Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab) [V]]

Amendment 1, which is also in the names of my noble friends Lord Lennie and Lord Grocott, simply re-establishes the existing practice whereby once the Boundary Commissions have done their work, Parliament puts it into legislation. Without this amendment, the Bill provides that the Boundary Commissions’ reviews will be implemented automatically by Order in Council, which, as we know, are not subject to parliamentary approval or any procedure.

There are four reasons to support this amendment. First, there has been no indication of any problem that the Bill seeks to solve with this change. There has been no pre-legislative consultation and no pre-legislative scrutiny of it. We have seen nothing of any debate with the commissions; there has been no suggestion of any demand for such a change and there has been no pre-discussion either with parliamentarians or the political parties, unless within the governing party itself.

Secondly, it is surely clear to the Committee that what happened last time was ample demonstration of the importance of parliamentary oversight to issues that might appear to be merely implementary, but in fact are constitutionally important. The coalition Government decided to reduce the size of the House of Commons to 600, with no reason given for that number. At the same time, they were increasing the size of this House with more unelected politicians. No rationale was given for the number 600 and no account was taken of its implication for Scottish and Welsh seats, or for those in rural or geographically challenged areas. Unsurprisingly, it was, in effect, rejected by the House of Commons. Without that ability of Parliament to have the final say, we would today have only 600 MPs, perhaps with 50 former MPs becoming Peers in compensation. It is proof positive of the need to take the elected House with you when a Government are suddenly seized with an unsustainable notion.

Thirdly, it will be clear from other amendments tabled for today that there is some distrust about the proposed procedure and the ability of the Executive to retain an influence, which under the Bill they will still have, either by the timing of the Order in Council or by the composition of the Boundary Commissions. We might note, therefore, the amendments to be moved by the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Young of Cookham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, which we will deal with later.

Furthermore, although our Constitution Committee agrees in principle with the change, it particularly said that the proposed automatic implementation of recommendations of the Boundary Commissions will protect against undue influence only if they are genuinely independent. The committee therefore suggests that the House consider safeguards to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Boundary Commissions and their recommendations. We will come to specific proposals on this later, but the themes underlying this resonate with Amendments 1, 2, 5 to 9, and 12. In other words, both the Constitution Committee and these other amendments are in fact all part of a piece, that the Government—perhaps especially this Government—are capable of a certain flexibility when it comes to decisions that they might seek to influence. Their appointment of their friends—Tony Abbott or others whom I will mention in another group later—or the removal of those whose advice they do not like, and here I cite a swathe of Permanent Secretaries, in addition to the sad loss today of the head of the legal service, indicate a willingness to use subtle pressure to get what they want, or less than subtle pressure, as we witnessed over the attempted Prorogation, the threat to judicial review, and basically the attempt to sideline any whose advice or decisions get in their way. We do, therefore, have a concern that without absolute, very solid safeguards, the ability remains with the Government and not with Parliament.

Fourthly and lastly, there is a vital issue about the role of Parliament vis-à-vis that of a quango. I hear what our Constitution Committee says on that matter, and about the exclusion of Parliament. However, this is about the Executive vis-à-vis Parliament. It is about the Government removing a democratic backstop to an issue where decisions are not black and white but involve judgments, and—vitally—affect communities, devolution and regionalism. These are choices which Parliament cannot shrug off to unaccountable appointees, who may, as the Constitution Committee suggests, be looking to their reappointment.

In brief, we do not need this change. It was not requested; it has not been discussed; and it removes an important backstop role from Parliament. I beg to move.

[Lord Grocott (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, well done to those who have been involved in setting up this hybrid Grand Committee. It is an innovation and my mind boggles at how it is done. But, despite its wondrous characteristics, the sooner we get back to normal the better. As a very early speaker in this Committee, I want to make one constitutional point. There is one very unusual thing about today’s proceedings, which I accept because of the circumstances we are in. To my knowledge, there has never been a major constitutional Bill—which this is—held in Grand Committee. Such Bills are always held on the Floor of the House. One cannot imagine anything more fundamental to our constitution than the way MPs are elected and the areas that they represent. So I hope that this Committee may be the last of its kind and we can get back to the more usual practice of debating these Bills on the Floor of the House.

I have put my name to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Hayter in the full knowledge that she would explain them lucidly and leave me little to do. I am sure she has been comprehensive enough even for Lord Tyler who, I am sure, will be listening and will have heard what she said. I will add, with some strength of feeling, to a couple of the points that my noble friend made. The first relates to the huge importance of Parliament having an ultimate say in the Boundary Commission’s recommendations and their implementation. The Government will deal with this later, but it is also relevant to this clause. The Government will argue that they are taking power from Parliament and the Government and giving it to an Order in Council which is absolutely neutral. I am afraid that that is not very accurate language. When the commission’s report is finally sent to the Order in Council is a matter for a government Minister. So, if the Bill goes through unamended, it will, effectively, transfer the final word from Parliament to Government. We can argue about that, but let us at least argue as if we were on a level playing field and understand what is actually being done.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) (Abolition of By-Elections) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Grocott and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 23rd November 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

There is only one point I want to raise, other than to say that of course we want a general election. Actually there are two issues. One, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has just mentioned, is the importance of refreshing this House not only with those who happen to be sons of people who, as the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, said, were appointed by a monarch or a Prime Minister. It will be important to refresh the House so that it is not just men who are appointed. That will certainly be the case for the Conservative Party which, otherwise, will end up very male-dominated.

My other point, from the point of view of the Labour Party, is on an issue that has been raised and which I have responded to before about the binding commitment. The binding commitment was, of course, not binding in law; it was binding until it was possible to change the composition of the House. I remind the noble Lord that that commitment was made in 1997. After we lost office, his party were in government in coalition from 2010 to 2015 and did not manage to bring in a change to the House, they were then not in coalition and did not do it, and they are now effectively in coalition again and are not doing it. The lack of commitment to changing the House means that a commitment made much earlier no longer has the standing that it had at the time.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I am grateful to a number of noble Lords who have spoken in favour of the Bill, and I do not want to add to the points that they made. The noble Lord, Lord Balfe, shared a useful piece of information about the views of important people in the Commons in relation to this legislation. It gives me great heart if I am able to think that, should this House pass the Bill, as I very much hope it will, it would be a huge example to almost any other institution of an institution reforming itself in a sensible way.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, for that, and to the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, who mentioned the need for speed. These by-elections will take place with increasing frequency; that is the inevitable consequence of age. We are talking about people who were identified as the 90 in 1999. There have been 44 by-elections since then—or 44 new Members as a result of by-elections; some have been for two new Peers—but inevitably they will come with greater frequency. There are two in the pipeline. The need to get this Bill through is all the more urgent if we are not to be subject to, it seems to me, the reasonable accusation of looking completely ridiculous with some of these by-elections. The point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, about the effect that an increasing proportion of the membership of the House being hereditary Peers will have on different parties is powerful.

I do not disagree at all with the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, about the need for a cap on the size of the House. I think very strongly that we should reduce the number of people here. But of course, if nothing is done specifically about the hereditary Peers—this is the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown—it will be significantly harder to reduce the size of the House if there are 92 people to whom “two out, one in” does not apply. The stats in the second, most recent report of the Burns committee are quite clear. They are small numbers so one should not draw huge lessons from them, but they make it pretty plain that it is difficult to reduce the size of the House if hereditary Peers are being replaced one-for-one, whereas everyone else is being replaced on the basis of one in for every two out.

This is a big group of amendments and I urge the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, not to press them further, either here or on Report, as they would have the cumulative effect of delaying the Bill’s implementation. I will be kind to him today and say that he is not trying to wreck the Bill with these amendments—though it was hard for me to say that—but they would certainly significantly delay it. One or two of them are, frankly, close to being silly, such as the idea of reviews of the work of both Houses. But let us leave it at that, and I appeal to him not to press them further either here or on Report.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

As far as that is possible; the choice was and is still a binary one. I do not think that there can be a compromise between my noble friend Lord Adonis’s position and mine, because he wants to remain in the European Union and I want to leave it. There may be a halfway position there, but I have not quite discerned it yet. Larger brains than mine need to find a consensus on that, if there is one. However, I am utterly clear that once this House of Lords, as well as the House of Commons, has said to the British people, “We want you to make a decision. We’ll tell you what the wording on the referendum ballot paper will be. We’ve decided that, we will decide the date, and we will abide by that decision”, those statements are unchallengeable. It is our duty to deal with the legislation which is the inevitable consequence of that decision, of which the Bill is one part.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I will restrain myself from entering into a longer debate on this issue. I agree with my noble friend Lord Grocott that this is an important Bill, but it will also affect the negotiations, and part of that will be affected by the timetable.

It is interesting that at various times when we have discussed the promised vote on the final deal—it is not just a matter of leaving but of our future relationship with the EU after we have left—the Minister has said that he hoped that the vote, in both Houses, would take place before the European Parliament has had its say, but that he could not definitely promise that it would, because our parliamentary timetable might not be flexible enough to fit in with that of the European Parliament. I cannot say that I accept that argument, because after all, we control our business and when we have votes—not necessarily how late at night they happen, but effectively we control our timetable. However, if the Minister was correct in the assumption that the European Parliament’s vote might not be at a predictable time—it may be delayed because talks are still going on—it may suddenly be brought forward.

Here, I will answer the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Butler. It seems essential that the deal has to be agreed before April, when the European Parliament will go into recess, because under Article 50 the deal has to be agreed and have the consent of the European Parliament. If the European Parliament is to recess, adjourn or prorogue before its elections, the deal has to get consent before then. Therefore, there is a timetable, and it has to go before the European Parliament. I have had various legal advice about what happens if the European Parliament does not give its consent—it seems quite complicated—but certainly Article 50 says that it has to give consent. Therefore, the negotiations could go on a bit later than everyone wants, and the European Parliament will have to prorogue for its own elections and will have no authority thereafter. The date on which we leave could be fixed by the words in an Act of Parliament which will be passed in August or whenever, some months after those events, and that seems a very unhelpful position for our negotiators to be in.

I am sure that there will be late-night sessions and lots of consultations, with people ringing back for instructions as the negotiations go on—there are people who have been through all this. I hope that we have trained the Minister well in coping with late nights here, because he may well have more of those, but there could be very long nights as the negotiations go on. If one side—our negotiators—were curtailed by a strict date in the Act, that would put us at a disadvantage. The other side is not so constrained. The European Parliament can meet at very short notice when a decision has been taken.

However, I interpret Article 50 slightly differently. It says:

“The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after … notification”.


So, without having to go to the Council for a unanimous decision, the withdrawal agreement could contain a leaving date of a week or two weeks after the two-year period, which would allow the last-minute arrangements to be made. If that is what the withdrawal agreement specifies, if that suits all the parties and if our Government would like to sign up to it, it would seem silly not to be able to do that.

It is important that we enable the negotiators to get the best possible deal, setting out exactly how we leave and exactly what our future terms of trade will be. If the amendment is passed, it will remove the straitjacket that the Government inserted at the behest not of the negotiators but of certain ardent Brexiteers. Let us remove that straitjacket, make the task easier for the negotiators and reflect what our own EU Committee said:

“The rigidity of the Article 50 deadline of 29 March 2019 … makes a no deal outcome more likely … enshrining the same deadline in domestic law would not be … in the national interest”.


I am sure that the Government want to put the national interest first and I certainly believe that this House will want to do so. Therefore, we strongly support the amendment moved by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, and we urge everyone to go into the Lobby behind him.

Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

I would have preferred the amendment of my noble friend Lord Soley, but this one is eminently sensible. The idea of a review after six years appeals to me. I put in an early bid to be a member of the reviewing committee, so that I could have the great pleasure of pointing out that the whole operation really was a waste of time, and being able to employ my favourite phrase: “I told you so”.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I am now trying to think what would tempt the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, to vote with us. It does not work when I say the same thing as our Back-Benchers; it does not work when I say the same as the Government. I am not sure that I am ever going to get him into our voting Lobby.

Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Monday 19th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, this is a heroic attempt to create, as my noble friend said, a level playing field. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, would acknowledge that Amendment 51 could be tidied up but the objective or principle behind the amendment of trying to make some provision for fairness is an important one in a very extended procedure. We know about the time between the Speaker and the petition officer and then the eight weeks that is in the Bill which will all have been preceded by lengthy considerations in perhaps a court or in the committee of the House of Commons, during which time the only case that will be heard is the specific case against the Member of Parliament. During the eight weeks, if the Bill stays as it is at present, the drama, at least at constituency level, will be all about how many have signed so far, “Have enough signed so far? Roll up! Sign up! We’re nearly there”. What is the defence against that? There is no defence.

The principle behind Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, is an impeccable principle. I hope that the Minister, even if he does not like the particular wording of the amendment, will at least acknowledge the importance of the principle.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I found the travels of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, around the highways and byways of Richmond Park interesting. When this Bill was first thought of, we were thinking it was going to be a Sheffield Hallam one with the NUS bussing in its students. So we have come further south from that early discussion.

Amendment 51 is interesting. As I said earlier, although I think the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, was not in his place at the time, the amendment could answer the queries that I had raised about whether the process is secret or effectively open. It is another way of dealing with that by allowing people to vote against and not just in favour of a recall by-election. It would certainly be a clearer option for electors who know that they have a choice. They can express that choice, having thought about the issue.

It is not, of course, what the Bill proposes so I am not able to offer support for it, particularly as it would negate a by-election simply if 10% voted against. You could have 30% wanting a by-election and 10% against. Under the amendment as drafted, the 10% would trump the 30%, which I am sure would not be a desirable outcome.

With regard to the increase to 20%, what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester was saying was interesting. From that, I might take the other view; if you get the 20% you have lost a fifth of your electorate. Effectively there will be no by-election. After having 20% against them, no one will possibly contest the by-election; so there would be a by-election, but not with the MP there. The purpose of the Bill, as it has been drafted, was that there should be the possibility of a by-election at which the MP refights that seat and tests the issue as to whether, despite whatever they have been found guilty of, they are nevertheless able to represent their constituents. My concern about the 20% is that it undermines the difference between a by-election and a recall petition.

I acknowledge that the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee recommended 20% but I do not think that we should pray that in aid given that it wanted no sight of this Bill whatever. I look forward to the Minister’s comments. The interesting thing is why on earth 10% was chosen and not 5% or 15%. The problem of 20% is that it effectively gets rid of the idea of having a by-election that the MP would fight. In that sense, it goes against the spirit of the Bill.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I really am grateful for the contributions that have been made to this debate, not least because, as I said at the beginning, I felt that I needed to apologise to the Committee for mentioning the word “referendum”. It seems that there is still a fair degree of enthusiasm for talking about it now.

I will not use the term “honeyed words”, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, always puts together a strong argument. I must say, however, he was on pretty weak ground when he tried to suggest that it was not the Prime Minister who decided that the next general election will be on 7 May 2015. No less an authority than his own dear leader said:

“We have a Prime Minister who is the first in history to relinquish the right to set the date of the general election”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/10; col. 622.]

Who did set the date of 7 May 2015? If it was not the Prime Minister, who was it? That decision was quite clearly made by this Prime Minister, and the only rights he is relinquishing are those of future Prime Ministers. I suggest taking the Denis Healey advice on that one—when in a hole, stop digging. The Prime Minister made his decision, with the Deputy Prime Minister, for the understandable political reason that they are in a fragile political situation following the general election and they had best try to bank five years in the job rather than risk their term being foreshortened. I really cannot put it any more strongly than that.

The noble and learned Lord suggested—and this may or may not be true; this is, by definition, something that cannot be demonstrated conclusively—that there might have been a few more general elections than I said since the Second World War if the provisions of this Bill had been in operation. He suggested that there might have been scenarios in which a general election would have been triggered according to the provisions that deal with that. I find that argument pretty unconvincing. I am trying to imagine a scenario in the House of Commons when two-thirds of the Members—that means the whole of the governing party and a substantial number of opposition party members—were cheerfully voting together to charge to the polls. It is very difficult to imagine.

The only time when an election would have been triggered under the provisions of this Bill was in 1979, when the Government lost a vote of confidence. I will not repeat too much of what was said on Second Reading, but that seems to have been the perfect operation of our constitutional arrangements. It was beyond improvement. Why on earth we need to start defining that kind of thing in legislation is beyond me. It was a magnificent occasion although, from my perspective, it was also a magnificent defeat. It was the constitution working as it should have done, and we only diminish the constitution by these provisions. But we will come to that later.

I am encouraged by a number of the contributions to this debate that were, on balance, more in favour of acknowledging that this is a fundamental change. Having fewer general elections weakens the electorate—surely we can agree on that. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, as ever, put forward an interesting tangential view. I agree with him that perhaps the electorate would not give the answer to the question, “How many elections do you want?”, that we might assume they would. They might decide, “We can’t be bothered with another blooming election for quite a few years now”. That is quite possible. However, I certainly think that they should have, as my noble friend said, the right to decide whether, instead of having an election every three years and 10 months on average, there should be one every five years. That, surely, is a fundamental constitutional change. I do not want to misrepresent what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, but I think that he as good as said that, as did a number of other speakers.

I realise that there is a weakness in my amendment, which is what my noble friend Lady Hayter said I might say. It was a pity that she did not go to New Zealand earlier because I would have loved to have heard her views of what the people there felt about changing their electoral system from first past the post and whether it had brought undiminished joy and happiness in the way that people who argue for proportional representation suggest.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

It does bring the likelihood of coalition very much to the fore. Some people favour that and some do not, but undoubtedly in New Zealand the great advantage for those who support coalitions is that abandoning first past the post makes a coalition more likely.

[Lord Grocott]

I wish even more that we had had the benefit of a contribution from my noble friend and that she had been to New Zealand earlier. Perhaps we should take some advice on that front. However, her fundamental point was that, if you are going to increase the gap between general elections, you should certainly not do so without consulting the electorate.

I do not know whether the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, was supporting the proposal for a referendum but I very much agreed with him on what I think he referred to as the “constitutional madness” of the Government or a phrase of that sort. He said that they have got everything else right—which I obviously do not agree with—but they are getting constitutional reform wrong.