Protection of Freedoms Bill
Lord Henley Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked that I should take particular note of what the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, said in moving his amendment. I can give him, the House and the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, an assurance that I will do that. Our time goes back a long way to when I served with the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, in the former Department for Education and Employment and I hope that we both have a great deal of respect for each other.
I echo the introductory words of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, when he said—this is important—that we cannot completely eliminate risk. We understand that. He also made the point that we must be proportionate in how we manage these matters and accept that we must try to reduce bureaucracy as and where we can. I was grateful for the wise words of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, when she referred to the need to reduce the unnecessary CRB checks that were taking place.
It is important for us to remember that it is a question of balance. It is one that we can never get absolutely and completely right and we will probably have to go on arguing almost until the cows come home before we can resolve these matters. We should try to get it right, but the balance will be perceived differently between one individual and another.
By way of background, I reiterate that the Government believe, as do many outside bodies, that by scaling back the scope of regulated activity, and thus disclosure and the barring scheme, we can strike a better balance between the role of the state and that of employers or other organisations in protecting the vulnerable. Both have a role to play.
Clause 64 and the amendments to it provide that certain activity, which would be within the scope of regulated activity in relation to children when unsupervised, will not constitute regulated activity when it is subject to day-to-day supervision. An example was given to me—I think by my noble friend Lady Walmsley—of a technician in a school. He certainly would be covered. The amendments take us back to the wider scope of regulated activity as it existed under the previous Administration.
Baroness Walmsley
In a letter to the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, of 1 February, the noble Lord suggested that an IT technician would not be regulated.
Lord Henley
The noble Baroness has caught me out and has got the letter that I wrote. I shall have to look again at the letter I sent to my noble friend and check that. I take back what I said but my understanding is that that is not the case. However, obviously I have got that wrong.
Lord Henley
My Lords, if my letter—written with the great authority of myself—said that he would not, obviously he would not. However, my understanding—I have obviously got it wrong and I will have to look very carefully at that letter—is that he would be covered in a school. Perhaps I may look at the letter and then get back to my noble friend.
Baroness Randerson
To clarify the situation, my recollection of the Minister’s letter is that he would be covered in a school but not in a college.
Lord Henley
I am grateful to my noble friend for that correction. My noble friend Lady Stowell has just reminded me that there is a strong distinction between schools and FE colleges. For that reason I think it is very important. Oh, dear, I have to give way to the noble Lord, Lord Harris. Can he wait and let me finish my remarks? Calm down, as they say. I shall look very carefully at what I said. Obviously there is an important distinction between the two. I now give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Harris of Haringey
All I would ask is that when the noble Lord is looking very carefully to clarify that distinction he also looks at the situation of the large numbers of volunteer assistants in schools and volunteers used for out-of-school activities linked to the school—for example, to interest children in science, since we have been talking about technicians, but it could also be in art or other activities—to see whether they would be covered.
Lord Henley
Of course I will look at those matters and respond to my noble friends Lady Randerson and Lady Walmsley. I will even send a copy of that letter to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, in due course.
Let us return to the amendments because that is the important thing to do. I suspect this might now have to be the last amendment that we can deal with. In putting forward the amendment, the noble Lord has questioned whether we are confident that any supervision would be adequate to protect these children. In making the case for these amendments, reference has been made to the concept of secondary access. Some commentators imply a unique causal link between initial contact with the child and later contact elsewhere if the first is the place where most work is regulated activity. We do not accept that premise. Initial contact may happen where regulated activity takes place or it may happen in some other setting, such as a leisure centre, library, church or wherever. In our view, one type of setting does not offer significantly more help than any other for seeking contact with the same child later and elsewhere. Whatever the setting, we believe that parents have the primary responsibility for educating their child in how to react to an approach from any adult if it goes beyond that adult’s normal role. I give way to the noble Baroness.
Baroness Howarth of Breckland
Is the Minister seriously suggesting that, if there was a CRB check showing that an individual was dangerous to children, it would not be noted because this was supervised contact? That person could then contact a child through all the known mechanisms, which parents are totally unable to deal with, and abuse that child. Do the Government believe that it is acceptable that that should happen?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I accept the noble Baroness’s great experience in these matters. She is pointing to an occasion where a CRB check has been taken out on an individual and it becomes clear that they are not suitable to be employed in the school or wherever. In that case they are not going to be. So I do not quite see the point that she is making. Do I give way to the noble Baroness again? We must get this right.
Baroness Howarth of Breckland
I was saying that the Government do not take responsibility for secondary contact. The problem is that we are not necessarily talking about a school; we are talking about youth facilities where trust is built up between a young person and a child and where supervision may take place but not the kind of supervision that can have oversight at every moment. A CRB check might well show that one of the volunteers in that setting is dangerous. At the moment those CRB checks would be taken up. But the person concerned might make contact outside the primary setting. That at the moment is covered and children and young people are safe. Under the new situation it seems to me that they will not be safe.
Lord Henley
I do not accept that. Let me see if I can get this right. I think what the noble Baroness is trying to imply is that any number of checks will provide the safeguard. I do not think that safeguard would be provided by a CRB check in the particular case that she outlines because we have now moved on to some secondary setting. Does the noble Baroness follow me?
Baroness Howarth of Breckland
To clarify the point, if a CRB check has not been taken out because this is a supervised setting and the volunteers are supposed to be supervised, and the person is actually an abuser who could have been identified by a CRB check, under the new provisions will that person no longer be checked and therefore be able to build up a position of trust with a child which, in a secondary setting, they could abuse?
Lord Henley
Will the noble Baroness accept that there is also a role for the parents in terms of the guidance that they offer their children in that role as well? That was the point that I was trying to get over. I shall give way again.
The Archbishop of York
I go back to the Soham murders. Huntley happened to be a caretaker and these girls trusted him because he was the caretaker and they had seen him in school. On that day, there was no supervision. What happened to those girls? I would rather be on the side of stricter rules and in time try to water them down a bit than assume that, because someone is in a supervised role, they cannot do something worse when they are in an unsupervised role. The word “supervision” is very loose. Unless it is tightened up, people like me will still be left worrying about what happened to those girls. The caretaker was not in a supervised role at that particular point and that is when he did it.
Lord Henley
My Lords, on the contrary, it would be covered now, and following the changes that we are going to make it would still be covered. He was not covered by what was in place before and that is how he slipped through the net. That is why the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, was asked to set up his review into these matters and why the changes were made. The point that we are trying to make is that the changes have gone too far—this was the point also made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—in terms of the bureaucracy involved. As the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, put it, one can never totally eliminate risk and there has to be a degree of balance in how one deals with these matters. One must be proportionate. Merely to think that any number of checks imposed by the state is going to eliminate all risk is, I suspect, a wish too far. I give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. He said a few moments ago that there is a responsibility for parents in this. The difficulty is that the normal assumption of parents will be that every person whom their child comes into contact with in a club or other activity is safe. So presumably what the noble Lord is saying is that, in the guidance that will explain what all this means, parents will be provided with a list. It will say, “The following people whom your child comes into contact with have been checked and the others on the list have not been checked. Please advise your children not to have any contact outside this activity”. That is the implication of what the Minister is saying. Of course parents have a responsibility, but what the Government are doing is creating a situation in which parents will think that an environment is safe, but it is not because some individuals will not have been checked and those individuals may build up a relationship of trust with a child that they could choose to abuse at secondary contact.
Lord Henley
The noble Lord may say what he wishes, but he should not try to put words into my mouth, which is what he is trying to do. He is trying to suggest that we could tell all parents exactly who is safe and who is unsafe. Obviously we cannot do that. What we are trying to do is create a system that will provide the necessary safeguards but does not make parents feel that their children are automatically safe. Parents must still have the duty of looking after their children by warning them of potential dangers. They should not assume that merely because someone has been CRB-checked, merely because the process has been gone through and merely because every box has been ticked, which is what the noble Lord seems to suggest, all is safe.
Lord Henley
I am not going to give way to the noble Lord. I am going to get on with my speech. If the noble Lord will allow me to do so, I will continue.
These amendments seek to preserve what we believe is a disproportionate disclosure and barring scheme that covers the employees and volunteers far more than is actually necessary on this occasion for safeguarding purposes. In so doing, it subjects all the businesses, organisations and whatever to unnecessary red tape and discourages volunteering. The noble Lord, Lord Bichard, also made the important point of whether it would still be open to schools, organisations and businesses to continue to check volunteers and others. Of course they can, and we will ensure that they are still able to request the enhanced CRB certificate when necessary. We want to emphasise the importance of good sense and judgment by the managers on the ground when they look at this issue. That is at the heart of our proposal and it is why we think we have got the balance right. The noble Lord, Lord Bichard, is now looking somewhat quizzical but no doubt we can have further discussion about this between now and another stage.
The right thing is to get the correct balance in how one looks at these things. The noble Lord asked about schools and what they could do. This gives local managers the ability to determine these things flexibly and make extra checks. With the various interruptions I have had, I appreciate the slight muddle I got into earlier over the letter to my noble friend Lady Walmsley. There has been a degree of confusion here.
Lord Henley
Can I just continue these matters? I hope that I have answered most of the points that the noble Lord put forward and that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
I am grateful to my noble friend. Could he just clarify one point? The volunteers we are talking about here are the volunteers who see children on a regular basis. That is correct, is it not?
Baroness Walmsley
I have one second point before my noble friend rises to answer. I accept that people who are not regulated can still be CRB-checked but the employer cannot get barring information. Unless the person has committed a crime and got on the police records in that way, the employer who voluntarily carries out a CRB check still does not know if that person has been barred. I understand that Sir Roger Singleton claims that 20 per cent of the people on the barred list have never been in contact with the police. Could my noble friend clarify that?
Lord Henley
May I write to my noble friend on that final point to make sure that I get it right? I will make sure that I look at my letter with the greatest care before sending it off to make sure that I have got it right. No doubt we will come back to this at a later stage. Meanwhile, I hope that I have satisfied the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and that he is able to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
Could I just put one question to the Minister? I preface it with the fact that I congratulated the Government—and still do—on the laudable effort to cut through a great deal of this red tape. I said that I share the concern right round the House about secondary access. I urge the Minister to go away and look at what we have said. It may be that some areas of secondary access could be differentiated from others—I do not know. He said that he might talk about it later. I urge him to do so.
Lord Henley
My Lords, if the noble and learned Baroness asks me to do that, then of course I will. It is obviously very important to get these things right—I want to get them right. Again, it is always a question of getting the balance right. That is what we are trying to do this evening. As I said, I suspect that the noble Lord may want to come back to this at a later stage. We will see. In the mean time, I hope that he is prepared to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, at the risk of straining my noble friend’s patience—he has been very patient—he offered to come back on points that have arisen today. It is obvious that we are going to continue this subject with the next group of amendments, which we will come to next week. It would be extremely helpful if the noble Lord responded, as he has offered to do, not just before Third Reading but before we return to this next week. He may not wish to give an undertaking to that effect but I leave him with that thought. As the debate has gone on, I have made more and more notes on his Amendment 50A, which will be the first amendment next Wednesday.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I do not know whether it will be next Wednesday when we come back to this. I remind the House again that we are on Report not in Committee, and I think I have been interrupted and intervened upon more than one would expect. I will try to write to my noble friend before the next day on Report on this Bill. Whether it will be next week, I do not know.
Lord Bichard
My Lords, I very much welcome the tone of the Minister’s response. I respect his position entirely and we have known each other long enough for me to be able to say that. I particularly welcome his confirmation that schools, if I understand it right, and organisations that want to carry on with checks will be able to do so. I assume that that means that they will have access to the intelligence that those checks would normally disclose. That issue might well need to be looked at, but I very much welcome that assurance.
I welcome the sympathetic way in which the Minister has responded to the debate. However, let us be absolutely clear, this is not for me, or I think for other noble Lords who have spoken, a question of bureaucracy and whether we need less of it. We all agree that we need less of it. The report that I produced after Soham was not implemented in full. Checks, for example, are not routinely updated, which is why we have the bureaucracy that we have. I said specifically in the Soham report that I wanted a system that was proportionate, and I do not think that we have ever achieved that.
This is therefore not a question of whether we need to reduce bureaucracy or of supervision. The core of the argument and of my contention is that we should be concerned about risk and not allow people who are a risk to have privileged access to our children—and it is privileged access. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has said, we have to draw a distinction between access that someone has in a school or a club and a chance encounter. If people build up trust in a school, it is a much more powerful relationship than it would be through some serendipitous or irregular meeting and much more likely to lead to secondary access, and to secondary access being exploited. I do not think it fair to say that we should expect parents to be able to monitor those kinds of situations. Parents expect schools, clubs and centres to be places where they can leave their children with some confidence. That is why we need to make sure that in those places we do not have people who are a risk having access to our children.
I welcome the tone of the response, as I said, and the possibility of further discussions, but let us never underestimate the importance of this issue. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harris, that it is unfortunate—it is no one’s fault—that we had this debate without a larger number of noble Lords present, because this is a really important issue. Had I not heard the Minister’s assurances at the end about further discussions and about schools and other organisations being able to carry on with the checks as they do now, I would have had to withdraw the amendment—I have no alternative but to do so—with a heavy heart and a great deal of apprehension. The reassurances that we have received enable me to withdraw the amendment with more optimism, and I look forward to those further discussions. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Lord Henley Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Campbell-Savours
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 3, which stands in my name. Perhaps at this stage I can apologise to the House for not being present during proceedings in Committee, as I was back and forth to and from hospital over a six-week period and was therefore unable to attend apart from a brief debate when DNA was being discussed. I set out my position on two amendments—including the one I will be moving later—on 29 November, when I made clear I was in favour of a voluntary national DNA database. I also apologise because Amendment 3, which I wrote in November, is slightly in error. Instead of it beginning with the words,
“or if the person from whom the DNA sample or fingerprint was taken”,
it should actually have read “and only”. That is my fault.
My amendment would require the authorities to obtain the permission of the DNA sample donor prior to the removal of his or her profile from the database, but does not totally compromise the Government’s intention to introduce their proposed changes. At first glimpse, the House might find it difficult to imagine circumstances in which a donor would resist removal of his or her profile. Furthermore, the House might wish to consider in what circumstances creating this new obstacle might benefit the state.
So why would a donor resist removal, and in what circumstances? A donor may wish to ensure that he or she is ruled out of a police inquiry through a simple DNA data mismatch during an investigation. The donor might feel that by allowing the retention of their profile, they were freeing themselves of suspicion during the police investigation. They may well have personal or particular family reasons for doing so. One has to place oneself in the mind of a person who has been accused of a crime and wants to be free of a potential accusation, or even show that he or she is not involved in criminal activity or is even going straight. It might help that person’s resolve. Some former criminals, even those involved in minor offences, feel that they are constantly under suspicion. This proposal is a psychological aid to rehabilitation.
So what possible benefits could there be to the state? I will not pray in aid the general arguments for the retention of DNA in the fight against crime. That is all well documented. However, there is a reasonable discussion to be had about whether, in the absence of DNA information following its removal, at least some residual information should be held on former donors. It was argued repeatedly in Committee that the proposed retention period was too short in the case of serious cases of rape and other crimes of violence. The Government’s response was the two-year possible extension period.
However, there are surely circumstances in which the state, while not retaining the DNA information, has an interest in at least knowing the whereabouts of a person who has previously been charged with a serious criminal offence. Let us not forget that “beyond reasonable doubt” is a high hurdle. Criminals who are successfully prosecuted often drop off the radar, as do those who are not successfully prosecuted. They move on in the process of seeking to cover their tracks. If DNA information is to be lost, the police should at least have the opportunity of retaining some point of contact, or knowledge of the whereabouts of former donors. Some who have been charged with offences will either surface at a contact address to request removal of the DNA data, to avoid detection in the future, or will steer clear of requesting removal, so as to avoid revealing their whereabouts. This may well happen in the case of people who have moved abroad, outside of what they believe to be UK jurisdiction. However, there will of course be those who have surfaced to request the removal of DNA data as a matter of principle. I fully recognise that these are complicated arguments; I suppose that they relate more to criminal psychology than to any empirical evidence that I am able to offer. But I merely ask the House to consider this as a proposition, perhaps for future legislation, since it is a little late at this stage
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, I hope that I can deal with these two cases relatively briefly. My noble friend Lady Hamwee has brought before the House again the issue of those detained by the police and taken to a police station as a place of safety under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act. My noble friend outlined what that did, but it might help if I briefly outline my understanding.
If a person in a public place appears to be suffering from a mental disorder and in need of immediate care or control, Section 136 of the Mental Health Act allows a police officer to remove that person to a place of safety if the officer thinks it necessary to do so in the interests of that person’s protection or that of other people. I should make it clear that persons detained under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act—my noble friend emphasised this—are not arrested. That is a very important point that we all have to remember. It is an entirely separate regime, focused on the protection of the detained individual rather than the wider public. The powers to take DNA and fingerprints in Part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 apply only to those individuals arrested for a recordable offence. If a person was arrested for a non-recordable offence, such as speeding, or if they were not arrested at all but detained under the provisions that we are talking about, as is the case under Section 136, the powers simply would not apply.
If the police were to take biometrics in these circumstances, it would be not only an error on the part of the police but in fact unlawful. Under new Section 63D(2)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, as inserted by Clause 1 of this Bill, if it should get on the statute book, all police officers would be under an obligation to delete material taken in this way. Therefore, I can say to my noble friend that Amendments 1 and 2 are unnecessary in that respect. She shakes her head, but I can assure her that, because the person had not been arrested, that would be the case. Taking biometrics from a person detained under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act is already unlawful.
The police are guided in the way that they take DNA and fingerprints by the PACE code of practice D, which deals with issues of identification of persons by police officers more generally. We will need to update code D in the light of the passage of this Bill and before it comes into force. I am happy to say to the House that we will include in that revision of the code a paragraph to make it quite clear that taking biometrics from those detained under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act is unlawful.
The Earl of Erroll
Just to clarify, if the police inadvertently, even despite the new code, were to take such a sample unlawfully, presumably it would just be destroyed once they realised that they had made the mistake. There would not have to be any other rigmarole.
Lord Henley
My understanding is that it would be unlawful and that therefore they would destroy what they had taken. I can give that assurance to the noble Earl.
Lord Harris of Haringey
To clarify further, presumably part of the difficulty here is that this is an inadvertent error by the police, because they have taken somebody under Section 136 to a place of safety which in this instance has turned out to be a cell in a police station. Is not the real problem here, and the reason why, presumably, custody officers have then made this mistake, that there is an inadequate supply of places of safety in more appropriate accommodation? That is a fundamental issue. If the Government were to address that, the chance of this arising would become far less.
Lord Henley
If I may say so, that is another question. I accept the fact that it might be better if there were other places that they could take the individual to, but the important point is that they have taken that person to that cell. They have then done something wrong by taking his or her DNA in whatever form. That would be unlawful—that is what I am trying to make clear—and I hope that the noble Lord will accept that point.
I turn now to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and welcome him back. I had not actually noticed that he was absent from the Committee stage of the Bill, because I seem to remember that we dealt with some of these things—but perhaps it is just a fantasy that I remember us addressing these matters. I certainly remember that we had considerable discussion on these matters.
I appreciate that the noble Lord feels that he has misdrafted his amendment and would like it to read “and only” instead of “or”. We are at Report stage, so it is possibly too late to fix these things, but I suspect that it is to some extent a probing amendment. If the noble Lord remembers, we had some quite spirited discussion in Committee of what the appropriate period should be, and I dare say that we will have another one when we discuss Amendment 4, which the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, will be moving. Amendment 3 does not define that period. If one assumes that the appropriate period would be the relevant period set out in the various provisions of the Bill, I would say to the noble Lord that subsection (3) of new Section 63D of PACE, as inserted by Clause 1, already does this. Subsection (3) says that in,
“any other case,”—
in other words, except in the circumstances already provided for in subsection (2), which are where the arrest or the taking of biometrics were unlawful,
“section 63D material must be destroyed unless it is retained under any power conferred by sections 63E to 630”.
We have a general presumption that material must be destroyed unless the Bill explicitly permits its retention. I will come back to retention on that later amendment from the noble Baroness and later amendments from the noble Lord. But it must be destroyed unless the Bill explicitly permits its retention, either for a fixed period, such as for a person charged with a qualifying offence but not convicted, or for an indefinite period for those with convictions.
I hope that with that explanation my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, will not press his amendment. I appreciate that we will discuss these matters in further detail on some later amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I do not think that we will have an opportunity to come back to mine. Of course, I am glad that the Minister and I are focused on the same outcome—the destruction of the material. My concern is that the answer to the Parliamentary Questions and the letter from the Minister rely on the new Section 63D(2) of PACE. However, as I had hoped I had explained, I do not think that it applies. The new section starts “This section applies to” and then in paragraphs (a) and (b) sets out what it applies to. My concern is that material taken when the person is not arrested, as the Minister has made clear, and has not given consent would not fall within this and therefore the provision for destruction in new Section 63D(2) would not apply.
I am glad to hear what the Minister says about the code and I am of course not going to press the amendment today. But my concern was that, by relying on a section that in my view does not apply—I do not think that we have quite bottomed it out—there might be resistance to destruction, which the Minister has said that the code will make quite clear is required. Although not within the context of the Bill, perhaps this is something that he and I might have a further word on outside the Chamber because we are clearly aiming at exactly the same outcome. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
The noble Baroness has referred to the figures that she gave us at the previous stage. She said that 23,000 criminals a year would no longer be on the database who could commit 6,000 further crimes. She has answered the point of my noble friend Lord Phillips and confirmed that these include minor offences. Rereading Hansard, I was not clear whether the 23,000 were those within years four to six, because some of the cases mentioned in the debate related to crimes where there had been more than a six-year period.
As noble Lords said on the previous occasion we discussed this matter, it is not entirely black and white. As we discussed in Committee, if one asked a random group of the public about this, most would want a longer period of retention. That is possibly correlated with those who watch entertaining but unrealistic television dramas; I know that I am affected by these things. We all know that if you asked the same group of people about capital punishment, you would probably get a very hard-line answer, which is why most of us try to avoid asking that question.
My noble friend Lord Phillips said that though we would all agree that a society with a full range of surveillance would be a different society, few of us would be able to articulate why that was so. I have to say that I am among the less articulate on this. I do not think anyone could say that what the Government have proposed is in any way a casual approach to retention or one which completely reverses the current approach. Indeed, it is a pity that what is proposed in the Bill is so hedged about with conditions that this is not so very different a piece of legislation. I agree that, of course, we should not be casual about crime and the prevention or detection of crime. Similarly, we should not be so cautious that we are casual about privacy, our culture and the intervention of the state in our privacy. The noble Baroness said in Committee that,
“there is a fine line between the preservation of … freedom and privacy”,—[Official Report, 29/11/11; col. 146.]
on the one hand and the delivery of justice and the protection of citizens on the other. I also acknowledge the fineness of that line but I think that I am on the other side of it from her.
Lord Henley
My Lords, as always, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill for his assistance and advice in relation to what the Joint Committee on Human Rights feels about this issue. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for what she had to say. Certainly, we will do what we can to provide better evidence of the use of DNA in convicting criminals as and when we can. However, I refer the noble Lords, Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Hughes of Woodside, and possibly even the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, to the figures. These are some of the figures that we have; obviously, more will become available. Since 2001, more than 4 million people have been added to the DNA database, yet despite that the number of DNA detections has fallen from 33,000 to just over 26,000 in 2009-10. There has been a vast growth in the hoarding of people’s DNA but a decline in the number of convictions. That is an important thing to remember as we look at this amendment.
I also give an assurance to the noble Lord, Lord Hughes of Woodside, who was worried that material taken from crime scenes would be lost. That is not the case. Material taken from crime scenes will still be taken; we are talking about material that is taken from individuals, whether criminals or not. That is a very different matter. My noble friend Lady Hamwee addressed a point of disagreement about whose DNA you should keep and for how long. We know that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, feels that there should be a national database containing everyone’s data. He would like to start with a voluntary database on which we can all put our DNA. We will discuss that when we reach his amendment. That might be hunky-dory and all that but it is not what we want, nor do we think that we should pursue a compulsory line in that regard.
I have explained what evidence we have. That is something we will look at but I also think we ought to look at other matters which influence this decision. The first thing to point out to the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, is that they would replace the Government’s provisions, which meet our coalition commitment to adopt the protections of the Scottish model. She says that that model was agreed without any analysis whatever. I have given some figures and we will provide some more in due course but we will also look at the remarks of Mr Keith Vaz, chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, at Committee stage on this Bill in another place. We will also look at what the ECHR had to say with regard to the Marper case referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Dear. I was very grateful to him for his intervention, particularly as he stressed the important point of this being a question of balance. My noble friend Lady Hamwee also stressed that point.
I believe that the party opposite is persisting in its approach to keep the DNA and fingerprints of innocent people for many years, no matter how little evidence was ever uncovered, and to keep huge numbers of individuals’ DNA and fingerprints on the national databases just in case they go on to commit crime in the future. That is not something with which we can agree. The party opposite pays scant regard to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the S and Marper case, which noted with approval the system which has been in place in Scotland for some years. I remind your Lordships that the Scottish system, seemingly endorsed by the European court and on which we have modelled the proposals in the Bill before us today, was put in place by the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006, which was presented to the Scottish Parliament by the then Labour Justice Minister, Cathy Jamieson. I do not think that the Labour Party is in power in Scotland at the moment.
Noble Lords opposite contend that our proposals are in some way a charter for dangerous criminals such as rapists which will allow dangerous individuals to roam the streets, committing serious offences with no way of tracking them down. The contention that every individual suspected of rape or any other serious offence will instantly come off the database as a result of these proposals is just not true. As we have discussed previously and at some length, those charged with a qualifying offence, including rape, will have their DNA held for three years, and the police will be able to apply to the courts to extend that by a further two years. The police will do that and that is similar to what is happening in Scotland. Those arrested for a qualifying offence but not charged—oh! I was wondering whether the noble Lord wished to intervene but he is obviously addressing his Front Bench.
Lord Campbell-Savours
If I recall correctly, my noble friend on the Front Bench said that there had been no extensions whatever in Scotland and no use of the two-year extension. Is that true? If it is true, on what basis can it be argued that it is going to happen here?
Lord Henley
I am saying that it is available to the police should that be necessary. That is the important point to get over to the noble Lord. I do not know what the figures are for Scotland. I am not responsible for Scotland. It is another Administration in charge of their—
Lord Campbell-Savours
In other words, the Government are proposing an extension of two years for England and Wales. That system already exists in Scotland but the Government do not even know what has happened in Scotland in terms of the use of the two years. Is that correct?
Lord Henley
My Lords, that provision will be available here; it is available there. That is the important point. The police will have the ability to apply to the courts. Those arrested for a qualifying offence but not charged, where the victim is vulnerable, will also have their DNA held for three years, subject to the approval of the new independent commissioner. The noble Lord may not like that but that is the case.
Lord Harris of Haringey
The Minister said that an application, which has not, or may not have been exercised in Scotland, could be made when the police consider it necessary. Could he define what he thinks would be necessary under such circumstances?
Lord Henley
I noticed the intervention made by the noble Lord earlier on that point. It would be for the police to decide whether they consider it necessary. I would not want to go any further than that at this stage. They will have to do that. These are matters that will be subject to review by the independent commissioner, which is another safeguard. I know that the noble Lord is not very keen on such safeguards, but I think they are very important.
Across the entire coalition Government we took the view, during the passage of the Crime and Security Bill and in advanced proposals on this Bill, that the correct approach is to ensure that those convicted in the past of serious offences have their DNA added to the database, while those arrested for, but not convicted of, more minor offences should not have their biometrics held beyond the end of the investigation. That is why we encouraged the police to complete Operation Sheen, which the noble Lord might have come across, which identified more than 300 subjects in prison custody who had been convicted of murder, manslaughter or any sex offence but who did not appear to have had their DNA profile recorded on the national database. That operation has been completed recently and has resulted in an additional 376 such individuals having their DNA taken and uploaded on to the database.
Having completed that work, using the provisions of the Crime and Security Act which were agreed in the final days of the previous Government, the police service has embarked on a further operation, Operation Nutmeg, which seeks to chase and sample those with similar convictions who are now in the community. As my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said at Third Reading of this Bill in the House of Commons:
“In June last year, we started a programme to identify individuals in the community who have previously been convicted of either a sexual offence or homicide, and whom the last Government failed to place on the DNA database. That process has so far identified more than 13,000 people whose identities have been passed to local police forces, and we are now working with the police to find the individuals and obtain samples”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/10/11; col. 282.]
I believe that that sets out why we are doing this and why we are getting it right. I also believe the analysis which has been looked at by many independent experts who have considered it closely and, as my right honourable friend the Minister for crime and security said in the House of Commons Public Bill Committee,
“the Information Commissioner states that he ‘does not consider that the evidence presented’”—
that is, the evidence presented by the previous Government—
‘“supports a general period of anything like six years’”.—[Official Report, Commons, Protection of Freedoms Bill Committee, 29/3/2011; col. 212.]
I turn finally to the remarks of the chairman of the Home Affairs Committee as I think they are apposite and they are remarks on which the noble Baroness might wish to reflect. In his contribution at the Report stage of the Crime and Security Bill in the House of Commons, the right honourable Member said,
“There were differences among those of us on the Select Committee on how long the period should be, but we came to the conclusion”—
this is again to stress the balance—
“that a three-year period probably strikes the right balance. We said that the period should not be less than three years—although it could be longer—but that three years was a reasonable length of time”.
The right honourable gentleman went on to say that on the Select Committee,
“there was a consensus that holding the data for six years was too long”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/3/10; col. 48.]
Again I go back to what I said at previous stages of the Bill, that these are questions of balance. We think that we have the balance right; the European Court of Human Rights seems to think that we are getting the balance right; and the chairman of the Home Affairs Committee thinks that that is the case. Three years with the possibility of an extension seems to me to be about right and we think that six years is too long. I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this brief debate and for the information provided by the Minister. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that I have huge respect for the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights but, on this occasion, I do not agree with its conclusions wholeheartedly. I noticed that other noble Lords have noted, as the noble Lord said himself, that the Committee was asking for better recording in future and for more evidence, in effect. It has become apparent during the debate that the coalition Government are now moving towards three years but are saying that, although they want three years, in some cases five years is more appropriate. They are, as many noble Lords would agree, putting that burden on the police.
In my earlier speech, I mentioned that ACPO had said that not one single application for an extension had been made in Scotland. That is very relevant to our deliberations this evening. I completely agree with all noble Lords who have spoken that this is a matter of balance and of which side of the line one comes down on. On these Benches, I think everyone comes down on the side of wishing to preserve people’s freedom to live, protected from crime, rather than having more protection for people’s privacy. We believe that the citizens of this country would prefer that. We are worried that in future—
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
I accept that it is a question of balance, as I have said on numerous occasions. However, I believe that it is also a question of “rather than”. We believe that, rather than people's privacy being the be-all and end-all in this argument, it is more important to retain DNA for a longer period. I see people nodding against me, if you see what I mean. I do not expect all noble Lords to agree with me but on this question of balance we come down on the protection of individuals rather than on the privacy of individuals. That is where we are.
I do not intend to move to a vote but I would be grateful if the noble Lord could come back to me with some more information which I may wish to pursue at Third Reading in relation to the three years and the five years. If this is a key plank within the arguments put forward by the Minister, as I believe it to be, it is very relevant that in Scotland it has not been used on a single occasion. I would like to know why the police in Scotland have not felt able to use this or have not felt it necessary to use it. I would be grateful if the Minister could bring back further information before Third Reading.
Lord Henley
My Lords, we are on Report so I intervene with some disquiet merely to say that I do not think that I can add anything to what I have said. I, and other colleagues on these Benches, have been saying that we have to get these things right for a matter of balance. This is also a matter that has been reflected on by the European Court of Human Rights and by our own Joint Committee on Human Rights. They think that three years is about right. We also feel that there should be the ability to extend that in certain cases. I leave it at that.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, of course I recognise what the European Court of Human Rights said, but my Government, when they came to the view that the period should be six years, believed that it was compliant with the ruling of the ECHR. I was not suggesting that the Minister was going to agree with me; I was asking him to come back with further evidence of the situation in Scotland. There must be some facts and figures. The facts relating to Scotland that I have put before the House have been questioned, and I would like more facts about the situation in Scotland. I would like to know whether it is indeed the case that the police have not asked for an extension from three to five years.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I rise not to support my noble friend on behalf of the Opposition necessarily but, as I said in Committee, as an individual I have a great deal of sympathy with my noble friend’s amendment. Like my noble friend I believe that such a voluntary database would lower the level of stigma and in the future might enhance public confidence in the secure handling of data, which is very necessary. As my noble friend has said today, the state will undoubtedly hold more and more information about its citizens.
I was also very interested to hear of the response by Professor Jeffreys to Mr Gary Streeter MP, which is worth pursuing. I do not know what the Government’s response to my noble friend’s amendment will be, although I suspect that they will reject the amendment. However, it is an interesting suggestion and I hope that, if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, the National DNA Database Strategy Board will look at the proposal as perhaps something interesting to pursue on behalf of the citizens of this country and their safety.
Lord Henley
My Lords, the noble Baroness guessed right in that I will be rejecting the amendment or at least not encouraging the House to accept it. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, like Jonathan Swift, made what is described as “a modest proposal” and claimed that I had recommended this policy in Committee with a smile on my face. The noble Lord should not always take me totally and utterly seriously, even in Committee, whether there is a smile on my face or otherwise. I will have to look carefully again at what precisely I said at that time.
If the noble Lord is of the view that he or others should be able to go along and hand in their DNA to the police, I am more than happy for them to do that. I will escort him to the police station in Workington, Carlisle or whatever town in the north-west he finds most convenient. We will go together and I will assist him in that process. Having said that, I do not think that this proposal really has much running for it, although I can see the arguments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, about reducing stigma and other such matters. Those remarks were echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Desai, although he went on to make the important point about those who do not volunteer and whether they would have problems. I will get to that in due course.
I want to make only one or two points about the amendment because I do not think we should waste too much time on it, modest proposal though it was. First, I do not believe that there is a demand for such an idea. The police service has not been demanding the establishment of such a database and I do not believe that there is any great demand for one within civil society as a whole. There might be a few public-spirited individuals such as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and others who wish to come forward and provide their DNA for a database, but I suspect that they would be few and far between. I would also suggest that it is unlikely that individuals such as the noble Lord who did come forward would have any involvement in criminality, and that would be the reason they were happy to put forward their DNA. It is therefore difficult to see what the use might be for such material being stored on a voluntary database.
Secondly, I have a rather more important objection to the amendment, which relates to new subsection (11) where it proposes that the,
“National DNA Database Strategy Board shall, within a period of 12 months of commencement, report to the Secretary of State with recommendations on the establishment”,
of the database, and then in subsection (12) it sets out what the board should do. I do have to say that having the board carry out a feasibility study within 12 months of the commencement of the Bill would be asking rather a lot. The board’s workload will already be high during that period in supervising the establishment of the new procedures required by the Bill. That will take up a considerable amount of its time. The board has no resources to do this and we do not consider it appropriate to require it to do all this extra work at this time.
Having said that, I will put the smile back on my face and say that it is an interesting idea, as the noble Baroness put it, and a modest proposal. No doubt he will be more than happy to hand in his DNA in due course, but I do not think that I can support his amendment at this stage.
Lord Campbell-Savours
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, for his recognition of the inevitability of the developments in DNA biometrics and how, in the end, there will be a national database. I am absolutely convinced of that, although it probably will not happen in my lifetime. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Hughes of Woodside on the question of the pilot. I do not think that this would cost the Government a lot of money. The only cost would be incurred by the strategy board in carrying out the work that is necessary for the purposes of my amendment. The fact is that we might find some great public benefactor, a private person, to fund a pilot which, over the years, might develop into a national DNA database. All I was asking was for the framework for a voluntary database to be considered, not for the Government to spend money on establishing it.
I recognise the concerns of my noble friend Lord Desai on the issue of black marks being put against those who refuse to join in. As I say, it would be voluntary, and in so far as it is voluntary I do not think that that issue would arise. I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was not able to intervene on this occasion, because she too is recorded in Hansard as expressing the view that it might have some effect on reducing the stigma generated over the retention of DNA. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon for expressing the hope that we can at least consider this seriously at some stage in the future.
Perhaps I may say to the Minister that this is a debate that is going to carry on. As I have said, I believe it is utterly inevitable that this will happen. It is just a question of which Government will have the courage actually to take on the responsibility of taking the project forward. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Henley
Lord Henley
My Lords, I shall speak also to the other amendments in my name in this group; that is, Amendments 19, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29. We will also consider in this group Amendments 20, 21 and 23, in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I shall respond to those as I come to the end of my remarks, but, at this stage, I shall speak just to my own amendments.
We consider a child’s biometric information to be highly personal and sensitive and, as such, it should be protected. It is right that schools and colleges should be required to obtain the written consent of a child’s parents if they wish to take and process this information.
We listened carefully to the concerns raised in Committee about these provisions. In particular, my noble friend Lord Lucas and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, argued that the requirement to obtain the written consent of both parents would place too great a bureaucratic burden on schools and could have the effect of dissuading schools and colleges from using biometric recognition systems.
The Government are persuaded that we should remove the “dual consent” requirement and instead provide for a system whereby all parents, and any other individual with parental responsibility for a child, must be informed in writing that the school or college intends to take and process the child’s biometric information and that they have a right to object. As long as no one objects in writing, the written consent of only one parent will be required. This change strikes the right balance between ensuring that the views of both parents continue to be taken into account, with their right to object preserved, and ensuring that the administrative burden on schools and colleges is not too great.
The Government’s amendments also make the consent requirements in the Bill more consistent with all other forms of consent that schools and colleges are required to obtain, therefore alleviating any additional bureaucratic burden. The main difference in this instance is the express provision to notify all parents and the stipulation that, if any parent objects, the processing of their child’s biometric information cannot take place. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, my Amendments 20 and 21 are to the Minister’s Amendment 19, which, as he explained, deals with notification to parents. My amendments would include the child in the notification.
Noble Lords will be aware of provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which are relevant here. Without being technical about it, it seems to me a matter of common sense and principle that a child whose data these are should be part of this whole process. I doubt that I need spend long seeking to persuade your Lordships of that—well, I hope not; if I get a look from in front of me, perhaps I should.
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has made it clear that:
“The realization of the right of the child to express her or his views requires that the child be informed about the matters, options and possible decisions to be taken and their consequences by those who are responsible for hearing the child, and by the child’s parents or guardian”.
Amendment 23 follows an amendment that I had in Grand Committee relating to the provision of information. Noble Lords at that stage regarded what I was proposing as too burdensome, in that it was read as an annual requirement. I had not intended that the provision of information should be anything as burdensome as was understood, so I have brought back a simpler amendment, which would provide that the authority in question should ensure that information is provided to each parent and child on their rights, in language capable of being readily understood by them.
I am not proposing here regular pieces of paper in difficult language—I remember the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, saying that in her experience, as both a mother and a grandmother, such pieces of paper tend to end up in the washing machine. I am simply saying that it needs to be recognised that information should be readily available, perhaps on the school’s website, along with other information. However, the provision of information in accessible language is an important principle. I understand that there has been some research that indicated that most children using biometric systems in schools had not considered how long their fingerprints would be held for. They were generally not concerned, which the researchers took as a serious matter. I am not entirely surprised that children may not think beyond what is immediately in front of them. However, it points up the need, not to shove it down children’s throats, but to make the information very easily accessible.
The Information Commissioner has made it clear that schools collecting data need to be aware that children are data subjects and that,
“it is they who should in the first instance be informed and consulted about the use of their personal data”.
The Earl of Erroll
My Lords, although I would agree that the Government have made an effort to move some way in the direction that we were talking about, I entirely agree with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. For many schools, particularly the not-so-good schools, fingerprint recognition biometrics are used in order to stop a certain amount of bullying—so that you cannot, for example, tell which children are in receipt of free school meals or getting special provisions. The moment you start to have a way of distinguishing those matters, other children will have a lever to start bullying, causing disruption et cetera.
It was said that if the parents decided that the child should not have its biometrics kept they could use a card and some other system would have to be provided. But that in itself could become a target for the other children. For instance, if you knew that little Johnny had a card and was also vulnerable, what could be better than to remove his card and destroy it? He will probably not dare tell people that he has been bullied in this way. People might even use that card to gain stuff for themselves. Your Lordships might say, “It is PIN-protected”. However, it would not be very difficult for other children to bully that PIN number out of little Johnny.
We have to realise that, in the real world, these things are not ideal. These biometrics were being used to provide a much more even way of identifying children with special requirements without other children knowing that they have them. The provision could drive a coach and horses right through this very efficient way of doing it. The Government should therefore think again about what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, and produce their own amendment for Third Reading. The system will need to work in that sort of way so that it can be changed and the child can opt out. If the child thinks, “I am going to get bullied”, it may well want to overrule its parents. In this case, I do not see why the child should not.
The other thing that they might want to do—although this would require a few more amendments and I would not begin to attempt those myself—is somehow to find a way of saying that if this is not working because it is starting to cause problems in schools, we could come back and change it without having to go back to primary legislation. Although I do not like the Henry VIII-clause method, perhaps we can bury some part of this in regulation whereby it could be varied if the Minister found later on that it was causing problems in schools. For instance, instead of the parents having to do an opt-in to the system it would have to be a very deliberate opt-out. Something like that could be useful, because I know this all looks great on paper but out there in the real world it does not work that well. People are not reasonable.
There are also a lot of people who cannot read and write. We talk about providing the information in a form which is easily understood by parents but I am told that the adult illiteracy rate is supposed to be 10 per cent. Perhaps it is 14 per cent, I hear, and in some schools you are going to have that. How many languages would you have to translate it into in some schools? We all seem to be assuming that people are reasonable and available, can read and write, and can understand the issues. That is very dangerous. The Minister should probably look at this and try to give himself more flexibility, in case there are some unintended consequences of what is a well-meaning part of the Bill.
The important thing which we want to end up with is that biometric information used by schools for their administration systems cannot be used outside the schools, and there are many ways of achieving that other than by this opt-in only basis. We should make sure that it is destroyed the moment that the pupil leaves, because it is not needed for administration purposes, and that is not permissible to use it in any other way. If we think that we can keep a voluntary DNA database secure from the Government, we can keep school databases secure from them and the police, or whoever. It is not the fact of the fingerprint that matters; it is what it is used for. We should perhaps make it so that it is not of evidential quality. I suggest to the Minister that he looks again at this.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I note what the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, said in his concluding remarks and we will certainly look at whether any such biometric information should ever be made available outside school. He makes a perfectly valid point on that. Perhaps I might answer some of the points that have been made in the course of this debate, then move my own amendments. It will be open to noble Lords to consider what to do with their own amendments that have been grouped with this later on.
I start with the question of language, which my noble friend Lady Hamwee raised in Amendment 23. The amendment says that information provided by schools and colleges to parents and children on their rights under these provisions must be in a language capable of being readily understood by the parent and child. In response to the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, this is true of all information that is provided to parents, whether illiterate or not, and it is something that schools always have to take into account when trying to get to their parents. As I indicated in our deliberations in Committee, the Bill provides that parental consent must be informed and freely given. Schools and colleges should take steps to ensure that parents receive full information about the processing of their child’s biometric information.
I can give an assurance that the Department for Education will issue advice to schools on the provisions in this chapter of the Bill. That advice will include a template consent form for schools to use if they wish. As well as providing information about the type of biometric information to be taken and how it will be used, the advice and the template will refer to the right of parents and pupils to refuse or withdraw their consent and the duty on schools to provide alternative arrangements for those pupils whose information cannot be processed. We will encourage schools to follow the template that we have put forward.
With the aid of this advice, I hope that my noble friend will agree that we can trust schools and colleges to provide appropriate information in the appropriate manner to provide parents and pupils with the right information without the need for an express legal requirement of the kind set out in her amendment.
I turn to my noble friend’s Amendments 20 and 21, which are amendments to government Amendment 19 and seek to ensure that children will also be notified of the processing and of their right to object. We do not consider that an express statutory provision to this effect is necessary, as schools and parents should be trusted to inform children in an age-appropriate manner of what is being proposed, and to ascertain if the child has any concerns about the processing. The proposed government advice will highlight to schools the child’s right to object, and will recommend that parents are made aware of that advice.
I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I was worried that his arguments were oversuspicious and, at some points, over-Jesuitical. He seemed to think that there was a hidden agenda, and at times I suspect that there was an element of him protesting too much in his objections to what we do. Having said that, I have a degree of sympathy for the arguments that he put forward.
The Government believe that, regardless of their age, all children should have the right to say no to the processing of his or her biometric information, even if that is an uninformed objection from a relatively small child. No child of any age should be coerced, physically or otherwise, to give his or her biometric information. We believe that it would be wrong to ignore the wishes and feelings of even a primary-aged child in this important matter.
Lord Rosser
If that is the Government’s view for a child of primary school age, is it also their view that if that child wishes their biometric information to be processed and their parents do not, the child’s view should likewise prevail?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I was going to come to that point. The two scenarios are different. This is why I thought that at times his arguments were positively Jesuitical, with one parent pushing one way, one pushing the other and the child possibly going down a third route, if there could be a third route. Why should one or the other prevail? We think it is right that if the parents say, “No, we do not want that”, that should be final. That is why we have tabled the amendments. Even if one parent objects, that should be it. However, because we believe that these things are important, we also feel that, even if the parents want the provision, it is right that the child can opt out, even if he or she is making an uninformed decision. There is a very big distinction between the two matters. That is why I was worried about the arguments that the noble Lord was putting forward. I believe there is little to be gained in overruling the child’s wishes and I am not aware of any specific evidence that—
The Earl of Erroll
I was trying to make that same point, although not as well. Does the noble Lord remember being very embarrassed when he was at school by some of the things that his parents did because they did not understand how things were at school? That is the huge danger here. Some parents will be wound up by the Daily Mail into deciding to opt out of providing biometric information and their child will feel incredibly embarrassed because they stand out in class. That could get quite serious. Children may know better in this instance than one thinks.
Lord Henley
All of us have been children and most of us in this House are parents. All of us know that one thing that is absolutely universal to all children is feeling deeply embarrassed by their parents. That has been the case since time began. There is no way round that. Children will continue to be embarrassed by their parents, whatever their parents decide to do. The point I am trying to make is that I think there is a very big distinction between the parents saying, “Yes, you should do this”, and the child saying, “No, I want to opt out”, even if he or she is making an uninformed decision; and the other way round whereby it is being suggested that the child should be allowed to opt in even though the parents want to opt out. We want to make it clear to the child that this is a very important decision about giving up some of their own identity. They should be allowed to make that decision for themselves because it is a decision they will have to go on making in the future.
I think that I was the first to use the expression “kicking and screaming” in Committee. I do not think that is something that is likely to happen. A relatively small number of schools will make use of these sorts of mechanics, particularly when we are talking about primary schools. I believe that we can trust parents, schools and teachers to resolve any of the concerns that might crop up. The noble Lord has a point but it is a relatively small point and I do not think that he should get too worked up about it. I assure him that there is no hidden agenda on the part of the Government. I think these matters can be resolved by schools in a sensible way. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will not feel it unecessary to move his Amendment 24 when we come to it. I hope that I have addressed the points raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee in her amendments and by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Lord Henley
“(1A) Before the first processing of a child’s biometric information on or after the coming into force of subsection (2), the relevant authority must notify each parent of the child—
(a) of its intention to process the child’s biometric information, and(b) that the parent may object at any time to the processing of the information.”
Lord Henley
My Lords, I hope I have understood correctly what is being proposed but if I have got it wrong I shall certainly write to the noble Baroness and we can return to it later. As I understand it, this is a matter of writing to the parents and it is then for the parents to ensure that the child understands, as far as possible, what is being asked. We also hope that the school will deal with this matter. It will be set out in the guidance that I promised that the Department for Education would bring forward in due course.
Lord Henley
“(a) at least one parent of the child consents to the information being processed, and(b) no parent of the child has withdrawn his or her consent, or otherwise objected, to the information being processed.(3) Section 27 makes further provision about the requirement to notify parents and the obtaining and withdrawal of consent (including when notification and consent are not required).”
Lord Henley
Lord Henley
Lord Henley
Lord Henley
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 38, 39, 40, 41 and 46. I can give an assurance that these are all minor drafting amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Lucas
This is also a minor drafting amendment, but I suspect that I shall have to speak to it at greater length. It concerns the scope of “such” in the clause. It is very hard to divine in English what preceding part of the clause “such” is meant to apply to. Clearly, it can go further than the preceding noun. For example, if I were to say, “Some Peers make marmalade; such marmalade is highly prized”, that “such” would clearly apply to marmalade made by Peers and not just to marmalade. However, one can stretch the elastic too far and in that case “such” would seem to apply only to the closing words of a phrase. That is the difference that I have with the drafters of this clause. Clause 33(3) says:
“The surveillance camera code is admissible in evidence in any such proceedings”.
Does “such” mean “criminal and civil proceedings” or does it mean the whole of subsection (2)? This is a moot point. If you put the two subsections together and read straight on, it is absolutely clear in any normal sense of English that “such” refers to the whole of the preceding sentence, but the drafters say that by separating it into two subsections, the “such” applies only to “criminal or civil proceedings”. That is a difficult argument. The additional separation is small and “such” requires to be construed as if what is being talked about is a subset of the whole, but if you are talking about civil and criminal proceedings, you are really talking about the universe of proceedings. There are no other kinds of legal proceedings; you are talking about every kind of legal proceedings in the common world. You would not need “such”, you would talk just about proceedings or legal proceedings. For “such” to have a meaning in that place—I have read and reread that clause—it must refer to the whole of subsection (2). If it does, it allows the surveillance camera code to be admissible in evidence only in cases brought against a person in connection with their not having obeyed the code, not in all the cases that might otherwise involve parking or other aspects of criminal and civil behaviour where the code might be relevant. “Such” greatly restricts the use of the code.
I am clear from my discussions with the Home Office that it intends subsection (3) to be wide—that is, it should apply to any criminal or civil proceedings. It would be much clearer for anyone subsequently reading the Bill if that is what it said, rather than “such”. I beg to move.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend, particularly for his references to making marmalade. I can assure him that I made my marmalade last weekend. It did not go terribly well and I will probably be making some more this weekend to make sure I can enter it in that great marmalade competition that takes place in Cumbria once a year. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, will be entering his marmalade in due course.
I am sorry that my noble friend still does not quite understand what we are trying to do here, but I admire his persistence. It reminds me of our late noble friend the Earl of Balfour, who frequently put down detailed amendments of this sort to a whole range of Bills and caused the parliamentary draftsmen considerable problems, as they had to try to explain their intentions and how they were getting to them. I hope that I will be able to do that and I shall quote from earlier correspondence.
My noble friend will remember that we discussed this matter in Grand Committee. My noble friend Lady Stowell dealt with it and then wrote to my noble friend Lord Lucas to clarify the overall purpose of Clause 33 and to provide reassurance that the wording of subsection (3) was consistent with the clause’s intention. Perhaps I may quote the relevant sections of the letter. It stated:
“Clause 33(1) provides that ‘a relevant authority’ must have regard to the surveillance camera code; clause 33(2) is deliberately wider than 33(1) in that it provides that any failure to have regard to the code (whether by a relevant authority or by another) does not of itself create civil or criminal liability. Subsection (2) is open to two interpretations: a narrow interpretation to the effect that the code is admissible in any civil or criminal proceedings in which a failure to have regard to the code is relevant, or a wider meaning, namely that it is admissible in any civil or criminal proceedings. We consider that it was clear from the context of the Bill that the words do refer to any civil or criminal proceedings. If you look at clause 33(2) there are no civil or criminal proceedings at that point. Consequently, the ‘any such proceedings’ (in subsection (3)) can really only refer to any civil or criminal proceedings. One also needs to consider clause 33(4) which refers to ‘any such proceedings’, since the meaning of that will hinge on the reference in clause 33(3)”.
I stand by the drafting skills of our parliamentary counsel and believe that the meaning that he has set out is already, should I say, crystal clear. The reference to “such proceedings” unambiguously refers back to the reference to criminal or civil proceedings in subsection (2). We do not need to repeat those words in subsection (3). We remain unconvinced that there is any real merit in such a revision to the Bill. Moreover, if we were to make that change in Clause 33, we would also need to amend Clauses 51 and 62 and Schedule 3, which adopts the same drafting approach.
With that explanation and having read out that extract from my noble friend Lady Stowell’s letter, I hope that my noble friend Lord Lucas will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Lucas
My Lords, one of the happy consequences of Pepper v Hart is that by setting out what he has, my noble friend has solved the problem, because he has produced something to which the courts can now turn to answer any question that may arise. I am very happy to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 34, which has been prepared by the Bar Council. Any noble Lord who looked at the Marshalled List would have been surprised that anyone without parliamentary counsel experience could have come up with this, and indeed it was a former parliamentary counsel who drafted it. I take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for the meeting he had with representatives of the Bar Council a few days ago.
The amendment is underlaid by the common-law right of a client and his lawyer—or indeed a lawyer and his client; it works both ways—to communicate privately. I do not think I need to emphasise the importance of this, nor can I overemphasise it. It is a fundamental human right and a major building block of our administration of justice. If a client feels that his communication might be disclosed and used against him, he will edit what he tells his lawyer, and his lawyer will inevitably be handicapped by that.
There is a statutory protection against the use of legally privileged communications when a client is in custody, but in 2009 in the case of Re McE, this House, when it was still sitting as a court, held, although not unanimously—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, dissented—that Part II of RIPA permits the covert surveillance of meetings between defendants and lawyers. This ruling applies to other covert investigation techniques: the interception of communications, the acquisition of communications data and the use of covert human intelligence sources. There is therefore a problem where instructions are taken outside a police station, such as a group of people at an environmental protest, or indeed when one meets any group of people, or any individual, outside particular premises. The ruling also applies outside criminal law when an individual brings a civil action against the state, and to think that the state itself could be listening into and using what he tells a lawyer reminds us of regimes that are very far from the model of what we wish to be in this country.
Following McE, orders were made that altered the authorisation provisions and revisions were made to the codes of practice, but in the view of the Bar Council these provide insufficient safeguards. The codes of practice provide for the violation of legal professional privilege only in “exceptional and compelling circumstances”, but the test contains no special protection for privileged material. For directed surveillance, such circumstances are said to arise only in cases where there is a threat to national security or to “life or limb”. The phrase “threat to life or limb” is not clear; it could extend to quite minor offences where physical injury has arisen from a lack of reasonable care or a breach of a duty that gives rise to strict liability.
The real difficulty is that these changes do not address the fundamental point that covert investigatory powers should not be used to target privileged communications. The orders, in any event, do not apply to the interception of communications and the acquisition of communications data. This amendment would protect legal professional privilege except where it is abused for criminal purposes.
The noble Baroness said in Grand Committee that no one could regard themselves as being beyond the law or immune from investigation or prosecution. I do not challenge that. Indeed, I share that view. Therefore the inequity exception, as it is known in the trade, is included, which provides that privilege does not attach to information that is held or to communications that were made in the furtherance of a criminal purpose. The proposed new clause would simply bring RIPA into line with other legislation. When RIPA was introduced, the issue of privilege was not debated at all, and the courts have been left to construe statutes. This is not a case of the courts having any basis other than an assumption of the construction, “Parliament must have intended”. I do not think that Parliament addressed its mind to it.
I have two further points. First, the noble Baroness mentioned the requirement of codes of practice that cases of legally privileged communications which are intercepted or retained, or are the subject of interception, should be reported to the Interception of Communications Commissioner. I take that point but it is after the event and does not meet the basic concern.
Secondly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, queried whether the way in which the provision was drafted would give a wide power to the Secretary of State to pre-empt how the courts might deal with a criminal purpose. He pointed to the words “or otherwise”. The matter is most likely to arise on an application for authorisation but it could arise later in an investigation where the fruits of a covert operation tend to include lawyer-client communication, which would not attract the iniquity exception.
The Bar Council and I believe that the addition of the words:
“For the purposes of this section”,
in two places would confine regulations which are proposed to provide for determinations only for the purposes of the relevant section of RIPA and not be as extensive as the noble and learned Lord feared. I am grateful to him for pointing out the need for a little tweaking.
This is an issue of really important principle, which I appreciate I am bringing to the House late in the evening. Perhaps the exit of a number of noble Lords indicates that we are not going to go on to what they were staying for. I have no doubt made myself a bit unpopular therefore by this but nevertheless it is an important point of privilege.
Lord Henley
My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely right to say that this is a very important matter. It is sad that we should be debating this so late and that it will be the last amendment of the day. I was going to congratulate her on her drafting abilities but, as she admitted, that was the work of others. I was grateful to see that it was a former parliamentary counsel who managed that.
Having said that, I appreciate that this is an area on which my noble friend and the Bar Council have strong views and I think that there is some agreement between us on the importance of these issues. I am therefore very grateful that my noble friend brought representatives of the Bar Council to a meeting with me, my officials and my noble friend Lady Stowell last week to discuss this matter further.
We all believe that the principle of legal privilege is important and that the ability of a person to seek legal advice in confidence is a key part of our justice system. We also all agree that the privilege must not be abused by lawyers who might themselves participate in or assist with criminal activity. When such communications are taking place it should be possible to target them for surveillance.
This amendment would not allow us to go any further than this and we do not agree that there are absolutely no other circumstances where privileged material can be targeted. We believe that there are some occasions, which would be exceptional in nature, where our intelligence and law enforcement agencies may need to target these communications in order to counter a serious threat or to protect a person from serious harm. An example would be where a person goes on a shooting rampage, taking members of the public or perhaps their family, hostage. Our law enforcement agencies may have intelligence to suggest that it is likely that the person will visit their lawyer and seek advice or refuge. In that situation, it is clearly vital that information can be obtained about the whereabouts of those taken hostage.
Alternatively, we could take the case of a terrorist planning an attack who may consult his lawyer at the lawyer’s office, where there might be an undercover officer in place, before that attack takes place. The surveillance commissioner may reasonably consider that the undercover officer will obtain information which could be used to avert the attack.
Immigration (Biometric Registration) (Amendment) Regulations 2012
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Earl Attlee
That the draft regulations and rules laid before the House on 6, 14 and 15 December 2011 be approved.
Relevant documents: 36th and 37th Reports from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, considered in Grand Committee on 23 January.
Policing Protocol Order 2012
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The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, I appreciate that the motivation of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, may be a fear of the democratic mandate that the PCC will have but, having said that, I am grateful to him for giving us the opportunity both to have a break from the Welfare Reform Bill and, far more seriously, to consider the finer details of the policing protocol which, last summer and autumn, this House argued was a necessity to secure the operational independence of the police service.
I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Browning, who took the Bill through this House. We are all grateful for everything that she did then. May I say how grateful I am for the chance to hear her today and how much I wish it were she who was still standing at the Dispatch Box to argue this case? Still, I shall do my best to live up to her standards in dealing with the various questions.
I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, when he said that—I hope that I have his words down correctly—we must do all we can to maintain the worldwide reputation of the British police. Yes, that is our aim and it is what was behind the Act as it went through Parliament, which is why the protocol is so important and why we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for offering us the opportunity to debate it on this occasion.
The noble Lord put a number of questions to me. I counted up to seven; I might have got that wrong, but he will no doubt intervene if I do not deal with all the points that he made. First, he echoed the Merits Committee’s complaints about a lack of consultation, and I will get to that in due course. I noticed those wonderful words from the noble Lord, Lord Dear: it was with “the greatest respect” that he disagreed with the Merits Committee. I have a great deal of respect for that committee—we created it in the run-up to the 1997 election, it is a great committee and we always take its views with great respect—but I also note that when someone says that they disagree “with the greatest respect”, they are disagreeing in pretty strong terms, and I am grateful to him for that.
I also note what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, had to say about the Merits Committee’s view about the ambiguity of some of the wording, and I will get to that on his sixth point, which was about the protocol not being drafted in legal language and whether it will stand up in court. Again, I was grateful for what my noble friend Lady Browning said about how grateful she was that it had been put in plain English. I assure the noble Lord that the courts are pretty good at interpreting things when they are in legal language, but I am sure that if necessary they are equally good at interpreting things when they are in plain English.
On that small point, I assure my noble friend Lady Hamwee about her interpretation of which came first—the statute or the protocol—that the courts would always have to take the statute first, should there be any disagreement between the statute and the protocol. As my noble friend pointed out, though, there will be no problem.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, talked about problems with the turnout for November elections. As he will remember, one of the reasons why they are happening is the delays, possibly those caused in this House, that meant that we had to push back that date, but I am sure that we will still have a very good turnout in due course.
The noble Lord spoke of the fear of undermining the operational independence of chief constables—again, that is something that I will get to as I deal with these matters—and about the fear of greater insecurity for chief constables. The noble Lord’s seventh point was again on the question of whether it would be appropriate to have a review in due course, and I hope that I will deal with that in my remarks.
I shall start with what was probably the noble Lord’s fourth point: operational independence. We have always been clear about our commitment to the absolute preservation of operational independence. As my right honourable friend made clear in the debate in another place, that is not something that can be defined in law but it is a cornerstone of policing in this country. That commitment has been made both here and in another place on a number of occasions.
I turn to the consultation process itself, which seemed to cause concern to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, although, as the noble Lord, Lord Dear, put it, it did not seem to cause concern in another place, nor does it seem to have caused concern to anyone else here other than the Merits Committee. Again, though, with the greatest respect I suggest that the committee is wrong; as my noble friend Lady Hamwee put it, it has been consulted almost to death.
The order was not drafted in isolation. It relied heavily on the active engagement of the Association of Police Authority Chief Executives, the Association of Police Authorities and the Association of Chief Police Officers, the former Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, and the deputy mayor for policing and crime and his chief executive in their former capacities as chair and chief executive of the Metropolitan Police Authority and the Greater London Authority itself. I have no doubt that once police and crime commissioners are elected, there will be a need to seek their views on the protocol, but I stress that this document was issued by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and it therefore reflects her interpretation in the context of the Police and Social Responsibility Act of how the policing landscape should operate effectively. The protocol that we have now had the opportunity to debate and consider is the result of determined negotiations between all those stakeholders, who have a broad range of robust views on operational independence. It is obvious to me that such a range of opinions also extends to debates in another place and to those in your Lordships’ House.
I appreciate that the noble Lord—I think this was his seventh point—would like to see a further review of that protocol before the end of 2013. My right honourable friend in another place gave no firm commitment about a review date, but he said that the Government would consult the PCCs although, as the noble Lord, Lord Dear, made clear, we cannot do so until they exist. However, he also stressed that the protocol, issued by the Home Secretary and setting out her expectations of the formal landscape, will enable the public to understand the respective roles and responsibilities of all parties. That process is obviously open to review in the future but no firm date can be given.
Thinking again about the wording of the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, who talks about the lack of a “robust consultation process”, I would also make it clear that this process has not been rushed in any way. We placed in the Library of the House a draft protocol, in which my noble friend Lady Browning invited Members from all sides of the House, whom she later met, to discuss the text. She then acted on the comments that she received. That engagement with Members of the House would not have been possible without the open—at times frank—approach that she took in reaching out to all sides on a matter in which I know she is considered to be above her colleagues. My ministerial colleagues in the Home Office and I are very grateful to her for continuing that process.
I think these numbers relate to the fourth and fifth questions about undermining operational independence and fears of greater job insecurity. I shall say just a little more about that matter for the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. As he reminded us, further orders will come before this House so there might be opportunities for other debates on the affirmative Motions and, no doubt, on some of the negative Motions that the noble Lord will seek to find means of debating as well. One of the key themes that has run through the numerous debates that we have had so far on the matter of operational independence and the safeguarding of the officers responsible is the fact that it is very difficult, as my right honourable friend made clear in another place, to define what operational independence is.
Primary legislation and common law provide some clarity on the legal principles that underpin the operational independence of the office of chief constable. For example, Section 29 of and Schedule 4 to the Police Act 1996 require members of police forces to be attested as constables on appointment and set out the wording of the declaration that they must make. Case law sets out the important principles that constables act as officers of the Crown in carrying out their duties, but are not to be regarded as servants of any executive authority, and exercise their powers independently at their own discretion. If the noble Lord wanted, I could cite case law going back to 1611 on that issue. I see that he shakes his head and does not require it at this moment. It also sets out the duty on chief constables to secure the preservation of the peace and uphold the law in their areas in the way that they see fit.
Therefore, striking the right balance in setting some clear boundaries within which we expect the day-to-day relationships between the key parties—that is, the PCCs and chief constables—to operate has been a key point of negotiation. I was grateful for the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, when he talked about there being possible tension on those occasions but that tension not necessarily being a bad thing. I think my noble friend Lady Hamwee described it as a creative tension. I forget the precise wording that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, used; I think it was “constructive tension”. However, I think we would all agree that tension can exist without being a bad thing on those points.
I hope that such assurances, including those of people such as the former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and his deputy, who endorsed the protocol alongside ACPO, the Association of Police Authorities and the Association of Police Authority Chief Executives, will be sufficient to remind the noble Lord that we have got the boundaries right. The protocol is written in plain English, which seems to disturb him, but perhaps I will hear on another occasion that he prefers them to be written in another manner. I am certainly satisfied that, in setting those boundaries, there remains enough flexibility in the protocol for it to be the starting point for a much more detailed and public-focused discussion of how to reduce crime and how to make sure that we get the policing service that we want and one that, as the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, put it, maintains its reputation of being one of the best in the world.
I hope I have dealt with all the points put by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and those raised by other noble Lords. If I have not, I will write to noble Lords in due course.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
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Lord Henley
That the amendments for the Report stage be marshalled and considered in the following order:
Clauses 1 to 19, Schedule 1, Clauses 20 to 39, Schedule 2, Clauses 40 to 53, Schedule 3, Clauses 54 to 56, Schedule 4, Clauses 57 to 61, Schedule 5, Clauses 62 and 63, Schedule 6, Clauses 64 to 78, Schedule 7, Clauses 79 to 87, Schedule 8, Clauses 88 to 113, Schedules 9 and 10, Clauses 114 to 119.
Immigration (Biometric Registration) (Amendment) Regulations 2012
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Lord Henley
That the Grand Committee do Report to the House that it has considered the Immigration (Biometric Registration) (Amendment) Regulations 2012.
Relevant documents: 36th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, on 25 November 2008, the UK Border Agency issued the first biometric residence permits, through regulations made under the previous Government’s UK Borders Act 2007, to foreign nationals granted further leave under student, marriage and partnership categories. Since then, the UK Border Agency has made significant progress by incrementally rolling out these highly secure immigration status documents, known in legislation as biometric immigration documents.
Identity-swapping threatens the integrity of immigration control and helps abusers to make multiple fraudulent immigration applications, to work illegally, and to access public funds and services to which they are not entitled. By recording fingerprints and digital facial images, we can check a person against our existing immigration database records and the police fingerprint database before deciding whether to allow someone to stay in the UK. We can then establish a reliable link between the holder and the document by linking the biographical details they give us to their unique biometric identifiers. Further rollouts since 2008 have incorporated points-based system applicants extending their stay in the UK for more than six months and a number of other immigration categories, and more than 600,000 biometric residence permits have been issued to date.
Approval of the Immigration (Biometric Registration) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 will mean the UK Border Agency can complete the in-country rollout of biometric residence permits to all foreign nationals from outside the European Economic Area given permission to stay here for more than six months. The planned date for rollout to new applicants in the new categories, which include those applying for settlement or indefinite leave and asylum or protection, is 29 February 2012. All non-EEA nationals will need to enrol their fingerprints and facial image if applying to stay here for more than six months from this date and they will be issued with a biometric residence permit if successful.
The provision in the regulations for any migrant granted permission to stay for more than six months from 1 December 2012 to apply for a biometric residence permit if they have not done so already is intended to incorporate those who made an application to stay in the UK before a biometric requirement in their immigration category. This ensures that from this date the agency will only issue one format of document to non-EEA nationals permitted to stay here for more than six months.
Rolling out secure biometric residence permits to more foreign nationals helps the UK Border Agency to upgrade and streamline the documents it issues. Volumes of biometric residence permits in circulation will be significantly boosted by this phase of the rollout, which in turn helps employers and others who are becoming increasingly familiar with them. Feedback from employers, businesses and other government departments supports this. The documents provide the opportunity for fast and simple checking and lend themselves to a one-stop check of immigration status, identity and right to work or access public benefits.
As increased numbers of migrants will hold biometric residence permits, these regulations widen the circumstances when they must be presented, to include all immigration applications and also nationality or related applications. The regulations ensure that when presenting these biometric documents, foreign nationals may be compelled to provide their fingerprints for comparison against those in the document, and this is extended for employment purposes. We will trial technology to achieve this with a select number of external organisations during 2012.
In addition to streamlining the immigration documents issued in the UK, biometric permits meet the standardised format of documents set out in European legislation that the UK opted into: Regulation EC 1030/2002, as amended by EC 380/2008, with which I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will be very familiar. Aligning with other member states ensures we are not a weak link in Europe for immigration abuse.
Rollout to overseas applicants coming to the United Kingdom for more than six months will require significant infrastructure and system changes, and we will return to Parliament with our plans, including policy proposals, for that final stage. This will be after the accreditation period for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, to ensure that the integrity and robustness of business-critical systems are maintained.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for explaining the background to these regulations. To date, the UK has partially complied with the EU regulation by undertaking the rollout of the permit incrementally by immigration application category. We support the general thrust of the regulations, but it would be helpful if the noble Lord would give the Committee an outline of what further stages need to be gone through before the work is complete.
In his speech today, the noble Lord referred to the Written Statement of 6 December in which he said that, on the overseas rollout of biometric permits, the Government will return to Parliament with plans, including policy proposals, for the final stage. This will be after the accreditation period of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Will the noble Lord give a little more information about that, and about when he intends to return to Parliament with his plans? Will he also say what will be the nature of the legislation that he will bring to Parliament—is it primary or secondary legislation?
Perhaps I might also ask him about public consultation on the regulations. Page 5 of the impact assessment sets out the process of consultation in some detail, and also refers to two surveys launched by the UK Border Agency in 2011. The impact assessment says that these various consultations,
“have informed the high level policy”.
That is always reassuring to know. However, it is silent on the actual results of the consultation. It would be helpful to know what the main thrust of the results was and how that informed high-level policy.
I would be grateful if the Minister would answer three further questions. First, will he give me an idea of how many permits he expects will be issued under these provisions? The second follows what the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, said in relation to the UK Border Agency’s staff resource issues over the past 18 months. The Minister and his esteemed predecessors brought to your Lordships’ House a number of proposals and changes in policy that added to the responsibilities of the UK Border Agency. We know that the agency has had to bear its share of the cuts in funding to the Home Office. I echo the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that the UKBA has been given additional responsibilities and fewer resources. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Henley, will talk about efficiencies that he hopes to drive through the system—which is a very fair point—but my experience is that when you do that, in the end the thing falls over. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has given examples of the impact on the time taken to process applications, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Henley, will come back to us on that.
Thirdly, on IT, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, suggested that this might be a routine application. My experience in government is that nothing in IT should ever be described as routine. One has to accept that these are very complex issues, but it would none the less be helpful to the Committee if the Minister would say something about the IT challenges that are being faced. Will the Minister also talk about the cost of implementation overseas? How does he anticipate that cost being met out of his budget?
However, in general, the Opposition support these proposals, which of course flow from the UK Borders Act introduced by the previous Government.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for finally getting to that crucial bit at the end and saying—as did his right honourable friend in the Commons—that the Opposition welcome these orders. After all, they simply follow from what his Government started as part of a continuous process of gradual rollout. The noble Lord asked what further stages were necessary for dealing with this. He will be more than happy that I can give him an assurance that—as I understand it; I will write to him if I am wrong—no further primary legislation will be necessary, although there will be a need to return to Parliament with some secondary legislation in due course.
For the overseas rollout of biometric permits, we are completing a very comprehensive analysis of our options to identify the most cost-effective solution that will have the least impact on our customers and will take account of our commitments under EU legislation. A number of factors are relevant, including the timing of the 2012 Olympic Games and the rollout of other new technology for the agency, and we will return to Parliament with this as soon as possible after the Games. For that reason, at this stage I cannot say anything more about what I think the noble Lord described as his third question—although there seemed to be more than three—on the cost of implementation overseas. If I have any further information, I will let the noble Lord know in due course.
The noble Lord also asked how many permits in total we would issue each year. Based on 2010’s published figures, we could expect around 550,000 permits a year to be issued. However, a reduction in this figure to around 400,000 could be expected given the significant number of grants made on a discretionary basis in 2010, mainly under measures aimed at clearing a backlog of outstanding unresolved cases and because of the impact of policy changes to the points-based system. I hope that that assists the noble Lord.
Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 3) Rules 2012
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Lord Henley
That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 3) Rules 2012.
Relevant document: 37th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, I shall speak also to the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) (Amendment No. 4) 2012 order. The two statutory instruments introduce procedural rules for court proceedings under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. They add a new part to the civil procedure rules for England and Wales, and a new order to the rules of the Court of Judicature for Northern Ireland. The rules came into force on 15 January last year—the same date that the Act came into force—because it was necessary for TPIM proceedings to take place soon after commencement. However, the Act requires subsequent approval of the rules by each House, which is why we are here today.
The rules substantively reflect the rules that are already in place for control order proceedings. They set out the procedures to be followed when the Secretary of State applies to the court for permission to impose a TPIM notice—or for the court to confirm, or quash, one imposed without prior permission—and for the subsequent directions hearings and review hearings that must be held. The rules also set out the process for an individual to appeal against decisions made by the Secretary of State in relation to a TPIM notice.
The guiding principles behind the court rules are that the decisions that are the subject of the proceedings are properly reviewed; and that the court must ensure that information is not disclosed contrary to the public interest. The rules provide that sensitive “closed material” may be relied upon and must be protected, although the requirements of a fair trial take precedence. They also make provision about the role and functions of special advocates, who may be appointed by the Attorney-General to represent the interests of the individual in closed proceedings.
In our recent debates on the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, the use of closed material and special advocates was explored in some detail. Closed material proceedings are undoubtedly controversial, I accept that, but are necessary to ensure that there can be effective judicial oversight of TPIM decisions, which inevitably rely upon sensitive material.
I can assure the Committee that the use of closed material and special advocates in this type of context is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, a position that the courts have confirmed. Indeed, the Act expressly provides that the rules do not require the court to act in a way inconsistent with Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to a fair trial. This is also the effect of the Human Rights Act.
Notwithstanding that the system is ECHR compatible, we understand that concerns remain. The Green Paper on justice and security is looking carefully at the use of sensitive information in civil proceedings, including suggestions as to how the special advocate system can be improved.
The rules provide a framework within which the Secretary of State, legal representatives, special advocates and the court work. In line with those provisions, the Lord Chief Justices of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland were consulted on the draft rules. Moreover, the Civil Procedure Rules Committee was given the opportunity to comment on a draft. I commend the rules and I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation of the two Motions that have been spoken to together. I also thank him for the invitation in our last debate for a meeting with the UK Border Agency chief executive. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, would wish me to say that we would very much appreciate that opportunity.
We have had extensive debates about the TPIM legislation going through your Lordships’ House, and this is not the moment for me to engage with the noble Lord in another debate on the principle. However, I would like to ask the noble Lord a couple of questions. First, I understand that nine people are currently subject to control orders. Would he be able to confirm that? Can he confirm that all nine people will be the subject of applications in relation to TPIM notices? He will be aware that, of course, a high threshold is required for the imposition of a TPIM notice. The TPIM regime provides for more tightly prescribed powers than control orders. It is therefore reasonable to ask him whether the new regime is intended to apply to all these nine people currently subject to control orders. If it is considered that there are some people who will not meet the new threshold, can he provide some satisfaction in relation to the safeguarding of security interests in relation to those people? I understand that this is a sensitive issue and that the noble Lord may be somewhat restricted in what he has to say, but he will probably get the drift of the general principle that I am putting forward here, which essentially is this. What are the differences between the current control orders and the TPIM notices?
I should like the noble Lord to reassure me about the state of readiness of the police and the security services for the new regime. We have the transition period that will allow the new circumstances to be brought into operation. I shall not go over in great detail the evidence given by the Metropolitan Police to the Special Bill Committee which considered the Bill in the other place, but he will be aware that at that point, the representative of the Metropolitan Police said that it would take at least a year to get the right equipment, resources and people in place in order to be able to implement the new regime. In our debates on the Bill as it went through your Lordships’ House, the Minister and his predecessor were confident that the arrangements would be in place sooner than the period of 12 months. Is he satisfied that the appropriate people are in place, that they have been trained and that they have the right equipment so that the new regime can start in good order from the date set out in the order?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I cannot comment on whether the nine individuals referred to by the noble Lord will transfer to TPIM notices, but what lay behind the gist of his question was whether people, in terms of civil procedures, come under what used to be referred to as the White Book. We are not immediately repealing the old civil procedure, so any that were being dealt with in the courts using the old civil procedures, those procedures will still apply, but the new TPIM ones will be covered by what we are debating today, and they came into effect in December.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
That is very helpful. I realise that it is difficult for the Minister to talk about individual people who are affected, but on a theoretical basis, if a person is currently under a control order, is it possible for them to continue under that order? Is that what the noble Lord is saying?
Lord Henley
What I am saying is that if they were still under a control order, they would be dealt with under the old control order civil procedings. I do not think that I can take the noble Lord much further. All I am saying is that we have not repealed the old orders. If they were being looked at under a control order, they will continue under the control order proceedings, and these broadly reflect those proceedings. As I have said, all we are dealing with here is the process of making amendments to civil procedure. It is therefore still possible to use the old procedure for those who are covered by it. But, obviously, control orders will not continue beyond 25 January, at which point it will be a TPIM. What we are debating here is the civil procedure. I hope that that deals with the noble Lord’s queries.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I do not want to be difficult. All I seek is a reassurance. I understand entirely what the noble Lord is saying about the basis for the civil procedure, but I am really looking for some reassurance that he is satisfied that as we move from a control order regime to the new regime, the people who were affected under the old control order regime and need to be subject to those provisions will, in the new circumstances of TPIM and given that the security provisions are paramount, indeed be subject to them.
Lord Henley
Obviously those provisions are of paramount importance, but as I made clear in my opening remarks, the right to a fair trial is also equally important.
The second major point made by the noble Lord was on the state of readiness of the police, which goes wider than the matter we are debating today. The noble Lord rightly said that when I introduced these rules, I made it clear that I was confident that that was the case, but before he even asked the question, he wrote down that I had moved from being confident to being satisfied, which formed the basis of the question he put to me. I can give the noble Lord an assurance that I am satisfied that everything is in place as it should be, and that I think the same is true of the police. With that, I hope that the Motion will be agreed.
Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) (Amendment No. 4) 2012
Lord Henley Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Henley
That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) (Amendment No. 4) 2012.
Relevant documents: 37th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.
Violence against Women
Lord Henley Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Prosser
To ask Her Majesty’s Government when the outcome of the cross-Whitehall consultation commissioned by the Home Secretary on the Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence will be made available to the House.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, the cross-Whitehall consultation identified a number of issues requiring further consideration before a final decision can be made on whether to sign the convention. As part of this further consideration, the Home Office launched a public consultation on 12 December last year on whether to create a new criminal offence of forced marriage. The consultation ends on 30 March.
Baroness Prosser
I thank the Minister for that reply. Given the importance that the Government give to tackling violence against women and their view that it is essential that the UK takes a strong lead on the issue internationally, can he advise the House of the timetable for signing the convention, which would both indicate their commitment to this issue and give a lead to other Council of Europe member states—18 of which have now signed up to the convention?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I cannot take the noble Baroness much further than saying that the consultation on forced marriage will end on 30 March. We will obviously have to respond after that and consider—as the Prime Minister made quite clear last year—whether forced marriage should become a criminal offence in itself. However, we also have to look at other issues, particularly whether extra-territorial jurisdiction should be extended. There are very real problems in that area. The simple fact is that we can only sign up to the convention as a whole—we cannot sign up to it in part. Until we can get decisions on all parts of it, we will not be in a position to sign up. However, I make it quite clear to the noble Baroness that we broadly support the intention behind the convention.
Lord Boswell of Aynho
My Lords, we currently have the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in the Council of Europe, and this issue affects and concerns noble Peers across all sides of the House and is widespread in this and other countries. Would it not be a wonderful opportunity, despite the reservations that my noble friend has rightly announced, to get on with this and get our signature on the paper before we leave the chair of that excellent organisation?
Lord Henley
My Lords, we would like to make progress on this, but the concerns, particularly in relation to extra-territorial jurisdiction, are very real indeed. My noble friend will be aware that, at the moment, we believe that extra-territorial jurisdiction should apply only to very serious crimes such as murder or torture. To sign up to this, we would have to change the law to make it cover such matters as common assault or harassment. We do not think that that is necessarily the right way to go about these things. However, colleagues in the Ministry of Justice will certainly look at these issues.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, major events such as the Olympics tend to attract a lot of visitors to this country, particularly from groups involved in things such as trafficking, which, as we all know, involves violence against women. Will the Minister give an assurance that he will get the report out as soon as possible to the vast majority of those who are interested in this subject, not least because we have been looking at this subject of violence against women for very many days under the Welfare Reform Bill and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I would not want to foreshorten the consultation, which ends, as I said, on the 30 March, but obviously we want to respond as quickly as possible after that. As for trafficking, the noble Baroness will be aware that we have recently brought in some amendments to the Protection of Freedoms Bill that help us to comply with the convention on those matters, and I believe we will be very broadly compliant with that convention. However, that goes slightly wider than the Question on the Order Paper.
Lord Faulkner of Worcester
My Lords, do the Government have any intention of accepting the advice of ACPO and, indeed, of his noble friend Lady Trumpington on tackling violence against women working in the sex industry, who are afraid of reporting assaults on them because if they make those reports they are likely to be charged under the laws relating to prostitution. Is it not time that the law on prostitution was changed along the lines adopted in New Zealand and as ACPO suggests?
Lord Henley
My Lords, the noble Lord is taking the issue way beyond the Question on the Order Paper, which relates to the Council of Europe’s convention. Obviously we will consider those points, but those are matters for domestic law and not matters relating to compliance with this convention, which relates to combating violence against women.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I welcome the consultation being across Whitehall, because many agencies are involved in the many issues. How are we to reconcile the localist approach of police and crime commissioners and candidates with an eye to election with the need to ensure that police budgets contain an adequate line for what is essentially not a very populist issue? In other words, how do we make it a populist issue?
Lord Henley
My Lords, again my noble friend is going way beyond the Question on the Order Paper in bringing in the subject of police commissioners. We are talking about whether we can comply with this Council of Europe convention—compliance that involves changing the law in a number of areas. That is what we are consulting on at the moment, but we are also looking at other issues, particularly extra-territorial jurisdiction.
Lord Tomlinson
Is the Minister aware that the Prime Minister is going to visit the Council of Europe next week and that his right honourable friend the Attorney-General will visit in April? I do not expect anything from the Prime Minister next week, but the period of consultation will be finished by the time the Attorney-General comes. Would it not be a good opportunity to build some bridges with other countries if the Attorney-General were in a position to make a positive statement on this issue at the April plenary session?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I have already indicated our broad support for what is going on, but it involves some quite serious changes to domestic legislation in this country and, I must stress, also in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the devolved Administrations, so we would need their agreement as well. It is not that easy suddenly to say that we will extend extra-territorial jurisdiction to all the issues to which I referred earlier, such as assault, when we have had the tradition of reserving them only for more serious offences. These are matters that we will obviously want to look at very seriously within government.
EUC Report: Internal Security Strategy
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The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, put it, a large number of questions have been put to me and I hope to be able to answer as many as possible in the course of my speech.
I am grateful that there is a least one question that I do not have to answer: the question posed at the beginning of his speech by the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate, when he talked about the security problems in our car park. That, at least, is not a matter for Her Majesty's Government; we can leave that to the House authorities.
I start by offering my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, on bringing forward the report and for all the work done by his committee. I also offer my apologies—if it is appropriate for me to apologise; I never know whether it is—for the delay between the publication of his report and the day on which it is debated. I think that that is a matter for the usual channels, not me. I see the noble Lord, Lord Roper, nod, but I am sure that he, as chairman of the EU Committee has been pressing as hard as he can to get this, along with a whole host of other valuable reports that his committee has produced, debated in a timely fashion.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said that he wanted to concentrate not so much on the Government's response but on where it had been less than adequate. It would be useful if I could start by saying a little about where the Government and the committee were in agreement. There is much that both the Government and the committee found to commend in the internal security strategy. We came to many of the same positive conclusions, not least that the scope of the ISS and the priorities established therein are the right ones. The Government and the committee found points of agreement throughout the strategy, including, but not limited to; support for the establishment of the EU policy cycle; the use of joint investigation teams; the value of the EU passenger name records directive—I note the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, on that subject; and the role of EUROSUR and FRONTEX in enhancing border security.
Again, like the committee, the Government welcome the priority given to cybersecurity in the strategy. We see that the EU has an important role to play in raising standards in, and awareness around, cybersecurity among member states at both the EU level and—stressing points made by a number of noble Lords—the international level. We know that in security matters of this sort there are no boundaries.
In November, as noble Lords will be aware, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary successfully hosted the London conference on cyberspace, and I shall be saying a little more about some of the cybersecurity questions later. Delegates agreed that the immediate next steps must involve taking practical measures to develop a shared understanding of the threats and to agree common approaches and confidence-building measures at an international level.
The Government also find common ground with the committee on a number of cross-cutting issues, such as the safeguarding of fundamental rights. I make it clear that this coalition Government are committed to defending security and defending civil liberties so that the Government infringe less on people’s freedoms, while providing the public with effective protection from terrorism and crime. Given the number of EU data-related dossiers which will impact upon security and the need to tackle threats to security while at the same time protecting civil liberties, we would have liked to have seen those issues addressed more directly in the ISS communication. We believe that the alignment of internal and external security policy is also an area where the Government and the committee take a similar position. The Government support the committee’s call for closer working between the Commissioner for Home Affairs and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
I should like to discuss one or two points that noble Lords raised. I start with the whole question of funding the cybercrime centre, which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, raised. He asked me to look at this area but I think he accepted, although he was sorry, that it was something that I could not help on directly. He is no doubt right. I am sure we all agree that there are other savings within the EU budget that could be looked at. We could look at the budget of the High Representative herself to see whether more money could come out of that to help with such a centre. However, we understand that the Commission will bring forward a communication later this year regarding setting up the cybercentre, and it remains the Government’s view that this should be managed within existing resources. However, the question of where those existing resources come from will obviously have to be discussed at a later stage.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, also suggested that oversight of Europol should be carried out by an interparliamentary committee. The Government’s view is that Europol now has fairly robust scrutiny and accountability structures in place. We believe that the Europol Council decision, which came into force in January 2010, means that the European Parliament can require the Europol director, the chair of the management board and the presidency of the Council to go before it to discuss Europol-related issues. Additional mechanisms are in place that ensure the transparency of Europol as an EU agency. They include the submission of the Europol work programme and annual reports to the European Parliament. That provides a useful job for the European Parliament, and we think that it is something it can probably do effectively. I believe that the committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Roper, and its various sub-committees can also scrutinise the activities of Europol with some vigour, as they have done in the past.
My noble friend Lord Hodgson hoped that the Government would make use of the various and valuable resources within the EU agencies themselves. Our position remains that member states can and should do more to share information, not just among EU agencies but among themselves, and to put that at the disposal of Europol. Improving our information-sharing strategy with Europol is very important in terms of influencing the EU intelligence picture at a strategic and operational level. It is important to make the most of Europol’s analytical capabilities to ensure that it can identify, for example, key persons of interest and operational opportunities for multilateral co-operation.
I turn to a query raised by the noble Lord, Lord Judd. He expressed some interest in the role of the Armed Forces in EU internal security and the committee’s concern that that was an oversight in the communication. We recognise that military assets can play a very significant role in supporting, for example, disaster relief activities, but we also believe that they should be used only as a last resort where there are no civilian alternatives. Decisions in such matters are, we believe, a matter for national authorities acting on a case-by-case basis.
My noble friend Lady Falkner was somewhat concerned about a lack of co-operation between the EU and NATO. I note that concern. We believe that that can be improved and developed, including in new fields such as cybersecurity, which has been raised a great deal. We have pressed both the high representative and the Secretary-General of NATO to encourage further information sharing and increased co-ordination on the ground in all areas between those two organisations.
I turn to structures and, in particular, to the questions relating to COSI which were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, by my noble friend Lord Hodgson and by other noble Lords. We do not consider that there is a case for the standing committee on operational co-operation on internal security, or COSI—I forget how the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, interpreted those initials—but there are obviously a number of ways in which we can replace all oversight bodies that have a legislative role, such as the Article 36 committee. I want to make it clear to my noble friend Lord Hodgson, who was worried about a lack of representatives from FRONTEX, Europol and others, that my understanding is that representatives from Europol and FRONTEX attend COSI meetings as a matter of course alongside representatives of the other EU and justice and home affairs agencies—for example, Eurojust. It is important that they are there.
I should also address the question raised by my noble friend Lord Hodgson, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and I think by my noble friend Lady Falkner about their concerns about the chairmanship and whether it should rotate. I forget who suggested that they were likely to get a rather mealy-mouthed response from me on this; from her reaction, I suspect it must have been my noble friend Lady Falkner. I understand that it is a working group and subject to the same chairing arrangements as other working groups. It is chaired on the six-monthly rotational basis that works for the Council presidency. That means that we hope we have an incoming, outgoing and current chairman and we hope that they will work together over that 18-month cycle as a troika. I think it was my noble friend who suggested that this might be the opportunity to change those arrangements, but I think for the moment it would probably be best to stick to the arrangements that we have in place for that. I am not sure that the COSI chairmanship would be the right one on which to make such a fundamental change. As regards transparency, again, it operates the same rules as other groups do. In some case-sensitive operational issues these matters can be discussed, which means that certain documents obviously cannot be publicly released. That would have to be handled appropriately, as with all other information.
The last point that I want to deal with is the question of ratifying the Warsaw convention. I appreciate that there might be other points, but time may be beginning to run out. I also appreciate that I came under a certain amount of pressure from the committee when I appeared before it the other day. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, referred to that and criticised my possibly imprecise remarks on ratification, when I said that I hoped it would happen in a year or so. I think he implied, in Sir Humphrey-speak, that that answer was not really as precise as Ministers ought to give. I have to say that, although one would like to ratify that convention, there are always concerns about ratifying and one has to get these things right.
The noble Lord referred to another convention that I was dealing with at Question Time today. We should always be very careful about any ratification; I do not think that we want to be like those countries which—dare I say it—ratify somewhat lightly, because we should consider the precise implications of ratification. In terms of the convention that I was talking about at Question Time, there are very serious concerns about extraterritorial jurisdiction, which would have a major effect on our own United Kingdom domestic law. We need to consider those carefully before we ratify and the same applies, although it is more a question of resource points, to ratifying the Warsaw convention.
As I said, a number of other issues probably need to be addressed, but time is running on—
Baroness Falkner of Margravine
I fear that the Minister is coming to his concluding comments and I wanted to get in before he sits down concerning the question that I asked about the forward plan, after the London cybersecurity conference of last November. Hungary is due to host the next summit and while I appreciate that he may not have the information to hand now, might he be able to write to tell us what tangible steps Her Majesty's Government are taking to implement the recommendations of the London conference?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I have some details somewhere about Hungary. I am not sure that I will be able to help my noble friend at this stage but, if I may, I will write to her in due course. As I said, I feel that I am beginning to run out of time and I am probably keeping the House up later than it ought to be. What I want to make clear is that I will respond to any points that I have not yet answered in due course by letter, but that we will keep the implementation of the EU internal security strategy under review.
As always, we are eternally grateful for the work of our own scrutiny committees: the EU Committee in this House, and all its sub-committees. They do a valuable job, and probably do a better job of scrutiny of EU matters than those of any other Chamber in any other country throughout the EU. On that, they should be congratulated. I also hope that the usual channels—that strange body which the noble Lord, Lord Roper, and I used to be members of many years ago—will take note of all the comments, particularly those of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and ensure that in future these matters are debated in a timely fashion, as appropriate.