Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Bill

Debate between Lord Hendy and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Indeed. The point is that the noble Baroness opposite and I disagree, perhaps, about what the effect will be on service users and others, but the test is necessity and proportionality, as was set out so well earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam. Whatever the motivations, it is a good addition to the list, in my view.

As for the noble Baroness’s point that this is will all be voluntary and the legislation will not impose anything on anyone, that really does not hold as a matter of law—not least because, as we discussed earlier, the “may/must” point is really significant; it is not hypothetical. It is hugely significant that, when one is a given a power—whether the Secretary of State is given a power to make regulations or an employer is given a power to issue work notices—they must exercise that power rationally. They cannot ignore that they have that power; they will face litigation. That is compounded in this area because the employers may well be contracted by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State would then have the purchasing power—the significant contractual power as the buyer of the service at one end—and would also wield regulations with the other hand. It is not completely ingenuous to suggest that this is all just helping the discussion and that there is no element of compulsion in it.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, much of the debate on this Bill has been concerned with its substantive content, but my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti draws attention to a major problem with the Bill; namely, its form.

I remind noble Lords that last year two committees of this House reiterated long-standing principles for drafting legislation. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, of which I have the honour to be a member, in its report Democracy Denied?, and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, in its report Government by Diktat, set out those principles, which were overwhelmingly endorsed in the debate in the House on 6 January last year. The fact is that this Bill flouts those principles. That view is reiterated by the reports on the Bill by the Delegated Powers Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Constitution Committee. In addition, as my noble friend Lord Collins has just pointed out, the Regulatory Policy Committee has described the Bill’s impact assessment as “not fit for purpose”. This raises the question of what steps this House could take to ensure that Bills comply with the principles that are essential for parliamentary democracy in this country.

I turn to my Amendment 36A in this group, which is my attempt to give some substance to—or to redress—the omission pointed out by the Delegated Powers Committee in its report on the Bill. I will read two short paragraphs from our report. Paragraph 19 says:

“The Government have chosen to put no detail in the Bill in relation to minimum service levels, leaving the matter entirely to regulations. Important matters of detail should be included on the face of the Bill, perhaps with a power to supplement those matters in regulations.”


That is my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s point. The conclusion, which the committee reached at paragraph 23, is:

“Given the absence of an exhaustive or non-exhaustive list in the Bill of the matters that can be included in regulations, the unconvincing reasons for this power in the Memorandum, and the absence of indicative draft regulations illustrating how the power might be exercised, the House may wish to press the Minister to provide an explanation of how the power to set minimum service levels in new section 234B(1) of the 1992 Act is likely to be exercised. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, we regard the power as inappropriate.”


My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti says that we can make it good by passing primary legislation. I wonder whether the Government will consider the possibility—even at this stage—of introducing amendments to put those omissions into the Bill to give it at least some semblance of meeting the format and principles for the drafting of legislation.

Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Bill

Debate between Lord Hendy and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Thursday 9th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, I have four questions for the Minister. First, I appreciate that this ground has been covered to a certain extent—at least, what has been covered provokes me to ask this question again—but the noble Lord, Lord Markham, specified that the criterion for implementing or setting a minimum service level in the health service was danger to life and limb. In relation to transport, what is the criterion, or what are the criteria? Once those are established, how is the minimum service level to be computed? Is it a percentage of existing services that will have to be provided, or is some other metric to be used?

The second issue is the boundaries of the transport sector, a point that my noble friend Lord Collins mentioned in passing. The transport sector can be very wide indeed. Obviously, it could cover road transport, freight, passenger buses and so on, but what about parcel transportation, parcel delivery—post delivery? Does it extend to the Post Office? There are a multitude of examples. I would be very grateful if the Minister could tell us what the boundaries are.

The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, mentioned a strike by cleaners. If the minimum service level for rail passenger transport requires that a certain percentage of trains run, what is the implication for workers other than those who drive the trains? What is the impact on guards, conductors and signallers? If we run half the commuter trains in and out of London, do we not need a full complement of signallers to do it? Are they to be banned from taking strike action altogether by a minimum service level of 100%? What about the ticketing staff and the guards who are in charge of collecting fares and so on? If they go on strike, what are the implications there for a minimum service level? There is also track maintenance. You cannot have 20% of track maintenance. Presumably you need all the track maintenance to keep the lines open. Is it proposed that there would be a 100% minimum service level for track maintenance staff?

The third issue is overtime, which also arose in relation to teachers. Anybody who knows anything about the railways knows that a rail passenger service runs on voluntary overtime—drivers working on the days that they are rostered to have off. Of course, they are paid, unlike the teachers. Nevertheless, it is voluntary. It is beyond their contractual obligation. How will setting a minimum service level—further, how will setting a work notice—avoid imposing an obligation that those who normally provide voluntary overtime must provide it to maintain the minimum service level? Is that what is being proposed? Is that what the Government have in mind, or can the Minister tell us now that there will be no requirement for rail staff to work voluntary overtime?

The fourth issue is one that the Minister has heard me raise before. This Bill clearly constrains and limits the right to strike. There can be no doubt about that. This has implications under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Articles 386 and 387 state that where the standards of the International Labour Organization—ILO Convention No. 87 and so on—are diminished by one of the parties, either the UK or the EU, and that affects trade, this will be a violation of that agreement.

The Minister may say that none of these sectors will affect trade. That may be dubious in relation to the transport sector but, leaving that aside, even if that does not apply, Article 399 of the trade and co-operation agreement requires the United Kingdom and the countries of the EU to implement those ILO conventions that they have ratified, including ILO Convention No. 87, which protects the right to strike, and requires them to implement the provisions of the European Social Charter, which they have ratified. The United Kingdom has ratified paragraph 4 of Article 6 of the European Social Charter 1961, which specifically provides that workers have the right to take collective action. The Bill unarguably diminishes that right, which will also lead to a violation of the treaty. Can the Minister explain why he thinks that there is no possible violation involved?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I will try to be brief to help the Minister. In a throwaway remark, I think, at Second Reading, he said, with his usual flair and panache, something like, “I notice that noble Lords opposite are very quick to invoke the nurses but not the railway workers”. But that was not quite the case, because a number of us, myself included, had happily invoked rail workers. I will not talk only about nurses. I have travelled on many trains up and down this country and I hugely admire rail workers, who are not just drivers but the people who look after us on our journeys. I have seen rail workers looking after people in distress on overcrowded trains in the heat and helping the infirm on and off trains. As a woman often travelling alone intercity late at night, I have been very grateful for there being somebody in that carriage, so I am very happy to invoke the rail workers.

The Minister said that as though that meant we were on weaker ground tactically—a bit more embarrassed about rail workers than, for example, health workers. It made me wonder whether this is not the real target of the legislation. If rail workers generally, or the RMT in particular—perhaps because the general secretary has a certain hairstyle—are the real target for this legislation, why can we not have targeted legislation that includes what the criteria are and what the service level agreement is? That would be better legislation.

My noble friends have pointed out the differences in the approaches of the three Ministers that we have heard so far. A life and limb test was offered in the context of healthcare. There was no test offered in the case of education, but some embarrassment and a real desire to never have to invoke this legislation at all. Is this difference of opinion a difference of policy and approach in the different departments or, to be more charitable to the Government, is it because these services are just too different and it is not appropriate for them all to be bundled into a single Bill to give sweeping powers to the indivisible Secretary of State to legislate by fiat?

Either way, whichever is true, it is not appropriate for legislation. I say once more to the Minister: if this is about rail services, there are ways to tackle that, with or without legislation, given the very influential role the Government have in relation to the private companies through contracts and so on. If this is supposed to be general emergency legislation, we need criteria suggesting that this is a proper emergency—not in healthcare but in getting teachers to do mandatory unpaid overtime in other areas. A real problem of inconsistency has been identified in the varying groups, and that is why I do not think they have been repetitive but a voyage of discovery about what may or may not be the real motivation and about the obvious weaknesses in the Bill.

Finally, if I may say so, the question posed by my noble friend Lord Hendy about whether a potential mandatory requirement for people to do voluntary unpaid work will—or might—feature, is within the vires of the Bill.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Lord Hendy and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Thursday 11th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I cannot hope to improve on the powerful and compelling forensic critique of Part 2 that has just been offered by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, but perhaps I may lend my support to his general approach and that of his noble friend Lady Smith of Newnham in these amendments. They probe and highlight the problems with interfering with judicial discretion in the manner proposed in Part 2.

A lot has been said about the Bill in general being about providing reassurance to our veterans. Reassurance can be important, particularly where it is a practical improvement on problematic law. But when reassurance is more political and is provided against a false problem that has been raised in political rhetoric, we all need to be far more concerned about interfering with judicial discretion. In the other place—although not so much in this place the last time we met—there has sometimes been the language of claims being used in relation to Part 1 and Part 2. Part 1 is about prosecution which, understandably, veterans will fear in certain difficult contexts. However, this is about civil claims, where the presumption of innocence that must and should apply in criminal proceedings does not apply. This ought to be as fair a contest as possible between two civil parties.

Invariably in the context of these claims, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has set out so clearly, we are talking about the MoD, a great and well-resourced department of state which is the defendant. Sometimes claimants will claim to be the victims of war crimes, but there will also be no small number of veterans themselves. That has been lost in parts of the public discourse and certainly in the debate in the other place. I am therefore grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, for bringing this forward.

The false war between veterans on the one hand and lawyers on the other is particularly pernicious in the context of Part 2 when veterans’ groups and the lawyers who represent them are in concert in their concerns about the way that Part 2 protects the MoD not from false claims, against which the department is well protected, but from genuine claims where, sometimes because of the problems of overseas conflict and the difficulties that veterans themselves have faced in those dangerous situations, six years is too short a time. Some open and well-applied judicial discretion is what is required.

Without further ado, I shall make way for my noble friend Lord Hendy, who I understand has direct experience of representing at least one veteran’s mother.

[Lord Hendy (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I cannot improve on the powerful contributions made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. However, perhaps I may add one point of legal detail which might assist. If I make the point now, I will not need to do it in my later contributions.

Section 7(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to which these amendments relate provides a one-year time limit or

“such longer period as the court … considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances”.

As regards any application to extend that time period, Clause 11 of this Bill seeks to require the court to have regard to the ability of witnesses in Her Majesty’s forces to remember or to have recorded events and to the impact of the litigation on the mental health of any HM forces witness.

Amendment 21 merely seeks to redress the balance by reference also to the interests of the claimant. It is a modest amendment. The movers might have gone a lot further and brought limitation under the Human Rights Act into line with the parallel provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 in civil cases. I will remind the House briefly of those provisions. They impose a limit of six years for claims in tort or contract, but in Section 3 this is reduced to three years for personal injury claims; that is, three years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action or from the date of knowledge if later. There is much jurisprudence on the date of knowledge, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, alluded to on Tuesday. However, the period can be extended. This is an area of law that is very familiar to anyone who has practised in the field of personal injuries.

Section 33(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 permits a court to allow an action to proceed out of time, if it

“appears … that it would be equitable”,

having regard to the prejudice if it were to do so to the defendant and to the claimant. In addition, Section 33(3) specifies that the court, in making a determination,

“shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case”.

In particular, it must have regard to certain specified factors:

“(a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff; (b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the plaintiff or the defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the time”


limits set out in the Act;

“(c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent (if any) to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the plaintiff’s cause of action … (d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action; (e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew”

he might have a claim; and, finally,

“(f) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice”.

If the Minister is not minded to concede the modest amendments sought, I commend to him altering the Bill to incorporate these familiar provisions of the Limitation Act, which has worked well in all manner of cases over the last 40 years. No justification appears for imposing harsher limitation provisions for actions in respect of personal injuries or death that relate to overseas operations of the Armed Forces.

This provision in the Bill may save the MoD a few bob, but it will give no reassurance to military personnel who are claimants or to members of their families, such as the lady for whom I acted some years ago, as I explained at Second Reading. Her son had been killed by a shell fired at his tank by another British tank outside Basra. The claim was based on the MoD’s failure to fit the tanks with adequate and available identification kit and to adequately train tank commanders. The case was ultimately settled by the MoD, after many years.

The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, kindly wrote to me after Second Reading to explain the time limits proposed in the Bill for cases such as this, but I regret to say that, in spite of her clarity in elucidating the Bill, I was not reassured. Military personnel on overseas operations need to know that they—and, if they die, their mums, dads and children—can make a claim against the MoD, if it turns out to be at fault. They should not be subject to hurdles to which other claimants are not subject. The Government need not fear vexatious claims. Anyone who has practised law in this field from bench or bar knows that the courts are astute enough not to permit vexatious claims. The Bill, unamended, will time-bar some vexatious claims, but it will equally time-bar meritorious claims. That is not forgivable. It is no answer to say that there will be few of them; there should be none.

A final point arises from an argument advanced by the Minister in response to Amendment 29, moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, late on Tuesday night. The Minister suggested that the amendment would result in an unjustifiable difference in treatment between different categories of claimants and that this, therefore, would offend against the European convention. Presumably he had Article 14 in mind, which prohibits discrimination on grounds including “other status”.

Yet these provisions in the Bill impose a difference in treatment between those making a claim for personal injuries or death that relate to overseas operations of the Armed Forces and those who make such a claim that does not relate to overseas operations of the Armed Forces. I and, it appears, many Members of your Lordships’ House regard that as unjustifiable. I would be interested to hear how the Minister justifies that difference in treatment under Article 14 or, indeed, Article 2, which protects life by law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

It is always a pleasure to follow my noble and learned friend Lord Morris of Aberavon, who is ever youthful and eloquent, but of course it is the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, who is on a particular roll with these amendments, one that I do not want to impede for too long—save to say that Amendment 22 in particular reveals and reflects what a terrible disservice Part 2 does to veterans in the context of difficult and complex overseas operations. In particular, it highlights that it is not just the date of the harm that is an issue but the date of knowledge of causation, which can be so complex in the course of overseas operations. In the practical reality of a legal aid landscape, where most people including, tragically, veterans, have no ready access to advice and representation, it could be a very long time before a troubled veteran even knows that they had the right to bring a claim. That is a problem for everyone in a legal aid landscape that has been virtually decimated, but it is particularly shameful for any Government to be making it harder for their own veterans to claim redress against the MoD where appropriate and put an absolute bar up at six years.

The point about causation is so important; the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, describes it as

“the manifestation of the harm resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim”.

A veteran may well know that they are injured and know that they have, for example, experienced a number of different traumatic and potentially harming events in a complex situation of warfare, but causation can be a very difficult thing to discover. This will be even more problematic in the context of psychological harm and, possibly, other physical harms—to hearing, for example. It may be very difficult to learn, let alone to prove, that it was friendly fire and not enemy fire, or that it was negligence in provision of equipment that caused the harm.

The absolute six-year bar put up in relation to veterans against their former employer would be shocking enough in the context of factory workers domestically. Given the Minister’s remarks on the previous groups, that we should be particularly sensitive to the difference between what he described as domestic litigation and the special issues around overseas operations, it seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has really hit the nail on the head in this group and some of those that follow.

[Lord Hendy (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I have practically nothing to add to the contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. Their arguments are powerful and appear irresistible.

I just add one small point. I mentioned a case in which I was involved for the mother of a serviceman killed in a tank because of friendly fire. That case in fact took more than 12 years from his death until the payment of an award by way of settlement by the Ministry of Defence. There was no delay on any side; there was litigation in the meanwhile, and the test case went to the Supreme Court, and so on. But there were inordinate difficulties in pursuing that claim—in finding out what had happened, what the MoD record was on the fitting of identification kit, what the training programmes were and whether they were defective, obtaining expert evidence on these points, and so on—to know whether the case was meritorious, as it turned out to be.

These cases are not easy. As I say, the logic of the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, is irresistible.