Lord Mackay of Clashfern
Main Page: Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Mackay of Clashfern's debates with the Home Office
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, can my noble friend deal with the point about funding? At the moment, to what extent does CEOP get outside funding to help it with its work? What safeguard is there? Will CEOP continue to get that money for its work as a result of the Government’s proposals?
My Lords, when my noble friend Lady Smith introduced the amendment, she made it clear that there was not necessarily a desire to stick to the wording before us: rather, that what we are having at this stage is very much a probing discussion. All your Lordships in this Committee support the work done by CEOP and we all want to see it succeed. Given that the Government intend to put CEOP within the National Crime Agency—for which there are some very strong arguments in favour but also some arguments against—the question is how one preserves the integrity of CEOP’s work and makes sure that the work continues and is seen to continue.
The amendment is partly about safeguarding the funding streams, as well as the external funding, and it is partly about ensuring that the existing partnership structures with CEOP, which are reflected in the current board structure of CEOP, are continued. Although the wording of my noble friend’s amendment does not necessarily resolve all these issues, it gives us an opportunity to highlight the concerns.
The principles are clear: we want to see CEOP’s work continue; we want to see it protected; and we want to see the retention of the partnership structure, which involves not only bringing in resources from outside but ensuring that those who provide the resources have confidence that the public contribution is retained and remains transparent. We want to ensure that in the operation of the agency there is a genuine partnership that involves different parties working together to achieve a common end.
We look to the Minister for some account of how the benefits of that separate entity, which is currently CEOP, can be preserved within a new structure. This is not a new concept. The presence on the government Bench reminds me that we had a very similar debate about the creation of Healthwatch within the Care Quality Commission; and there, completely erroneously of course, the Government’s objective was to create something that was independent and that had its own income flow and governance structure that was different from the rest of the Care Quality Commission. Although I do not think that the solution that the Government adopted in that particular model was perfect, it demonstrates that a number of models are available that try to achieve the objective of preserving this continuing area of activity, preserving the partnership structure and preserving the funding and independence of that funding for the future. I hope that the Minister can respond in those terms.
I wonder if my noble friend can help me. I am trying to follow what he is saying about this. Is this advisory panel to be charged with advising in connection with the first arrangements for the new principal officer? And once that is done, has the panel finished, leaving the Secretary of State to do it himself? Is that the idea, or is the advisory panel to continue and be consulted only when the Secretary of State feels that he requires some extra independent and expert advice since he does not feel able to completely decide for himself?
My Lords, if I can assist my noble and learned friend, the point we were trying to get over is that the actual designation of the director-general is a matter for my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. She will make an assessment of the director-general’s suitability and capability to exercise the operational powers in any given case. It might be that the advisory panel, through its chair, could then assess whether the director-general was adequately trained to exercise those operational powers and if, as experts—as we hope they would be—they were satisfied that the director-general met the requirements for exercising his designated duties. But it might be that the Home Secretary was satisfied about the director-general’s suitability and capability to exercise those powers, in which case there would be no need for the board.