Queen’s Speech

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 22nd June 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, this is the first debate on the Address since last June’s referendum resulted in a narrow majority in favour of leaving the EU. It is also the first since the assumption of office by a new US president, Donald Trump, whose “America First” slogan, and, even more so, policies on climate change, trade issues, NATO, the UN and human rights, put him at cross purposes with our own policy objectives. Therefore, I make no apologies for focusing my remarks on these two matters and their consequences for our own foreign policy-making.

Much of the debate about Brexit concentrates on important, but often quite narrow and technical, questions of trade in both goods and services, the status of EU nationals, including our own, and our future domestic policies on regulation, immigration, agriculture and fisheries. That is, of course, exactly as it should be, and those aspects will be debated later in this debate next week. They are important matters. We must not, however, overlook the wider strategic consequences of our decision to leave the EU in terms of Europe’s security and the future direction of the European Union’s foreign policies. It seems to have been almost completely overlooked at the time of our vote last June that we risked turning our backs on something like 500 years of British foreign policy, during which we played an integral—often crucial—part in the formulation of policies relating to European security and the balance of power among our nearest neighbours—an area you could describe as stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, to coin a phrase. Now we risk becoming not just semi-detached but fully detached from that tradition, and that to our cost, I suggest, as we found in earlier periods when we occasionally drifted off into isolation.

It is no good thinking that these risks can be avoided simply by repeating meaningless mantras such as, “We are leaving the EU, but not leaving Europe”. Nor is NATO a full answer to the problem, although it is certainly part of the answer. It seems that the problem requires us to fashion a close, operationally effective relationship on foreign and security policy with the European Union, and in particular with its principal members, France and Germany. Several other previous speakers, including the noble Lord, Lord Howell, concentrated on that point. I hope that the Minister will say something about how we plan to set about doing that when he replies to the debate, because so far we have heard nothing but aspirations in this area.

Then there are the challenges we face from across the Atlantic, not just from the erratic and intemperate policy pronouncements which have so far been the hallmark of the Trump Administration. There are more fundamental problems than that. The policies of that Administration are already undermining the whole structure of a rules-based international community, which successive British Governments have, over the last 70 years, worked so hard to create and on which our own future prosperity and security will rely to an even greater extent if and when we leave the European Union. An adequate response cannot simply consist of the rather feeble kinds of triangulation which presumably motivated our refusal to sign up to the statement of France, Germany and Italy when the US notified its decision to withdraw from the Paris agreement on climate change, nor the rather pusillanimous attitude we have taken to supporting a two-state solution to the problem of Palestine. Nor is—I am afraid that I agree with my noble friend Lord Ricketts—the untimely invitation to President Trump to make a state visit to London this year likely to help very much. Perhaps the Minister could elucidate what the absence of a reference to that in the gracious Speech is meant to mean. However, of course we must not fall back into that knee-jerk anti-Americanism which has so often been a feature of the left in British politics. That relationship of the United States will be of crucial value to this country long beyond the tenure in office of a particular US President.

The two themes I have mentioned criss-cross when one examines the chaos in the Middle East, a set of issues which were addressed in the report of your Lordships’ International Relations Committee, which several other speakers have mentioned and which I very much trust we shall have an opportunity to debate in full before the Summer Recess. The intemperate nature of US policy-making has been clear in the Middle East most recently in the rhetorical onslaught against Iran, which took place only two days after the very welcome re-election of President Rouhani, who said that he was committed to greater engagement with the outside world. To stoke up Saudi-Iranian rivalry is not in Britain’s interest. Plenty of criticism can be levied against some aspects of Iran’s external policy. However, I hope that we will work for a kind of modus vivendi between these two important regional powers, not organise a Thirty Years’ War between Sunni and Shia. Perhaps the Minister can say how we view the current tensions between members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which have broken out in the bans on travel between a number of Qatar’s neighbours and that emirate. That, too, does not seem to be likely to move the region into a better place.

Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2017

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 21st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, it is with some trepidation that I participate in this debate, which is after all mainly about defence policy, but I do so because in my view the international rules-based order is under greater and more existential challenge than it has ever been since our predecessors began to piece it together amid the ruins of two catastrophic world wars. I do so also because those challenges and the necessary responses to them cannot be confined to the spheres of defence and security policy; they need to go much wider than that.

To understand this, along with the need for a wider vision and response, we need only look at the period between the two world wars. Of course history does not repeat itself exactly, but it does contain plenty of lessons that we would be foolish to ignore. The world experienced then a perfect storm in which economic, political and military developments fused into a single mass which overwhelmed the totally inadequate rules and international institutions that had been established after the First World War. The 1929 stock market crash led to mass unemployment, trade protectionism and tit-for-tat monetary devaluations. These and other factors fuelled the rise of populist political parties across Europe, while the weakened democracies averted their eyes and turned inwards. Does that sound familiar? Is there any parallel with the faltering response to the financial crisis of 2008-09 and the emergence of political forces such as those which propelled Donald Trump to the White House and are fuelling the political bids of Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders and Beppe Grillo? It is not an exact parallel, of course, but it is quite enough to cause us to worry very seriously.

I will look at three pillars of our rules-based order which are under threat: the open global trading system, symbolised by the World Trade Organization; the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; and the functions of the UN with respect to international peace and security. The arrival in the White House of a President and a trade policy team who seem to regard protectionism as a path to prosperity, and bilateral trade balances as something to be eliminated by any means, including by measures that would run roughshod over WTO rules, is a challenge to all of us, and in particular to this country which has, quite rightly in my view, nailed its post-Brexit colours to the mast of being a champion of free trade. That will require more than just words. It will require standing up to the forces of mercantilism and protectionism wherever they emerge and defending the rules of the WTO. If we fail, we will end up poorer and less able to generate the resources we need to defend ourselves and our allies, in NATO or elsewhere.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty has been for a considerable time now one of the cornerstones of our rules-based world, but has been under considerable stress for some years, particularly from North Korea, which cheated on its obligations under the treaty and then withdrew, and from Iran, whose nuclear programmes gave much legitimate cause for concern. The only thing the two challenges have in common, I suggest, is that in neither case is a military response either sensible or to be anticipated or planned for, other than as an extremely last resort. There is no doubt about the immediacy and reality of the challenge from North Korea. Clearly, our own position can only be an ancillary one, but do the Government share the view that China has to be a key player in any effective response? Antagonising China, either politically or in trade policy terms, is unlikely to be the best way of securing its support.

As to Iran, we have the rather oddly acronymed JCPOA. Can the noble Earl confirm that the Government’s policy is to remain committed to that agreement and its rigorous implementation, whatever the US attitude may turn out to be? Is that policy properly understood in Washington? Is it not time, too, that we began thinking about globalising and generalising the constraints in the Iran agreement, thus extending its duration, which is rather on the short side, and ceasing to make it so Iran-specific, which makes it less attractive to Iran?

The United Nations, too, is under stress, even as it has more than 100,000 peacekeepers, both military and civilian, deployed worldwide. Often, as in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, they are the only forces that fulfil the responsibility to protect civilians—forces that the rulers of those countries are either unwilling or unable to provide. The Government’s decision to strengthen our commitments to UN peacekeeping in South Sudan and Somalia is very welcome. Can the Minister say something about the Government’s medium and long-term policies on UN peacekeeping? Is the shift in policy we have seen in the last year here to stay? Is it built in to our security strategy and destined to play a more prominent part in it than has been the case in the recent past?

Others have covered the crucial issue of NATO and the uncertainties about its deterrent capacity as a result of some of the things that the new President of the United States said during his election campaign. My neglect of that issue merely shows, I think, what an extremely wide scope for debate today has offered us and how important it is to focus on all parts of it.

Multilateral Disarmament

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord makes some very good points. Among the actions that the UK has recently been taking is work with Norway on disarmament verification, as my noble friend Lord Trefgarne referred to. We initiated the P5 process in 2009 to bring together nuclear weapons states to build the trust and confidence that I referred to. We proposed a programme of work at the conference on disarmament held in Geneva in February this year with the aim of reinvigorating the conference’s work—in fact, that was eventually blocked but we made a good attempt at it—and we continue to press for the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. So there is work that we are trying to push along.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, are the Government giving any thought to globalising and generalising some of the constraints in the agreement between Iran and the P5+1, thus building a basis on which that agreement could extend far longer than the 15 years it will currently last?

[Earl Howe]

I completely take the noble Lord’s point. It is early days to be thinking in those terms, although he is right to do so. It is encouraging that the November IAEA report to the board of governors confirmed that Iran remains compliant with the nuclear-related measures set out in the joint comprehensive plan of action. We welcome the findings of the DG’s report. We praised the IAEA for its progress and continued work on that very challenging task, but no doubt lessons and messages will emerge from that strand of work.

Counter-Daesh: Quarterly Update

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there is no doubt that Syria needs transition to a new Government able to meet the needs of the Syrian people as a whole. That is why our position on Assad is unchanged. That regime is responsible for the current crisis in Syria. The barbarity it has meted out—the barrel bombs, the chlorine, the siege tactics, the interception of medical supplies to those in need—is the main driver of the refugee crisis. We do not think that Assad can form any possible part of a future regime, and the transition has to take place by another means.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, will the Minister enlighten the House as to how many elections President Assad won without the will of the people?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord is better informed than I am of the political history of Syria. There is no doubt that Assad does not now command the support he once clearly did.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, as several noble Lords have said, this debate is taking place exactly one month before the 23 June vote on Britain’s membership of the EU. It is the most significant strategic choice that this country has faced for many decades. No one should delude themselves that it does not much matter which way the vote goes; it does. A decision to leave the EU would reverse all the tenets of British foreign policy over the past 70 years, adversely affecting relations not only with our closest European neighbours and partners but with the United States, NATO and leading members of the Commonwealth, while undermining our own capacity to play an effective and influential role in the major multilateral organisations to which we belong: the UN, the IMF and many others. So I have no hesitation about devoting my remarks to that aspect.

Every single sounding of opinion around the country comes up with a common concern, a complaint that individuals need to know more about the basic facts before they make up their minds how to vote. It is understandable that they do not have total confidence in all the facts provided by the two campaigns—all the more so when one of the leaders of the leave campaign is travelling around the country on a bus emblazoned with the figure for Britain’s contribution to the EU budget that is nearly twice the amount of our actual net contribution. That is before we come to nonsensical claims about teabags and bunches of bananas.

However, the Government, responding to requests made by Parliament, have in every case provided a large amount of factual material—to my count, six major studies on different aspects of our membership. The leave campaign’s sole response to these documents is to belittle them as dodgy dossiers, which they are not, or to say that Treasury forecasts are always wrong. These are members of the Government whose Treasury it is that has made the forecasts. It is a little odd to describe it as always wrong. That really will not do if we are to have a decent national debate on this. I fear that the fact that the former Mayor of London has now deserted history after his brush with the ghost of the Führer to futurology in today’s Daily Telegraph does not give me a lot of confidence that this debate is getting more serious.

A lot is said about what is called Project Fear, at least when the risks of leaving are raised by the remain campaign. Eurosceptics should know plenty about that, because they have been running a Project Fear of their own on pretty well everything the EU does for the past 40 years. But risk analysis must surely be part of any major policy decision of the kind the electorate is being asked to take. No business would think it responsible to take a leap in the dark without such an analysis. Of course, that has to include the risks attendant on remaining in the EU. The remain campaign has no reason to fear such an analysis and is not in a position of doing so.

Clearly there has to be—and here I do feel that some of the criticisms of the remain campaign have some force—a strong, positive side to the campaign to stay in the EU, as well as the arguments on the risks of leaving, fundamentally important as those are. Here are just a few of the positive sides with which I think all those in the remain campaign would agree. They are: competing with the common market in services—that is nearly 80% of our economy; creating a level playing field for the digital economy throughout the EU; building up an energy union and a capital markets union; switching the emphasis of the EU budget spending further towards research and innovation, at which we excel and which Europe needs; bringing freer trade negotiations with the US, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand and Mercosur to a successful conclusion; strengthening the aspects of EU security policy that are complementary to NATO’s, and working to maximise co-operation between the two organisations; ensuring that EU countries lead in implementing the UN’s 2015 sustainable development goals and the Paris climate change commitments; working more effectively with our EU partners to combat serious organised crime, including in particular terrorism, cybercrime and human trafficking; and facing up together to the challenges from Daesh and from an assertive Russia. That, surely, is quite a list—quite a bit to be getting on with, apart from those unforeseen events, so many of which we are more likely to be able to deal with and cope with effectively in concert with the other Europeans than acting on our own.

All that will be on the table in June, and much else as well: for instance, whether the electorate’s decision then will strengthen or weaken our own union within these islands—a vote to leave carried on English votes against any or all of the votes of to remain in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would, I believe, inevitably weaken our union; whether or not we will put the people of Gibraltar at risk by leaving them more exposed to Spanish unilateral action; whether or not we will undermine the Good Friday agreement in Ireland, and perhaps also the common travel area arrangements; whether or not we will increase intergenerational tensions within our own society if the older half of our population with a higher propensity to vote imposes an outcome on the younger half who will have to live a lot longer with its consequences. Well, that is plenty for one day. I just hope we get it right.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 3rd December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the topicality of the noble Earl’s debate today, coming as it does just a week after the publication of the 2015 SDSR, can surely not be in doubt. It is a delight, too, to have four maiden speeches in the debate, three of them from noble Lords for whom or with whom I have worked in the past. Not only is the debate timely, it provides an opportunity to consider the UK’s security posture at a time of greater international volatility and challenge than has been the case for many decades. Recent trends of a drift towards a new world disorder and away from the new world order which some mistakenly predicted would follow the end of the Cold War are too numerous to require listing. The Government’s commitment to,

“work with our allies and partners to strengthen, adapt and extend the rules-based international order and its institutions, enabling further participation of growing powers”,

is therefore both welcome and overdue if that drift is to be challenged and reversed. It rightly recognises the extent to which Britain’s security extends beyond what could be called the classical formulation of the defence of the realm and requires a major collective effort, if it is to be achieved.

I shall focus my remarks on chapter 5 of the SDSR, entitled “Project our global influence”, and within it on two issues—support for international peacekeeping and help to fragile states. First, in recent years, this country’s contribution to UN peacekeeping has become at best marginal, and at worst insignificant. That could be explained, even if it could not be entirely justified, by our preoccupation with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. That can no longer be so. The demand for UN peacekeepers, both military and civilian, remains as high as ever, with more than 100,000 currently deployed worldwide, and that shows no signs of abating. We cannot reasonably expect others to fill the whole of that on their own. The decision in the SDSR to double the number of military personnel we contribute to UN peacekeeping operations is therefore welcome, but I hope that the Minister can say whether the baseline for doubling is the present deployed figure or the figure including the 300 additional personnel announced by the Prime Minister in October for South Sudan and Somalia. If it is the former, I have to say that the commitment is thin gruel.

Do the Government accept that what we need to try to do is to make a real contribution not only in numbers—those well-known boots on the ground—but in the provision of more sophisticated equipment to UN peacekeeping, and more sophisticated personnel who are required if modern peacekeeping is to be effective? I refer also to things like reconnaissance drones, helicopters, intelligence capacity and many other logistical aspects of these operations. Are we prepared to contribute such items in the future?

Secondly, I refer to the commitment to spend at least 50% of our aid budget on fragile and failing states. This recognition is really welcome, and I hope that the UN and the OECD’s DAC guidelines will now take better account of the reality that you cannot do development in fragile or failing states. You have to stabilise them first and then you can do development. I hope that we can make a real success of that commitment.

Finally and in conclusion, I congratulate the Government on a review that is generally both more realistic and more action-oriented than the 2010 review. Whether it will also be more effective will depend on its implementation. In recent years, a rather wide gap has opened up between the Government’s rhetoric on international development and their actual performance. The success of this review will be determined by whether that gap can be narrowed, and in that context I welcome the outcome of last night’s debate in the other place and the decision there to authorise the extension of our military operations against IS to include its heartland in eastern Syria, a decision that I believe was morally, legally and strategically the right one to take.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 28th May 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I may begin by echoing something said by the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown. He asked how, given his background, he could possibly be averse in all respects to the use of force. How could I, given my background, possibly be averse to the message he gave us that we need an effective diplomacy?

Our new Government have been born into a more turbulent, unpredictable and unstable world than any we have experienced in recent times. They have been born into a world where Britain, acting simply on its own, is less able to defend and further its interests than has been the case in the past. We can see that the three rules-based international organisations into which we have put such trust—the UN, NATO and the European Union—are struggling to face effectively and respond to the challenges posed by that turbulent world. Add to that the unfortunate fact that up to now our own response to these challenges has, I have to say, been barely adequate. Look at our marginal involvement in the coalition against the so-called Islamic State and our self-exclusion from the inner circle of those concerting a response to Russia’s aggression against and continuing destabilisation of Ukraine. It surely is evident that this is no time to turn away from the outside world, or to be distracted to the exclusion of everything else by the debate over our place in Europe, important though the outcome of that debate will be for all Britain’s future roles in the world.

What are the principal challenges that we and our European partners and western allies face worldwide in the Middle East and on Europe’s eastern borders? Two major UN decision-making summit conferences are due to take place in the second half of this year—the first in September to set the sustainable development goals for the period ahead, and the second at the end of year in Paris to address climate change. At the first, we should indeed be well placed to play an influential role, thanks to our continuing and in my view, very welcome commitment to the UN target of 0.7% of gross national income for development aid. Perhaps the Minister could say something about the Government’s objectives at these two conferences, and also about how this House is to have a fuller opportunity to debate the prospects for both of them.

Then in 2016, a new Secretary-General of the United Nations is to be elected for five, and perhaps, if recent precedents are followed, effectively for 10 years. What is Britain, whose influence as a permanent member of the Security Council is considerable, doing to ensure that that process is more open, more transparent and less dominated by regional pre-emption than has been the case in the past? What thoughts, too, do the Government have on how to prevent the current no-go areas for the Security Council over Syria, Ukraine, and the south and east China seas from spreading, and indeed, how to reduce those no-go areas?

It is easy to throw up one’s hands in despair at the turn of events in the Middle East—easy but, I suggest, self-defeating. We surely do need to help to marshal a better response to the threats from IS. Is it not time to examine the sense of taking military action against IS in Iraq but to leave its expanding outreach in Syria completely unscathed? Secondly, we are only a month away from the deadline for completing a comprehensive agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme. Can we be assured that, despite the open criticism from Israel and the more muffled doubts expressed by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, we remain committed to a successful outcome to that negotiation as long as the purely civilian nature of Iran’s future nuclear programme can be guaranteed and, most important—more than being guaranteed—can be verified on a continuing basis?

Thirdly, even if prospects for a two-state solution in Palestine look at best discouraging, will we nevertheless persevere with what remains, I believe, the only possible long-term way of avoiding further outbreaks of hostilities? Would it not make sense, as a recent vote in the other place suggested, to buttress our support for a two-state solution by recognising Palestine? Should we not be encouraging a return to the Security Council to set out the basic parameters of a settlement in that forum and thus encourage a resumption of negotiations?

It would require a degree of optimism a bit beyond my reach to assert that the problems in Ukraine have been resolved by the Minsk II agreement in February. Nor have the wider implications of Russia’s aggressively assertive foreign policy towards its western and southern neighbours yet been met by a fully adequate response. Any such response must surely involve being ready to tighten economic sanctions if fighting intensifies in the east of Ukraine; and also to maintaining existing sanctions until every provision of Minsk II has been implemented to the full—in particular, re-establishing Ukrainian control of its eastern frontier. It requires, too, that the European Union should take effective action to stabilise and help to reform the Ukrainian economy. I do not see how we can hope to give a lead in strengthening NATO’s deterrent capability, as we should be doing, and as the Government say they wish to do, if we do not stick to the NATO 2% target for military spending which we did so much to promote. Does that mean that we cannot talk to, or even co-operate with Russia? Of course, it does not. After all, we did that throughout the Cold War period. President Putin will respect and pay heed to us only if we are ready to stand by our friends and our interests.

I have so far avoided the ever fascinating topic of the European Union. No doubt we will have ample opportunity to debate it in the weeks and months ahead when the Government bring forward legislation for a referendum that they have tabled in another place today. Suffice it to say now that every other respect of Britain’s foreign policy will be affected, for better or for worse, by the outcome on that referendum. The Prime Minister’s aim to achieve reforms in the European Union is a laudable one that I have no difficulty at all in supporting. However, if those reforms are to have any chance of success, they must be reforms that benefit the whole of the European Union; they must not just be monuments to British exceptionalism.

Defence Capabilities: EUC Report

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I begin by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and his sub-committee on this excellent and extraordinarily timely report. Let us face it: as others have said before me, the report paints a pretty gloomy picture. The financial crisis that we have been living through since 2008 and which has, alas, a long way to run, is wreaking havoc with the defence budgets of all our member states. Many of the early hopes of European defence co-operation have tended to wither on the vine.

The divisions over Libya are fresh in the mind, although I tend to feel that they are exaggerated. The German vote in the Security Council was a gross error: that is clear. Had the Germans merely voted with those authorising the operation but made it clear that they would not participate themselves, we would now be talking about a great European success in Libya. Perhaps we should not dwell on that too much.

You can add to that rather gloomy picture the point that the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, made—and I entirely agree with him—that whoever wins the American election, the Americans will not be back in Europe in force in the way that they were. The pivot towards Asia is there to stay. Romney or Obama will expect the Europeans to do more for themselves in their immediate region. We will see the Americans involved heavily in Asia and in the Middle East, although probably against their will, and involved heavily in the area around Pakistan. However, we will not see them coming and picking up the chestnuts for us in Europe if something goes wrong in our periphery.

Is Europe facing fewer security challenges? I do not really think so. If anything, there are a few more. It is always a bit difficult to read the mind of whoever is in the Kremlin—whether before the end of the Cold War or after it—but I do not believe that President Putin wishes us very well. I am quite sure that he will continue to probe the Europeans for weakness; that he will divide and rule between the Europeans if he can.

We know that the Middle East is going to present us with some pretty horrendous challenges. Syria is in a terrible mess and our performance is not brilliant, frankly—although I am not a supporter of military intervention there—and it is going to carry on giving a lot of problems, but other countries in the Middle East may well join it. We cannot be sure. We are probably living through a period of 20 years at least of great instability in the Middle East. In Mali, we are already seeing a kind of spillover from the totally desirable overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi, which led to a lot of weapons getting out into the Sahara area and a lot of bad things happening there now.

Of course, the Balkans are still not absolutely stabilised. A lot will depend on the way the European Union handles the requests for accession of all the Balkan countries and its own role in stabilising that area.

Confronted with this rather gloomy picture, there are two broad alternative policies. One is to turn in on ourselves—to accept, in a plaintive way, that the budget cuts are there, they are irreversible and we just have to do less. If we do that, and if other Europeans do that, we will become increasingly marginalised and discounted when the major security challenges are thrown up around the world; that will be to our detriment and Britain and other countries in Europe will be the losers.

The alternative is to draw some really quite difficult conclusions, one of which is that increased co-operation between the Europeans—and I do not want to get into the EU versus NATO versus whoever it may be—is no longer, in present and probable circumstances, a luxury; it is a necessity. I agree with the previous speaker that we ought to breathe life again into the European Defence Agency. We should be thinking about how we can broaden our co-operation with the French and perhaps see it as a way of including other European countries. That, undoubtedly, would be very welcome to the present French Government, who want to give a wider European cover to the whole thing, but I fear we will be held back by some kibitzing by people at the other end of the Corridor who probably do not know much of what they are talking about.

It is all the more important that we should take this second option—the constructive, positive option—because, I am afraid to say, our position in Europe is slipping, much though the Government deny this. The whole series of events surrounding the fiscal and banking union make this inevitable. It is going to be a hard struggle to achieve the safeguards we need for the single market. I am not suggesting that we should become a party to all these arrangements, but if we are to avoid the worst of all outcomes—which in my view would be the fossilisation of a two-tier Europe, with us on the lower tier, and not having much say in the shaping of policies—we must pursue the alternative, which is how to update and make more effective a variable-speed, variable-geometry Europe.

However, we cannot always be on the outside of every inner circle. That is where defence comes in as more European defence co-operation can be achieved only with this country being part of it; otherwise, it has no credibility whatever. Would it be good news for us if we were part of that? I believe it would be very good news because it would show that we were not permanently in a second tier and that there were some things such as defence and foreign policy where we were very much in the first tier. There are other things where we are in a second tier. That is inevitable and cannot be helped. I may bewail it but it cannot be helped. However, if we do not do this and we are always in the second tier, it will not be good. If we are always just reacting defensively, that will not be good either.

Therefore, I suggest that for defence policy and procurement considerations and for wider European considerations, we should have a more proactive, positive policy. However, following the exchange in the House yesterday, if we withdraw from the European Defence Agency, we can forget about that.

Defence: Trident Replacement Programme

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the purpose of the study is to help the Liberal Democrats to make the case for an alternative to the Trident system, as agreed in the coalition programme for government. I understand that the Cabinet Office is leading the review and it is being overseen by the Minister for the Armed Forces. It will report by the end of the year to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. The Secretary of State did mention it in his UQ in the other place yesterday; it was mentioned several times. On the point about Israel, we are aware of the widespread assumption that Israel possesses nuclear weapons but note that the Israeli Government have refused to confirm this.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, what consideration has been given to—

[Lord Gilbert]

My Lords, is it not the case that, in order to be credible, any deterrent has to be simultaneously invulnerable and undetectable? That is clearly not the case with any Cruise system even if it is supersonic—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I do not want to be drawn into an argument with my colleagues but I can say that the first duty of any Government is to ensure the security of their people. The nuclear deterrent provides the ultimate guarantee of our national security, and for the past 42 years the Royal Navy has successfully operated continuous deterrent patrols to ensure that. I pay tribute to the crews and support staff who ensure the continued success of deterrent operations and to the families of all those personnel, many of whom are regularly away from home for long periods.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, what consideration are the Government giving, during the clearly lengthy period between now and the main gate decision on Trident, to making the nuclear dimension of our security posture less prominent than it was during the Cold War and to pursuing measures to reduce both our alert status and those of other nuclear weapon states?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, this will be one of the issues that the alternative study overseen by my colleague, the Armed Forces Minister, will be looking at. As I said earlier, the study will report to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister by the end of this year.