. Where is there the search for consensus? Where, in short, is there any of that care, caution and concern for our past, present and future which should always be part of constitutional change? The answer of course is that there was none, and our country will pay the price for such hurried and careless law-making.

The Government criticise the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, saying that the sunset clause is not suitable in a constitutional Bill, forgetting, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reminded us a few minutes ago, that, when in opposition, both parties demanded—quite rightly, in many cases—sunset clauses in constitutional matters affecting citizens’ civil liberties. In short, there is absolutely nothing unconstitutional.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield]

My Lords, it is a pleasure and an honour to be the first to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, on his superb maiden speech. It demonstrated the noble Lord’s special feel for Parliament, its practices and its history, for the magic and mystery of the British constitution and for its constitutional legislation. So subtle and insightful is his understanding of the constitution that I have long believed that the noble Lord is actually part of its warp and woof. He served as a hugely distinguished chairman of the History of Parliament Trust and his distinction has been very much in evidence this afternoon.

The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has been a much valued friend and mentor of mine for several years. He has sustained the gifts of the history teacher he once was; he has followed Albert Einstein's words:

“Never lose a holy curiosity”.

He is a natural transmitter of that curiosity to others. The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, gave the other place long, distinguished and devoted service as a dedicated and natural parliamentarian. I am confident that he will do the same as an enormously welcome addition to your Lordships' House.

The Bill before us today is a collector's item for a combination of reasons. First, if passed, it will be a rare example of a Prime Minister relinquishing a power which his predecessors possessed: the power to request the sovereign to dissolve Parliament, thereby triggering a general election. In the unusual circumstances of the coupon election in 1918, after the sudden armistice that brought the Great War to an end, David Lloyd George took that power unto himself as coalition leader. Previously, such requests had been a decision for the Cabinet.

Secondly, as other noble Lords have pointed out, the Bill proposes that Her Majesty the Queen be stripped of a sizeable chunk of one of her two remaining personal prerogative powers: that of dissolving Parliament, although summoning Parliament or proroguing it will remain a matter for the sovereign. Her other personal prerogative, that of appointing a Prime Minister, will remain entirely untouched.

Thirdly, this is a very rare example of a government Bill originating in the other place that, as currently drafted, is entirely beyond the reach of the Parliament Acts, creating an unusual stretch of legislative turf on which your Lordships can frisk. The Clerk of the Parliaments has attested that:

“It is ... clear that the … Bill does contain provision to extend the maximum duration of a Parliament beyond five years, and that it cannot, therefore, be passed under the Parliament Acts procedure unless, before it leaves the Commons, the … provisions ... are amended”.

Not since November 1944, when your Lordships’ House agreed to extend the Prolongation of Parliament Act 1940 until the Second World War had ended, has this been true of a government measure sent to your Lordships’ House from the other place.

Fourthly, and of the greatest concern for your Lordships, the Bill seeks to change the biorhythm of our national politics by creating a statutory norm for the timing of our general elections. The question—several other noble Lords have raised it already—is whether five years captures our natural biorhythm. There is a strong case for arguing that it does not. The fine report by your Lordships’ Select Committee on the Constitution on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill published last December calculates that the average duration of the 17 Parliaments between the general election of July 1945 and that of May 2010 has been three years and 10 months.

As well as the biorhythmic arithmetic, we need to consider the quality of government and political life in the fifth year of Parliaments that have gone to the wire. They have rarely been shining patches in the life of Administrations. Ministers are often tired and accident prone. The palette of the electorate becomes progressively more jaded. A kind of pre-electoral blight sets in. Of course it could be argued that the final year of a fixed-term four-year Parliament would be similarly blighted. Certainly, the press would succumb to its customary pre-election frenzy as the last year deepened. However, the blight is likely to be less pronounced towards the end of a four-year span than a five-year one, and accountability is more likely to be enhanced by a four-year cycle.

On balance, your Lordships’ Select Committee, and the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform in the other place, came down for four-year Parliaments. I plump for the tariff that they recommend. Four years not only fits with the UK-wide biorhythm but, as other noble Lords have pointed out, with the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies. The second question to which your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has drawn attention is the pair of safety valves for use if, for emergency or other reasons, the other place decides that an election is necessary before the fixed term is expended. For the valves to operate, either 66 per cent of the membership of the other place has to vote for Dissolution, or the Government have to lose a confidence vote and, over the subsequent 14 days, fail to conjure up an alternative Administration or be replaced by another one that can demonstrate command of the other place.

It would be highly undesirable if these provisions became the political equivalents of “get out of jail free” cards in the game of Monopoly. The British constitution is not a Stradivarius to be played—or indeed fiddled—for reasons of narrow electoral advantage by the party or parties in government. A number of safeguards, therefore, are desirable. First, the Bill needs to contain as precise a definition as possible of what constitutes a confidence Motion. Secondly, the ticking clock must be so arranged that a general election following Dissolution sooner than the expiry of the fixed term does not restart the clock from scratch. Instead, the refreshed Parliament should sit for the remainder of the original fixed term and no longer—as is, so far, the untested arrangement for the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.

Finally, I share the regret of your Lordships’ Select Committee, and the one in the other place, that we have before us yet another substantial constitutional Bill that is without the benefit of a Green or a White Paper, or pre-legislative hearings. For, to pinch a line from PG Wodehouse, it is always easy to distinguish between a ray of sunshine and the coalition bearing a statute prepared in haste.