Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Monday 10th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, this group consists of three government amendments that, if not technical amendments, are certainly not controversial. Amendment 114 is intended to remove uncommenced elements of Section 67 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and make a minor consequential amendment to the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

I know that it might seem odd for this House to be considering again a provision that was debated so recently both here and in the other place, but it is right for us to do so. This amendment repeals provisions in the LASPO Act that, if brought into force, would mean that the courts could consider a case where an offender has breached a community order without reasonable excuse and allow the order to continue unchanged.

Having reconsidered their position, the Government do not think that it is appropriate for offenders to breach their community order and not face any sanction at all. We must ensure that both offenders and the public have confidence in community orders and take them seriously. Offenders will not take their order seriously if breaching does not have consequences. If an offender breaches a community order, we believe that a court should be able to take one of the three following actions: make the order more onerous; revoke the order and resentence for the original offence; or impose a fine. The last option allows the order to remain unchanged, while at the same time imposing a penalty for the breach. The courts did not have this power until it was included in the LASPO Act 2012. I am sure noble Lords will be pleased to know that it was brought into force on 3 December.

The Government believe that this revised framework provides the courts with the right options for dealing with failures to comply with community orders. It will still give the courts different options to tailor responses to breaches to individual offenders. However, it will also ensure there is a sanction of some sort for any offender who is found to have breached. Accordingly, on further consideration, we now believe that there is no good case for allowing offenders who fail to comply with court orders without a reasonable excuse to receive no penalty.

Amendment 114 also corrects a technical error in Section 150 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This section was amended by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, which prevents a court from making a community sentence where a mandatory minimum sentence for the new aggravated knife possession offences in the LASPO Act apply. The LASPO change inadvertently prevents the court from giving a 16 or 17 year-old a youth rehabilitation order, which is the youth equivalent of the adult community order for these offences. Amendment 114 corrects this technical error so that the new provisions work as they were originally intended to. Without this amendment, were the court to decide to set aside the mandatory minimum, it would not be able to give a youth rehabilitation order and would therefore have no option but to give a lesser penalty such as a referral order or a fine.

Amendments 113H and 113J are of a technical nature. The intention is to allow for the transfer of community orders and suspended sentences to Northern Ireland, where an order containing location monitoring under the new electronic monitoring requirement is made in England or Wales but the offender lives in, or is planning to move to, Northern Ireland. It is already possible to transfer existing orders to Northern Ireland, so this provision merely extends that capability to the new location monitoring provision that we are introducing in the Bill. Although location monitoring is not currently available in Northern Ireland under existing contractual arrangements, this will be addressed in the retendering of the contract in 2013. This provision will therefore enable appropriate cases to be transferred when the operational arrangements are in place in Northern Ireland. The transfer will be possible only where the court is satisfied that the appropriate arrangements are in place. This means that the tag will be capable of being fitted and the offender’s location will then be able to be monitored. If the court is not satisfied that the necessary tracking technology is available, the court in England and Wales will not be able to transfer the order.

Noble Lords will have noticed that the provision covers Northern Ireland but not Scotland. This is because at the moment there is no statutory provision for the imposition of tracking as a requirement in Scotland. If and when the time comes that Scottish courts can impose location monitoring as a requirement, we will bring forward legislation enabling the transfer of orders, including such requirements, from England and Wales to the Scottish jurisdiction. I beg to move.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I rise slightly diffidently to ask a question about Amendment 114. I am not sure that I fully understood what the Minister said, though I am sure it is my fault. At one point I thought he was saying that the effect of Amendment 114 was to take out from LASPO an obligation to deal with breaches and insert instead a power to deal with breaches and give the court the opportunity to make its own mind up, but then I thought I understood him to be saying the opposite, that the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that where there is a breach of a community order the court is obliged to impose some penalty. I would be grateful if he would clarify that.

Perhaps the Minister could also clarify how it comes about that we are asked to amend LASPO quite so quickly and whether or not the passages that would be amended—indeed, removed—by this amendment were debated. I have no recollection as to whether or not they were, but it would be good to know if something that was debated, for example, in this House is now being removed in this way at 9.45 pm on the penultimate day of Report.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord is long enough in the tooth to remember other times when Governments have taken a second look at relatively recent legislation.

To clarify, Amendment 114 will remove uncommenced elements of Section 67 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The provision being removed would have empowered courts dealing with a breach of a community order to allow the order to continue unchanged. Not commencing the provision means that the court must make the order more onerous, resentence for the original offence or fine the offender for breach. In lay man’s language—which is the only language I can use, because I am a lay man in this—in the Government’s opinion, the LASPO Act left an option that they now wish to change, which is that breaches of the order could have gone unpunished. We do not think that that is a sensible way of getting people to take the orders seriously and therefore this amendment empowers the courts to make the order more onerous, resentence for the original offence or fine the offender for breach.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 116ZA and to refer to Amendment 116E, which stands in my name in this group. Both amendments touch on a similar point, although possibly from different perspectives. I note that my noble friend Lord Beecham and I have perhaps started in slightly different places on this part of the Bill, although maybe we are moving towards a middle position. As the House knows, I am one of those who has been more in the enthusiastic group who support the introduction of deferred prosecution agreements. I believe that they are capable of assisting enormously, in particular cases, in dealing with the problems with which we are faced in crime.

I am sorry that the Government have such a blinkered approach to where these deferred prosecution agreements can assist. What obviously lies behind my Amendment 116E is at least to enable other offences to be added to the list of those that are covered by deferred prosecution agreements without the need for further primary legislation. I have no illusions as to whether the Government will accept this amendment. I am grateful for the meeting to which my noble friend Lord Beecham has already referred and for the attention paid to what was said by a number of us in that meeting. I am also clear that the Government will not move, which is a shame.

Although my amendment deals with offences, the Minister will recall that not only I but others in this Chamber have been concerned also about the ambit of deferred prosecution agreements. It is not strictly speaking the subject of an amendment tonight but the question of reviewing this includes whether it can be reviewed not only to consider the efficacy of the system as it is being introduced but also whether its ambit is appropriate, both in terms of offences and, I repeat, in terms of individuals.

Perhaps I may say this to the noble Lord and, through him, to his ministerial colleagues and their officials: I believe that the Government are making a big mistake in not seeing the advantage of deferred prosecutions in other cases. In this House previously, in Committee, I referred to the benefits that I have seen, particularly in relation to drug offences. If you go to any Crown Court in the country—certainly, this was the case when I sat regularly there and I believe it is likely still to be the case—you will see case after case to do with drugs. It is either a drug offence, or an offence of petty theft, burglary, mugging or something of that sort to get money for drugs. It is hugely damaging to our society but we do not seem to be that good at finding solutions to it. I believe that the carrot and stick approach, which deferred prosecution agreements provide, is one way to deal with that.

I know that the Minister will not respond positively to that today and I know that he will not respond positively to my amendment. However, as my noble friend Lord Beecham said, I hope that there can be a clear commitment to review the operation. I ask the Minister to accept that that commitment should include looking at not just whether the system is working, as it is about to be enacted, but also whether it could be more broadly based in relation to offences or to individuals. If he cannot give that assurance, I, for one, would support—although this was not my position previously—my noble friend Lord Beecham’s amendment as a way of forcing that review.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I shall speak briefly to both amendments. While I support in outline the idea that there should be a review, the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Rosser, does not include a provision for an extension of the schedule. It seems to me that a review should be part of a continuing process. I agree very much with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that there is considerable potential for deferred prosecution agreements. I would expect a review to come out with a recommendation for extension, rather than for limitation, and certainly for continuation of the system unless it turns out to have been a failure, which is not the expectation that I have.

I also agree with the noble and learned Lord in his amendment. I think it is a shame that the range of offences is confined to financial and economic offences. I entirely understand the Government’s position that, at this stage, this is an exercise in putting a toe into the water in unfamiliar territory, and I accept that it is unfamiliar territory. However, the extension of the offences under paragraph 31 of the schedule is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. For my part, I do not see a huge distinction between adding other financial and economic offences to the list of offences under that procedure and adding the other offences of which we spoke at the meeting and in the debate in Committee. Health and safety and environmental offences have been mentioned, and drug offences were mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.

We are in the middle of providing for what the Minister has called a rehabilitation revolution. I regard that as a useful phrase and a useful and beneficial concept. It seems to me that deferred prosecution agreements, with their potential for arrangements to be made to encourage future compliant behaviour, can be seen as part of that overall rehabilitation revolution. I know that my noble friend will not accept these amendments tonight, but I urge him to bear in mind, with those in his department in charge of these things, that a wider view can be taken of these agreements.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Goldsmith]

116A: Schedule 17, page 262, line 21, leave out sub-paragraph (4)

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I will speak to all four amendments in this group, which are in my name. Amendments 116A and 116B cover the same grounds. They are really alternatives, and I will explain why. However, the fundamental point is that they deal with the provision in the Bill that the,

“amount of any financial penalty agreed between the prosecutor and”—

the company—let us call it that—

“must be broadly comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed on”—

the company—

“on conviction for the alleged offence following a guilty plea”.

I firmly believe that that is a wrong provision. It removes, first, the incentive for an agreement to be made. It is odd, because the Government put forward the limitations on the deferred prosecution agreement on the pragmatic grounds that it is often difficult to prosecute these offences. Therefore they want to have an alternative system which people suspected guilty of financial or economic crime will be prepared to accept. Well, they will be prepared to accept it if the offer is acceptable. There is another point to which I will come, but this provision says that if you do the deal you can only do it on the basis of the same financial penalty. Bear in mind that we are dealing with companies and commercial organisations which cannot be sent to prison, so it is the financial penalty which matters. It seems, with respect, to make no sense to remove the possibility from an agreement which provides some sort of incentive to make that agreement. To impose a requirement that the penalty must be,

“broadly comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed on … a guilty plea”,

seems, as I have suggested, to be wrong in principle.

However, there is another reason. It was pointed out clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, in Committee, when he noted that this provision only applies if there is a financial penalty. There are a number of options in the agreement: a financial penalty; compensation; donation of money to charity; disgorgement of profits; implementing a compliance programme; and so on. There is a whole menu, but this provision says that if you have a financial penalty is has got to be the same fine that would have been imposed, broadly speaking.

That seems to lead to an absurd situation. In the discussions that are taking place, the company will say, “We don’t want to pay the full fine that we would have paid. We are prepared to accept our guilt even though we think that we could fight this in court and get off, but we do not want to pay the full penalty”. Then the prosecutor is faced with saying, “Well, either that means no penalty at all, because then I can escape the straitjacket of subsection (4), or you have to pay the full penalty, so there is no deal. So we will be forced to go into court; we may lose the case; it will cost the public a great deal”. It seems to make no sense at all, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, was quite right to draw attention to that.

It is critical that deferred prosecution agreements work. Of all the amendments necessary to make this work, I suggest that this is one. One needs to remove the straitjacket whereby the penalty has to be the same as the fine that would have been imposed. In promoting that—I shall come to the way to do it—I want to underline that the scheme that the Government have put forward contains safeguards against a wrong agreement. Those safeguards are, first, that the deal has to be approved by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the director of the Serious Fraud Office or another senior prosecutor specifically designated for that role. There is no doubt that a senior prosecutor will have to make the decision. Secondly, the deal has to go through not one but two approvals of the court, the preliminary approval and the final approval. That is the structure of the proposal. I cannot see why this opportunity to make an agreement with some greater incentive should be removed.

There are two ways of achieving this, and that is what my two alternative amendments are designed to do. One is simply to remove sub-paragraph (4) altogether. I would be content with that. It achieves the objective and it leaves it to the discretion of the prosecutor and the court to fix the right elements. If there is some sentencing guideline as to what is appropriate, that is perfectly proper and perhaps it does not need to be contained in the Bill. That way of dealing with the matter meets an objection raised when I spoke to the other amendment in Committee when it was said that by saying “not more than broadly comparable”, one had to work out what the fine would have been, that that was difficult and it was therefore unreasonable to say that it should be “not more than broadly comparable”. I did not say then what I say now: that seems to be an objection to the provision as it stands, in any event. If the Government prefer, I accept that the alternative way of doing this would be not to say that the amount of any financial penalty should be “broadly comparable” to the fine that would have been imposed on a guilty plea, but “not more than” such a fine. It sets a finite level.

I want to make one further point before I briefly deal with the two other amendments in my name, Amendments 116C and 116D. I have gone back to the consultation paper to consider what respondents actually said on this issue because a question arose in our meeting as to whether I had recollected correctly that a majority of respondents had thought that the reduction should not be limited to the one-third reduction that one receives on a guilty plea. On page 28 of the Government’s response to the consultation paper at paragraph 102, it is stated:

“57% of respondents disagreed with the proposed maximum reduction of one third”.

Also, paragraph 105 states:

“We have noted the concerns raised by respondents that the maximum penalty level of one third may not prove to be sufficiently attractive in practice”.

Those are exactly the points that I have raised, and it appears that a majority of respondents took that view. I take some heart from that.

The other two amendments go together. Amendments 116C and 116D are simply intended to provide that in a deferred prosecution agreement there should be an obligation to spell out to the person who accepts it what the consequences may be, so that people know where they stand. There may be other ways of achieving that, but it seems right that the deferred prosecution agreement should, one way or another, make it clear to someone who is signing up to it what the consequences may be. Of course, if the person signing up to the agreement is a great corporation advised by substantial firms of lawyers, they do not need such a provision, but these cases may not be limited to such corporations and people deserve to be told just what they are getting into. I beg to move.

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D'Souza)]

My Lords, I should warn your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 116B by reason of pre-emption.

--- Later in debate ---

The suggested amendments would require that every agreement include a term on the possible consequences of non-compliance. We do not think this is necessary, not least since such a term is designed to address a narrow range of non-compliance, which may not be appropriate in every DPA. I know the hour is late, but I trust that this rather lengthy explanation that I have provided to your Lordships’ House has addressed the concerns raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and my noble friend Lord Marks. In the light of this explanation, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I very much regret to say that they have not been addressed. I am not going to press either amendment, but I want to say something about them because I want the Government to think a little further.

As regards the second set, I am afraid that the Government miss my point altogether. I invite the noble Lord and his officials to consider whether there is a way of ensuring that people who sign up to DPAs know what the consequences may be. I am not going to say anything more about that; it is an obvious point. The point that he made in response does not actually meet it; it meets a different point.

Let me go back to the first point. I detected three reasons why—and I was very disappointed by this—they said that it was inappropriate to accept either of the two amendments that I have put forward. One is the fear that if my amendments were accepted, the penalties would get out of line with what would happen in court. If that is saying any more than we want them to be the same, it is adding nothing to that. The parties will be in a position to know what the court would have imposed and can of course use that as a guidance without there being an obligation to fix at the same level.

Secondly, it said that there needs to be a benchmark. You have a benchmark by knowing what a court would do, and that could be a benchmark you can have in mind when you are negotiating. However, my second amendment would include that benchmark; I do not understand why it is thought otherwise. The real point—the third reason which the noble Lord repeated several times—is that it is thought that it will be a soft option. I really would invite the Government to think again. This is not a soft option because what is being overlooked each time is that the range of things that can be achieved in a DPA are not just the financial penalty. You would not get on a conviction an order for compliance; you would not get on a conviction an order for a monitor; you would not get on a conviction an order to make a payment to charity. You might get compensation for victims, but that would probably not be as well as a huge fine, because the court would take into account the fact that there is a limited financial obligation overall that should be imposed on the defendant. So it is not a soft option, and I invite the Government to get out of that frame of thinking about it and maybe one or two other times today the same point has come about.

I urge the Government to think again because they are about to make DPAs unworkable and fail to achieve the objectives they set. I will withdraw the amendment this evening—I am not saying that I will not bring it back. However, I really would respectfully—I do not normally use that word here, but I mean it all the time—invite the Government to think again and to question their view about this amendment. We will see where we get to by Third Reading.

Amendment 116A withdrawn.