Children and Families Bill

Debate between Lord Haskel and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Monday 9th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Haskel) (Lab)]

There is an error on the paper. The government amendment is number 11 and the amendment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is number 12. The two are grouped together, so the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, may speak to her amendment.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I was completely confused. There was a moment when I thought I was getting out of control because I know this is not so far a government amendment.

I start by expressing my own gratitude to the Government for the way they have approached care leaders, from the Secretary of State downwards to the Ministers standing over there and sitting here. We on our side are enormously grateful for the fact that the plight of care leavers has been recognised and, I cannot resist adding, the particular plight of the trafficked children who at the age of 18 were possibly going to be in a very parlous state.

Children and Families Bill

Debate between Lord Haskel and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Wednesday 16th October 2013 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)]

If Amendment 53 is agreed, I cannot call Amendments 54 and 55 because of pre-emption.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I assume that I am allowed to speak to Amendment 54. I agree with, particularly, Amendment 55. It is extremely sensible because it cuts out the division of a child’s time, which all too many lay people see as “shared parenting”. Thank goodness the Government have taken those two words out of the draft Bill.

Clause 11 raises a technical legal point of considerable importance. It will affect the way in which all family judges and family magistrates try private law cases where the arrangements in relation to children have to be decided by the court. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, would be affected by it sitting in the family proceedings court. I have discussed this clause with some members of the judiciary, who view it with some concern.

I start with a problem. If the clause becomes law, it will raise two potentially conflicting presumptions for the court to tackle. I regret to say, with the greatest respect, that the Minister will be wrong if he says what the noble Baroness said was in his brief. Under Clause 11 the court, in the various circumstances, is to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that the involvement of each parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child’s welfare. That is a presumption. However, the whole basis of family child law is the presumption of the paramountcy of the welfare of the child, which is in Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989.

“Where a court determines any question with respect to … of the upbringing of a child … the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration”.

That is engraved on the hearts of all family judges and magistrates. In order not to be appealed, they always put it at the beginning of all their judgments. It is extremely important.

The effect of Clause 11 is to bring in a second presumption. You cannot help it because you are presuming in Clause 11 and you are presuming in Section 1 of the Children Act. Those two presumptions potentially clash. Quite simply, a court can have only one presumption at a time.

This is not just me making a legalistic technical point. People might be forgiven for thinking that I am going back to my judicial days, but I promise that this is far broader than a legalistic point. The NSPCC and Coram are very concerned, and I am happy to adopt the points that they make. They make three very important points: this clause could lead to a shift in emphasis away from what is best for the child towards the feelings and desires of parents; it could inadvertently increase risk to children by putting pressure on parents to agree to contact arrangements that are unsuitable or dangerous in the erroneous belief that a court would order that kind of contact; and the proposed change is unnecessary because no evidence of a bias in the court system has been found.

It is not good enough to have two presumptions that the judge has to juggle which could clash. It is particularly difficult for family magistrates who are not lawyers. It is also important to bear in mind that the litigants in the cases to which this clause applies will be unrepresented in the absence of legal aid. As to the increased risk of harm to which the NSPCC and Coram refer, these unrepresented litigants have gone through the traumatic experience of a failed relationship. As I said earlier, 90% will not go to court, or only for an agreed order, 5% can be persuaded by the family information and assessment meeting and the remaining hardcore 5% will be extremely antagonistic towards each other. Some of them actually hate each other. They can hardly bear to be in the same room and the failed relationship has become corrosive. That is not a happy situation in which to make arrangements for their children. I regret to say that I have said from time to time that when parents are in dispute about their children, they are the last people who should ever make arrangements for their future. They are simply unsuitable.

However, one parent or the other may give way and agree to unsuitable access/contact—two failed words—because of the way in which this clause is framed and in the mistaken belief that that is what a court would order. Although the phrase “shared parenting” has been deleted, the public perception is that they will get 50% of the time. When they are not necessarily going to court, that is what one parent will try to impose on the other. Those who cannot agree are likely to hold out for more contact, and this will lead to increased litigation before the courts. The courts are already beginning to be clogged up as a result of the absence of legal aid in private family law cases, particularly at district judge level, where, I am told, district judge first appointments, which used to last half an hour, now go on for at least 45 minutes. The backlog of cases is bound to grow. Of course, the children will suffer while the parents go on fighting and carrying on their dispute about child arrangements because it will take longer for these cases to be heard.

My experience as a family judge and then as head of the family court is that judges look to parents rather than impose gender discrimination in favour of mothers. I made a very large number of decisions in favour of fathers, although Fathers 4 Justice did not believe me. If it had looked at my track record, it might have seen that that was the case. I cannot tell the Committee what Fathers 4 Justice did for me, but its members did lock the gate on one occasion so that I could not get out and I had to get my husband to get the bolt cutters to open it. They also had Batman and Robin on the roof of the law courts. Noble Lords may remember that they stopped Tower Bridge functioning for a week by climbing up to the top, and they also climbed up on to Buckingham Palace.

I know that fathers do not accept that there is no gender discrimination against them and in favour of mothers. However, as the NSPCC said, there is no independent evidence of a bias. The Justice Select Committee accepted that there was no such evidence, as did, I understand, the Children’s Minister in the other place. There is no evidence of bias in the courts in favour of one parent. Therefore, the changes appear to be based on perceived rather than actual bias. I hope that the Minister and those behind him will look at the experience in Australia. At this stage of the evening, I shall not go into that, but it has been unhappy, and it has used similar phraseology. Much of this otherwise admirable Bill is very much based on the Norgrove report, which interestingly does not support a change to the Children Act.

Having said all that, I recognise and support the intention behind the clause that the importance of both parents should be at the forefront of the court’s mind. It is very sad that countless children are losing one parent, generally the father, who leaves home and there is no further relationship between him and his children. That is a very sad situation. Of course, we must encourage the continuing involvement of both parents so that after they separate, both are encouraged to stay in touch. However, to make it a presumption is a step too far, and that is why I have not sought to delete this clause. I have sought to amend it to highlight the importance of both parents, but not to create a second presumption. My amendment leaves out the word “presume” and inserts “pay particular regard” to highlight to the judge that he or she must,

“pay particular regard, unless the contrary is shown, to the importance of the”—

and then the wording of the clause is followed.

This is an important matter that cannot be brushed aside. I am speaking because of the issue of presumption and the effect that it will have on the public who come to court. From my practical experience, I am extremely concerned about the impact on the overriding presumption of welfare not just in the courts—where I think most judges could cope with the provision, although they do not like to have two clashing presumptions—but in the minds of the public who are trying to come to some sort of settlement. That is worrying, and I ask the Government to look at this issue carefully. My amendment would meet the need to emphasise the importance of the relationship between the child and both parents and the continuing involvement of both parents, but would not create the real problem of competing presumptions.