European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Goldsmith]

13A: Clause 1, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations bringing into force subsection (1) may not be made until the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament proposals for arrangements for the continued application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to retained EU law under sections 2, 3 and 4.”

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, we now come to the first group of amendments that deals with the exclusion from the Bill of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. A number of amendments relate to the exclusion of the charter and to its specific provisions, so this may be a convenient place to debate the general principle of what the Government are proposing and the issues to which that gives rise. I shall therefore speak also to Amendments 14, 20, 25 and 34. Amendments 46, 47, 333 and 347 are consequential and I apprehend that there will be no need to say anything more about them.

The starting point for these amendments is the Government’s decision to exclude the European Charter of Fundamental Rights from the carryover into domestic law of existing EU law that the Bill is otherwise designed to achieve. As noble Lords know, and as the Government have been at pains to point out, the purpose of the Bill is to maintain legal continuity, certainty and stability for businesses and individuals by incorporating EU law as it stands into UK law. As the Prime Minister said in her foreword to the White Paper, the purpose is to ensure that:

“The same rules and laws will apply on the day after exit as on the day before”.


The White Paper goes on to explain that it will then be for democratically elected representatives in the UK, in this Parliament and the devolved Administrations, to decide whether to change that law after full and proper scrutiny and debate. This decision to bring EU law into UK law at the moment of exit is an essential part of the plan to provide clarity and is necessary, it is said by the Government, to bolster confidence and planning as the Brexit process comes into effect. The noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal said at Second Reading that this is,

“about ensuring that people’s rights are maintained. It is vital to a smooth and orderly exit from the EU”.—[Official Report, 30/1/18; col. 1374.]

However, there is one glaring and deeply troubling exception to the proposal to bring EU law into domestic law so that it is the same the day after exit as it was the day before: the exclusion of the charter, in its entirety, from this exercise.

In another place, the Solicitor-General described the exercise as downloading EU law into domestic law, but what is not being downloaded is the charter. In another place, Sir Keir Starmer noted that although thousands of provisions of EU law are being converted into domestic law, and may have to be modified in some sense after that exercise, only one provision in the thousands on thousands of provisions of EU law is singled out for extinction, and that is the charter. That gives rise to a conundrum.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Is the noble and learned Lord going to come on to explaining why it was, when he was Attorney-General and working with Tony Blair, he worked so hard to try to get the charter excluded from the Lisbon treaty? Indeed, they thought they had achieved such an opt-out from the treaty until it was overruled subsequently by the European Court of Justice. Surely what we are doing now is trying to fulfil the objective that he himself had in mind.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Goldsmith]

I can see noble Lords opposite are all very well briefed. I predicted this at Second Reading. I will come on to that, but let me make some progress on the arguments which matter.

[Noble Lords]

Answer!

[Lord Goldsmith]

No, I will make some progress on the arguments which matter. As the Constitution Committee of this House said at paragraph 119 of its report, the conundrum is this:

“The primary purpose of this Bill is to maintain legal continuity and promote legal certainty by retaining existing EU law as part of our law, while conferring powers on ministers to amend the retained EU law. If, as the Government suggests, the Charter of Fundamental Rights adds nothing to the content of EU law which is being retained, we do not understand why an exception needs to be made for it. If, however, the Charter does add value, then legal continuity suggests that the Bill should not make substantive changes to the law which applies immediately after exit day”.


I want to examine the reasons that are put forward for not including the charter. The more I look at the arguments, the more convinced I become that the Government have got it wrong. I will not deny that there are issues as to the best way to bring the charter into effect in domestic law, and there are other amendments which will debate that, but Amendment 13A would require the Government to bring forward proposals for its continued application and the route by which the charter can be given effect.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Would the noble and learned Lord tell the Committee whether he is contemplating that the charter should be incorporated into domestic law as a statute, and as such be capable of amendment?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am suggesting that the charter is brought into domestic law in the same way as all the other provisions of EU law will be brought into domestic law by this Bill, if it is passed. That means that they will be subject to the powers in the clauses that will be passed for amendment through orders, if this House and the other place approve that way of doing it. They will also, of course, as always, be subject to amendment by primary legislation. I will come on to this, but it is interesting that special protection is given to the ECHR through the Human Rights Act to protect it as we go forward, but there is no protection provided at all for the rights which underlie the charter. That is one of the deficiencies that are not taken account of in the Government’s proposal.

[Baroness Deech]

Does the noble and learned Lord accept that perhaps we are being tied in knots by his argument? The nub of the charter, and why it is different from the European Convention on Human Rights and our Human Rights Act, is that the charter says that judges can set aside, invalidate or nullify our Acts of Parliament. That is the nub of it and is why it does not sit with the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty. If you incorporate it in domestic law, you are in a real tangle, because if you try to repeal it, judges could set that aside. You end up in a vicious spiral.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the intervention. Of course it is not the charter which provides that, in certain circumstances, our courts have the ability to disapply domestic law; it is EU law and its ability to override Parliament. That is not what the charter has created; it is EU law that has created it. That is something which this Bill is intended to remove.

I want to get back on to the reasons why. The first reason put forward—this is the nub of the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Lawson—is that the charter merely codifies existing rights and principles.

[Noble Lords]

Lamont!

[Lord Goldsmith]

I apologise to both noble Lords. The proposition is that the charter does no more than codify existing rights and principles, so it is not necessary to bring it in. It has been said, for example, by the very distinguished and independent Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law that that proposition is demonstrably not correct. It sets that out in a detailed report that I commend to noble Lords. An opinion of Queen’s Counsel obtained by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission concludes that in fact this would lead to a significant weakening of human rights protection in the United Kingdom. Against those independent statements, it is no wonder that many NGOs and many members of civil society are deeply troubled about the exclusion of the charter. It is not just civil society that is concerned about that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, noted in the last debate, but industries such as the tech industry.

One can find examples of rights that are not protected in the report, which I also commend to noble Lords, by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In its right-by-right analysis it identifies which rights are already included in our law and which are not. For example, on the very first item in the charter—Article 1 on the protection of human dignity, which many people would regard as the most fundamental human right and the basis of all others—the Government’s right-by-right analysis gives two reasons for saying that that would be continued: first, an unincorporated treaty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which does not have enforceable effect in this country at all; and, secondly, as a general principle of EU law—but, as noble Lords will know, this Bill seeks to prevent general principles of EU law being given effect or creating any enforceable rights. That is an aspect that we will have to come back to later in the debates on the Bill.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord identifies the fact that certain rights are no longer protected adequately because the charter contains rights that are not there in the European convention or, presumably, otherwise provided for by law. Could he tell the House why the Human Rights Act was not expanded to take into account the protection of these laws? At no time from 1998 to the time when the Labour Government lost power was there any attempt to include these rights that he now says are a central part of our law.

[Lord Goldsmith]

They were, because the charter provided for them. The Human Rights Act incorporated one set of provisions only, the European Convention on Human Rights, which goes back to just after the Second World War and which provides the classic political and civil rights. The other rights that we find in the charter, which is a much longer document and refers to socioeconomic rights, were not included in the Human Rights Act because they were not included in the European Convention on Human Rights.

The right-by-right analysis demonstrates which of these rights are not included. Given that the Government’s objective, as stated by the Prime Minister, is to ensure that the protections for people in this country are the same the day after exit as the day before, I respectfully suggest that it is not for me to identify why that is not right; it is for the Government to demonstrate why it is. When we have substantial independent bodies such as the Bingham Centre and independent opinions from QCs demonstrating that actually it is not the case that the protections remain the same, the Government need to explain. I shall come on to that further.

Obviously there are examples of rights in the charter that reflect precisely other rights that we have within our law. In particular, there are a number of rights in the charter that are explicitly based on the European Convention on Human Rights; they are the same. Indeed, during the negotiations I went to some pains to try to ensure that they were phrased in the same way so as to prevent lawyers from saying, “It’s written differently so it must mean something different”. However, those are not the only rights that are there. As I noted at Second Reading, the charter is based not just on the European Convention on Human Rights but on principles of EU law and on principles that are commonly accepted by the member states, and those are in a different position from the ECHR rights.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Just take one of the rights that is precisely mirrored in the convention. Is it suggested that henceforth, the wise complainant who faces primary legislation here which is incompatible with that right should therefore sue under both the charter and the convention because, lo and behold, under the convention, despite the constitutional arrangement whereby the court’s powers are limited to a declaration of incompatibility, he can disapply the primary legislation? Is that to be the consequence: that in a case where it matches, the convention trumps the constitutional settlement we arrived at, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, referred?

[Lord Goldsmith]

That will depend on the shape of the Bill when it is completed—in particular, what is said about the provisions which deal with primacy of EU law—but at the moment, as the noble and learned Lord will know well from the cases he sat on, people have been bringing cases by reference to both the charter and the convention. One reason for that is that the protection under the charter is more powerful. In future, if people want protection of human rights, they will want the more powerful protection, and if that remains available after the Bill is enacted, they will look to it.

[Baroness Deech]

So if that protection is more powerful, the entire British structure relating to human fertilisation and embryology, which is very liberal and go-ahead, could be wiped out by the application of Article 3. It is very fortunate that the bodies opposed to our progress in reproductive rights have not cottoned on to that. It talks about the prohibition of eugenics, whatever that is, and selection of persons. By interpretation, it would stop us doing mitochondrial research, selection of embryos to screen out disease and a whole host of other things. Another article ensures continuing freedom of movement. Surely we do not want that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble Baroness raises two different points. Some of the rights in the charter plainly do not continue after exit because they are dependent on our membership of the EU. Those include freedom of movement, which is based, as the explanations of the charter plainly show, on the rights that currently exist. There are others, such as the right to vote in European elections, which will not apply.

Let me make this point now, because it is one of the objections raised to keeping the charter in. As with many other provisions of EU law, there will need to be changes—I think they are described as deficiencies in the Bill; defects. For example, other provisions of EU law refer to bodies to which we will no longer belong or to supervising agencies with which we will no longer be concerned because we will have left the European Union. That is what the provisions of the deficiency orders are intended to deal with. So, too, they can deal with matters under the charter which no longer have effect for that reason.

The noble Baroness’s first point was a different matter, which was to do with the ambit of Article 3. I am sure that she has it clearly in mind, but the explanations of Article 3 make it clear that:

“The reference to eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons, relates to possible situations in which selection programmes are organised and implemented, involving campaigns for sterilisation, forced pregnancy, compulsory ethnic marriage among others, all acts deemed to be international crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court”.


I do not doubt that the noble Baroness would be as opposed to those provisions as the rest of us would be. In relation to reproductive cloning, which may be what she had in mind, the explanations talk about being against reproductive cloning, but that is not the same as therapeutic cloning. We can have debates about that if need be.

Let me move on, if I may, because I have only started to deal with one aspect of the issue. In terms of the substantive protections that the charter provides but the ECHR does not, although it covers many of the same, reference has been made already to the case of Mr David Davis himself and Mr Tom Watson. I say this not because it is amusing to point the finger at Mr Davis, in his current position, having relied on the charter, as we know he did, but because it is illustrative of something significant. As a Back Bencher, he and Mr Watson brought a case against the provisions of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act—DRIPA. Mr Davis was concerned that they would impinge on the ability of MPs to have confidential communications from their constituents. In his argument, he and his lawyers relied on the charter, and they were successful in doing so. The court agreed that the charter was relevant.

Another example of new rights, developed rights or rights that have emerged through the dynamic approach of the charter is in the Google Spain case in which the right to be forgotten arose as a result of an examination of Articles 7 and 8 by the Court of Justice of the European Union. So, there are a number of examples where the substantive protections will be different. I have made it clear that there are many examples where the substantive protections are the same, but the purpose behind the Bill is to make sure that the protections for people are the same the day after leaving as the day before.

It is not just the substantive protections. There are different remedies, one of which has been referred to already—the ability to disapply legislation if that is where the Bill ends up at the end of the day. That is a more powerful remedy than the Human Rights Act. That was demonstrated in the Benkharbouche case when the State Immunity Act was disapplied so that foreign employees of an embassy could bring claims, which they would not otherwise be able to bring, so as to produce a more just situation.

The Government’s position on the substantive protections appears to have changed. I understood that the Government said that the protections would be the same, but now the formula that appears to be being used is that there will be no significant loss of substantive protection. That is not the same thing. No significant loss of substantive protection means that there is some loss of substantive protection, though someone takes the view that it is not significant. That is not the same as the principle the Prime Minister’s foreword set out.

Will the Minister respond to the following questions? First, will he confirm that the Government no longer contend that disapplying, excluding the charter, will lead to all the same existing substantive protections, or do they accept that some of them will not exist? If so, will he tell the Committee either now or subsequently what those are? Secondly, I referred to the phrase “no significant loss of substantive protections”. Does the Minister agree that that leaves aside the question of whether procedural or other protections will be excluded as a result of excluding the charter from this protection? I ask the Minister to identify what the differences are and whether he accepts that there will be a loss of protection, even though the Government wish to say that it is not significant, so that the Committee can judge. Also, he will need to say, please, why that meets the objective the Prime Minister set in her foreword to the White Paper.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I promise that I will not intervene again—I loathe intervening. But does the noble and learned Lord agree, although he proposes the domestication of the charter, it will still be necessary in future to decide what is within the ambit of what used to be EU law, because that is where the operation of the charter is presently confined—or does he suggest that now it opens up and encompasses all UK law, so that it is a wider application than it was originally? Are we going to have to go again through the impossible exercise, notoriously uncertain in application, of having to decide what is specifically and directly within the ambit of EU law in future as well?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I know that this is a point that troubles him, but he should bear in mind that what we have in Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of the Bill are provisions to bring specific aspects of EU derived legislation and EU direct effect legislation into UK law. That is the Union law that will continue, and that is what is defined as retained EU law—and it is to that retained EU law that the charter will continue to have effect under the scheme that I advocate to your Lordships, not to anything else or more broadly UK law.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

So the right to dignity would exist in the context of EU law, but not otherwise? Is that really how it is intended to work? Can the noble and learned Lord give an illustration of a case that will succeed under the right to human dignity in future—I mean, there has not ever been one in the past that has succeeded under that—when otherwise it would fail?

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord knows that I took Article 1 as an example only because it is the very first article in the charter. I have respectfully invited noble Lords to look at the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, where the committee goes through each of the articles and through what the Government have said in relation to them, and identifies where they find place already in existing, enforceable UK law, and where they do not. It is where they do not that we are concerned with, and where they do not that there will be the very gap that the Prime Minister has said should not exist.

There is the further problem that, even if the rights survive, they will survive without the enhanced status and protection that they currently have. They have an enhanced status at the moment because of the 1972 Act and because of EU membership, but from the date of this Act they will only survive in a delegated form and be amendable by delegated legislation. They are not protected from being amended or removed by delegated legislation.

Compare the position in relation to the ECHR and the Human Rights Act. The Bill says in three places—in Clauses 7(7)(e), 8(3)(d) and 9(3)(d)—that the Human Rights Act is protected from amendment or revocation. The classic civil and political rights, but no more, which are, rightly, protected by the HRA, are protected from being amended other than by primary legislation to which this House and the other place have specifically agreed after proper scrutiny. However, none of the rights underlying the charter will be protected in that way, unless they find themselves within the ECHR, which is only some of them. That is unacceptable for many people.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I find this very difficult to understand. If you look at the charter, you find reference to the Union in item after item. It begins with a series of rights, but as soon as you penetrate further you find that it is closely related to membership of the Union and things that are guaranteed by its law. If I understood the noble and learned Lord correctly, he wants the charter to be brought in and protected against that kind of amendment in the same way as the Convention on Human Rights. This charter will have to be largely rewritten if we introduce it into our law, but it is not designed for the kind of situation we are facing after Brexit. It is designed for use within the Union and to be interpreted by the CJEU. I simply do not understand how the system is intended to work if it were brought into our law in the way the noble and learned Lord is suggesting.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord will recall that, whenever he opposed me with that argument from his position in the House of Lords or Supreme Court, I did my best to try to explain why there is an error in his thinking. With respect, I do the same here. If one takes, for example, one of the rights in the charter which does derive from Union law, is it to be said that although it is going to be transposed into our law as an EU retained law, it will no longer be subject to any of the protections that it has at the moment through being subject to the charter? It does not mean, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, suggested, that all UK law will be subject to this protection. It does mean that that law which is currently subject to that protection will continue to be so unless and until it is amended. That is the way that one gives effect to the intention that the law should be the same the day after Brexit as the day before.

I want to underline that we are talking about the extent of substantive protections; other protections and their extent; and the lack of enhancement of rights. These are all distinct points. I will also refer to the loss of the effect of charter principles. Noble Lords who have studied the charter will know that as well as rights there are principles. The principles are more aspirational, but they guide the legislator and that is a useful thing to have. Even leaving that aside, the other items I identified—the substantive protections, their nature and their enhancement or lack of it—are all things which mean we will not have the same protections after exit day as we have at the moment.

[Lord Faulks]

Is the noble and learned Lord telling the House that these principles are going to be actionable on their own?

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble Lord knows that that is not the position in relation to the principles: they are guidance and aspirational. I am not spending a lot of time on them, although some of the NGOs have. I will give one example. There was a case in which the EU’s proposed legislation in relation to plain packaging of tobacco products was challenged in the courts on the grounds that it contravened freedom of expression. One of the things that the court looking at that noted was that the charter provided for a high degree of public protection in terms of health. I hope that all noble Lords agree with that sentiment, whether or not they agree with the result of the case. That is an example of where the principles come into effect.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I apologise for interrupting the noble and learned Lord a second time. We have listened to what he has said with great care. He has spoken for 34 minutes. He said that he would answer the question I posed at the very beginning of his speech—namely, why he had altered his mind when previously he had tried to keep the charter out of the Lisbon treaty, when he then said that it ought to have no direct domestic effect. Why has he changed his mind?

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I was about to come to that and I am grateful to the noble Lord.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Goldsmith]

I said that I would come back to it, and that is what I intended to do. A number of things have happened since the charter was drafted, as I said on Second Reading. The courts have referred to provisions of the charter and have given them effect. The decision was made to give the charter legal effect, which was not the way we started the negotiation. That is what happened in the Lisbon treaty, but that was not the original intention. That is what we argued against at the time, precisely so as to avoid the situation in which the courts were in a position to give effect to rights that we had not expected them to give effect to. That is what changed. That is why we now have a situation, where, as I have said, in a number of cases the courts have said that the charter has an effect and provides enforceable rights to individuals.

I conclude. The Joint Committee on Human Rights considered that the Government’s decision to exclude the charter, while effectively retaining nearly all other EU law, was taken without having undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the implications for the protection of rights. I cannot say whether that is right, but this amendment would require a focus to be given to that so that we can see what the correct analysis is and what the right way to proceed is. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 14A, 20A and 25A in this group, which stand in my name. I apologise for the absence of my noble friend Lord Bowness, who has put his name to a number of amendments but cannot be here because of weather conditions. He has asked me to apologise to your Lordships for his absence.

The purpose of the three amendments standing in my name is to ensure that the terms of the charter, if incorporated into domestic law, are capable of amendment by Parliament. This may be implied by the other amendments, but I think not. I listened very carefully to the noble and learned Lord. While there is a capacity to remedy deficiencies by regulation, there is no capacity to enable Parliament to mount a careful scrutiny and amendment of the charter. Therefore, the purpose of my amendments is to make it explicit that the charter, if incorporated into domestic law, is subject to parliamentary scrutiny and amendment.

I do not want to say very much by way of a general justification for the need to incorporate the charter; I am conscious that the noble and learned Lord who has spoken has much greater expertise than I. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will probably speak. He, too, has much greater knowledge of this than I. I am but a journeyman lawyer and I have never had to wrestle with the charter’s significance in domestic terms. However, I noticed last week in the Times that Professor Bogdanor made a very powerful case for not scrapping the rights. The important thing that your Lordships need to keep in mind is that the charter provides a number of rights and remedies not found elsewhere in our domestic law. That point was made by the noble and learned Lord.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 14, the effect of which is to retain the charter as part of domestic law and to retain EU law under which claimants would be able to have domestic legislation struck down on the basis of incompatibility with the charter. Some noble Lords have expressed the view that they were baffled by the exclusion of the charter from this legislation, but I felt that the arguments were put very simply and cogently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, at Second Reading when he simply pointed out that the charter is only one part of our extensive framework of human rights, that there would be a risk of confusion because of conflict with the ECHR and that what this was doing was complicating the situation to no good purpose.

Furthermore, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has produced a memorandum showing how existing rights are being provided for in the legislation and in retained law. He has also gone further and said that if anyone can provide specific examples of rights that are not provided for, he will give the matter due consideration. Various people have suggested various things that may or may not be suitable for inclusion, but they will no doubt be considered by the Secretary of State and could be considered for primary legislation.

I asked the noble and learned Lord why he had changed his mind about the incorporation of the charter, which he and Prime Minister Blair strongly opposed in the Lisbon treaty. I do not want to go over that, as I think I made my point, but I suggest to the noble and learned Lord that he had very good reasons for excluding it, and that now is an opportunity—

[Lord Goldsmith]

In fact, this country accepted that the charter would become part of EU law in the Lisbon treaty—it is the opposite of what the noble Lord said.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Against the noble and learned Lord’s will. There was also an attempt to get an opt-out, which the European Court of Justice said was not valid. I see that the Minister is agreeing with me. I believe that is a correct account of what happened. It was struck down. The case in which it happened was, I think, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The potential answer is no, and the note says that my time is up. Nevertheless, and be that as it may, we will endeavour to address these issues as soon as we can. Clearly it will require us not only to consider the position we have adopted already in the document published in December last year but to take into consideration the concerns expressed by other lawyers and in this Committee in the course of the debate. We will look at those and we will want to address them at the next stage of the Bill; of that, I am confident.

At this stage I appreciate that there are some questions which I have not directly answered in the course of my response and it may be difficult to do so in the time remaining. Perhaps I may say that I endorse entirely the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood, with regard to the potential difficulties of simply drawing the charter over into domestic law. I am not going to elaborate on the consequences of doing that, but they can be summarised as confusion, uncertainty and difficulty, and ultimately could prove to be counterproductive. In these circumstances, I invite the noble and learned Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have taken part in the debate. It has been wide-ranging, as we anticipated it would be. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his remarks. I shall obviously not spend long on what I say now, given the hour. As we approached midnight, I was looking around the corner to see whether a pumpkin would arrive with horses. I was not sure whether it would be for me or for the noble and learned Lord opposite.