My Lords, that was a powerful and valuable speech from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, relying on her experience and her contacts. I was particularly impressed by the personal examples. We probably all know individual Ukrainians in this country who have suffered. As the last Back-Bencher in the debate—story of my life—I fear that everything that can be said has been said, but not everyone has said it, so here goes my contribution. I begin by adapting Yaroslavsky: we are witnessing the grand patriotic war of the Ukrainian people. Patriotic? Yes. Putin claimed that the Ukrainians were just cousins, or indeed part of the Russian people, but they have shown that he has provoked a very profound patriotism among the people, who have shown enormous courage and resilience.
I was at NATO headquarters on the eve of the aggression in 2022. I must admit to the Committee that the consensus appeared to be that, if there were an invasion, Russian troops—better resourced, and with a degree of morale—would be taking Kyiv within two or three days. That, happily, was not to be. This debate now is about making Russia recognise and possibly pay for its aggression.
Two main areas of concern were mentioned by the committee. First, there is the geographic limit and whether we should extend it to 2014, to Crimea and the Donbass. On the grounds of justice, of course, that should happen and there is the possibility of an amendment to the convention. However, the demands of justice, in my judgment, conflict with practicalities. The areas concerned are currently occupied by Russia, and they are likely to remain so in any ultimate settlement. Therefore, there are formidable problems; they have to be visited to assess and evaluate claims. The evidential problems are enormous.
The second area of concern relates to the prospect of achieving what we all would like: the extent of the compensation. There is a proposed three-stage process. The register is extremely valuable, but hopefully it will not just be a historic document. The commission will have to recognise categories, and presumably lawyers will have to work out standardised categories. There is then the assessment of the claims. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, has given some indication of the vast accumulation of claims, which will make even the most assiduous lawyers work for very many years to come.
The final and most difficult part is the problem of payment. An enormous problem is posed. It is most unlikely that Russia will put up its hands and accept responsibility or pay anything voluntarily. Even the second stage raises formidable tasks in terms of assessment.
Turning to the point the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, made about the precedent of Iraq, with all respect to the noble Lord, for whom I have great admiration, there is no great difficulty in distinguishing the Iraq problem. In Iraq, we were dealing with a defeated country. It was not difficult, therefore, to assess the portion of the oil receipts of Iraq that could be used for compensating far fewer people. It was not the extent or the complexity that we have now. So the precedent, in my judgment, is not as helpful as we would like.
In the case of Ukraine, it is not likely that either side will triumph—there will not be a victory for either side—so where is the money to come from? Vast sums are involved. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, has given an indication of the likely sums. The only potential source is likely to be the frozen assets held by western banks, which are, I agree, very substantial, including $9 billion in UK banks. But there are problems legally about this. It could set a very poor precedent for other states or individuals who deposit money in our banks. Here, we also have sovereign immunity.
It may be extremely difficult to obtain a consensus to achieve an agreement on defreezing those assets. Therefore, the demands of justice may not be attainable. I recall that we, as a committee, were urged not to use “reparations” —that was said by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I think—but instead to use “compensation”, which is a far less loaded term. Does anyone with a sense of history consider Russian agreement likely for such a proud nation? Equally, the United States is likely to ensure that any agreement or a settlement may have some territorial concessions, particularly given the warm relationship between President Trump and President Putin, but it is unlikely to lead to the sort of outcome we would all like. Similarly, China could of course use its limited influence in this field to side with Putin.
I concede that that would be a most unfortunate conclusion and against all justice. However, after the immense efforts, the costs and the work of all those experts—possibly extending over a decade or more, given the size of the claims that they have to consider—it may be that no money will ultimately accrue to the poor claimants who have suffered so much. We should be aware from the outset that there is a great danger of that. Now, the sceptics will argue this, and they may be proved right at the end of a long period. As we say in the committee’s report, expectations may, alas, not be realised.
Before the noble Lord sits down, I want to raise one point to which he referred: the large number of people who were compensated by the Iraq-Kuwait compensation commission set up by the UN Security Council. There were many hundreds of thousands of them, because workers from Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and the Philippines were all grievously damaged and lost huge amounts of money, and they were all compensated by the commission. It was not the case that the Iraq commission dealt simply with the oil and the damage created by it being spilled, although it did do that; it also resulted in lots of very poor individuals receiving full compensation.
I hear the noble Lord, but I think he would agree that the amounts and numbers involved are vastly more in the case of Ukraine than was the case of the relatively simple—as compared with Ukraine—precedent of Iraq and Kuwait.
(10 years, 1 month ago)
Lords Chamber(12 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am sure the noble Lord is right, but the extent to which the Prime Minister carries his party with him seems to be in a little more doubt today than it was a few days ago. As I say, I am sure that the noble Lord is correct, but the amendment would require the Government of the day—that Government may well not be the present Prime Minister’s Government—to provide, at the time a referendum is held, and in advance of it, certain kinds of information that are not called for in the Bill as it stands. I happen to think that this falls fairly and squarely in what I would call in the argot the “Cormack category”—that is, a provision that will improve the Bill. I hope very much that the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, will accept the amendment. I do not think that there is any ambiguity in it at all. Therefore, I hope very much that it will be endorsed.
My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, says that he will accept this amendment, I will very happily sit down and spare your Lordships’ House a few moments of my thoughts. I think I detect a negative response, in which case I ask the noble Lord, Lord Sherbourne, what is the purpose of giving information to the electorate after the event, and telling them plan B after they have voted yes or no, possibly partly in ignorance of what the implications of so doing are? I am reminded of the story of the eminent Scottish divine who, to his surprise, after a blameless life, found himself languishing in hell. He looked up, saw the good Lord and said, “Oh, Lord, I dinna ken, I dinna ken”. The good Lord, in his infinite mercy and goodness, replied, “Ye ken the noo”. That will be the position of the electorate. They will know the consequences of the referendum result for good or ill, but after the event—after the blameless life, in that case.
I am a signatory to both the amendments we are discussing. I put my name to them because I believe that on an issue of such importance the electorate should be informed about it. It is for those proposing the measure to say what their plan B is. Surely, we do not say to the electorate, “You will vote yes or no. If you vote no, you will step into the void. We will be coy about what the implications are”. That is why I have tabled a series of amendments—Amendments 74A to 74G—which I will summarise briefly. Amendment 74A is headed, “Report on alternatives to membership of the European Union: Switzerland”; Amendment 74B is headed, “Report on alternatives to membership of the European Union: Norway”; Amendment 74C is headed. “Report on alternatives to membership of the European Union: the Commonwealth”; Amendment 74D is headed, “Report on alternatives to membership of the European Union: North America”; Amendment 74E is headed, “Report on alternatives to membership of the European Union”, which is concerned with other alternatives to membership of the European Union; Amendment 74F is headed, “Report on alternatives to membership of the European Union: European Economic Area”, and Amendment 74G is headed, “Report on alternatives to membership of the European Union: European Free Trade Association”.
There is a whole series of potential alternatives. Probably the most likely would be a relationship akin to that of Norway or Switzerland, or akin to that of the Commonwealth. I will not give a dress rehearsal of what I will say if we reach those amendments, as that would surely bore your Lordships. However, if the amendment we are discussing is passed—I very much hope that it will be because of its potential for an informed electorate—my amendments may then be otiose. However, I say for the benefit of the House that, as regards the position in respect of Norway, the report published about two years ago for the Norwegian Government by a learned professor is very helpful. He said, in terms, that he had come to the conclusion that it made sense for Norway to be fully part of the European Union. He set out all the disadvantages of Norway’s position, including the financial cost to it and the extent to which it was not able to make any serious input into discussions. Indeed, that was underlined by a representative of the Norwegian employers’ federation, the NHO, who said:
“We feel we have access”—
to Brussels—
“and the doors are open to us, but no one listens. Interest in Norway, and the influence of Norway, is diminishing”.
That is as much as I can say about Norway. In respect of Switzerland, the bilateral deals that that country has with the European Union are of interest, but the EU is unhappy with those relationships and is unlikely to want to repeat them. Switzerland is of course outside the financial arrangements of the EU and, because of the importance of the City of London, those arrangements are of considerable importance to us. Frankfurt and other financial centres look eagerly to see if they can replace the City of London. As to the implications for Switzerland—I shall not dwell on this because it would bore your Lordships if I were to go through them all—there is a very useful document by David Buchan for the Centre for European Reform, Outsiders on the Inside: Swiss and Norwegian Lessons for the UK. It sets out clearly what the implications of withdrawal are likely to be.
The Conservative Party appears latterly to have discovered the Commonwealth. I recall when, once upon a time, I spoke for the Opposition in respect of South Africa. In 1986-87, the Conservative Party almost destroyed the Commonwealth over that country and wishes now to forget that. However, probably the best reply in respect of the European Union and the Commonwealth was given in a speech by the then Commonwealth Secretary-General, the New Zealander, Don McKinnon. He gave clear answers in response to a speech by the noble Lord, Lord Howell. I have copies if colleagues wish to see it. I shall not extensively go over what was said, but Don McKinnon was saying essentially that the Commonwealth needs the United Kingdom to be part of the European Union as an advocate on behalf of Commonwealth interests—whether in relation to bananas, or the interests of Gibraltar in relation to Spain. There is a whole series of areas in which the Commonwealth is needed. Don McKinnon, who was obviously totally a Commonwealth man, gave the lie to those who see the Commonwealth as some sort of alternative, not a partner.
To conclude, the real question is: do we want an informed electorate or do we not? We should, as democrats, seek to have an informed electorate and, therefore, I shall support these amendments.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is another amendment on the Order Paper, Amendment 72—which we are not within miles of reaching and will obviously not reach in the next 50 minutes—which covers very much this ground. It is down in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, and would basically put a requirement on the Government to state before the referendum took place what alternative relationship Britain should seek to have with the European Union without Britain in it, if there were a no vote. I agree absolutely with what the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Anderson, said. It is essential that before the electorate cast their vote they should be told what the consequences in terms of Britain’s relationship with the truncated European Union would be in the event of a no vote. It would be too late to say what the Government are going to do after the vote; they must say so up front, before the vote.
However, that will come up in the later amendment as well. At the moment, the important thing is to note that this is a serious issue which will have to be addressed on Report, or in Committee when we get to Amendment 72. I hope that by the time we get there, the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, refreshed by a certain period of repose after his exertions today, will see the sense of this as one of the amendments which basically strengthens the Bill. It does not weaken it; it does not make a referendum less likely; it does not prejudge the outcome of the referendum or anything like that. It just means that if and when the referendum comes, there will be before the British people a clear idea of what the alternative is if, in their majority, they vote no.
There is a considerable difference between this amendment and Amendment 72, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull. His amendment relates only to the intended relationship with what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, called the truncated European Union, whereas this amendment relates to the whole panoply of possible alternatives. I gave some of those as examples: a relationship like that of Norway or Switzerland, the Commonwealth, the EEA or EFTA—one could go on. Both are important matters and should be discussed.
I do not want to disagree totally with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, but, quite frankly, if you look at Amendment 72 of the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, it is clear that, under it, the Government of the day would have to say, “If you vote no, we will try to get an agreement to join the EEA”, for example; or, “We would like to have a series of agreements like the Swiss”—there are 30 or 50 of them; or, “We would have none of the above and would rely simply on our World Trade Organisation membership”. All the things that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has discussed in his amendment are actually also covered in Amendment 72. I am saying merely that we will come to that later, on another day.