Scotland: Devolution Commission

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Wednesday 22nd October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, obviously everyone wants the outcome to be consistent with the referendum outcome and in the interests of the people of Scotland. The noble Lord, Lord Smith, has already met the individual parties and said that he believes there is a will among them to reach agreement. I hope so and that it will be done in good faith.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

Was the Minister actually saying, in answer to an earlier question, that while it would be fine to create two categories of MP by withdrawing voting rights on certain matters from MPs from Scotland, there would be no question whatever of having two categories of Peer—a matter in which he would have a direct interest? That sounds to me suspiciously like wanting to have your cake and eat it. Surely, the only way that one can sustain a position of equality across the United Kingdom is to say no to any suggestion that there should be two categories of voting rights, either for MPs in the House of Commons or Peers here. Starting to have two categories of Member would be to take a very dangerous route towards the break-up of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I think I was answering very directly the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. I made the self-evident point that there was a difference between people elected to represent a territorial part of the country and Peers of the United Kingdom. However, the so-called West Lothian question is a live issue that has been around for far longer than even Mr Tam Dalyell. A number of proposals have been put forward, including comprehensive proposals from the McKay commission. I know that my right honourable friend Kenneth Clarke chaired a commission for the Conservative Party, and my right honourable friend David Laws has put forward ideas on behalf of my own party. It is important that these issues are addressed. The Prime Minister set up a committee under the chairmanship of William Hague to look at this issue, among other things, and I very much hope that it can proceed on a cross-party basis, if possible.

Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Thursday 15th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

Perhaps I may ask about a matter of significance to this Parliament. Will the Minister clarify whether there will be just five or six days between Committee and Report on the Bill? The noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, is in his place, and he will know that the Leader’s report, which he commissioned, recommended very strongly that the minimum intervals between stages of Bills should be respected. As the House will remember, they were abused at the time of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill, and I would be troubled—as the House should be—if they are being abused again now.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I hope that I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that this is not an abuse. The matter was agreed because we were meeting a legitimate concern and expectation, expressed by a number of your Lordships across the House, that we should defer some sittings of the Committee until such time as the United Kingdom Government’s consultation had concluded. That was welcomed at the time; and because of that, the timescales inevitably had to be short.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, if I might clarify I think I said that that was one suggestion put forward by the Constitution Committee. It said that that might be one of the occasions that would trigger a referendum but it is certainly not the policy of this Government to have a referendum on Scottish independence. The Prime Minister has made it clear that that would be a matter for the Scottish Parliament. Let me make that point very clear: it was one of the cases suggested by the Constitution Committee as, possibly, reaching that threshold. This illustrates the point that these are inevitably subjective issues. Any Government who wished to make a distinction about fundamental significance would find that that could vary from Government to Government. However, I undertake that the comments made by your Lordships will be fed back, and I am sure that there will be other occasions when the issue of referendums is discussed. A number of colleagues who talked generally about referendums did not necessarily think that the subject of fixed-term Parliaments lent itself to a referendum. Against that background, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I am not just being polite when I say that I am grateful to everyone who has taken part in this short—well, not so short—debate. I was straightforward with the House in saying that I was introducing the amendment not with a view to the House reaching a decision on it, but because I felt that it was important that the House should have an opportunity to reflect on the fact that a major referendum had taken place on a major constitutional issue and that lessons could be learnt.

Many people have contributed; there have been nine contributions. The Minister said at the end, as I was going to ask him to do, that he would take the views that had been expressed back to his colleagues. Normally it is mere politeness to say that but I really would recommend him to do so; he does not have to include my remarks, but if he includes the other nine contributions in the evidence that he takes back to his colleagues, it might even make them think again about this whole, not overly related programme of constitutional reform on which the Government seem to have embarked.

The contributions were terrific. It is impossible to summarise them, although it is fair to say that there was widespread concern about the way in which these constitutional changes are being taken through Parliament without in all or any cases, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, proper pre-legislative scrutiny, proper consultation with the public or any proper attempt to get widespread agreement before any move is made. I hope that some lessons have been learnt from that.

I have to respond particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Newton, who chided the previous Labour Government for the various constitutional changes that we made. I am not sure that I need quite the same defence that I was preparing; I was amazed when it was pointed out how many referenda that there had been on various aspects of the previous Labour Government’s constitutional reforms. I say to him that it is a different situation when a Government are returned with the clearest possible manifesto commitment—in Scotland and Wales particularly, there is absolute clarity about the commitment there—and a large majority.

I can tell the noble Lord, in the privacy of this meeting, that there were some constitutional changes that we could seriously have done without; I mention in passing the decision to change the electoral system for the European Parliament from first past the post to proportional representation. I am even more convinced now that, had that been put to the public rather than unilaterally decided by Parliament, we should have a splendid first past the post system for the European elections as well.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, this is a very simple amendment with a very simple objective which I hope the Government will be able to accept. As the House knows, I find the Bill entirely unattractive and wish that we were simply getting rid of it, but if we are to have a Bill where there are fixed five-year Parliaments, then it follows, as night follows day, that there ought to be a rule governing the number of Sessions within the fixed five years.

It is very odd trying to put our constitution into a straitjacket, but the Government seem intent on doing so. This amendment was considered in Committee but not very satisfactory answers were given. The reason I have been inspired to table it is that whereas we normally know that a parliamentary Session will last about a year—with the exception of the first year of a Parliament, which can frequently be 18 months, from, say, May in one year until November the following year—I am sorry to say that this Government have unilaterally decided that there would be a two-year Session to begin this Parliament.

If we were following the normal conventions of our democracy then we would not be debating the Report stage of a Bill now, we would be having a Queen’s Speech. It is a year since the general election and that is the normal length of a Session of Parliament. The Government have already told us that the next general election will be in May 2015, so it seems an incredibly simple proposition that there should be five Sessions of one year each. Normally it would be completely unnecessary for me or anyone else to move an amendment requiring that this should be the case, but the Government have broken the normal rules. I do not know where the decision to have a two-year Session came from. I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, what consultation the Government had with the Opposition or anyone else when they decided that we should have a two-year Session of Parliament.

As we all know, the sessional discipline is part of the delicate balance between Government and Opposition. Oppositions get stronger, in a sense, as the Session progresses because the Government know that they are up against the deadline of a Queen’s Speech; and we have had, quite properly, to establish precise mechanisms to enable a Bill to be carried over from one Session to the next. I say “quite properly” because we have all recognised in the past—although apparently not now—that it would be quite wrong for a Government simply to be able to extend at their convenience the periods between Queen’s Speeches.

As I say, I do not like translating conventions into rules, but it is necessary in this case. Why are we not having a Queen’s Speech now? Why are the Government not bringing the first year of this Parliament to a conclusion in the normal way, after 12 months, making concessions on Bills—which is what Governments do towards the end of a Session—and then preparing for the next statement of the Government’s policies and legislative objectives, which of course is what we get with a new Queen’s Speech? If the Government are intent on having five years after five years after five years ad infinitum—although I am obviously delighted with the amendment that has been passed that will require any new Government to think again about this—what could conceivably be the objection to insisting in this legislation, which provides us with the opportunity, that there should be a minimum of five Sessions in a five-year Parliament?

I looked in vain, having reread the Committee stage when this was discussed, but no one spoke against it except the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace. Maybe it was wishful thinking on my part, but I got the feeling that he was not wildly enthusiastic about speaking against it. The only objections that he offered were that this could present problems should there be a Dissolution of Parliament under the terms of this legislation in less than five years. We all know that that is a possibility; again, it is a part of the Bill that not many of us like, but there are precise provisions for saying how Parliaments can be of a period of less than five years. If the Government have found the mechanism for dealing with a Parliament that lasts less than five years, surely it is not difficult to find a mechanism for dealing with the consequences for parliamentary Sessions. It is unfortunate that we have to go down this road but, if we have, it cannot be beyond the skill of parliamentary draftsmen to deal with that objection.

The only other case that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, offered in Committee comes in col. 526 of Hansard on 21 March. He explained why the Government decided that it would be not a one-year Session but a two-year Session; it was announced unilaterally to Parliament last September without consultation, as far as I know—although I would be delighted to be proved wrong in that respect. The explanation that was given was as follows:

“An announcement was made in September, which would normally have been between a third and half way through the Session”.

He is referring to the last Session, which should have concluded this May, as I have suggested.

“There was an option to truncate the Session about now”—

he was speaking in March—

“but it was thought that the best thing to do was to go to next year”.

The Minister is very precise with words; he is a lawyer and is careful what he says. It is not exactly truncating a Session to suggest that it should be for a year, however. It really is a fairly loose use of the word.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

Does the noble Lord not recall that the normal practice has been for the first Session after a May election—indeed, I think that it happened with almost every Government elected when Mr Blair was Prime Minister—to last not a year but until the following autumn? So when I say truncated, I mean that there would not normally have been a Queen’s Speech this May; it would still have been in November. The first Session would probably have gone 18 months, so to have had a Queen’s Speech in March or April would have been to truncate the normal practice after a May general election.

[Lord Grocott]

The problem with that argument is that, yes, it is true that if the election is in May then normally you have the Queen’s Speech the following year, in November. But if there is an election in October—and one that I vividly remember is the one in October 1974, because it was when the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, went out and I came in—the Queen’s Speech is the following November. The convention is that the Queen’s Speech is in November and if the sequence of elections means that that does not happen, it is quite right that there is a long Session of 18 months. There is a bit of a case for that, I suppose; all Governments are wild with enthusiasm when they come in and have lots of exciting things to propose, such as Fixed-term Parliament Bills, and so on. So it goes for a longish Session. But this was a choice for the Government, once they had decided that there would be a five-year Parliament, between having a year Session or a two-year Session. If he thinks there is not much to choose between an 18-month Session, which as he rightly says obtains when there is a May election, and a two-year Session, let me say that it would have been heaven to me as Chief Whip to have had a two-year Session. There is no pressure on you and no trouble; you can spend as long as you like on Committee and Report stages, and so on. So I do not think that that argument held up very well.

I do not suggest evil intent on the part of the Minister or anyone else in the Government in this respect at all. I am simply saying that not much thought went into what was in fact a quite substantial shift of power between Government and Opposition. As I said, that is a pretty delicate matter in our parliamentary procedures in both Houses, because it shifted the balance of power substantially in favour of the Government. I thought that the Minister really gave the game away in this second sentence:

“There was an option to truncate the Session about now, but it was thought that the best thing to do was to go to next year”.—[Official Report, 21/3/11; col. 526.]

The question from where I am standing is: the best thing to do for whom? In whose interest was it unilaterally to determine that there should be a two-year Session?

I simply put two questions to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace. First, was there any consultation through the normal channels about the Government's decision unilaterally to decide, for the first time in the past 30 or 40 years—I am sure that the historians could go much further—on a two-year Session which is massively to the Government’s advantage? Secondly, I really would like to know, once it was determined to be the “best thing to do”, in whose interest the decision was thought to be made. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for affording the House a further opportunity to consider and scrutinise this point, which, as has been indicated, he first raised in Committee. At that point I indicated that the two-year Session that we are currently in was intended as a transitional situation so that we could get into a position where we had 12-month parliamentary Sessions that fitted in, should Parliament pass a fixed-term Parliament Act.

I draw your Lordships’ attention to the Written Ministerial Statement made by my right honourable friend the Leader of the other place, Sir George Young, on 23 March. He reiterated the Government’s decision to extend the current Session of Parliament to spring 2012,

“in order to ensure a smooth transition towards five, 12-month Sessions over a Parliament, which would be a beneficial consequence of Parliament agreeing the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill”.—[Official Report, Commons, 23/3/11; col. 57WS.]

I hope that the House and the noble Lord will be assured that it is our intention that there should normally be five Sessions in a five-year Parliament. While the expectation is that future Sessions will last for 12 months, it remains inappropriate to enshrine that in statute; indeed, I think that I understood the noble Lord himself to indicate that he would prefer that working practices and conventions were not enshrined in statute. It is our intention that in future Parliaments there should be five 12-month Sessions.

In the Bill we have sought to do only what is necessary to establish fixed-term Parliaments for the United Kingdom. I am not convinced that the case has been made for legislating for the number of Sessions. The Bill does not abolish the prerogative power to prorogue Parliament, which will continue to be used to set parliamentary Sessions, nor does the Bill affect the powers of each House to adjourn. It is worth noting that the Constitution Committee has endorsed our decision not to abolish the prerogative power to prorogue.

Future Sessions after this one will last for only 12 months. The noble Lord asked me about the points that I made in Committee. When I talked about truncating this Session, that was on the basis that, as he acknowledged, when elections have been held in May or June it has been customary for that first Session to continue through to the following October or November. To have had a Queen’s Speech around now would therefore have meant truncating what had been expected at the outset.

I have made it clear that the decision to go for two years and thereafter to have 12-monthly Sessions was taken not in May last year but at a later stage. I am not aware that there was any consultation—I accept that criticism—but this was intended to be a transitional measure. By that stage, the Government’s legislative programme had been announced and it would have been very difficult if we had moved immediately to a 12-month Session for the first Session, although that could have been done if it had been thought about at the outset. I hope that the House will accept that that is the purpose of this being a two-year Session. It is not intended that this should be repeated. My right honourable friend the Leader of the other place has indicated that it would now be our intention to move to five 12-month Sessions in a Parliament.

I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Norton about this always being in the interests of Parliament. My experience in your Lordships’ House in the run-up to the most recent general election is that, with the final Session starting in November and finishing in March in order to accommodate a May election, we have tended to have a short Session that I do not believe allows proper scrutiny of legislation. This led to a very unfortunate situation in the wash-up where large parts of Bills were ditched, some of which are now on the statute book but certainly did not have the kind of scrutiny that we would normally expect. Having five 12-month Sessions will allow for proper planning of legislation. While it would be unwise to say that there will never be any kind of wash-up at the end of the final Session, one hopes that there will be far less than has been the case hitherto. One of the advantages of a fixed-term Parliament is that it will be possible to plan a legislative programme in a way that will not lead to these log-jams at the end, when much legislation is virtually nodded through.

The decision having been taken to move to fixed-term Parliaments, and since we seem—for better or worse—to have moved into a situation where elections are held in May, the Bill provides for elections in May. Therefore, it makes sense that we should have annual May-to-May Sessions. I repeat: the current two-year Session is a transition. No doubt what we gain here is that there is only a finite amount of legislative time in the Parliament as a whole if it lasts for five years. It would not be appropriate to put that in the statute. I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving me an opportunity to reiterate the position and to flag up what my right honourable friend the Leader of the other place has said on this matter. With these reassurances, I hope the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Grocott]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for that response. He simply holds a fundamental view on the constitution. So do I, but it is a different one. He is comfortable with a legislative programme being neatly sliced and organised over a fixed-term Parliament, whereas I have been straightforward with the House in saying that I am not at all comfortable with that. I like the flexibility that normally obtains with our parliamentary system. I do not even have the problem that he has with the last Session of a four-year Parliament quite frequently being a five or six-month pre-election Session. All that the Bill will do is make sure that it is a 12-month pre-election Session instead of a six-month pre-election Session. It will also lead to a lot of uncertainty.

I was straightforward with the House in saying that I was, in some respects, very uncomfortable with my own amendment. For the reasons I have already set out, I do not like putting our constitution in any more of a straitjacket than it needs to be. I am very grateful for the contributions that have been made. As ever, I find myself agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, on most things, particularly his reference to the 1945 to 1950 Labour Government having been the greatest Labour Government. I would go marginally further and say that it was the greatest peacetime Government in the history of this country; there is only a word’s difference between us.

I was taken with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton. I agree with him that maybe a year is not necessarily the best period. Maybe it is worth discussing that. I strongly believe in the convention that we have. If a Government are unable to contain their legislative programme within an agreed period of time, there should be an agreement by either House to carry a Bill over from one Session to the next only after the most rigorous tests. However, I take the noble Lord’s point. I must admit that I was stopped in my tracks by my noble friend, who reminded me that it was against the philosophy of several of us to try to put the proceedings of this Parliament into too strong a legislative framework.

The point has been made, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has acknowledged. It is written in blood in Hansard that there will be 12-month Sessions for the remainder of this Parliament until the happy day when it comes to a conclusion and a Labour Government can repeal the whole of this legislation. In light of what has been said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That the Report be now received.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, before we consider the Report of the Bill, I should like to put a couple of points to the Minister. We are about to embark on a major constitutional reform at Report, but since we considered the Bill in Committee, a matter of considerable constitutional significance has taken place. That is to say, there was a referendum on the alternative vote system which, I am delighted to say, was overwhelmingly defeated by the British public—including, I might say, a 72 per cent no vote in Telford and a Labour-control gain from the Conservatives in Telford.

It is normal, if significant national events occur after Committee or between any stages of the Bill, that there be some reaction and, perhaps, amendments to the Bill. I see the Minister looking a little startled and, I am sure, thinking, “What is the significance of the referendum to this Bill?”.

I put it to him that there is considerable significance. Many of us on this side of the House spent a lot of time, when we debated the Bill that set up the referendum, arguing strongly that this was not an issue that the British public wanted put to them in a referendum, and that it was certainly not at the top of their list of priorities. I suggest that the read-across ought to be that the Government, rather than concentrating on constitutional Bills for which there seems to be very little public support, should concentrate on bread and butter issues.

The Deputy Prime Minister has repeatedly said that the three Bills that we will consider—the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, the constituency boundaries and referendum Bill, which we have already considered, and the Bill to reform the House of Lords—are part of the greatest reform package since 1832. Therefore, if one plank is shown to be fallible, one would assume that, even in the view of the Deputy Prime Minister, other parts would be as well. I do not know what the Minister's experience was when he canvassed, but after the canvassing that I did my judgment is that there is as little public support for, or interest in, the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill—and I predict the same for the Bill to abolish the House of Lords and replace it with a Senate—as the yes campaign garnered in the referendum.

I will put two questions to the Minister. First, what is the urgency to consider the Bill on Report, in particular as the Government have decided very wisely that a period of three months’ reflection is sensible between Committee and Report for the health Bill? That is a welcome development and—I think the Minister will agree—a clear precedent for doing a similar thing with this major constitutional Bill. Secondly, does the Minister, with his long political experience, have any grounds for thinking—perhaps I have missed something—that there is strong public demand for the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill and for the Bill to abolish the House of Lords in its present form? If he cannot answer those questions reasonably positively, it would make sense to have a period of reflection before we go on with constitutional Bills in which there is no public interest and for which there is no public support.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, there would not necessarily be another 14-day period triggered by the first one. Subject to that, the noble and learned Lord’s analysis is absolutely correct. If someone else sought to form a Government and did not win a vote of no confidence, that would lead to an election if no other Government were then formed within 14 days.

I think there is agreement, surprising though it may seem. However, there are two other possible outcomes: that there is a Dissolution leading to an election, or another Government could be formed, the 1924 example being a case in point. As I said, the 14 days is a matter of judgment, but it does provide for a period for that second outcome of another Government being formed to actually happen. We have debated this issue already and we are due for another debate on an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, on whether 14 days is right. However, the provision does allow for a period for that to happen and, if it does not happen, for us to proceed to an election.

[Lord Grocott]

Can the noble and learned Lord answer this question? It has been raised on a number of occasions but I have never heard a specific answer to it. Under the Bill, if the Liberal Democrats decide at some time in the next four years that they cannot support the present Government, the Government lose a motion of no confidence and, during the subsequent 14 days, the Liberal Democrats decide to support the Labour Party—which would not give many of us a great deal of joy—an entirely new Government could be formed without any reference to the British people whatsoever. Is that the position?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It is a very hypothetical situation. Any new Government, as the noble Lord suggests, would have to be subject to a positive vote of confidence. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, says that they would get it. That does not necessarily follow because clearly the two parties do not command a majority in the House of Commons. It is hypothetical but, if the other Government were formed, possibly involving the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party, and it commanded the confidence of the House of Commons, which is crucial, the fixed term would continue to its natural conclusion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I apologise. I had presumed that there had been a vote of no confidence in what would then have been a Conservative minority Government if the Liberal Democrats had left it. In that case a new Government would have had to be formed and there would have to have been a vote of confidence. I am sure that a new Government formed in that way would have to have a Queen’s Speech, which would trigger a potential confidence motion, and if they won that they would continue to govern. As my noble friend said, if an Administration have the support and the confidence of a majority in the other place, they can govern. I apologise if I misinterpreted the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. I presumed that there had been a motion of no confidence, and that may not have been part of the hypothesis that he put. However, the new Government would be susceptible to a vote of no confidence if they did not have a majority and could not command the confidence of the House. Therefore the procedures in this Bill would then be triggered; otherwise it is as the noble Baroness says.

[Lord Grocott]

If this game of musical parties were to occur—more specifically, if the Liberal Democrats were to decide which party they wanted to operate with—it would be very difficult for Mr Clegg to continue his argument that this was reconnecting Parliament with the public.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

If that was the scenario—a purely hypothetical one—I think my party would have a challenging time making the argument as to why things had changed. However, I do not suppose for a moment that the noble Lord—who probably was in the Commons in 1977—complained too much about an arrangement falling short of a coalition with the then Liberal Party, which actually sustained a Labour Government in power. Obviously the Liberal Party had to answer to the electorate for what it did then, and that is the political reality. These things are all considered in a political context. There is the political reality again, taking the point made by the noble and learned Lord, that if a Prime Minister of the day sought to try and abuse or contrive a vote of no confidence, that would be judged in a political context. It may be thought in some circumstances that it was right to do so, in others that it was duplicitous; the ultimate determination of whether it was right or wrong is one for the electorate, and so it should be.

The period in my noble friend’s amendment is 28 days. He indicated that he took it from the arrangements that had been made for Scotland and Wales in the event of a resignation of a First Minister. There are sufficient differences in the position between the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the United Kingdom Parliament that would make 28 days an inappropriate period. That is why we have exercised our judgment and said in the Bill that 14 days is more appropriate.

The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, would provide that an early general election could be triggered where the Prime Minister has resigned and 14 days have elapsed without the House of Commons passing a motion expressing confidence in a Government. Again, my point would be that in establishing fixed terms, we are seeking to deny the Executive their ability to decide if and when there should be an election. This amendment places one of the triggers for an early Dissolution within the hands of a Prime Minister. That is the problem which we would have with it. The noble Lord mentioned 1951 but it is generally accepted—indeed, I think Mr Jack Straw accepted this on Second Reading—that the circumstances there would almost certainly have triggered the two-thirds majority for Dissolution, because there was common ground that an election should take place. The problem with the noble Lord’s amendment, as I indicated, is that in an effort to try and take away the power from the Executive and put it into the hands of Parliament, it would return it to the Prime Minister.

However, subject to what I said in my opening remarks in response to the constructive point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and in wishing to look at the important contributions that have been made, I certainly intend to reflect on what has been said in this debate and in earlier debates on the same subject. I have no doubt whatsoever that these matters will be returned to on Report but I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

This legislation is having ample legislative scrutiny and I suspect that in times to come we will move towards having much more pre-legislative scrutiny. That is why I argue for five-year fixed terms; there will be more opportunity for pre-legislative scrutiny as well as legislative scrutiny. I simply make the point that to truncate one Session into two or three months would not be sensible. Future Sessions will last for only 12 months. What is happening in this Session is a one-off adjustment so we can get into the pattern of spring to spring Sessions that would fit the election timetable of fixed-term Parliaments with elections in May. For these reasons, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, is getting tired or whether I am. He has ample reason for getting tired because he has been heroic as the only Minister dealing with this vital constitutional Bill. However, I simply did not understand what he said. We had a general election in May last year and he said that in order to adjust to the situation where we know the date of the next general election, which will be five years from last May, the length of this Session of Parliament had to be adjusted to accommodate that. I do not understand that argument.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving me an opportunity to explain it. It was clear from the comments made by the Deputy Leader of the other place in May of last year that the decision to extend the Session to spring 2012 was not made in the early days. The working assumption was that we would go forward as we normally do after an election in May and have the first Session running through to the following October or November. It is not giving away any state secrets to say that that was the assumption. We then considered whether it was better to move to a situation where, if we were going to have fixed-term Parliaments, the Sessions should run annually, May to May. An announcement was made in September, which would normally have been between a third and half way through the Session. There was an option to truncate the Session about now, but it was thought that the best thing to do was to go to next year. There is nothing sinister in that; we were totally open. However, this is a one-off change and from next year, Sessions will go from May to May. That is the right way to proceed. I hope the noble Lord will accept that there was nothing sinister in this, but that it was an adjustment made in-year, given that the original expectation was to go through until the autumn of this year.

[Lord Grocott]

I am not saying that it is sinister; I am just saying that it is illogical. If the Government decided in those five days in May that there were to be five-year fixed-term Parliaments, why was it not plain as a pikestaff that in normal circumstances that would mean five annual Sessions? No adjustment was required. A year would take you to the following May, then the May after that and so on. I do not need to go through it. With respect, it seems obvious to everyone in the House apart from the Minister that that is the logic of a five-year Parliament.

I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contributions, which have been 100 per cent on the side of those who agree with the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

We did not, in those five days in May, think about moving from one year to one year to one year. That is the simple answer and I hope that the noble Lord will accept it at face value.

[Lord Grocott]

Of course I accept that and I shall not labour it further if the Minister assures me that the coalition was not going to tamper with that aspect of our constitution. However, I emphasise the sheer inconsistency of rejecting this amendment when the whole rationale—if there is one, although I doubt it as every day passes—of the Government’s comprehensive constitutional reform programme is to provide a degree of predictability and take away powers from the Executive. My amendment simply tests the Government’s sincerity and commitment to that by requiring them to correct their very inadequate and unsatisfactory decision unilaterally to make it much easier for the Government to legislate.

I fear that there is a tendency by the Minister—it is understandable when you are taking a complicated and important Bill such as this through the House on your own—to assume that, if any amendment is put down, particularly by the opposition Benches, the duty of the people in the Box is to find reasons for saying no to it. If the Minister were to put a cold towel over his head and think in as dispassionate a way as he is allowed—I do not mean “allowed” in any sense other than that this Government seem to be totally locked into their constitutional reform programmes, which do not seem to be thought out in a coherent way—he would come to the conclusion that, once the deal had been sealed between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, there would be no flexibility on that Bench to make any adjustments whatever.

Before I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, perhaps I may appeal to the Minister to tell those of a higher pay grade that this really is a sensible proposal, which, so far as we have tested the opinion of the Committee, has 100 per cent support from everyone but the Government, and that, if they are to be consistent in their principles, about which, as I said, I am not thrilled, they really ought to see the logic and sense of having fixed annual Sessions within five-year fixed Parliaments. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Tempting though the honeyed words of the noble Lord are—that seems to be the phrase of the night—he knows full well that it would be wrong of me to anticipate a hypothetical situation regarding that committee other than to confirm that it is proposed that there will be a Joint Committee to carry out pre-legislative scrutiny. It would be wrong for me to speculate on what that committee will propose, because that is some way down the track, or what the Government’s response would be.

My noble friend Lord Marks indicated that the previous Government brought forward legislation that fundamentally changed the relationship between the judiciary, the Executive and Parliament, and did so without a referendum. That might be thought to be a far more fundamental and far-reaching constitutional reform than the one we are considering. With the exception of the proposed referendum on the alternative vote, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, introduced in this House before the wash-up, had a plethora of constitutional measures, none of which, other than the AV referendum, sought to have a referendum attached to it. While I take on board the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the Constitution Committee’s consideration and view on this Bill, the committee did not, as he confirmed, recommend that there should be a referendum. If one reads the Constitution Committee report from the previous Session, when I was a member, one detects a great reluctance to go down the route of referendums—or referenda, in deference to my noble friend Lord Cormack.

The items on the list read out by my noble friend Lord Marks, including the abolition of the monarchy and the secession of one of the nations from the United Kingdom, are of a different order from what is proposed in the Bill. This country is, after all, governed by a system of representative democracy in the other place. We in Parliament are basically entrusted with the power to make important decisions on behalf of the people of this country and, in the other place, by the people who are elected to make these decisions as representatives of the people. There must be an exceptional reason to ask people a direct question in a referendum, and I do not believe that the case has been made this evening for that exceptional high threshold to have been reached in respect of the Bill. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I really am grateful for the contributions that have been made to this debate, not least because, as I said at the beginning, I felt that I needed to apologise to the Committee for mentioning the word “referendum”. It seems that there is still a fair degree of enthusiasm for talking about it now.

I will not use the term “honeyed words”, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, always puts together a strong argument. I must say, however, he was on pretty weak ground when he tried to suggest that it was not the Prime Minister who decided that the next general election will be on 7 May 2015. No less an authority than his own dear leader said:

“We have a Prime Minister who is the first in history to relinquish the right to set the date of the general election”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/10; col. 622.]

Who did set the date of 7 May 2015? If it was not the Prime Minister, who was it? That decision was quite clearly made by this Prime Minister, and the only rights he is relinquishing are those of future Prime Ministers. I suggest taking the Denis Healey advice on that one—when in a hole, stop digging. The Prime Minister made his decision, with the Deputy Prime Minister, for the understandable political reason that they are in a fragile political situation following the general election and they had best try to bank five years in the job rather than risk their term being foreshortened. I really cannot put it any more strongly than that.

The noble and learned Lord suggested—and this may or may not be true; this is, by definition, something that cannot be demonstrated conclusively—that there might have been a few more general elections than I said since the Second World War if the provisions of this Bill had been in operation. He suggested that there might have been scenarios in which a general election would have been triggered according to the provisions that deal with that. I find that argument pretty unconvincing. I am trying to imagine a scenario in the House of Commons when two-thirds of the Members—that means the whole of the governing party and a substantial number of opposition party members—were cheerfully voting together to charge to the polls. It is very difficult to imagine.

The only time when an election would have been triggered under the provisions of this Bill was in 1979, when the Government lost a vote of confidence. I will not repeat too much of what was said on Second Reading, but that seems to have been the perfect operation of our constitutional arrangements. It was beyond improvement. Why on earth we need to start defining that kind of thing in legislation is beyond me. It was a magnificent occasion although, from my perspective, it was also a magnificent defeat. It was the constitution working as it should have done, and we only diminish the constitution by these provisions. But we will come to that later.

I am encouraged by a number of the contributions to this debate that were, on balance, more in favour of acknowledging that this is a fundamental change. Having fewer general elections weakens the electorate—surely we can agree on that. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, as ever, put forward an interesting tangential view. I agree with him that perhaps the electorate would not give the answer to the question, “How many elections do you want?”, that we might assume they would. They might decide, “We can’t be bothered with another blooming election for quite a few years now”. That is quite possible. However, I certainly think that they should have, as my noble friend said, the right to decide whether, instead of having an election every three years and 10 months on average, there should be one every five years. That, surely, is a fundamental constitutional change. I do not want to misrepresent what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, but I think that he as good as said that, as did a number of other speakers.

I realise that there is a weakness in my amendment, which is what my noble friend Lady Hayter said I might say. It was a pity that she did not go to New Zealand earlier because I would have loved to have heard her views of what the people there felt about changing their electoral system from first past the post and whether it had brought undiminished joy and happiness in the way that people who argue for proportional representation suggest.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

We need to address the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, which as ever was entirely valid, about the extent to which we all tend to cover our party advantage with the cloak of great constitutional principle. That is obviously a criticism that we need to take seriously. The way in which to leaven that a little is to ask ourselves, whichever side of the argument we are on, whether we would take the same position of “principle” if we were on the other side of the House. I readily ask that question of myself, having spent a fair chunk of my parliamentary life in government—not as a Minister but in supporting the Government—and a fair chunk in opposition. If I find, as we all do from time to time, that I am in danger of adopting different positions in government and in opposition—which I must say I have seen to be spectacularly the case with one or two who are now in government—we ought to ask whether it was a great constitutional principle or party advantage. I try to test that myself and I have no doubt that I frequently fail, as I freely admit that I do not readily support a constitutional principle that I know would damage the Labour Party. That is where I am.

However, I ask the Government whether, if there were a Labour majority of one after the next general election, which they want to be in 2015, would they with the same passionate, principled enthusiasm say that it is essential that that Government remained in power for five years? That is the question the Government need to ask themselves. If they can say with certainty and conviction that the answer is yes, then obviously I will accept their argument and their integrity on that basis and will live with it, but I think they will find that a pretty tricky question to answer.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, again this amendment has stimulated an interesting debate, some of which goes into the general principles of fixed-terms Parliaments and some of which foreshadows the later debate we will have on the figure of four or five years. The amendment would omit the date of 7 May 2015 and provide instead that the next parliamentary general election should be held within a range of four to five years after the previous general election. In other words, we would be looking at an election held no earlier than 6 May 2014 and no later than 6 May 2015.

As my noble friend Lord Tyler very succinctly put it, that drives a coach and horses through the whole concept of a fixed-term Parliament because it would put back into the hands of the Prime Minister the option of choosing the date of the election which those of us who have supported the concept of fixed-term Parliaments want to move away from. I say to my noble friend Lord Cormack that it would quite easily be resolved because the Prime Minister could do so only if he had the agreement of the Deputy Prime Minister. It would be in the very circumstances where the Deputy Prime Minister and the Prime Minister fell out that the chances would be that the Prime Minister would want that option—the circumstances perhaps more graphically, from a literary perspective, expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn. As my noble friend Lady Stowell said, the important point about fixed-term Parliaments is that the Government of the day have to face the electorate on a predetermined date regardless of the prevailing political circumstances.

Asquith was quoted. I have read this quote several times, and I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, did quote him because it gave us the benefit of the intervention by my noble friend Lord Brooke. We can have a quite legitimate debate about what Mr Asquith was saying on 21 February 1911. He said that reducing the Parliament from seven years, as it previously was, to five years would,

“probably amount in practice to an actual legislative working term of four years”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/2/1911; col. 1749.]

He did not say that the term would be four years, but that legislative working term would be four years. That reflects the comments referred to by my noble friend Lady Stowell that were made by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, at Second Reading. I readily concede that he has misgivings about the idea of fixed-term Parliaments, but he said that if we have them, he prefers five years rather than four years because:

“Even with a term of five years, that shadow extends over the last year of the term and tends to reduce to no more than four years the period during which government policy-making and parliamentary debate can effectively be pursued without too much looking over the shoulder at electoral considerations”.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; col. 971.].

His concern is that if we have a four-year fixed term, it would kick in at the end of three years. Obviously, if we are going to have even more prelegislative scrutiny in the first year, that shrinks the time available to Governments to deliver their programme.

My noble friend Lord Norton, the noble Lord, Lord Martin, and others have indicated that our recent experience of Governments who have gone for a fifth year has not necessarily always been happy. In many ways, that almost makes the point. The only reason those Governments limped on during the fifth year was that it was not propitious or opportunistic for the Prime Minister of the day to call an election after four years because he thought he was going to lose. If you have a five-year fixed term, clearly Governments can plan for those five years. It may well be that they can do more prelegislative scrutiny in the first year. There will inevitably be an election looming at the end of the fifth year, but you are more likely to get proper planning for five years and a Government not having to go for the fifth year because they do not think it opportune to go at the end of four years.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Thursday 20th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

No, I think that we have heard quite a bit on this matter. I turn now to the other capital city, Edinburgh, which was referred to by the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Watson of Invergowrie, and indeed, with due deference to his native home, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, declared his interest as a supporter of Heart of Midlothian Football Club—perhaps he just took it that it is a well known fact. If the additional five constituencies all contained in the Edinburgh council area were to be excepted, which would be the consequence of the amendment, from the 5 per cent above or below the rule, they would be projected to diverge on average from the electoral quota by just over 12,300 electors—that is, just over 16 per cent. Again, I do not think that that ties in with the concept of fairness and equal votes, as we believe that constituencies should be broadly of equal size.

I do not believe that there are the geographical challenges that we find in the two constituencies that have been preserved. I know Edinburgh reasonably well and I do not think that there are geographical challenges there that would make it particularly difficult for MPs to see their constituents or for constituents to see their MPs. Nor, indeed, is this a case in which there is an issue of sparsity of population. The noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, mentioned that, for the Boundary Commission, the Edinburgh East constituency had sometimes included and sometimes excluded Musselburgh, which I believe lies administratively in the county of East Lothian. Therefore, Edinburgh has expanded its boundaries in the past for parliamentary purposes.

Ultimately, it will be for the independent Boundary Commission to take account of all the factors. I say this only because I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said that in every circumstance he would want Edinburgh to have five seats. If Edinburgh, in order to thrive and flourish, as we would all wish to see, merited six seats, I am not sure why in statute we should restrict the number to five. There is a problem in going down that road. However, I have no doubt that the Boundary Commission will be able to secure equality of votes between constituencies within the 5 per cent margin and that Edinburgh’s standing as Scotland’s capital city will in no way be impaired.

I turn to the case made by the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, and supported by others, including the noble Lord, Lord Watson, on Argyll and Bute. As I have already indicated, Argyll and Bute already combines islands and the mainland, which I think distinguishes it from the two that are reserved and which, as I have already indicated, we do not believe could incorporate part of the mainland very readily. Argyll and Bute is already very close to the range that will be required under the Bill. Although I recognise noble Lords’ concern about large areas, I have already referred to the fact that there are rules in the Bill that would ensure that the size did not become unmanageable. It is not just at 13,000 but at between 12,000 and 13,000 square kilometres that there is a sliding scale.

The noble Lord, Lord Watson, mentioned Helensburgh, which is currently part of the Argyll and Bute constituency. I believe that in parliamentary terms it is a recent addition, although in local government terms it has been part of the Argyll and Bute council area for some time. Helensburgh, of course, is historically part of the ancient county of Dunbartonshire, so its boundaries have already changed and it is now familiar as part of Argyll and Bute. I was a sufficiently political anorak in my youth that I can remember when Argyll and Bute did not have Bute and that Bute was part of a north Ayrshire and Bute constituency, so Bute has migrated backwards and forwards. In areas such as these, there has been no fixed boundary. Therefore, given the safeguards to prevent its size becoming too great, and the fact that the islands are already incorporated in the mainland, it would not qualify for a preserved constituency in the same way as the Western Isles and Orkney and Shetland do.

As to the island area of Telford being surrounded by the rest of Shropshire—

[Lord Grocott]

The Labour island.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, says, the Labour island. He referred to this because it gave him an opportunity to make some important points, but he will readily recognise the arguments for preservation. I do not think that even he would start to claim that it has a special extreme geographical situation. I understand what he is saying, but a Boundary Commission will be able to devise and recommend seats within the parameters of size defined in the Bill that give proper and fair representation and a fair vote and fair value to the people of Shropshire, including the people of Telford.

In any of these matters, we should not lose sight of the fact that while, yes, primacy is given in the legislation to securing fair votes and fair values as best we can, the Boundary Commission still may—I acknowledge that the numbers within the margins take primacy—take into account, to such extent as it thinks fit, special geographical considerations, including the particular size, shape and accessibility of a constituency; local government boundaries as they existed at recent ordinary council election days; and any local ties that would be broken by changes in the constituencies. These are important factors, which will help to address a number of the concerns that have been raised not only in this debate but in other parts of the United Kingdom.

In these circumstances, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment. We are certainly conscious of the concerns expressed and we recognise the strength of feeling, but we are confident that the variation of up to 10 per cent between the biggest and smallest constituencies will lead to a reasonable balance between equal value votes and have proper regard to locally meaningful boundaries.

Elections: AV Referendum and Scottish Parliament

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 20th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

No, I do not think that it should. Indeed, I make no secret of the fact that there is a combination of polls in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and many parts of England where there are local elections. One of the advantages will be increased turnouts for both the respective elections and the referendum. It will be up to the respective yes or no campaigns in places where there are no other elections to try to ensure that there is a good turnout for a referendum on a very important issue facing the country—how its elected House should be elected. It is an issue on which the noble Lord’s party brought forward legislation when it was in government. I look forward to receiving its support when we debate these matters when the Bill comes to this House.

[Lord Grocott]

Further to the answer that he has just given, does the noble and learned Lord not recall, as I do, that for years and years the Deputy Prime Minister and others have been assuring us that the British public are desperate to get rid of the first past the post system and will queue at the polling stations at the first opportunity to do so? Now we are being told that it is essential that we have the referendum on the same day as some other elections because it is the only way that you can guarantee that anyone at all will be bothered to turn out. Who is right?