Lord Harris of Haringey
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(12 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, it is not very often that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford; in fact, I try to make it a general principle to disagree with him. However, on this occasion he has put his finger on an extraordinary gap in the Bill, and I can only assume that Home Office Ministers do not have the courage of their convictions.
We spent many happy months debating the principle of electing police and crime commissioners and we were told what significant individuals they were going to be. They were going to hold to account the chief constable and police service for all that went on in their area. Now, under the arrangements in this Bill the director-general of the National Crime Agency can say to any chief constable, “I would like the following resource from you dedicated to a particular operation”, but there is no requirement at all to inform the elected police and crime commissioner about that. Surely at the very least there should be a recognition that the police and crime commissioner might consider this matter important.
I am not a candidate to be a police and crime commissioner, but if I were in some remote part of the country outside London and had run on an election campaign saying that I wanted to see the police of my county devoted to the rural villages, the town centres or whatever, and I then discovered that behind my back the director-general of the National Crime Agency had said to my chief constable, “We’ve got to have this chunk of your resources and use them for a particular operation”, I would find it extraordinary that I had not even been told that that was happening and that my position as the directly elected police and crime commissioner, with a remit from the people of my area, was being undermined. I assume that this is an error in the drafting of the Bill.
I thought that my noble friend Lord Rosser was extraordinarily generous to the government Front Bench in offering two or three arguments as to why these amendments might not be necessary. However, unless the Minister is prepared to stand up and say, “Yes, of course, this was a drafting error. We did intend that police and crime commissioners would be informed”, the Government will be undermining what was apparently a flagship policy for this Administration.
Why might such a provision not be included in the Bill? The suggestion that this is a potentially trivial and merely operational matter that should not worry the police and crime commissioner is, frankly, nonsense. These are precisely the sorts of issues that will exercise local communities. Some of your Lordships may remember that at the time of the riots and disturbances last August one chief constable, quite properly, responded to a request to send a substantial number of police officers to London in support of ensuring that the streets were under control only to find that there were then disturbances in his own patch. He was then subject to all sorts of criticisms for having agreed to release those officers. What would the position be in very similar circumstances, although perhaps not a visible riot, in which the director-general of the National Crime Agency requested the movement of police officers for a particular operation and that then left the force concerned short? The police and crime commissioner would have to justify that this had been allowed to happen, even though he had not been informed in advance that such a request had been made. What would happen if the police and crime commissioner took a different view from that of the chief constable about whether this request was reasonable or justifiable? This is not an ordinary operational decision by the chief constable. The chief constable is not deciding within the framework of what is going on in that area how to deploy his or her resources; it is a decision to deploy them and to take them out of that area. That is precisely the area where the police and crime commissioner may say, “I want all the resources of my force kept in this area”.
So what is the justification for not having these provisions in the Bill? I hope that the Minister will tell us that he will adopt the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and incorporate them in the Bill, if not today, on Report. If he is not prepared to say that, I hope that he will give us a real explanation and reaffirm that, as far as the Home Office is concerned, the police and crime commissioners really matter, otherwise we spent three or four months in this Chamber debating the police and crime commissioners for no purpose whatever. They will be elected officials with no significant function.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I wish to say how sad I am that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, will not be a candidate for a PCC. We understand that there is already a PCC for London and the noble Lord would have to move out of his own city in order to stand as a candidate. He might want to consider that in due course and I am sure that he would make a very fine PCC, should he wish to do so.
Sadly, I was not involved in what the noble Lord referred to as those happy months debating the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act. I was then involved with another department but I was very grateful to my noble friends for the way in which they took that Bill through and discussed those matters.
The points put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Harris, and my noble friend Lord Thomas seem to imply a misunderstanding of the role of the PCCs and seem to suggest that PCCs should be involved in operational matters. I hope that I can explain why that will not be the case.
First, I shall speak about the policing protocol which was mentioned and which, I stress, has already been laid before Parliament. It outlines how the new policing governance arrangements established in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act will work and it clarifies the roles and responsibilities of police and crime commissioners, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime in London, chief constables, police and crime panels and the London Assembly Police and Crime Panel. It outlines what those bodies are expected to do and how they are expected to work together to fight crime and to improve policing. It also underlines the Home Secretary’s role as being ultimately accountable to Parliament and charged with ensuring the maintenance of the Queen’s peace with all force areas, safeguarding the public and protecting our national borders and security.
I do not think that directed tasking by the director-general in anyway undermines the police and crime commissioners in fighting serious and organised crime. It is a shared concern for the NCA and the PCCs. The tasking to the NCA from a police force in England and Wales would be used to fight cross-boundary serious and organised crime which police forces and PCCs must already have regard to in strategic policing requirements.
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was right to draw attention to those voluntary tasking arrangements between the NCA, all United Kingdom police forces and other enforcement bodies. Those two-way tasking provisions closely reflect the operational reality of how police forces and law enforcement agencies already work together and are the central, but co-ordinating, efforts against serious and organised crime.
Amendment 34 places a duty on the director-general of the NCA to consult the relevant PCC, prior to requesting its chief constable to perform a task under the voluntary tasking arrangements.
I want to emphasise to the noble Lord that the NCA will have a key relationship with the PCC in the fight against serious and organised crime. For example, police and crime commissioners will be consulted when the agency determines its strategic priorities and an annual plan respectively.
However, the tasking—I emphasise that word—of police forces by the agency and the tasking of the agency by chief constables are operational matters, where command and control of an operation is transferred to the organisation being tasked. Given the operational nature of tasking, I am certainly not persuaded of the case for the consultation and notification requirements set out in Amendments 34 and 35 tabled by the noble Lord for debate today.
Placing a duty on the director-general of the National Crime Agency to consult the relevant PCC before entering into a voluntary tasking arrangement risks blurring the line between operational independence and political accountability.
Moreover, imposing such a duty could disrupt a time-critical operation. For example, the director-general of the agency may need to task a specific police force to take the lead on a time-sensitive interdiction, such as a stop, arrest or search, in a long-running operation. Although a duty to notify, as provided for in Amendment 35, is less objectionable, again I remain to be persuaded of the case for including this in the Bill for the same reasons. As I have previously outlined, tasking arrangements ought properly to be left to an operational determination rather than imposing a uniform obligation of notification in England and Wales, irrespective of the nature of the tasking request.
Tasking of the National Crime Agency may also need to take place in time-critical situations. For example, a chief constable may request the director-general of the agency urgently to take the lead on activity where a resident in their police area has been kidnapped and their location is unknown in the United Kingdom. Under such circumstances, there may be operational consequences if executive action were to be delayed because the relevant PCC could not be contacted or notified in time—the individual may not have been available, had their mobile turned off, or whatever. A whole host of reasons might have made that difficult.
That is not to say that a PCC would not be notified of a tasking request by their chief constable. I would expect that a chief constable would notify their PCC as soon as it was feasible, practical and sensible to do so, if not beforehand. But formal, statutory notification prior to every tasking request would not be appropriate.
I trust that the party opposite is as committed as are the Government to protecting the operational independence of the director-general of the agency and chief constables, and to ensuring that swift action can be taken during time-critical operations. On that basis, I hope that those explanations deal with the points that the noble Lord raised, and having listened to what I had to say, he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I am slightly confused by the response from the noble Lord, Lord Henley. He implied that this group of amendments is designed to undermine the operational independence of the chief constable. But this is not about an operational decision. This is not saying that the police and crime commissioner must approve. It is simply saying that before making a request to use the resources that are properly the responsibility of that police and crime commissioner —the resources for which that police and crime commissioner is answerable to the public and the police and crime panel and so forth—as a minimum, the police and crime commissioner should be informed. This is not saying that the police and crime commissioner will then interfere in the operational judgment of the chief constable as to whether those resources can be released and what the implications of that are. Let us not pretend that this is not potentially hugely significant. As my noble friend Lord Rosser pointed out, there is nothing that prescribes the size or scale of these requests, so they could be enormously significant.
Lord Henley
The noble Lord protests too much. I will not go back to the various remarks he made about the police and crime commissioners. That is an argument that we had in another place—dare I say it, in another country—a long time ago. It has been dealt with. That is what Parliament has agreed.
Lord Henley
No, no, the noble Lord can intervene after I have dealt with the points about his amendment. The noble Lord objects to what is happening, and apparently supports Amendments 34 and 35. Interestingly, he did not put his name down to them, but that is possibly why he made a speech of that sort—because he knows that the amendments go too far. He knows perfectly well that the amendments say “must”, which is why I talked about time-sensitive problems and said that it was not appropriate that the director-general “must” always consult the police and crime commissioner or, in Amendment 35, that,
“a chief officer of a UK police force must notify the Police and Crime Commissioner”,
because these things are not practical in those circumstances. That is what I dealt with in the amendment and in my answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who will respond in due course.
We all welcome the chance to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, yet again making one of the speeches that he no doubt made during the passage of the Bill, which sadly I was not able to take part in but which my noble friend dealt with so well. I hope that my explanation of why the word “must” is not appropriate in Amendments 34 and 35 is satisfactory and that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will feel able to withdraw his amendment, as I suggested earlier.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I hesitate to correct the Minister, but if he checks back on the speeches I made during the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill when it was being considered in your Lordships’ House, he will see that I was not a particular supporter of the concept of police and crime commissioners. What I am doing today is fighting on their behalf for them to be given the information to enable them to do their job. They should be allowed to be the police and crime commissioners that the Conservative Party envisaged when it put this measure before Parliament.
If we are now being told that the only reason for rejecting this amendment is the word “must” because of the implications of urgency, as I said in my previous intervention, that is very easily remedied. If the noble Lord is saying that he is happy to table these amendments on Report with an urgency exclusion, obviously I cannot speak for the opposition Front Bench but I am sure we would think that progress had been made.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am always happy to look at further amendments to amendments. Similarly, I am happy to think that one of the things I could do in the long summer months when the Olympics are on is read some of the noble Lord’s speeches on police and crime commissioners. Those will no doubt provide me with a great deal of pleasure and possibly put me to sleep. They will be great speeches and I will read them just as I will listen to the noble Lord.
What the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, does with his amendments is a matter for him. I was responding to the specific amendments that were put before me. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, can add his name, if he wishes, to the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, might bring forward in due course.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, the amendment would delete the requirement on the director-general of the National Crime Agency to seek the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing a direction to the chief constable of the British Transport Police, as set out in Clause 5(9). There does not seem to be, in Clause 5, a similar requirement for the director-general to seek the consent of the Secretary of State to a direction to perform a task that is given to the chief officer of an England and Wales police force, as opposed to the chief constable of the British Transport Police.
Schedule 3(8) provides for the director-general of the National Crime Agency to direct, among others, a chief officer of an England and Wales police force, and the chief constable of the British Transport Police, to provide specified assistance to the National Crime Agency, subject to the appropriate consent being given to the direction—meaning that of the Secretary of State in relation to the chief officer of a police force. However, Schedule 3 appears to remain silent on whether the consent of the Secretary of State is required for the director-general of the National Crime Agency to give a direction to provide specified assistance to the chief constable of the British Transport Police—unless of course the chief constable of the British Transport Police is included within the reference to a “chief officer of” a “police force”.
I accept that we may not have correctly understood the wording in the parts of the Bill to which I have just referred. I am sure that if we have not, the Minister will point that out. However, if we have understood it correctly, can the Minister explain the significance or otherwise of the necessity for the director-general of the NCA to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State to give a direction only to the chief constable of the British Transport Police appearing in Clause 5, when that clause also deals with directions being given to the chief officer of an England and Wales police force; and the significance or otherwise of the necessity for the director-general of the National Crime Agency to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State to give a direction only to a chief officer of an England and Wales police force appearing in Schedule 3, when that schedule also deals with directions being given to the chief constable of the British Transport Police?
Why is the necessity for the director-general of the National Crime Agency to seek the consent of the Secretary of State to the giving of a direction to both a chief officer of an England and Wales police force, and the chief constable of the British Transport Police, not dealt with in the same place in the Bill, whether at Clause 5 or Schedule 3, instead of being split, as appears to be the case at present? I accept that Clause 5 and Schedule 3 may address different circumstances, hence the difference in wording. Such a distinction between Clause 5 and Schedule 3 does seem to be drawn in Part 5 of Schedule 3, addressing the issue of payments. No doubt the Minister will clarify the position in his reply.
Amendment 39 would remove the requirement for the consent of the Secretary of State to be given. The Minister’s response to these amendments may address some of the points we wish to raise under Amendment 39.
Finally, as we are dealing with the issue of directions being given by the director-general, the Minister said at Second Reading that the Bill provides that the director-general should, in exceptional circumstances, be able to direct police forces in England and Wales. Can he tell us where in the Bill it states, “in exceptional circumstances”?
Lord Harris of Haringey
I see the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, readying himself to answer on this amendment. Perhaps he can answer my simple question. We listened to the protestations of the noble Lord, Lord Henley, that the amendments that we just considered were completely unworkable because of the use of the word “must”, and that there would be circumstances in which urgent matters and urgent operational needs had to be dealt with. Why do we now find a clause in the schedule which says that before you can get the British Transport Police to do anything, the prior approval of the Secretary of State has to be obtained?
When the noble Earl reads his note, perhaps he could also say whether a fine distinction is being drawn between a direction and a request? If so, perhaps he could also tell us what is the status of the British Transport Police Authority. Does it have no say in the matter? Is it simply for the Secretary of State? I assume that we are here talking about the Secretary of State for Transport, although I understand that there is always a fiction in our legislative process whereby Secretaries of State are indivisible. I assume that, before a direction can be given, the Secretary of State for Transport must be found, diverted from whatever consideration she or he might be giving to high-speed rail, airports or whatever, and told that there is an urgent operational direction needed by the British Transport Police. How is that really meant to work?
Earl Attlee
My Lords, in responding to the amendment, I start by emphasising that in almost all cases, tasking will be voluntary, based on strong relationships and mutual co-operation, exploiting intelligence and building on existing arrangements. If not, surely something is going badly wrong, so of course such circumstances will be exceptional. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about “exceptional”, there are already strict legal tests in the Bill to prevent misuse of the directed tasking powers.
In order for the director-general of the agency to use those powers, a threefold test must be met. The performance of the task would be to assist the NCA to carry out its functions; it would need to be expedient for the directed body to perform the task; and satisfactory arrangements could not have been made, or made in time. A further safeguard is that the director-general must personally exercise the power and may delegate it in his absence only to a senior NCA officer, who would be nominated for the purpose. Directed assistance powers would also be subject to a threefold test. There would have to be a special need for that assistance; it would need to be expedient for the directed body to provide assistance; and voluntary assistance could not have been made, or made in time. In addition to that threefold test, any directed assistance to the NCA would require consent from the relevant Secretary of State. Separate arrangements are in place for Northern Ireland.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked about the term “Secretary of State”. He will know very well that it is a legal term.
I was asked about the difference between tasking and assistance. “Tasking” means that the responsibility for the direction and control of the operation goes to the agency being tasked. Examples are that the NCA may task a specific police force to take the lead to disrupt a human-trafficking gang that is predominantly based in that force area but impacting across the UK, or that a police force could task the NCA, subject to the NCA’s agreement, to take the direction and control in an operation to disrupt that organised crime group’s overseas financial infrastructure by using its specialist cybercapabilities and overseas liaison officers. Under assistance, resources transfer from the operational command of one organisation to another. One example is that if a specific police force is faced with a local kidnapping case, the chief officer could maintain direction and control but request some assistance from the NCA’s specialist kidnapping unit. In the case of a co-ordinated day of national action against the smuggling of rhino horns, the NCA could request assistance from UKBA specialists on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora to assist with identifying seized ivory.
The powers in respect of directed tasking are a necessary and sensible backstop to enable the National Crime Agency to fulfil its role of ensuring that there is a co-ordinated national response to serious, organised and complex crime. In particular, directed powers could be vital in time-critical situations where arrangements need to be made quickly and there is not time to establish satisfactory voluntary arrangements. The question that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has quite reasonably posed is: why is it necessary for the Secretary of State to consent before the director-general can direct the British Transport Police to perform a task yet there is no equivalent consent requirement when one of the 43 territorial forces in England and Wales is subject to such a direction?
The British Transport Police is different from police forces in England and Wales for three reasons. First, it is not a Home Office police force but a special police force, ultimately accountable to the Secretary of State for Transport under the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003. Secondly—
Lord Harris of Haringey
Can the noble Earl explain how that accountability differs from the accountability that a Home Office force has to the police and crime commissioner?
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I will go on to say that but what is particularly important is how the British Transport Police is funded. Secondly, unlike police forces in England and Wales, the British Transport Police has a national remit which includes jurisdiction across the railway network in England and Wales—and in Scotland, where policing in the latter is otherwise devolved to the Scottish Government. Thirdly, the British Transport Police is primarily contracted and funded by providers of railway services—the train operators and Network Rail—applying the “user pays” principle. Railway service providers are required to enter into a police services agreement with the British Transport Police as a condition of their licence to operate. Home Office forces have no such contractual or financial relationship with industry of day-to-day significance.
Taking into consideration these difficulties, a direction to the British Transport Police is so significant in regards to the potential impact on accountability, devolved policing arrangements with Scotland and arrangements with industry that it requires a Secretary of State to affirm that the issue is of sufficient national interest. I would also be very surprised if my right honourable friend the Secretary of State did not want to be aware that agreement could not be reached. It would be a very serious matter. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
Perhaps the noble Earl could also address this point. I understand the point about the different funding arrangements for the British Transport Police, which is extremely significant, but the funding is therefore coming not from the Government but from the transport operating companies. Those companies are engaged through the British Transport Police Authority so why does this clause not therefore relate to that authority, to which the chief constable is accountable, where the funders, who may feel that they have an issue at stake, would be represented? Would that not be a better arrangement?
Perhaps the noble Earl will respond to the question about the terrifying cases of urgency that the noble Lord, Lord Henley, worried us with on the previous group of amendments. How are they going to be dealt with with this requirement for the prior approval of the Secretary of State?
Earl Attlee
My Lords, in a terrifying case of urgency, it is in my opinion inconceivable that the British Transport Police would not agree to assist.
In answer to the noble Lord’s question about the British Transport Police Authority, he is right to point out that the chief constable of the British Transport Police is accountable to the British Transport Police Authority in the same way that chief constables of police forces in England and Wales are accountable to their respective police and crime commissioners. However, in the case of a directed tasking to the British Transport Police, the Secretary of State for Transport is ultimately responsible for the security of passengers and staff on the national rail network and on underground and light-rail systems. It is therefore right that she should have the ability to consent to direct tasking of the British Transport Police at the national level aimed at tackling serious and organised crime.
Moreover, tasking by the National Crime Agency may need to take place in time-critical situations. Members of the British Transport Police Authority meet six times a year to set British Transport Police targets and to allocate funds for its budget. It may not be possible to clear consent with the British Transport Police Authority in time for the necessary executive action to take place. This is not to say that the British Transport Police Authority would not be notified by its chief constable of a direct tasking request. I have no doubt that the chief constable of the British Transport Police would notify the British Transport Police Authority of direct tasking as soon as it was feasible to do so. Noble Lords have not convinced me that a situation would arise where the British Transport Police would refuse to provide assistance voluntarily.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I seek clarity from the Minister. This is a genuine attempt to secure information. Clause 7(1) states:
“A person may disclose information to the NCA if the disclosure is made for the purposes of the exercise of any NCA function”.
I seek to clarify whether this is as broad a statement as I think it may be. Does it mean that any person may choose out of sheer devilment to ignore any other requirements to which they may be subject under the Data Protection Act or anything else to disclose information to the NCA because they think that it may be useful for the purposes of the exercise of its work? I am trying to get at who determines whether the disclosure is for the exercise of the NCA’s functions. Could I as a private individual who holds some privileged information decide that I think the NCA ought to be interested in the information because I think it relates to serious crime, and therefore I may decide to ignore the legal obligations on me not to disclose that information and pass it to the NCA? I could understand it if the wording was, “The NCA may require me to disclose the information because it is investigating something and gets the necessary permissions to override it”. I may be completely misinterpreting Clause 7(1) but I would be grateful for clarity on that point.
Lord Henley
I am sorry but I am slightly confused by the procedure that we are adopting. My understanding was that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, was going to oppose the Question that Clause 7 stand part of the Bill. The noble Lord has intervened at this stage to ask a question about Clause 7. Does he want to wait for the general debate that we are going to have? However, the noble Baroness seems to be implying that there will not be a—
Lord Henley
I am distraught. There I was expecting a major debate and the noble Lord asked me only about Clause 7(1), who the relevant person may be and whether it was any person. I would have thought the simplest way of dealing with this matter is the way that I was taught many years ago—the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will remember this from when he first trained as a lawyer—namely, that you look at what the words on the face of the Bill say. We hope that the Bill will become an Act when we have finished dealing with it and it has gone through all its stages. The Bill states:
“A person may disclose information to the NCA if the disclosure is made for the purposes of the exercise of any NCA function”.
I would have thought that that is fairly straightforward. That is what the Bill says. My advice suggests that one need not go beyond that. The words “A person” imply that any person can disclose information to the NCA,
“if the disclosure is made for the purposes of the exercise of any NCA function”.
The noble Lord will now come back to me, because he always does, and I enjoy our debates. This statute is relatively simple to interpret. We know that that is not always the case and that great complications can arise in the interpretation of statutes. However, I should have thought that the words we are discussing are as simple as you can get.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, perhaps I did not make myself as clear as I should have done. If I am a data controller in an organisation and I have certain obligations placed on me not to disclose information, does Clause 7(1) override my normal duties as a data controller under the Data Protection Act and allow me to decide whether certain information looks as though it ought to fall within the remit of the NCA, and therefore enable me to disclose it to that body? That is my simple question and, even though I am trying to behave as though the words on the paper mean what they seem to mean, I am simply trying to understand whether this is as broad a “may” for the persons concerned as I think it is.
Lord Henley
I was probably not as clear as I ought to have been. Obviously, the persons would be subject to any other enactment, which would include, as the noble Lord said, the Data Protection Act. One could also mention the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. They would be covered by the provisions of those Acts. The situation is as it states on the package, but subject to other statutory provisions.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I really do not wish to prolong this, unless the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is about to explain what the words mean. What is the purpose of having this provision at all? If all that it is saying is that I, as an individual person, may do something that I am not prohibited from doing, what is the point of even putting it in the legislation in the first place? If the subsection is merely saying, “I have a bit of information that I am not prohibited from passing on, and I may decide to pass it to the NCA”, it seems to be completely unnecessary. It clearly means something, and I think that it means rather more than, “I can provide information without being constrained by, say, the Data Protection Act”. Unless the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is going to provide some insight on this point, it may be something that the noble Lord can write to us about.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, can my noble friend deal with the point about funding? At the moment, to what extent does CEOP get outside funding to help it with its work? What safeguard is there? Will CEOP continue to get that money for its work as a result of the Government’s proposals?
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, when my noble friend Lady Smith introduced the amendment, she made it clear that there was not necessarily a desire to stick to the wording before us: rather, that what we are having at this stage is very much a probing discussion. All your Lordships in this Committee support the work done by CEOP and we all want to see it succeed. Given that the Government intend to put CEOP within the National Crime Agency—for which there are some very strong arguments in favour but also some arguments against—the question is how one preserves the integrity of CEOP’s work and makes sure that the work continues and is seen to continue.
The amendment is partly about safeguarding the funding streams, as well as the external funding, and it is partly about ensuring that the existing partnership structures with CEOP, which are reflected in the current board structure of CEOP, are continued. Although the wording of my noble friend’s amendment does not necessarily resolve all these issues, it gives us an opportunity to highlight the concerns.
The principles are clear: we want to see CEOP’s work continue; we want to see it protected; and we want to see the retention of the partnership structure, which involves not only bringing in resources from outside but ensuring that those who provide the resources have confidence that the public contribution is retained and remains transparent. We want to ensure that in the operation of the agency there is a genuine partnership that involves different parties working together to achieve a common end.
We look to the Minister for some account of how the benefits of that separate entity, which is currently CEOP, can be preserved within a new structure. This is not a new concept. The presence on the government Bench reminds me that we had a very similar debate about the creation of Healthwatch within the Care Quality Commission; and there, completely erroneously of course, the Government’s objective was to create something that was independent and that had its own income flow and governance structure that was different from the rest of the Care Quality Commission. Although I do not think that the solution that the Government adopted in that particular model was perfect, it demonstrates that a number of models are available that try to achieve the objective of preserving this continuing area of activity, preserving the partnership structure and preserving the funding and independence of that funding for the future. I hope that the Minister can respond in those terms.
Lord Henley
My Lords, again, I regret that I missed the debates on the Care Quality Commission. I shall spend the summer reading those as well as the other ones. In response to the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I make it clear that I fully understand that his noble friend’s amendment is probing and seeks reassurances about what CEOP does and how it works. I shall not dismiss it purely on the grounds of its wording, nor shall I say that it is merely a fantasy amendment because we do not yet have the NCA board that she was looking for, as that was dealt with at an earlier stage. I accept that this as a probing amendment and that there is a need for reassurances from me and the Government about the future of CEOP and what will happen under the new arrangements.
I pay tribute to the work of CEOP, which I saw when I visited it, as I am sure other noble Lords have done. We should all be very grateful that that child protection work will continue through the work of the agency. Since its creation, it has been a significant success story. It is important that I remind noble Lords that it has not previously had a statutory basis that is distinct from that of SOCA, and that has had no detrimental impact on its operational independence. It has worked perfectly well, and the six principles, to which I shall turn later, that underpin CEOP will continue to underpin it on the transition to the NCA.
Before I go through what I want to get on the record as an assurance, perhaps I may respond to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay on the funding of CEOP and the fact that it can receive funds from outside sources. At the moment its existing funding model allows it to charge, for example, for training services that are provided mainly to the police, teachers and child protection workers and to raise income or support in kind through sponsorship and corporate arrangements. We certainly want those arrangements to continue with the NCA; there will be no change to that.
I assure the Committee that child protection will run throughout the National Crime Agency. CEOP will still exist as a part of that as a separate command within it, but we would not want to see it silo-ised—an inelegant word—within the department. It is important that its work runs throughout the agency. As well as building on CEOP’s existing role as the national centre dedicated to working with others to protect children from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, the NCA will also be subject to a new statutory duty, which in essence is to safeguard and to promote the welfare of children. That means that the agency will give appropriate priority to children when it comes into contact with them and that it will share early concerns about the safety and welfare of children, ensuring preventive action before a crisis develops.
Those requirements will be part of the training that each and every NCA officer will receive. I emphasise the point that CEOP will be a separate command within the NCA; we do not want to see these matters silo-ised. Contrary to the noble Baroness’s amendment, it is imperative that the responsibility to discharge that duty remains with the whole of the National Crime Agency and not just with CEOP.