(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, with the leave of the House, I will briefly remind your Lordships of where we find ourselves. Your Lordships’ House amended the Bill, which had been passed by the other place, to give the Commons the right to a veto on dissolution and invited the other place to reconsider its decision. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, told us, the amendment would offer the House of Commons an opportunity to reflect again on this highly important constitutional Bill.
It has now been considered by the other place again, and the Commons unsurprisingly maintained its previous decision. During the discussion in the other place, Members noted the flaws of a prescriptive system and feared that it would recreate the paralysis of the 2019 Parliament—something that the manifestos of both major parties at the last general election said they wished to avoid. Furthermore, the importance of retaining the flexible nature of the constitution was emphasised.
Your Lordships asked the other place to consider its role, as is your Lordships’ right. For a second time it has done so, and it has decisively rejected a Commons veto, placing its trust, as do the Government, in the constitutional practices that served this country well for generations before the failed experiment of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. The Government agree with the view of the other place: the amendment would undermine the rationale of the Bill.
We are now within reach of securing important and historic legislation and delivering the manifesto commitment of two political parties—and notably, from my point of view, of the Government. The Bill returns us to the status quo ante, revives the prerogative powers for the Dissolution and calling of Parliament, and preserves the long-standing position on the non-justiciability of these powers.
I thank all noble Lords for their important engagement in the passage of this Bill, which was valued by me and the Government. It deepened reflection on the Bill and the principles behind it. However, I would be grateful if your Lordships now accepted the clear decision of the other place, which, as the reason before us today notes, is that
“the Commons do not consider it appropriate that the dissolution of Parliament should be subject to a vote in the Commons.”
That is a very clear message from the other House, and I urge your Lordships not to insist on their amendment.
My Lords, after a short debate in the other place, the amendment proposed by this House was disagreed, and here we are today. There is still an issue: we believe the Dissolution of Parliament should not be based on the revival of the prerogative, but the other place takes a different view. The other place is the elected Chamber. As I made clear during the debate, this issue was to be decided not by Parliament as a whole but by the other place because that is the elected Chamber. It has spoken. I stand by the undertaking I gave during the debate, and therefore this must be carried.
In doing so—I think I am allowed to say this—I very much hope that, in the long march of the future, it will turn out that the decision of the House of Commons is vindicated. I really do hope that. I would like to think that I will be right, but I still do not have confidence that we can be sure that no future Prime Minister will misuse or abuse this power. We will therefore have to wait for the future to decide who, in truth, was right on the issue.
My Lords, we laugh, and in some ways, it is amusing. It is also extraordinary—I am not sure that it is amusing. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act was an Act of its time whose main purpose was to protect the coalition Government, and it succeeded in that to a degree. I was very disappointed to read the response of Ministers in the other place. It seemed to focus on the argument that because all parties agreed that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act must go, there was only one way of doing it. That seemed an extraordinary proposition to make. On the points made by my noble friend Lord Grocott and the noble Lord, Lord Newby, this House had no vested interest whatever in the amendment that it passed. It sought to do so in the interests of the democratic system. The Government’s preferred option was one that we found quite extraordinary.
We enjoy in our Parliament a system of checks and balances in the democratic system. For those of us who do not consider that the Prime Minister alone should decide on the election, there seem to be three alternatives: first, that the courts intervene, which the majority of your Lordships’ House found unacceptable, although I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Butler; secondly, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said, that the monarchy would be drawn into that decision-making process, which we would all seek to avoid—I was glad that he quoted both Jackie Doyle-Price and Kevin Brennan, because I thought the points they made in the House of Commons were very pertinent; finally, that Parliament should have an opportunity to be engaged in that decision.
Those of my age who remember Wolfie Smith in “Citizen Smith” will have heard “Power to the people”; the Minister said, “Let us hand power back to the people”, but the Government are actually handing power back to the Prime Minister. There was never any difficulty in the election process—there was always going to be a general election—it is about who decides on the election. The Minister probably watched too much bad TV in his younger days. I find it extraordinary that the House of Commons was prepared to give up that power so easily.
I agree that, as the other place—albeit its majority being the Government’s majority—does not wish to pursue this, there is little point in our asking it to reconsider. However, I repeat a question that my noble friend Lord Collins asked the Minister in Oral Questions yesterday, which he sort of answered in the affirmative. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act was a prime example of legislation being passed for one particular purpose without a great deal of thought, and it has had to be undone for all the reasons we know. Legislation made too quickly for a specific circumstance does not protect the constitution in any way. I hope the Minister will agree with me that constitutional change needs much more careful examination of long-term and unintended consequences. We have got ourselves into a right pickle over this one. Does he accept that, when looking at any significant constitutional change, a period of pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation would provide for better legislation at the end of the day?
But for now, bizarre as the decision made by the other place may seem, we do not intend to pursue this further.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I say to the noble Baroness that this Bill did receive detailed pre-legislative scrutiny; it was considered by a Joint Committee of both Houses and Ministers were scrutinised by committees in both Houses. Ministers in both Houses—I have had some small endeavour in this—have engaged actively with interested Members during the Bill. That is a contrast—perhaps this was the point the noble Baroness was making—to what happened in 2011 when the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was cobbled together in back rooms, as we learn about in the memoirs of Mr David Laws.
Just to help the Minister, that is exactly the point I was making about the Fixed-term Parliaments Act not having proper scrutiny and getting us into the position we are in now.
I was agreeing with the noble Baroness on that. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act was an aberration from 2011 to 2022. Some noble Lords have expressed shock that the House of Commons would wish to return to an arrangement which endured for generations. I do not share that shock.
The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who was a ferocious opponent of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act—I agreed with him profoundly on this—said he was surprised that the House of Commons responded in the way it did. I read out to the House its reason in my opening remarks. Your Lordships asked the Commons a specific question on the Dissolution Bill: did it want a veto on this Dissolution measure? The House of Commons has replied specifically to that question in its reason. That does not in any way detract from the powers of the House of Commons either to bring down a Government through withdrawing confidence or to sustain one. That remains one of its fundamental powers, which can promote a Dissolution and a general election.
I agree with those who said there is an abiding need to avoid the sovereign being drawn into politics. That principle is accepted by all people, I think, at every level of politics; it has been and will remain the case, as was set out in the Dissolution principles.
It was proposed that the Commons should have a vote, and the Commons has clearly rejected the proposal. I am grateful that noble Lords—albeit it in a mildly chiding way in some cases—have accepted that. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for not pressing his amendment. I did not chide the House in any way on the role it played—I respect that role—but I think we should show respect for the decision of the Commons in our words and deeds now.
I thank noble Lords for all the points made in the debate. I hope we can now proceed, and I beg to move.