Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab) [V]]

Amendment 1, which is also in the names of my noble friends Lord Lennie and Lord Grocott, simply re-establishes the existing practice whereby once the Boundary Commissions have done their work, Parliament puts it into legislation. Without this amendment, the Bill provides that the Boundary Commissions’ reviews will be implemented automatically by Order in Council, which, as we know, are not subject to parliamentary approval or any procedure.

There are four reasons to support this amendment. First, there has been no indication of any problem that the Bill seeks to solve with this change. There has been no pre-legislative consultation and no pre-legislative scrutiny of it. We have seen nothing of any debate with the commissions; there has been no suggestion of any demand for such a change and there has been no pre-discussion either with parliamentarians or the political parties, unless within the governing party itself.

Secondly, it is surely clear to the Committee that what happened last time was ample demonstration of the importance of parliamentary oversight to issues that might appear to be merely implementary, but in fact are constitutionally important. The coalition Government decided to reduce the size of the House of Commons to 600, with no reason given for that number. At the same time, they were increasing the size of this House with more unelected politicians. No rationale was given for the number 600 and no account was taken of its implication for Scottish and Welsh seats, or for those in rural or geographically challenged areas. Unsurprisingly, it was, in effect, rejected by the House of Commons. Without that ability of Parliament to have the final say, we would today have only 600 MPs, perhaps with 50 former MPs becoming Peers in compensation. It is proof positive of the need to take the elected House with you when a Government are suddenly seized with an unsustainable notion.

Thirdly, it will be clear from other amendments tabled for today that there is some distrust about the proposed procedure and the ability of the Executive to retain an influence, which under the Bill they will still have, either by the timing of the Order in Council or by the composition of the Boundary Commissions. We might note, therefore, the amendments to be moved by the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Young of Cookham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, which we will deal with later.

Furthermore, although our Constitution Committee agrees in principle with the change, it particularly said that the proposed automatic implementation of recommendations of the Boundary Commissions will protect against undue influence only if they are genuinely independent. The committee therefore suggests that the House consider safeguards to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Boundary Commissions and their recommendations. We will come to specific proposals on this later, but the themes underlying this resonate with Amendments 1, 2, 5 to 9, and 12. In other words, both the Constitution Committee and these other amendments are in fact all part of a piece, that the Government—perhaps especially this Government—are capable of a certain flexibility when it comes to decisions that they might seek to influence. Their appointment of their friends—Tony Abbott or others whom I will mention in another group later—or the removal of those whose advice they do not like, and here I cite a swathe of Permanent Secretaries, in addition to the sad loss today of the head of the legal service, indicate a willingness to use subtle pressure to get what they want, or less than subtle pressure, as we witnessed over the attempted Prorogation, the threat to judicial review, and basically the attempt to sideline any whose advice or decisions get in their way. We do, therefore, have a concern that without absolute, very solid safeguards, the ability remains with the Government and not with Parliament.

Fourthly and lastly, there is a vital issue about the role of Parliament vis-à-vis that of a quango. I hear what our Constitution Committee says on that matter, and about the exclusion of Parliament. However, this is about the Executive vis-à-vis Parliament. It is about the Government removing a democratic backstop to an issue where decisions are not black and white but involve judgments, and—vitally—affect communities, devolution and regionalism. These are choices which Parliament cannot shrug off to unaccountable appointees, who may, as the Constitution Committee suggests, be looking to their reappointment.

In brief, we do not need this change. It was not requested; it has not been discussed; and it removes an important backstop role from Parliament. I beg to move.

[Lord Grocott (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, well done to those who have been involved in setting up this hybrid Grand Committee. It is an innovation and my mind boggles at how it is done. But, despite its wondrous characteristics, the sooner we get back to normal the better. As a very early speaker in this Committee, I want to make one constitutional point. There is one very unusual thing about today’s proceedings, which I accept because of the circumstances we are in. To my knowledge, there has never been a major constitutional Bill—which this is—held in Grand Committee. Such Bills are always held on the Floor of the House. One cannot imagine anything more fundamental to our constitution than the way MPs are elected and the areas that they represent. So I hope that this Committee may be the last of its kind and we can get back to the more usual practice of debating these Bills on the Floor of the House.

I have put my name to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Hayter in the full knowledge that she would explain them lucidly and leave me little to do. I am sure she has been comprehensive enough even for Lord Tyler who, I am sure, will be listening and will have heard what she said. I will add, with some strength of feeling, to a couple of the points that my noble friend made. The first relates to the huge importance of Parliament having an ultimate say in the Boundary Commission’s recommendations and their implementation. The Government will deal with this later, but it is also relevant to this clause. The Government will argue that they are taking power from Parliament and the Government and giving it to an Order in Council which is absolutely neutral. I am afraid that that is not very accurate language. When the commission’s report is finally sent to the Order in Council is a matter for a government Minister. So, if the Bill goes through unamended, it will, effectively, transfer the final word from Parliament to Government. We can argue about that, but let us at least argue as if we were on a level playing field and understand what is actually being done.