Renewable Energy: Costs

Lord Frost Excerpts

Thursday 14th November 2024 Lords Chamber

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[Lord Frost]

That this House takes note of the cost of renewable energy and its effect on energy costs in the United Kingdom.

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my entries in the register of interests. I thank all those Members of your Lordships’ House who have agreed to speak today; I am very grateful to them all.

With COP 29 well under way in Baku, it is a timely moment to have this debate, even if that conference is perhaps attracting rather less interest than in previous years. That is certainly not because of lack of interest in the climate and energy issue. President Trump’s election is likely to open up debate once again at a global level. In the EU, we see increasing levels of doubt about the policy consequences of the climate commitments already made. Here in the UK, we have the new Government’s plan to decarbonise the energy grid by 2030, with the report last week from NESO, the newly formed National Energy System Operator, constituting the first detailed commentary on that plan.

Central to that plan is delivery of large-scale renewable capacity for our energy grid, both wind—onshore and offshore—and solar, together with a revamp of the transmission system to handle that. The NESO report provides us with costings for all this and much else besides. Like most other official and quasi-official studies on the costs of net zero, the NESO report uses figures already produced by the Government for this purpose. That is why it is such a matter of regret that there appears to be a large measure of disagreement about many of those underlying figures. We would have a much higher quality debate about the costs of net zero overall if there were at least consensus on the underlying figures. There is not, and that is why I felt it right to try to secure today’s debate on this matter. I do not expect we will find consensus today either, I fear, but perhaps we can hope to shed some light on why the differences exist.

The difficulty arises for two broad reasons. First, there are starkly different views of the levelised costs of renewables, particularly onshore and offshore wind, and these are relevant to the closely connected question of subsidies to this sector. Secondly, it is an inevitable consequence of the intermittent nature of renewables that this imposes costs elsewhere on the energy system: back-up, interconnectors, other non-renewable generation, and measures to ensure grid stability, together with the costs of rebuilding and reconfiguring the transmission system—and all this seemingly on a highly ambitious scale. I want to look at these areas in turn.

First, on the levelised costs of renewables—that is, the cost of building and operating wind and solar, discounted over time—the latest figures were published in 2023 by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and, as I said, the NESO report is based on them. Those figures claim that offshore wind can generate power at £44 per megawatt hour in current prices. Yet AR6, the recent round of capacity auctions, awarded contracts for offshore wind at £82 per megawatt hour in current prices. It is difficult to understand why there should be such a significant difference between these figures, if the £44 figure is in any way correct. One becomes even more baffled if one looks at the actual accounts of recently commissioned offshore wind farms, which suggest a production cost of around £100 per megawatt hour, or, indeed, if one looks at the recent payments, published yesterday, to offshore wind farms under contracts for difference, which suggest a production cost of around £150 per megawatt hour.

There are similar huge gaps in other areas of the costings. DESNZ assumes a capital cost for offshore wind of £1.5 million per megawatt of capacity. Yet, once again, looking at the accounts of wind companies, the figure appears to be about £3 million per megawatt, which is twice as much. Indeed, at the end of 2023, the developers of Moray West wind farm were still installing the foundations of the wind farm yet had already, at that point, spent the equivalent of £1.6 million per megawatt hour. It bears noting that if the seemingly correct higher offshore wind capital spending figure were used, the NESO estimate for capex from now to 2030 would go up by about £15 billion every year, taking the total capex from a total of £31 billion to £34 billion to a total of £45 billion to £50 billion annually.

To take just one further difference, the DESNZ figures assume a 61% capacity factor for offshore wind—that is, they assume that over a year, wind farms generate about three-fifths of their notional installed capacity. But once again, recent wind farms are opening at a capacity of 45% when new, and that figure is falling over time. The real capacity factor over the whole of the life of a wind farm may well be under 40%. If that is correct, it means that we will need to build 50% more offshore wind farms to get to the actual power that DESNZ estimates—and, of course, costs will go up by the same amount.

I note that Professor Gordon Hughes from Edinburgh University and Andrew Montford, director of Net Zero Watch, wrote to the Permanent Secretary at DESNZ on 16 September asking for further detail on some of these discrepancies. They have not yet received a reply.

Those figures are just the actual costs of operating offshore wind. The gap between assumptions, auctions and actual real-world costs explains why there has been such a need for subsidies ever since the shift to renewables began in the mid-2000s. The OBR says that “environmental levies”—a catch-all category which covers the renewables obligation, the contracts for difference and the feed-in tariffs—currently stand at about £12 billion a year. That is over £400 for every UK household. Yet one has to ask again: if the real cost of offshore wind really is £44 per megawatt hour, well below current market prices and the prices agreed in auction rounds, why do we need these subsidies at all?

I turn now to my second category: the costs elsewhere in the energy system. I think everybody agrees that there are some such costs; the question is: how high are they and what are the consequentials? The costs are principally those of intermittency, of which there are two kinds. The better-known one is the fact that little power is generated by renewables when the wind does not blow and the sun does not shine—periods like the one we saw in this country for most of last week. This requires back-up, currently mainly gas, and there is obviously a capital cost in maintaining a dual system of any kind. Moreover, the fact that the gas-fired stations cannot be used at close to full capacity but must be turned on and off at short notice brings a cost in reduced efficiency and revenue. The cost of paying operators not to shut their power down as a result of this lack of efficiency—the so-called capacity market—is currently £1 billion a year. The OBR says it will rise to £4 billion in three years’ time.

The other kind of intermittency, which is less well known, is the reverse: what happens when the wind blows and the sun shines when we do not need the power generated. Under current arrangements, that involves us paying the renewables producers not to produce and to turn their kit off to avoid grid instability. That costs £2.5 billion per year, which is expected to rise to £3.5 billion in three years’ time.

It bears noting that the more renewables we produce and build, the bigger these figures will get. The more we rely on renewables, the bigger the problem when we have the wrong kind of weather, and the bigger the concomitant costs are going to be. That is why it is a simple fallacy, though a seemingly widely believed one, that building more renewables reduces costs and brings more security. It is surely clear that the reverse must be true.

Finally, there are the wider knock-on costs, most notably in the plans for what NESO calls “demand management”: rationing of energy if the grid cannot supply enough energy to meet demand. This will come either by compulsion—for example, in plans to reduce supply to industry in such circumstances—or by price rationing to consumers, or both. The NESO plan for demand management is slated to cover, by 2030, five times as much potential demand as now—that is, about 10 gigawatts.

Now noble Lords may say, as people do, there have always been differential energy tariffs. Indeed, some of us are old enough to remember things like Economy 7, from the 1980s. But that was differential pricing to stimulate demand in the night-time, when supply was high but demand was low. This is the reverse; this is a plan for us to put up with differential pricing to reduce demand, when it is demand that is high and supply that is low. That is quite different, and it necessarily imposes an economic cost on industry and the consumer, for they cannot use energy when they want to use it and may have no warning of the fact, either. It is hard to quantify that cost, but it is clearly potentially significant. It should be factored in to the cost of running an intermittent renewables system, but it is not.

The only attempt that I am aware of by government to quantify some of those wider costs—though not all of them, for some are still excluded—was made by the then BEIS in 2020, in its document entitled Energy Generation Costs 2020. This showed, even on the imperfect measures being used, that both offshore and onshore wind were on average likely to be more expensive than modern gas power stations, even allowing for some of the implausible assumptions that I discussed earlier.

Let us try to bring all this together. We have a significant discrepancy—disagreement, call it what you will—in assessments of the levelised costs of renewables. In the case of offshore wind, it is a discrepancy amounting, potentially, to up to £100 per megawatt hour. The high levels of subsidy we are paying in various forms suggest that production costs are in fact quite a lot higher than acknowledged. There are also wider costs to the grid—£3 billion to £5 billion in the current year, growing in future—and to the economy, hard to quantify but definitely present in the various kinds of inefficiencies created by an inefficiently working electricity supply system. In short, one side of the argument sees low levelised costs and believes that they will fall further; the other, with which obviously I associate myself, sees costs that are not falling and that require high and growing levels of subsidy and complexity to make the whole system work properly.

This situation is deeply unsatisfactory. The Government are about to embark on a dash to decarbonise the electricity grid according to an assessment that is based on certainly disputable direct costings, and which will be heavily contested and simply fails to take into account many of the wider costs and consequentials. This really is not good enough; the country is owed better.

I recognise, of course, that when the Minister responds he may not have the information he needs to reply fully to some of these detailed points, but I hope he might do so in writing, and perhaps at the same time encourage his Permanent Secretary to reply to Professor Hughes’ letter, which I mentioned earlier.

I say all this not to make a political point. We really need to understand better the real cost of renewables to the consumer, the Government and the economy. If it turns out that I am wrong and the costs really are low and falling, that will be excellent news for us all. I am doubtful about renewables not on some ideological grounds, but because they seem to me extremely expensive in their own right and to come with many additional costs and security risks too. I have not yet seen the evidence that would persuade me otherwise.

I finish on this point. With this in mind—and I am not sure the Minister will leap with alacrity on what I am about to say, but I hope he might respond anyway—the Government should consider establishing some form of expert committee on this subject, made up of officials and experts from the department and bodies such as NESO and the Climate Change Committee, with a red team of outside experts to provide challenge, to look on a totally transparent basis at the evidence and the costings, and to see how close it could get to a common view. This would seem to me the best way of getting at the reality and an assessment that might command a bit more consensus than the current situation does. Whatever this country’s future energy policy may be, we surely all want it to be established on the best possible analysis and the best possible knowledge. I look forward to the debate today and to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I do not want to detain your Lordships’ House for long. I thank every contributor today for the care with which they have presented their case, and I am grateful to the Minister for his thorough winding up. I did not really expect him to pick up my suggestion, and indeed he did not. I look forward to his full response to some of the points that I raised.

We have heard an extremely interesting set of speeches. If I might be allowed just one reflection, on those that we have heard from proponents of the transition, it is that I detected perhaps a reluctance to tackle some of the specific details of costs and numbers that I mentioned but rather appeals to authority and nebulous assertions about the costs of not acting in relation to our global responsibility and credibility in this regard. I feel that is a little unsatisfactory as a basis for transforming our entire energy system, which is why I suspect we will need to come back to this and related subjects before long in the future. Meanwhile, I commend the Motion to the House.

Motion agreed.