Future Capability of the Armed Forces

Lord Harlech Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Harlech]

To move that this House takes note of the future capability of the United Kingdom’s armed forces in light of the current international situation.

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have signed up to this debate. I am grateful that your Lordships are able to debate the United Kingdom Armed Forces’ capability shortly after the publication of the defence investment plan. I look forward to all contributions, not least that of the Minister and the valedictory speech from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark. I declare an interest as a serving officer in the Army Reserve.

Let us confront a single stark reality: the United Kingdom remains the third-largest defence spender in NATO, surpassed only by the United States and Germany. Yet NATO’s own internal assessments rank us 31st out of 32 members in delivering on capability targets, with only Iceland, which has no armed forces at all, sitting below us. This is the critical gap I intend to scrutinise—not the disparity between our forces and our adversaries, real though that is, but the profound disconnect between the funds we invest and the capabilities we can deploy. This is the gulf between the promise and the product.

Let me say plainly what this debate is not. It is not a party-political point. I belong to the party that was in government for 14 years and, for much of that time, we did not spend enough on defence. Many of us said so then, and I say it again now. I have no interest in a quarrel about who cut what a decade ago, or who is pledging what for 2035. The two great alibis of defence policy are the distant past and the distant future, and both are used to dodge the only question that matters: what are we spending now, and what will we feel tomorrow in the years in which we might have to fight?

Those years are not theoretical. Admiral Sir Keith Blount, who stepped down only this year as NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, DSACEUR, warned a fortnight ago on the “The General & The Journalist” podcast from the Times that Britain now risks losing influence within the alliance if it fails to deliver what it has promised. When our most senior recent commander at NATO says that in public, the Government should listen.

I give credit where the Motion invites it, on future capability. The strategic defence review was serious work, and I support its direction of travel. The best decision in last month’s defence investment plan is the one that looks furthest ahead—more than £5 billion for drones and autonomous systems, the largest such investment we have ever made. That is the right instinct. It is the lesson of Ukraine, where innovation cycles are measured in weeks. It is, in the Government’s own phrase, investing for

“the next war, not the last one”.

My concern is not the direction of travel; it is that £5 billion is not enough and that, when you open it up, the wider plan does not bear weight. Consider the headline of £298 billion over four years. It is a number designed to end an argument. But only around £15 billion is new money over last year’s settlement, and the Defence Secretary has acknowledged that most of that £15 billion is not for new equipment at all but for day-to-day running costs—keeping the ships and aircraft we already own available and our people trained. That is necessary, but it is not rearmament. It is paying to run the force we have and calling it the force we need. Is even that money real? Of that £15 billion, only around £10 billion is funded. The rest, some £4.7 billion, waits on a Budget that has not yet happened. That is not a funded plan; it is an IOU. The plan leaves the years from 2030 to 2035 all but blank, reaches 2.7% of GDP in 2027 and then flatlines. It funds neither the 3% promised for the next Parliament nor the 3.5% signed up to for 2035. Set against the threat that the Government’s own advisers place before 2028, this is a plan matched not to the danger but to the Treasury’s accountants.

My disagreement with the review centres on its approach to personnel. The proposal to expand our reserves by a mere 20%—even then, only when financial conditions permit—is far too cautious. Currently, we field just 30,000 trained reservists compared to 137,000 regulars, rendering our Reserve Forces only a fifth of the size of our regular military. In contrast, Finland, directly confronting the Russian threat, maintains a formidable trained reserve many times the strength of its modest regular army. My goal is far bolder: we must aim for a trained reserve that is not a fraction of our regular forces but three times their size. Achieving this will require a generational pivot, but it offers the only cost-effective way to restore the strategic depth this nation has neglected for far too long.

Numbers, though, are the easy part. I would not have the House think I am merely asking for a longer list of names. A reservist without equipment, training days and a drill hall to train in is not a capability, and here our record is dismal. The Public Accounts Committee found that the volunteer estate, the reserve centres on which all this depends, is in what the department calls “managed decline”. The reserve estate optimisation programme, REOP, has all but stopped. Tranche 1 was delivered, but the funding bid for tranche 2 failed and had to be rebid, and the department has still not secured funding for the phases beyond. Yet the department’s own evidence to that committee was that this estate is the critical enabler of the very reserve growth the review promises. We have written the ambition and declined to pay for the foundations beneath it.

This is the habit I most want the Minister to break. When budgets tighten, the reserve is always the first to be raided because it is dispersed and part-time and, sadly, too many decisions affecting it are taken by regulars. If the reserve is genuinely part of the first echelon, as the review implies, because our regular forces are so small, then it cannot also be the balancing item. You cannot ask a formation to be ready to mobilise while treating its training, equipment and accommodation as discretionary spending.

This matters most for the mission closest to home. Homeland defence and national resilience are not some additional burden for the reserve. They are its natural work. It is the reserve that is local, dispersed and embedded in every county. These are the people who would guard critical national infrastructure or reinforce the response to a flood, a cyber attack or an act of sabotage, drawing on their skills and experience from their civilian life. Every reserve centre we allow quietly to decay is a node of national resilience dismantled, and a link severed between the Armed Forces and the communities who must ultimately sustain them. If we are serious about resilience, the drill hall is not an overhead; it is infrastructure.

I add one further warning on the industrial base. Small and medium firms build the drones this plan celebrates. They are the least able to survive a Government who cannot make up their mind, and techUK warns that the delay to the publication of the defence investment plan has already forced firms in the supply chain to issue redundancy notices. You cannot switch an industrial base off and on. Once the engineers are gone, they are gone, and our allies see all this. The Public Accounts Committee has warned that the delay has damaged our credibility with the very partners the review tells us to put first. “NATO first” is good and the right doctrine, shared across this House, and I am delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, in his place. However, a nation ranked 31st out of 32 on NATO’s own scorecard is practising “NATO first” in the press release and “NATO last” in the plan.

I have three questions for the Minister. First, when will the £4.7 billion of unfunded commitment be confirmed and, until it is, why should the House treat this as a funded plan? Secondly, will the Government raise their ambition on the reserves well beyond 20% and will they fund the volunteer estate and the training and equipment on which such growth depends? Thirdly, given that the sharpest risk is placed before 2028, what capability will reach the front line inside that window?

I tabled this Motion not to embarrass the Government but because the distance between our words and our capability is now visible to our adversaries as well as our friends, and because the years in which that distance matters most are these ones, not some comfortable decade hence. We spend enough to stand third in the alliance. We should be able to field far more than 31st. The task is not to spend more in 2035. It is to spend well, spend diligently and spend now. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

My Lords, I am truly grateful to all noble Lords, all noble and gallant Lords, and the right reverend Prelate for taking part—I wish him godspeed in his future endeavours. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for answering my questions and those of others, and for his powerful, impassioned reply at the end, which we all fully support. I add my voice to those. Whatever happens in terms of a reshuffle, we hope very much that the Minister stays in post.

This has been a fascinating strength/weakness, opportunity/threat analysis, because it has been cross-party, from all sides of the House. Again, I am truly grateful to everyone who signed up. It has also been a cross-interest debate: we have had the defence voices, but we have also heard diplomatic, economic and political voices too, which has added to its richness. I truly want the media to play its part in stimulating the national conversation; I just wish that it would give more column inches to this debate and others like it, rather than the Punch and Judy stuff that happens in the other place.

It is rare to have such unanimity of opinion but, as the Minister has said, we have heard that today. The direction of travel is right, but we must go further and faster. To govern is to choose. Yes, 3.5% or 5% is more, but it is a damn sight cheaper than the alternative of fighting a war with a peer adversary.

I will finish, as I know there is additional business to come. The campaign slogan of the right honourable Member for Makerfield, the incoming Prime Minister, was “Vote Andy, Vote Hope”. Those of us who have had a military career—and there are some here who have had much longer military careers than me—know that you learn pretty early on that hope is not a planning tool. He must understand that the defence of the realm can, and must, be a Government’s top priority.

Motion agreed.