Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Beith

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the House is indebted to the noble Lord for elucidating this issue and tabling the amendment. In the Joint Committee, it was worrying that the Government did not initially seem to understand the distinction between requesting a Dissolution and advising a Dissolution, advice that would be binding on the sovereign. I entirely exempt the ministerial reply today from that criticism—the Minister is indeed a former member of the Constitution Committee, which also considered this—but we certainly considered it necessary to explore a little more fully and to criticise the wording of the Dissolution Principles document, the one-page analysis of the issue that made the specific mistake to which the noble Lord made reference.

The refusal of a Dissolution is the only remaining restraint on the ability of a Prime Minister to foreshorten a Parliament in circumstances that might be either entirely appropriate or, in some cases, at least questionable. Subsequent government writing, such as appears in their response to the Joint Committee, indicates that the Government recognise that there are circumstances in which it might be inappropriate to grant a Dissolution, such as a Prime Minister seeking a rerun of an election that has not quite gone according to plan and has not delivered the overall majority that was sought.

Another possibility is the 1974 situation, which I remember vividly because I was elected first in October 1973 and then in February 1974. Ted Heath was unable to establish a coalition, because we did not want to form a coalition with him, so Harold Wilson became Prime Minister. Was he advised that it would be premature to go to the palace and seek an immediate Dissolution? I have no idea, but he did not do so. He took the rather shrewder step of spending about nine months trying to demonstrate that you could have a sanitised Labour Government who did not do any of the things that people worry about Labour Governments doing, and was therefore able to go to the country in a slightly stronger position in October that year. Thankfully, I was re-elected but with a majority of only 70-odd, if I remember rightly; I survived to tell the tale another day. There are circumstances like that in which the issue is a questionable one, and that is why it is important to defend the personal prerogative power.

There are ways of addressing this issue but they do not seem likely to find their way into the legislation as it will eventually be passed. We will discuss Motions of the House of Commons later. They would provide some restraint on a Prime Minister but not very much. Considering that this might not find its way into the final legislation, it is even more important that we protect the ability of the sovereign to decline to give a Dissolution in exceptional circumstances.

Of course, a power like that is more important for what happens behind the scenes than for any possibility that it would be fully exercised and the sovereign would actually have to do it. We are talking about a situation in which the Prime Minister would be advised that it would be unhelpful, inappropriate and potentially damaging to the position of the monarchy to raise the issue at this precise point and, if it was going to be raised, it would be much better to raise it later or at a better moment. Those are the kinds of conversations that surround the few personal prerogative powers that still exist.

The system depends on something that is sadly lacking at the moment, which is a great deal of trust. The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the Commons said that

“some mix of statute and convention is the best way for this area to be governed, but this requires the actors involved to act in ways which engender trust.”

That has not been happening very much lately, so we should look at this with some care.

The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has done the right thing by tabling the amendment. I am not entirely persuaded that it makes a difference because my view is that it is a personal prerogative and, unless Parliament legislates it away, it is still there. However, first, it is highly desirable that it becomes clear that the Government understand the position that it is a request, not advice; and, secondly, if there is a general feeling in the House that it needs to be included in the Bill, we can do so. If not, we simply recognise that this is the position and that it has not been changed if we revert to the status quo ante.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said and with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Norton. I am not sure it is hugely important but, because the issue of “advice” as opposed to “request” has reared its head as early as this, I want to make what seems to me to be a self-evident unarguable point, although I have been unable to persuade everyone that it is. Although the assumption prior to 2011 was that the Prime Minister went to the monarch with a request—in other words, it gave the monarch the decision as to whether or not to accept the request for Dissolution—the overwhelming evidence in my lifetime, and that of others of similar age in this Committee today, is that in practice it is inconceivable that an elected Prime Minister could go to the monarch and say, “I think we should go to the country” and the monarch would say no. Incidentally, that is hardly a disastrous request; the notion sometimes seems to come out in these discussions that asking for a general election is somehow an affront to democracy.

It is inconceivable to me that the monarch would say no, and historically, at least in modern times, it has just never happened. There may have been chats behind the scenes but there is no doubt that it would be a constitutional crisis of enormous magnitude if the Prime Minister of the day went to the monarch and said, “Please can I have a general election?”—or, to put it more accurately, “Please can the people resolve this difficulty that Parliament is in?”—and the hereditary monarch, who we must at all costs keep out of politics, said no. That is about the most politically contentious decision that any monarch could make.

It has always been an assumption of most people in these debates that at all costs we must protect the monarch from making those kinds of decisions. To me, it is a slam-dunk case that the monarch in modern times has had advice from the Prime Minister because in practice it has been inconceivable that the monarch would ever say no.

Greater Manchester Combined Authority (Election of Mayor with Police and Crime Commissioner Functions) Order 2016

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Beith

Wednesday 23rd March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I join my noble friend Lord Shipley in welcoming the Tees Valley order. I sympathise with those who prefer to call it Teesside as well. I note in particular that Liberal Democrat councillors and party chairmen in the Tees area have firmly and publicly stated how much they want to work together with others to make a success of the combined authority and associated arrangements.

I also say in passing that I share the view expressed in several quarters that making an elected mayor a condition of deals of this kind is a very unreasonable position for the Government to adopt. I say that when I look at what would happen if we had to have an elected mayor covering an area from Berwick to Sunderland—an area of very diverse differences. It would be a very inappropriate governance arrangement.

I turn to the Greater Manchester order because of a little-mentioned positive aspect of it, but I am not clear how far it goes. It is what was referred to at paragraph 1.279 of the Budget statement, on criminal justice:

“The government has also agreed a further devolution deal with Greater Manchester, including a commitment to work towards the devolution of criminal justice powers”.

That is rather weak wording: “to work towards” is what Governments sometimes say when they are making concessions and are in difficulty. I do not think that that is the origin in this case. As far as I am aware, there is a genuine government commitment to achieve some devolution of criminal justice powers. Will the Minister, in responding to the debate, say just a little more? It was barely mentioned at the opening. It is a new development and unique to the Greater Manchester deal.

There is tremendous scope to be had from developments of this kind because at the moment we have a distortion in our system that means that, whereas the prison system is funded nationally, all other disposals arising from sentences tend to depend on local funding and extremely variable local provision of services for alcohol addiction, drug addiction and so forth. Greater Manchester is one of the areas that has tried to grapple with some of this. When, in my former capacity as chairman of the Justice Committee, we visited Stockport, we found there determined co-operation between magistrates, the local authority and the probation service, the development of something more like the problem-solving court, and the bringing together of various public bodies to deal with the problems that a case identifies that could lead to the ending of a pattern of offending behaviour. That requires a lot of co-operation between different bodies. Similarly, making logical use of alternatives to custody in sentencing depends on having a financial structure in which the commissioning is not done by completely different bodies.

There is a lot of scope here, and there will be even more scope if national spending on criminal justice is increasingly devolved to local areas. If that is done, we have a much better chance of ending up spending money on preventing crime, rather than on keeping people in prison for crimes that should never have happened. I see this as potentially important, and not something that we should allow to be forgotten in the Greater Manchester deal.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with pretty well everyone who has spoken, particularly my noble friend Lady Armstrong. Everyone was in favour of devolution and of decisions being made as locally as possible. I wish there was a bit more of that thinking in the Government as far as education is concerned, but I suppose there are inconsistencies in all government policies. I still feel a sense of foreboding about these orders and they are not entirely removed by my noble friend’s amendments, although I think it is infinitely desirable for the amendments to be carried.

The foreboding comes, at least in part, from the sense that we are developing in an almost ad-hoc way. I do not want to use the word “hotchpotch”, but it is the nearest thing to the truth. We will have different forms of local government in different parts of what is still, certainly geographically, quite a small and homogeneous country. We will soon reach the stage when a member of the public will need a doctorate in public administration to know what kind of system they live in, who does what, where and how, when to vote and all the rest. That will particularly be the case when people move around the country, as they do, of course, from one part to another. I do not think that it is the only principle governing constitutional change, but I think that intelligibility should be one of the principles.

We are in increasing danger, as these orders come through, of forgetting that principle and making a very complicated system of local and regional government public administration. I say that despite the fact— I am very conscious of the fact—that some people I admire enormously in local government, friends of mine, have been involved in the various negotiations and the conclusions that have been reached. It is something that should cause us concern. We should at least keep a watchful eye on how these things are developing.

I confess to a prejudice in all this, in that I think one should always be a little wary of Chancellors who say they are here to help. Chancellors of the Exchequer have a fair bit of power and a fair bit of money at their disposal. It is never quite an equal discussion when they come and negotiate with local leaders, who have tremendous knowledge of their area but nothing like the same capacity to implement decisions for their area that people in national government quite rightly have.

However, my main concern with these changes remains, as it was when we were taking the Bill through, about this business of directly elected mayors being compulsory. Let us not throw weasel words around any more. I do not like using language like that, but it is using weasel words to say that this is an optional addition to devolution agreements—that it is optional as to whether you have a mayor or not. It is not. It is quite clearly an absolute requirement for the Chancellor. It is something that should not just pass in an order without us at least registering our concerns, as others have.

I will not repeat things I said during the passage of the parent legislation, but I did not expect that on the leader page of the Daily Telegraph I would find an article by a Conservative writer with whom I found myself agreeing wholeheartedly. The headline in last Friday’s Daily Telegraph was: “Voters don’t want them, but the march of the mayors is now unstoppable”. It is not me saying this, though I find a great affinity with it. The article says that four years ago:

“George Osborne … asked 10 cities, in a referendum, if they’d like a directly-elected mayor. Nine said “no”. It was the wrong answer … It’s hard not to admire his audacity. Soon, all nine of the cities which rejected the offer of a mayor in a referendum will have one anyway”.

We know the history of this. It was introduced by a Labour Government, I acknowledge that, but then the impetus for an elected mayor had to come from below. Then the Conservative Government said, “Well, this isn’t moving fast enough, so we are going to force these 10 local authorities to consult the people”. They did consult the people and the people said, “No, thank you very much, we do not want one”. So what do the Government do? In the finest traditions of the European Union, I have to say, if you do not like the first result you have another go until the electorate come to their senses. That is essentially what has happened. Fraser Nelson goes on to say:

“Since 2001, there have been 50 mayoral referendums, of which just 15 agreed to mayors. Many have come to regret it”.

We know two, of course, where there has been a vote to get rid of it.

I know that it is whistling in the wind now to say this, but we are setting up a quasi-presidential system as a model across the country. This is not yet at a national level, thankfully—because I think that a parliamentary system is infinitely preferable—but that is what is going to happen. It will inevitably mean different systems in different parts of the country. We are still in the very unfortunate situation, as far as I can see, unless the Minister can correct me on this, where unlike in any quasi-presidential system anywhere in the world there is no limit on the number of terms a mayor can serve. That is a great fault in the system. Parliamentary systems get rid of leaders when they are not keen on them, but mayoral systems do not have that mechanism. I should have thought that eight years—two terms—should be a maximum, but that safeguard does not exist.

I have no sense of joy and exhilaration at a wonderful new experiment. I do not think that that was detected in any of the three Front-Bench speeches; I may be misinterpreting them. I hope that as this process continues—it now seems inexorable—care will be exercised to ensure that we do not develop a system of devolution across our relatively small country which no one without a double doctorate can understand.