Lord Frost
That this House takes note of the cost of renewable energy and its effect on energy costs in the United Kingdom.
Lord Frost (Con)
My Lords, I draw attention to my entries in the register of interests. I thank all those Members of your Lordships’ House who have agreed to speak today; I am very grateful to them all.
With COP 29 well under way in Baku, it is a timely moment to have this debate, even if that conference is perhaps attracting rather less interest than in previous years. That is certainly not because of lack of interest in the climate and energy issue. President Trump’s election is likely to open up debate once again at a global level. In the EU, we see increasing levels of doubt about the policy consequences of the climate commitments already made. Here in the UK, we have the new Government’s plan to decarbonise the energy grid by 2030, with the report last week from NESO, the newly formed National Energy System Operator, constituting the first detailed commentary on that plan.
Central to that plan is delivery of large-scale renewable capacity for our energy grid, both wind—onshore and offshore—and solar, together with a revamp of the transmission system to handle that. The NESO report provides us with costings for all this and much else besides. Like most other official and quasi-official studies on the costs of net zero, the NESO report uses figures already produced by the Government for this purpose. That is why it is such a matter of regret that there appears to be a large measure of disagreement about many of those underlying figures. We would have a much higher quality debate about the costs of net zero overall if there were at least consensus on the underlying figures. There is not, and that is why I felt it right to try to secure today’s debate on this matter. I do not expect we will find consensus today either, I fear, but perhaps we can hope to shed some light on why the differences exist.
The difficulty arises for two broad reasons. First, there are starkly different views of the levelised costs of renewables, particularly onshore and offshore wind, and these are relevant to the closely connected question of subsidies to this sector. Secondly, it is an inevitable consequence of the intermittent nature of renewables that this imposes costs elsewhere on the energy system: back-up, interconnectors, other non-renewable generation, and measures to ensure grid stability, together with the costs of rebuilding and reconfiguring the transmission system—and all this seemingly on a highly ambitious scale. I want to look at these areas in turn.
First, on the levelised costs of renewables—that is, the cost of building and operating wind and solar, discounted over time—the latest figures were published in 2023 by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and, as I said, the NESO report is based on them. Those figures claim that offshore wind can generate power at £44 per megawatt hour in current prices. Yet AR6, the recent round of capacity auctions, awarded contracts for offshore wind at £82 per megawatt hour in current prices. It is difficult to understand why there should be such a significant difference between these figures, if the £44 figure is in any way correct. One becomes even more baffled if one looks at the actual accounts of recently commissioned offshore wind farms, which suggest a production cost of around £100 per megawatt hour, or, indeed, if one looks at the recent payments, published yesterday, to offshore wind farms under contracts for difference, which suggest a production cost of around £150 per megawatt hour.
There are similar huge gaps in other areas of the costings. DESNZ assumes a capital cost for offshore wind of £1.5 million per megawatt of capacity. Yet, once again, looking at the accounts of wind companies, the figure appears to be about £3 million per megawatt, which is twice as much. Indeed, at the end of 2023, the developers of Moray West wind farm were still installing the foundations of the wind farm yet had already, at that point, spent the equivalent of £1.6 million per megawatt hour. It bears noting that if the seemingly correct higher offshore wind capital spending figure were used, the NESO estimate for capex from now to 2030 would go up by about £15 billion every year, taking the total capex from a total of £31 billion to £34 billion to a total of £45 billion to £50 billion annually.
To take just one further difference, the DESNZ figures assume a 61% capacity factor for offshore wind—that is, they assume that over a year, wind farms generate about three-fifths of their notional installed capacity. But once again, recent wind farms are opening at a capacity of 45% when new, and that figure is falling over time. The real capacity factor over the whole of the life of a wind farm may well be under 40%. If that is correct, it means that we will need to build 50% more offshore wind farms to get to the actual power that DESNZ estimates—and, of course, costs will go up by the same amount.
I note that Professor Gordon Hughes from Edinburgh University and Andrew Montford, director of Net Zero Watch, wrote to the Permanent Secretary at DESNZ on 16 September asking for further detail on some of these discrepancies. They have not yet received a reply.
Those figures are just the actual costs of operating offshore wind. The gap between assumptions, auctions and actual real-world costs explains why there has been such a need for subsidies ever since the shift to renewables began in the mid-2000s. The OBR says that “environmental levies”—a catch-all category which covers the renewables obligation, the contracts for difference and the feed-in tariffs—currently stand at about £12 billion a year. That is over £400 for every UK household. Yet one has to ask again: if the real cost of offshore wind really is £44 per megawatt hour, well below current market prices and the prices agreed in auction rounds, why do we need these subsidies at all?
I turn now to my second category: the costs elsewhere in the energy system. I think everybody agrees that there are some such costs; the question is: how high are they and what are the consequentials? The costs are principally those of intermittency, of which there are two kinds. The better-known one is the fact that little power is generated by renewables when the wind does not blow and the sun does not shine—periods like the one we saw in this country for most of last week. This requires back-up, currently mainly gas, and there is obviously a capital cost in maintaining a dual system of any kind. Moreover, the fact that the gas-fired stations cannot be used at close to full capacity but must be turned on and off at short notice brings a cost in reduced efficiency and revenue. The cost of paying operators not to shut their power down as a result of this lack of efficiency—the so-called capacity market—is currently £1 billion a year. The OBR says it will rise to £4 billion in three years’ time.
The other kind of intermittency, which is less well known, is the reverse: what happens when the wind blows and the sun shines when we do not need the power generated. Under current arrangements, that involves us paying the renewables producers not to produce and to turn their kit off to avoid grid instability. That costs £2.5 billion per year, which is expected to rise to £3.5 billion in three years’ time.
It bears noting that the more renewables we produce and build, the bigger these figures will get. The more we rely on renewables, the bigger the problem when we have the wrong kind of weather, and the bigger the concomitant costs are going to be. That is why it is a simple fallacy, though a seemingly widely believed one, that building more renewables reduces costs and brings more security. It is surely clear that the reverse must be true.
Finally, there are the wider knock-on costs, most notably in the plans for what NESO calls “demand management”: rationing of energy if the grid cannot supply enough energy to meet demand. This will come either by compulsion—for example, in plans to reduce supply to industry in such circumstances—or by price rationing to consumers, or both. The NESO plan for demand management is slated to cover, by 2030, five times as much potential demand as now—that is, about 10 gigawatts.
Now noble Lords may say, as people do, there have always been differential energy tariffs. Indeed, some of us are old enough to remember things like Economy 7, from the 1980s. But that was differential pricing to stimulate demand in the night-time, when supply was high but demand was low. This is the reverse; this is a plan for us to put up with differential pricing to reduce demand, when it is demand that is high and supply that is low. That is quite different, and it necessarily imposes an economic cost on industry and the consumer, for they cannot use energy when they want to use it and may have no warning of the fact, either. It is hard to quantify that cost, but it is clearly potentially significant. It should be factored in to the cost of running an intermittent renewables system, but it is not.
The only attempt that I am aware of by government to quantify some of those wider costs—though not all of them, for some are still excluded—was made by the then BEIS in 2020, in its document entitled Energy Generation Costs 2020. This showed, even on the imperfect measures being used, that both offshore and onshore wind were on average likely to be more expensive than modern gas power stations, even allowing for some of the implausible assumptions that I discussed earlier.
Let us try to bring all this together. We have a significant discrepancy—disagreement, call it what you will—in assessments of the levelised costs of renewables. In the case of offshore wind, it is a discrepancy amounting, potentially, to up to £100 per megawatt hour. The high levels of subsidy we are paying in various forms suggest that production costs are in fact quite a lot higher than acknowledged. There are also wider costs to the grid—£3 billion to £5 billion in the current year, growing in future—and to the economy, hard to quantify but definitely present in the various kinds of inefficiencies created by an inefficiently working electricity supply system. In short, one side of the argument sees low levelised costs and believes that they will fall further; the other, with which obviously I associate myself, sees costs that are not falling and that require high and growing levels of subsidy and complexity to make the whole system work properly.
This situation is deeply unsatisfactory. The Government are about to embark on a dash to decarbonise the electricity grid according to an assessment that is based on certainly disputable direct costings, and which will be heavily contested and simply fails to take into account many of the wider costs and consequentials. This really is not good enough; the country is owed better.
I recognise, of course, that when the Minister responds he may not have the information he needs to reply fully to some of these detailed points, but I hope he might do so in writing, and perhaps at the same time encourage his Permanent Secretary to reply to Professor Hughes’ letter, which I mentioned earlier.
I say all this not to make a political point. We really need to understand better the real cost of renewables to the consumer, the Government and the economy. If it turns out that I am wrong and the costs really are low and falling, that will be excellent news for us all. I am doubtful about renewables not on some ideological grounds, but because they seem to me extremely expensive in their own right and to come with many additional costs and security risks too. I have not yet seen the evidence that would persuade me otherwise.
I finish on this point. With this in mind—and I am not sure the Minister will leap with alacrity on what I am about to say, but I hope he might respond anyway—the Government should consider establishing some form of expert committee on this subject, made up of officials and experts from the department and bodies such as NESO and the Climate Change Committee, with a red team of outside experts to provide challenge, to look on a totally transparent basis at the evidence and the costings, and to see how close it could get to a common view. This would seem to me the best way of getting at the reality and an assessment that might command a bit more consensus than the current situation does. Whatever this country’s future energy policy may be, we surely all want it to be established on the best possible analysis and the best possible knowledge. I look forward to the debate today and to the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Lord Hunt of Kings Heath) (Lab)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to respond to this morning’s debate and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Frost, on initiating it. We have had an interesting discussion on many of the challenging issues that we face around energy. This is our third debate because, although the noble Lord was not present for it, we had one on electric vehicles, which covered many of the same issues. As the noble Lord, Lord Offord, said, we look forward to the Second Reading of the Great British Energy Bill on Monday.
I welcome the interest. It is so important, on an issue that is of such critical importance to our country, that your Lordships are making a real effort, debating some of the difficult challenges that we face. Clearly, there are different views. I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Frost and Lord Whitty, and the right reverend Prelate about the apposite nature of the debate happening at the same time as the discussions in Baku. I also take the right reverend Prelate’s point about our international responsibilities, which we very much understand.
In essence the noble Lord, Lord Frost, has argued today and in previous debate that he sees the net-zero consensus as breaking down. He has said previously, although he did not cover it much today, that he disagrees that investment in net zero will make us richer. He thinks that we should unwind and invest in gas and nuclear. I agree about nuclear. I note his detailed analysis of the costs of renewables. I will ensure that he receives a considered response. I have a response that I could read out, but it might be better if I wrote to him, with a copy to all Members of your Lordships’ House, since it is technical in nature. I get the substance of what he is saying. He will understand that I do not think the consensus was quite with him. There are clearly many different interpretations of the costs, not least, as noble Lords have said, the costs of not taking action. That is one of the great dividing lines between us. It was discussed by my noble friend Lord Hain, the right reverend Prelate and the noble Lord, Lord Oates, whose speech was about the costs of not taking action.
It is interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Frost, made no reference to climate change, as far as I can recollect. I find it very difficult to debate this without taking climate change as the context in which we develop these arguments. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, that I see net zero not as a religion but as a rational response to evidence that is becoming clearer and clearer. The noble Lord, Lord Offord, said that he disagrees with the pace at which we are going—I understand that—but he does not resile from net zero. I do not want to waste your Lordships’ time repeating what other noble Lords have said about the impact of climate change. Clearly, it is with us. I took over the Climate Change Bill from my noble friend Lord Rooker in 2008. When we were debating it, it was almost an academic exercise in whether climate change was real. It was a future threat, but now it is with us. The noble Lord, Lord Oates, is so right about what is now happening. It is not a religion but a rational response to say that we have to take action and speed it up as quickly as we can.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Frost, that this requires a lot of investment. We cannot get away from that. I know that some noble Lords opposite are saying that the OBR, the Committee on Climate Change, my own department and NESO are all part of a blob. I hesitated to use the word, because it gives Michael Gove credibility and I think it is a word that is very disrespectful to many people who are doing the right thing—but noble Lords know what I mean. You cannot just dismiss the conclusions of those august, independent institutions. Their broad consensus is that we have to go down this route.
I quote the Committee on Climate Change:
“the net costs of the transition (including upfront investment, ongoing running costs and costs of financing) will be less than 1% of GDP over the entirety of 2020-2050, lower than we concluded in our 2019 Net Zero report”.
The party opposite has started to criticise the OBR, which is unfortunate, but it highlighted that delayed action on reaching net zero will have significant negative fiscal and economic impacts, which would be as true for Northern Ireland as for the rest of the UK, as the noble Lord, Lord Elliott, raised. Do we ignore or just dismiss this? I suggest not; that is the basis on which we make progress.
The National Energy System Operator has produced a report; I have realised that noble Lords can find evidence in it to support any case they wish to put forward, but I think that the substance of what it says is significant. It says that an
“investment programme averaging £40 billion or more annually”
can support “economic and job opportunities” across the UK.
I will briefly mention levelised costs to the noble Lord, Lord Frost. As the noble Lord, Lord Oates, suggested, he may not be comparing like with like, which is part of the problem of having a rational debate on the true cost of energy. For instance, you can have a levelised cost of electricity for offshore wind, which reflects the average cost to build and operate a plant, but it cannot be equated to the strike price. The strike price represents the price needed over the contract for difference for a project to be commercially viable, factoring in revenue, market and policy considerations. There are other points that I could make on that, but I think it best that I circulate a paper so that all noble Lords can see that.
I come to the issue that the noble Lord really raised. He agrees with net zero but thinks that we are going too fast. He and my noble friend Lord Rooker and the noble Lord, Lord Elliott, suggested that the 2030 target is unrealisable. We can look again at the NESO report, but it depends how you interpret it. I interpret it as saying that that is very challenging. I do not think anyone has resiled from that; of course it is challenging. It involves plumbing, as the noble Lord said, and there are issues with the planning system at the moment about the grid and what needs to happen, but we are working very fast to try to resolve some of them. I say to my noble friend Lord Rooker that we may not be of the same measure as the members of the original Lunar Society, in our great city of Birmingham, but we believe that we can meet those targets.
To the noble Lord, Lord Swire, I say that of course pylons are not popular. We understand that. I was interested in what he said about potential alternatives, although he will understand that the figures we have so far suggest that they are much more expensive at the moment. In the end, we have to make connections to the grid much quicker and we have to invest in and see an extension of the grid. This is inevitable and it will sometimes involve unpopular decisions. I accept that.
In relation to public opinion on the cost of energy to householders, the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, made his point very well. I gently say that most of these costs actually occurred under previous Governments, over a long period. The decisions that we are taking now will have an impact—there is no question about that—but noble Lords need to accept that that was an inevitability given what needs to happen to start to invest in the move towards clean power.
The noble Lord, Lord Howell, was absolutely right when he said that this is but one part of the story. The decarbonisation of heating, transport and industrial processes represents an immense challenge too, as we go towards 2050. This is very well understood, and our debate on electric vehicles two weeks ago brought that home to your Lordships.
The noble Lords, Lord Howell and Lord Moynihan, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and others mentioned nuclear. I say to the party opposite that, when I was doing this job between 2008 and 2010, we had just taken the decision to go back to new nuclear and were in firm discussions about Hinkley Point C and its siting, the skilled jobs required and the supply chain. I understand that the final investment decision did not take place until 2017, so there was an awful lot of delay. There have been other issues too. The cost of the project was underestimated and there was an unrealistic assumption that taking a technology from France and putting it into Hinkley Point C would not involve design changes because of our approach to regulation.
In July, I went to see Hinkley Point C, and I met the chief executive yesterday to talk about progress. It is fair to say that considerable progress is now being made. It is the largest construction in the UK, if not in Europe. It is immensely impressive, and 65% of the value of the supply chain went to UK companies. Another point is that, when Sizewell C is developed and we get to final investment decisions, which I hope will be in the next few months, it is going to be a replica above ground of Hinkley Point C, so all the lessons that have been learned will be translated. Huge progress has been made between the first and second reactors.
Noble Lords will understand that I am very passionate about the role of nuclear. It provides the essential baseload and deals with some of the issues that noble Lords have mentioned. The issue of intermittency is well understood, and it is part of the cost of what we seek to do. Our approach is to take nuclear as the essential base load.
I think the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, was a bit unfair about progress. The technology of the SMR programme is being appraised by Great British Nuclear at the moment, and I hope that over the next few months we will begin to see progress there. There is clearly great potential with AMRs as well. We are all excited by what is happening in the US and the link between the major media companies’ data centres and potential AMR technology, and I want the UK to be part of that.
On Wylfa, I understand its potential. We will come to decisions over the next few months.
A number of noble Lords mentioned oil and gas and the North Sea. I understand the potential that it still has, because we are still going to need gas and the flexibility of gas. We want to develop carbon capture, usage and storage to make sure that it is abated gas, which means that we wish to see an orderly transition. We are working, and will work, very closely with industry in relation to the North Sea.
Other technologies have been mentioned: the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, mentioned hydrogen and the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and my noble friend Lord Hain mentioned wave energy technologies. I readily acknowledge that all that may have a role to play. Essentially, we are ever-open to people coming forward with ideas and new technologies, but, at the moment, we think that in reaching clean power we need to focus on offshore wind, onshore wind and solar, alongside ensuring that the nuclear programme speeds ahead as quickly as it possibly can.
The noble Lord, Lord Frost, did not discuss this today, but implicit in what he says is his doubt about the impact on the economy of investing in renewables. The evidence we have is that many jobs will become available in future because of what is happening and our drive towards clean power. We reckon that 640,000 people are employed in the UK in what are described as green jobs, and that number is going to grow as we accelerate to 2030. We have an office for clean energy jobs that is going to focus on how we can develop the skilled workforce.
On the nuclear side, the national Nuclear Skills Taskforce has estimated that, by 2030, we need an extra 40,000 people. If the programme goes well and we have a continuous number of nuclear power plants being developed, that figure could go well over 100,000 by the 2040s. We are talking about high-quality, well-paid jobs in all these sectors.
In relation to the North Sea, many of the skills being used there are translatable. We want to make sure that happens as smoothly as possible.
Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)
My Lords, in a very interesting speech, the Minister said just now that, in the next few months—those were his words—some decisions will be made on the smaller end of modular reactors and so on. My understanding from Great British Nuclear is that no decision will be made before 2029. Is this a new position being taken up? If so, that is extremely encouraging.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
I hope I have not just announced a new position. The position is that they are now going through a technology appraisal, which will take a matter of months. At that stage, the Government will then have to make decisions about what will happen in the future and on the funding, and we will have to have discussions with our friends in His Majesty’s Treasury in relation to that. Before that, I hope we will be having discussions about a final investment decision on Sizewell C.
I am in danger of overrunning. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Frost, again. This has actually been a very interesting debate, although he did not anticipate consensus. I am going to disappoint him on his request for yet another committee. I have picked up the suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, of an energy institute—without commitment, I should say, but it is very interesting. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Frost, for instituting such an interesting debate.
Lord Frost (Con)
My Lords, I do not want to detain your Lordships’ House for long. I thank every contributor today for the care with which they have presented their case, and I am grateful to the Minister for his thorough winding up. I did not really expect him to pick up my suggestion, and indeed he did not. I look forward to his full response to some of the points that I raised.
We have heard an extremely interesting set of speeches. If I might be allowed just one reflection, on those that we have heard from proponents of the transition, it is that I detected perhaps a reluctance to tackle some of the specific details of costs and numbers that I mentioned but rather appeals to authority and nebulous assertions about the costs of not acting in relation to our global responsibility and credibility in this regard. I feel that is a little unsatisfactory as a basis for transforming our entire energy system, which is why I suspect we will need to come back to this and related subjects before long in the future. Meanwhile, I commend the Motion to the House.