All 3 Debates between Lord Grocott and Lord Lansley

Tue 22nd Mar 2022
Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill
Lords Chamber

Consideration of Commons amendments & Consideration of Commons amendments
Wed 9th Feb 2022

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Lansley
Lord Lansley Portrait Lord Lansley (Con)
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My Lords, I hope we are all agreed that we should not insist on the amendment that we passed on the previous occasion. However, we were right to ask the other place to think again. Indeed, even though it was a relatively short debate, and programmed as such, it was an opportunity for a number of Members to think again—if not necessarily to change their minds, at least to reflect on the nature of the decision that was being made. For example, Jackie Doyle-Price said:

“In building legislation that will last, we need to ensure that we have sufficient, adequate checks so that any Prime Minister will not abuse their position.”


Kevin Brennan asked a very interesting question, which we raised here:

“What would happen where the Prime Minister of a minority Government wished to call a general election, but there was the possibility of an alternative Government being formed? Would that Prime Minister be able to dissolve Parliament by prerogative in those circumstances, or would another person be given an opportunity to form a Government and a majority in the House of Commons?”—[Official Report, Commons, 14/3/22; cols. 647 and 643.]


Of course, the answer is that such a person may be given such an opportunity but that would be by the exercise of the discretion of the sovereign, which would draw the sovereign back into decision-making—something we were all agreed that we wanted to avoid.

The point is that our amendment was intended to raise these issues but not in any sense to undermine the manifesto commitments of the two main parties to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. However, the manifestos did not say how the Act was to be replaced.

The Government have settled to their satisfaction that the constraint of Parliament upon the prerogative power is to be removed, but they have not settled the question of whether the sovereign might continue to be drawn into Dissolution decisions. It is unfortunately likely that, if there were to be another coalition—I speak as a former Minister in a coalition Government—this issue will resurface; it is bound to do so. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, I hope that we will be proved wrong and the Government proved right.

In such important constitutional legislation—the Government are fortunate in having my noble friend on the Front Bench to steward it in this place—we should be looking for consensus and certainty. I am not sure that this Bill has achieved that. None the less, I hope that the Bill will succeed in its objectives.

Lord Grocott Portrait Lord Grocott (Lab)
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My Lords, we should not let this moment pass without reminding ourselves of precisely what a bizarre set of circumstances we find ourselves in. I remind the House that the Lords amendment that we sent to the Commons says:

“The powers referred to in subsection (1)”


—that is, the power to dissolve Parliament—

“shall not be exercised unless the House of Commons passes a motion in the form set out in subsection (1B).”

In other words, very simply, this unelected House is saying to the elected House that, while it is none of our business, we think the House of Commons should have something to say about whether the House of Commons should be dissolved and the electorate consulted. I hope that, at some point in the future, the Commons reason for disagreeing with this House will be printed word for word in Erskine May, as follows:

“The Commons disagree to Lords Amendment 1 for the following Reason—Because the Commons do not consider it appropriate that the dissolution of Parliament should be subject to a vote in the Commons.”


Imagine if we substituted “the Dissolution of Parliament” for, say, something that we are going to debate in another Bill tomorrow—“the electoral system”. This is our constitution. It is not any old Bill but the rules of the game. Could we have an amendment in future saying that the Commons disagrees with the Lords in an amendment on the electoral system, on the basis that the Commons does not consider it appropriate that the electoral system should be subject to a vote in the House of Commons? That could apply to any other aspect of our constitution.

I feel pretty confident in saying that there has never been anything quite like this. As we have said time and time again, the whole development of our parliamentary democracy has been a slow transference of power from the monarch/Executive to the elected House of Commons; yet this particular Commons, elected just two years ago, is saying that whether or not there is an election is not anything to do with it. Ultimately, this entrenches the possibility of the monarch becoming profoundly and deeply involved in politics and in an acutely political decision: whether there should be a general election—there is no bigger decision than that. The House of Commons feels that it should not have any say in that whatever, and it should ultimately be a decision for the monarch.

I encourage those who revise Erskine May to make sure that this stunning reason on Dissolution appears somewhere in the text of that great tome. I am sure that it has never happened before. I think it is absolutely bizarre of the Commons to say that it does not want anything to do with this.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Lansley
Lord Lansley Portrait Lord Lansley (Con)
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My Lords, I have signed once more on Report this amendment, along with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I entirely agree with what he just said to the House. That is partly in the light of the debate in Committee, which compellingly reinforced the need to send this issue back to the other place to be reconsidered, and for it to make the final decision, as the noble and learned Lord says.

I say to colleagues, not least on this side of the House, that the Conservative Party’s manifesto in 2019, which we are implementing, said:

“We will get rid of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act.”


This legislation, including Amendment 1, will do that. So the Conservative manifesto commitment will be met. The question, of course, is what we put in its place.

My noble friend on the Front Bench will have his chance to say so, but he has said that the purpose of the Bill is to restore the prerogative power, or the status quo ante. I have to say that it still feels like generals fighting the last war—they are fixed on the events of the autumn of 2019, and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has amply illustrated, we are not in the situation of the end of 2019 and we may never be again. If one looks at the events of the autumn of 2019, one sees that three times the Prime Minister sought a general election and failed to secure a two-thirds majority but in each case secured a simple majority. The proposition, which seems to be at the heart of the Government’s approach, is that this Bill prevents gridlock, but in my view a simple majority of the House of Commons would, in almost all circumstances, also prevent such gridlock.

More to the point, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, is the question that the other place has to answer: should this once again be an executive decision of the Prime Minister of the day, regardless of the view of the House of Commons? I will not go on at length, but I repeat my view that the Prime Minister exercises the responsibility to request a Dissolution by virtue of the fact that he or she commands a majority in the House of Commons. If a Prime Minister loses the confidence of the House of Commons, by what right do they go to the palace and seek a Dissolution? In the circumstances in which a Prime Minister loses the confidence of his or her own party, and of the House of Commons by extension, there may be, and often has been in the past, an opportunity for a new Administration to be formed who enjoy the command of a majority in the House of Commons. Under those circumstances, it seems to me that it would not be right to seek a Dissolution.

The noble and learned Lord referred to what Mr Rees-Mogg said. I am a former Leader of the House of Commons and I believe that the job of the Leader of the House of Commons is to explain the Government’s thinking to the House and explain the House’s thinking to the Government. On this occasion, the latter did not happen. The House was not in a mind to have a Dissolution and an election and I do not think that the Leader of the House was reflecting any view in the House of Commons to that effect. It was, therefore, a threat—an unconstitutional threat, since the Fixed-term Parliaments Act currently applies and such a threat could not be given effect unless and until this legislation passes into law.

My point is that we should give an opportunity not to restore the prerogative in the form in which it existed in the past but to qualify it by reference to what is the reality of our constitution—that sovereignty rests in the sovereign in Parliament, that that must be reflected by a majority in the House of Commons and that therefore a request for an election should be backed by a simple majority in the House of Commons. Anything other than those circumstances would be an illegitimate request and contrary to the view of Parliament.

Lord Grocott Portrait Lord Grocott (Lab)
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My Lords, I mentioned in Committee and I mention again to the House now that I have always been a strong critic of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and I was pleased when the Government decided to do away with it. But I find myself in a strange position now of being pleased that they have introduced the Bill but disappointed with it, because it is a messy and—for the reasons that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said—counterintuitive solution, in that it is moving power back to the monarch. It is a messy solution to a problem that was particular, in most respects, to the 2017-19 Parliament and which, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said, we are now trying to repair or prevent from happening again.

My message is simply that the shenanigans of the 2017-19 Parliament were a result, more than anything else, of the 2011 Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which this Bill will repeal. We need not worry about that kind of problem again because it is incredibly unlikely—impossible, I would say—that we will see those sets of circumstances recurring. Of course, the main reason why the Government could not get a majority for a general election—a facility that I strongly believe should be available to a Government—was the requirement for a two-thirds majority. On each occasion when Boris Johnson went to Parliament and asked for a majority, it gave him one, but not a two-thirds majority.

The solution being offered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is beautiful in its simplicity. It solves all the problems with one mighty bound. The main problems of this Bill—or rather, the problems that it does not resolve—are the possible interference by the judiciary, the possible politicisation of the role of the monarch and the argument that we can all have about what the Dissolution principles should be, which a lot of the debate in the Joint Committee was about. With one mighty bound we are free, if we say that you need a majority in the House of Commons. It prevents—for ever—any possibility of the monarch again being involved in this most political of decisions and of saying to a democratically elected Prime Minister, “No, sorry, I’m the monarch; you think you should go to the people, but I’m telling you that you can’t.” It is inconceivable that that could happen and, if it did, it would be a constitutional crisis of a magnitude that we have not so far seen. You get rid of all that area of debate and problem. You also get rid of this ugly ouster clause, to which we will come in a moment. The courts are kept out of it because no court is going to challenge a majority verdict of the House of Commons. With a simple majority in the House of Commons, it is job done. The courts and the monarch are out of it.

Arrangement of Business

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Lansley
Monday 18th March 2019

(5 years, 9 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Lansley Portrait Lord Lansley (Con)
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My Lords, my noble friend the Chief Whip was absolutely right to express a degree of caution over the question of regulations. If the European Council does not agree to an extension, we will leave the European Union on Friday 29 March. We cannot change that other than by revoking Article 50, and the Government have no power to do that—it would have to come before Parliament. To reflect, if my noble friend will forgive me, what the Leader of the Opposition was saying, to amend exit day under Section 20 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act would require an affirmative procedure. We hope and expect that such a regulation will be made next week, and we will therefore need to debate it. It would be perfectly reasonable now to schedule such a debate for next week so that Members of this House can prepare for it.

Lord Grocott Portrait Lord Grocott (Lab)
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My Lords, can the Chief Whip assure us that the suggestion from this House, albeit from only one Member—my noble friend Lord Adonis—that Parliament, which includes this unelected House, should, at the recommendation of an unelected Member of Parliament—my noble friend Lord Adonis—rescind at a stroke a decision that is the consequence of a referendum in which 17.4 million people voted—