China Espionage: Government Security Response

Lord Fox Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier today in the other place, with her own tone and emphasis.

Recent political and media attention has focused on the failed prosecution of two British men accused of spying for China—one of whom worked in the Houses of Parliament. The circumstances of that case remain opaque and the consequences unresolved.

Looking beyond that case, it is clear China presents a substantial threat to this country and our interests on multiple fronts. The Government’s own 2025 national security strategy recognises that China has

“the ability to undermine our security”

and that,

“instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and the undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years”.

Publicly documented cases of the intimidation of UK-based Hong Kong activists, attempts to meddle in the United Kingdom Parliament and cyberattacks are just some of the threats that China poses to us; the Government need to be clear and robust in response. We also need to be proactive in order to prevent such malign actions from taking place in the first place.

Chatham House has made it clear that:

“China presents an intelligence challenge of unprecedented scale and ambition. It is not only the world’s largest authoritarian regime but an economic and technological superpower”,


with the ability to undertake substantial operations in many theatres across the world.

The Government have spoken in their Statement today about a response to Chinese espionage and the removal of Chinese equipment from sensitive sites, but what about a response to the risks posed by the development of a Chinese embassy—or more particularly, a Chinese intelligence facility—in the immediate vicinity of some of the most sensitive communications channels in the country? That also requires to be addressed.

It is clear that we need to be far more proactive in how we deal with this threat, so we are not reduced to responding to events and to malign interference once it has occurred. We need to be able to stop it happening in the first place. We are facing a world in which the influence of China is set to increase, alongside the scale of the threat that it poses to us, and prevention will be a much better approach in the long term.

After completing its China audit earlier this year, the Government committed to strengthening China expertise within the national security system. That is a welcome commitment which goes some way in recognising the threat. However, experts are clear that capability needs to extend far beyond a relatively small circle of officials.

The Government must invest far more in helping politicians, civil servants, businesses, universities and the wider public to understand how the Chinese Communist Party seeks to advance its interests and how the United Kingdom should respond. I welcome that the Minister in the other place set out some steps that the Government are taking to do this, but there should be a far wider campaign to raise public awareness and to provide information to people in academia, politics, industry and other parts of our economy and country, so that they can identify threats and take action proactively.

There have been many recent cases which have highlighted where this approach would have been beneficial. In the past few weeks, Professor Michelle Shipworth of University College London compared China’s influence on teaching to “termites eating a house”. She related how Chinese MSc students, and then her own superiors at University College’s Bartlett School of Environment, tried to get her to cut out references to abuses of human rights in China from a module she teaches on critical thinking in data analysis.

Indeed, the collapsed prosecution case I mentioned earlier involved a person who was a staffer in this very building. Academics, politicians, civil servants and we in your Lordships’ House are now on the front line. This has been identified by the security services. The director-general of MI5 warned in 2022 that China poses a “whole-of-system challenge”, that demands

“a profound whole-of-system response”.

This has to be an ongoing effort, facilitated by the Government, to ensure that threats are now identified and mitigated before they can fully manifest.

I have painted a gloomy picture, and with good cause, but we have some substantial advantages in the face of this challenge. It is obvious that, while China brings a wealth of resources to its intelligence campaigns, many of its attempts to influence politics and public life in the United Kingdom, and indeed other democracies, are not terribly sophisticated. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party has few ideological supporters in the United Kingdom, therefore limited ground on which to thrive.

If British officials, politicians, academics, businesspeople and the wider public are more aware of that party’s tactics, they will be better able to resist them. However, this is reliant on the Government’s strategy on this question broadening out to include all of those who are now on the front line and not merely containing this within counterintelligence circles. This cannot be a one-time response to a flurry of news reports or a failed prosecution; this has to come in the form of a new culture of security which is aware of, alive to and preventative of the subversive and malign action that China wishes to take against us.

I therefore want to ask the Minister some questions on this point. What plans do the Government have to work with partners in Europe and Asia to collect expertise and resources in order to expand public awareness about China? In particular, what lessons are the Government learning from Taiwan, which is facing probably the greatest barrage of espionage and influence campaigns from China? What help can it give us to deal with this?

What work are the Government doing to help people in this country identify and be aware of the risks that China poses to them as individuals, as well as to us as a collective? Will the Government publish a long-term approach to engaging with China, and will they make clear both to Beijing and to the British public what our red lines actually are and how we will ensure that they are enforced?

The British people need to be aware of the threats and of the actions that the Government are taking to protect them. I hope that the Minister can use this opportunity to answer these points.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I start by joining the Minister in paying tribute to the crew member of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tidesurge lost off the coast of Ireland.

This is my first opportunity to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Alton, back to his place—he has been missed.

I thank the Minister for repeating this Statement, which we broadly welcome. It seems to represent a change of gear, certainly from the approach of the previous Government. The ISC report on China in 2023 concluded that China had been able to

“penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy”.

At last, this seems to be being taken seriously. However, clearly, with such a deep threat, there is an awful lot that needs to be done, and some of that is reflected in this Statement.

Any Statement like this begs questions that cannot be answered, so I am going to try to ask questions that can be publicly asked. I start with the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, around the failed prosecution of the two spies. There are many questions on this. Will the Government launch an independent inquiry into the collapse of that case and ensure that there are lessons learned from this appalling failure of national security?

In the other place, the Minister fully recognised that the Government know that China

“poses a series of threats to UK national security”,

yet when it comes to putting China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, yet again the Minister said that “no decision” on China has been made. What more has to be done for China to qualify to be put on this register? Given the reluctance to enact FIRS, what guidance is now being given to MPs, Select Committees and researchers on contacts with representatives of the Chinese Government and other Governments?

The Statement also specifically calls for co-operation with China on scientific research. Such engagement is extremely fraught. A huge amount of guidance and focus needs to be brought to this so that universities can safely engage in any co-operation. Clearly, they have raised the flag on this and there is an awful lot of work to do.

The Statement talks about a “low threshold” of what information is considered valuable, so are there plans to discuss how or whether to tighten the vetting and ongoing monitoring of researchers and staff, and how they access and deliver sensitive information? The Statement also says that the Government will

“strengthen the legislative tools available … to disrupt the threat”.

Is this solely going to be the cybersecurity and resilience Bill, or is there another piece of legislation looming for this? It would be useful to know. When will the elections Bill be introduced? We really welcome it and remind your Lordships that this is not specifically a China problem. With Russia waging a hybrid war against us, the sooner we can get this Bill out and discussed the better.

The removal of technology from sensitive sites is good news, but does the Minister accept that, beyond the locations mentioned, there is much to be done to remove Chinese-manufactured electronic components that put our national infrastructure at risk? Who is accountable for spearheading a programme for technology that has been manufactured by friends and not by China, which we know from this Statement does not have our best interests at heart? We should start with the electricity grid and power generation as a focus.

The economic security advisory service for business is a welcome idea. To which department will it report, and how will it fit in with other processes, such as the National Security and Investment Act?

Chinese dissidents and Hong Kongers are having bounties levied on them, including here in the UK. Will the Minister confirm that the Government will sanction those officials responsible for levying these bounties and provide a much clearer legislative protection against transnational repression?

Predictably, I will raise China’s new super-embassy, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, did. Given everything in this Statement, it should be unthinkable that the application succeeds. Under no circumstance should a hub for the network of spies that the Government have set out in this Statement be built. When will the Government rule out this embassy?

Finally, can the Minister update your Lordships on planned visits by Cabinet Ministers and the Prime Minister to the People’s Republic of China?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their points and questions on this very serious matter, and the tone in which they participated. As noble Lords have rightly acknowledged, matters of espionage, particularly those that relate to Parliament, are of the utmost importance to us in both Houses and to the whole nation. They merit careful consideration by government, decisive action by Ministers and appropriate scrutiny by Parliament.

When it comes to China, we have been clear that we will co-operate where we can but always challenge when we must, which is why today’s message to all noble Lords from the Lord Speaker was so important. Our action today is about challenging behaviour by China that this Government will simply not tolerate. We know the high cost of inaction when it comes to national security measures. This comprehensive package will help us tackle economic, academic, cyber and espionage threats that China presents. Its impact will be immediate and we will not hesitate to further strengthen our protections as the threat evolves.

I will now seek to address a number of the specific questions raised. I will also reflect on Hansard should there be any points that I miss. Noble Lords will appreciate that a number of points I will talk about concern national security, so if I do not necessarily respond I will speak to both noble Lords outside the Chamber about some of those issues. Before that, I also add my genuine joy at seeing the noble Lord, Lord Alton, back in his place. When I discussed with him the issues that we are about to discuss, I did not really think we would be discussing them in your Lordships’ House so quickly, but I am delighted he is here—probably to give me a hard time.

I am going to answer the specifics that have been raised broadly in order, but I think it would be helpful to detail some more of our plans. Regarding the Chinese embassy, which both noble Lords raised, it will not surprise your Lordships’ House that I will repeat the same statement that was made in the other place today and that I have made before. A final decision on the Chinese application for a new embassy will be made in due course by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. This is a quasi-judicial decision so I cannot comment on it in more detail. To reassure noble Lords, though, national security is the first duty of government and it has been the core priority throughout this process.

On the threat posed by China, which was raised by both noble Lords but specifically by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, this Government fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyberattacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institution to transnational repression of Hong Kongers. Yet we are also alive to the fact that China presents the UK with opportunities, as the world’s second-largest economy and the UK’s third-largest trading partner. Not engaging is no choice at all. We will therefore continue to develop a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising our national security.

On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the foreign influence registration scheme came into being in terms of its operational action only on 1 July. No decision has yet been made relating to specifying China on the enhanced tier. The Government have a range of capabilities to manage and mitigate threats emanating from foreign states. FIRS is one tool out of many, and we will keep decisions on when to use these tools under continuous review. Any decisions will be brought before Parliament in the usual way in due course. Adding countries to the enhanced tier requires the consideration of a broad range of interests, including but not limited to security considerations. It is important that we get this right.

On the points around critical national infrastructure, which both noble Lords raised, last week the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology introduced the cyber security and resilience Bill to Parliament in the latest step towards strengthening our cyber defences across society. The Bill will increase UK defences against cyberattacks, better protecting services that the public rely on to go about their normal lives—to switch on lights, to turn on the taps, to save water, and to know that the NHS is there to support them. It is clear that the definition of critical national infrastructure under the forthcoming legislation will be amended to make sure that many of these areas are captured.

I turn to some of the other points, including those about a national campaign of awareness. There has been a great deal in the national media about issues pertaining to China, not least the reports leading the news today because of this security alert. The noble and learned Lord makes an important point about ensuring that the people on the front line have the tools available to them. It is, in part, about making sure that everyone receives the information that is relevant to them, which is why Members of your Lordships’ House received specific information today.

We will continue to make sure that the people who need the information receive it. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, made a point about the tools available to universities. We are hosting a private and closed round table for vice-chancellors, and universities and other entities will receive ongoing information through the Office for Students going forward.

There were several other questions, just a few of which I will answer very quickly; I am aware that I am over time. On our plans to work with allies and partners, conversations with them are ongoing, especially with our Five Eyes partners, with which we undertook a significant chunk of the China audit.

On publishing a long-term approach to engaging with China, we need to look at all the issues in the round. Our national security strategy and our SDR both reference China. We will continue to update your Lordships’ House as and when events change and through the normal course of our actions.

There will be an elections Bill when parliamentary time allows. I expect that to be sooner rather than later.

On security vetting, we will continue to work with parliamentary authorities. It is very important at this point to make it clear that planned visits will continue and engagement with the Chinese state will continue. That is incredibly important. Even 12 days ago, the Foreign Secretary made clear to the Chinese state our views on the issues we have discussed today. Conversations need to continue. We need to ensure that where we can co-operate, we do so, and where we can challenge, we will.

The collapse of the Official Secrets Act case is currently under investigation by the JCNSS and the ISC, and we look forward to receiving their advice.

Official Secret Act Case: Witness Statements

Lord Fox Excerpts

Monday 20th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. It is our third such outing on matters pertaining—well, our second, but the third in a week. To confirm, the meeting on 1 September was a discussion with the National Security Adviser about the management of the court case as it continued. There was no discussion of anything other than what would happen during the progression of the court case. Although I am sure all noble Lords have had various dealings with the person who suggested that a Box note was provided, I am not sure how he would know of such a Box note, seeing as no Box note existed. No briefing note whatever was provided from the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister, nor was there any conversation about the case.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, this case seems to boil down to the binary political question: conspiracy or cock-up? The Government vehemently deny conspiracy, so they must believe it is a cock-up. But where and how did this happen, and how will the Government find out this fact? A Joint Select Committee plans to investigate, and I am sure that the ISC will too. Will the Government co-operate fully and quickly with these inquiries and undertake to publish everything possible that arises from them?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises a very important point. Our Parliament is at its best when it scrutinises the Government, and I am very pleased that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy is now undertaking its inquiry. The Intelligence and Security Committee, led by my noble friend Lord Beamish, will also undertake its investigation. How quickly those progress is obviously now a matter for Parliament. I promise noble Lords that both investigations will have our full co-operation and support. We expect this to be done quickly. All information will be given very quickly. I have met with officials today to make it very clear that Government Ministers expect full co-operation.

Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case

Lord Fox Excerpts

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the matter before us today is a grave and serious one, and I am glad that we have another opportunity to discuss it, following my noble friend Lord True’s success in securing a PNQ on the matter yesterday. The collapse of the case against Mr Cash and Mr Berry goes to the very heart of this Parliament. What is at stake is nothing less than the dignity and security of Members of both Houses and of those who work within them.

In their handling of the matter, the Government have shown a grave failure of responsibility. The Statement issued by the Security Minister in the other place on Monday was woefully inadequate. This dispute turns on one simple question: why did the Government not give the Crown Prosecution Service the evidence it needed to pursue this case? In both his Statement and his replies, the Security Minister failed to clarify four central matters.

First, he proceeded on the false premise that the previous Government did not regard China as a national security threat. The record shows that they did. For example, the head of MI6 in 2021 said that China was one of the biggest four threats to the UK, alongside Russia, Iran and international terrorism.

Secondly, like the Prime Minister, the Security Minister seemed to argue that it was not open to the current Government to give the Crown Prosecution Service evidence that differed from the previous Government’s view of the threat from China. In other words, he seems to have assumed that the present Government could not form their own view of the threat during 2021 to 2023 or provide a statement to that effect. That was wrong. Nothing in law or practice stopped the Government from doing so.

Thirdly, he cited the Roussev judgment as though it had narrowed the 1911 Act. It did not. The Court of Appeal made it clear that “enemy” includes any state acting against the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, whether or not we are at war with it.

Fourthly, he assumed that only the Government can determine who falls within that definition. There is no such requirement. The question is one of fact, not fiat, and may properly be assessed by a jury on the evidence before it.

I might stress that noble Lords should not just take my word for it. The Minister’s and the Prime Minister’s argument has been refuted by no less than one former DPP, two former Cabinet Secretaries—one of whom was a National Security Adviser—two former heads of MI6 and a professor of public law at the University of Cambridge, who said this week that Ministers’ statements so far are “misleading” about the legal position. The experts are all clear that Mr Cash and Mr Berry could have been prosecuted under the old legislation. Are we to believe the Government’s position that they are all wrong and that they—the Government—are right?

This case is only one symptom of a deeper failure in the Government’s approach to China. Ministers are still intent on allowing the Chinese Communist Party to build its new embassy on the Royal Mint site, within sight of some of the most sensitive financial and communications infrastructure in the country. They have done so despite clear and repeated warnings from our allies in Washington and from our own intelligence agencies that the project poses a serious espionage risk. Those warnings have been brushed aside and key details redacted from public view.

The decision to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius tells the same story. China’s ambassador there publicly welcomed the move, congratulating Mauritius and confirming its intention to join Beijing’s belt and road initiative. Now, even as evidence of Chinese interference has reached into Parliament itself, the Government’s response has remained slow, confused and complacent. This is not an isolated failure but a pattern of neglect—one that leaves the United Kingdom exposed at a moment when China’s ambitions are clearer and more aggressive than ever.

Before I conclude, I have several questions for the noble Baroness the Minister. It is not for Ministers or officials to determine what evidence meets the threshold for prosecution. That judgment belongs solely to the Crown Prosecution Service. The Government’s duty was to provide all relevant information to the CPS when asked. They did not. The question is: who decided that the Crown Prosecution Service would not be provided with further evidence? Was that decision taken by Ministers, officials or advisers?

Everyone in government knows that a matter of this kind would have gone to Ministers. To pretend otherwise is not credible; to blame a single official is wrong. Did the Deputy National Security Adviser act without ministerial oversight in determining the evidential basis of the case? If so, who authorised that arrangement? Were any Ministers or special advisers shown, did they clear or were they consulted on the Deputy National Security Adviser’s draft statement before it was sent to the CPS? When the CPS requested further material, were Ministers shown this request and did they clear the revised version? Will the Minister publish the internal guidance that allowed the Deputy National Security Adviser to act “without interference” from Ministers, as well as the correspondence between the Cabinet Office, the CPS and the Foreign Office concerning the drafting of his statements?

Furthermore, how many current investigations rely on the 1911 Act, and have any been paused following Roussev? What part of that judgment, which produced six convictions, prevented the CPS proceeding in this case? Did any official or Minister advise that Roussev made prosecution under the 1911 Act impossible, and will that advice be placed in the Library? Mr Justice Hilliard cited the evidence of Matthew Collins, the Deputy National Security Adviser, as authoritative in Roussev. Why is the same official’s evidence deemed unusable when applied to China?

Why is guidance to Members being launched only today, when MI5 and the National Protective Security Authority have been aware of active Chinese interference since at least 2022?

Finally, will the Minister confirm whether Sir Olly Robbins has been instructed to make clear to his counterparts that the United Kingdom regards China as a national security threat and to set out what discussions he is authorised to hold?

This is not about one prosecution that failed. It is about whether we still possess the will to defend the institutions that safeguard our liberty. It is about whether those charged with protecting this country still understand what it means to act in its defence. When foreign powers reach into our Parliament and Ministers look away, it is not only our security that is breached but our sense of who we are. A Government who will not face the truth invite their own humiliation. A nation that tolerates such weakness endangers itself.

Britain’s strength has never rested on wealth or size but on the courage to confront those who would test it. That courage is now being tested again. The Government must speak plainly, act decisively and show that this country will never be cowed, compromised or complacent in the face of the ambitions of China. I urge the noble Baroness to answer not with evasion but with candour, and to meet this moment with the seriousness our duty to the nation demands.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I do not think that I have followed the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, in the past and it is a great pleasure to do so. I am happy to say that there are still one or two things left to say.

This Statement is clearly an attempt to put to rest the issue of these botched prosecutions, or non-prosecutions. So far, however, it has not only failed in that ambition; at the same time, it has resurfaced other issues regarding China and our relationship that generate increasing concern. Regarding the prosecutions, and given the Minister’s Statement and the Government’s adamant view that they have not concealed evidence or suppressed anything, it would be easy for the Government to publish all the relevant documentation. They have nothing to hide; we know that—they have told us, and we trust them. Will the Government publish all the relevant documents, as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the correspondence between all officials, politicians and advisers involved with the CPS?

It is time for the Government to properly protect the interests of our citizens so, working with the CPS, will the Government look at all legislative options to make sure that these two individuals have their time in the court, face a jury and are able to plead their case? These are the ways that the Government can push this issue to rest: by openness and actually seeking to prosecute.

More widely, this case has exposed appalling gaps in the Government’s willingness to challenge China’s considerable espionage efforts, but I am pleased that they recognise that we have a problem. The Statement is clear:

“We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security”,


it says, but their actions fly in the face of that reality.

A former director-general of the Security Service has warned that Chinese espionage is being carried out on an industrial scale, including by seeking influence over Parliament, as well as in industry and education. This has been clear for some time. That was why we warned that exempting China from the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act was a terrible mistake by this Government.

Will the Government now undertake to include all Chinese officials, Hong Kong special administrative region officials and Chinese Communist Party-linked organisations in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? More than that, the Government, supported by the Conservatives, exempted government administration and public bodies in their entirety from the FIRS scheme. Will the Minister now undertake to listen to the intelligence community and include people performing in these activities in the enhanced layer of FIRS?

Finally, as we have heard, it is now time for the Government to come to their senses and block the planning application for the Chinese mega-embassy. We know that, through its embassy in the UK, China has been co-ordinating the transnational repression of people who are carrying out normal and legal activities in the United Kingdom. Will the Minister confirm that the intelligence agencies were not consulted before the Government approved China’s new super-embassy in London, and will the Government now take heed and halt that project until a full national security review is completed?

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, that is a significant number of questions, which I have written down and now lost—thank you—and I will endeavour to answer all of them. I will also review Hansard and make sure that I correspond on anything that I am unsuccessful in responding to. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for their participation and genuine interest in this. Let us be very clear that matters of espionage, especially those that have seemingly been conducted within your Lordships’ House, but also within Parliament, are of the utmost seriousness.

I want to begin by reinforcing that this Government remain extremely disappointed by the collapse of the Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry trial. During yesterday’s PNQ, I committed to update your Lordships’ House on the facts surrounding the collapse of this trial, as well as government actions to counter state threats—as my honourable friend Dan Jarvis, the Security Minister, also made clear yesterday. The decision not to prosecute was made independently by the CPS. It is a bedrock principle of our democracy that decisions of the CPS are independent of Ministers and the Government.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has written to the chairs of the Home Affairs Committee and the Justice Committee, setting out that the CPS decision not to take this case to trial was because the evidential test was not met. As the Prime Minister—who, if we are citing former DPPs, I remind noble Lords is also a former DPP—has stated, the policy position of the current Government was “immaterial” to the CPS’s assessment.

The legal test required consideration of the Government’s policy at the time the alleged offences were committed—between December 2021 and February 2023—when Members opposite were in Government. At that time, the previous Conservative Government described China as a “systematic challenge” in the Integrated Review 2021 and an “epoch-defining challenge” in the Integrated Review Refresh 2023. They did not designate China as a threat or an enemy; that is at the crux of the issue.

I want to be clear, and I am genuinely horrified by the suggestion, that accusations that the Government concealed evidence, withdrew witnesses or in any way restricted the ability of witnesses to provide evidence are entirely untrue. The Director of Public Prosecutions has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party, any member of this Government or any senior civil servant or special adviser. As the Security Minister set out in detail yesterday, evidence was provided to the CPS by the Deputy National Security Adviser, who is highly respected and has the full support of this Government. All the evidence provided by the Deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offences and the policy position of the Conservative Government at that time. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anybody to do so.

On the question raised by both the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox—which was also raised yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Gove—it is not for me to make decisions about the publication of evidence that may be used in further ongoing legal processes. To do so, or not, would likely affect witnesses in coming forward and hamper the interests of justice.

I understand that many noble Lords are also rightly interested in the opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny of the facts around the collapse of this case. The Government’s approach will always be to make as much information available as possible through the appropriate processes, given the national security considerations. I welcome that the National Security Adviser will be giving a private briefing to the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy next month.

On our approach to China, this Government are unequivocal. China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyberattacks and foreign interference to the transnational repression of Hong Kongers. This Government fully recognise the gravity of these threats. However, we must also recognise that China presents opportunities. It is the world’s second-largest economy. To act in the UK’s best interests, we must adopt a long-term strategic approach, as the last Government did. This means a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising our national security.

On some of the other specifics that have been raised, I want to respond to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on the Chinese embassy. No such decision has been made. The noble Lord knows that, throughout the process, we have been clear that we have considered the breadth of national security considerations and have publicly outlined necessary security mitigations that we would need to see to support an application. National security has been our core priority throughout the process. A final decision will be made in due course by Ministers in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government in their quasi-judicial role, and we expect a decision imminently. We do not underestimate the impact of national security as part of that decision.

As I also said yesterday in response to the PNQ, no decision has been made on China regarding the FIRS scheme. We are talking about a scheme that has been undertaken for only three and a half months. No decision has yet been made to exempt or include China, but a decision will be brought forward to your Lordships’ House.

On the specific question of the 1911 Act, the legislation the CPS uses for arrests and prosecutions is a matter for that agency. I do not have access to that data; that would be for the CPS. To clarify for noble Lords, there is a reason why many hours were spent in your Lordships’ House debating the National Security Bill in 2023—which was supported by my colleagues too on a cross-party basis—to update the Official Secrets Act. It is unfortunate that the 1911 Act was the basis of this prosecution, but there is a reason why we had to update it, and that is because of the very definition of “espionage” and “enemy”. This is a piece of legislation that was written prior to World War I. The world has changed, the threat level has changed and how people undertake threats has significantly changed.

I think I have touched on all the evidence. The Deputy National Security Adviser operated within the confines and constraints of the policy direction of the previous Government. We are fully committed to his work. He can operate only within the confines of the situation of the moment and, on that basis, there is nothing more for him to answer.

I reiterate this Government’s unwavering commitment to our national security. Yesterday, MI5’s National Protective Security Authority launched new guidance, building on previous guidance—it was not brand new—to protect our democratic institutions from foreign interference. I urge all noble Lords to read this vital guidance. Furthermore, the Government continue to hold China state-linked actors accountable for cyber espionage. The National Cyber Security Centre recently co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored actors for targeting global networks, including in the UK. We will continue to take all necessary action to tackle state threats, including those from China. That is the primary responsibility of government.

Business Confidence

Lord Fox Excerpts

Tuesday 28th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The first thing to note is that the report is positive, and the CBI has not always been the most positive in its analysis of the Government’s activities. Secondly, we have anticipated a number of the issues which the report has flagged up, not least productivity and investment in SMEs. In the calendar year ahead, we shall look at how to move these areas from where they are now to help them grow. I am tempted to cite Chauncey Gardiner on the notion that as long as the roots are still in the soil then all will be well in the garden. That might be a little optimistic because the year ahead will be a challenge, but the same thing is true: we have opportunities ahead which will do us well.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister is right to be slightly more cautious than the questioner on the status of this data, because I am sure that he knows that the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, for example, will publish its monthly statistics on Thursday. Undoubtedly, although we do not know what the numbers will be, they will be massively less than the record numbers for what they were able to build in this country some time earlier. Given what the Chancellor has said about regulatory alignment, how much confidence or optimism can the automotive industry have that its supply chains will still be operating this time next year?

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I do have confidence. I am wearing my summer suit right now, but I also have an umbrella. Looking to the year ahead, it is important to recognise that some serious negotiations are to be done to ensure that the supply chains work. That will be part of the approach in the ongoing negotiations which will benefit both sides.

Horizon 2020

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Monday 27th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The noble Lord makes an interesting point. He will recall that when Horizon 2020 was being negotiated this time seven years ago a significant effort was made by the EU to cut the funding in order to put more money into agriculture. One of my colleagues, Vicky Ford, now an MP, managed to stop that cut being so significant. We are at that delicate stage now. Horizon Europe has not yet been determined and we cannot therefore be sure exactly what it will look like or how we can engage with it until the EU has completed those operations.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister has made clear the position on Horizon 2020, but the position on Horizon Europe is exercising the minds of researchers in this country. The proposed budget is about €100 billion. Can the Minister guarantee that, whether or not we are inside that deal, research organisations in this country which would have benefited will continue to benefit by at least as much as the share they would have got from Horizon Europe?

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The important thing to stress is that the EU has not yet determined Horizon Europe and the most important sticking point remains the budget. It is the Government’s commitment to have an association agreement to ensure that scientists and all within that area going forward are able to participate fully and are able to get full value for money, just as the EU will get full value from us through such an association agreement.

Nuclear Power: Emissions

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Tuesday 14th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

My noble friend is, of course, absolutely correct. If we get to the stage where Hinkley comes online according to its timetable in 2025, it will in due course supply 7% of our electricity needs. However, the reality is that small modular reactors are vital. That is why we have invested £18 million in development thus far—£18 million that is matched by the private sector. This may well be how we can move forward a whole new generation of nuclear electricity generation.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I think all your Lordships will welcome the fact that an energy White Paper is going to be published. This country has lacked a joined-up strategy on energy for many years. Can the Minister confirm that this White Paper will include not only generation of all kinds but the storage of energy and the flexible, or more flexible, distribution of energy? Clearly those will be key in how we go forward.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The noble Lord has raised these points before; he was right then and is right now. Storage is absolutely vital in this area. Without it, we run the risk not just in nuclear but in our renewables more widely that we cannot capture and hold the energy that we create. Storage needs to be in the White Paper.

Creative Industries: Research and Development

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Wednesday 8th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right that creative industries are at the heart of the improvements that we have seen across the UK’s global reach. We put a significant amount of money into research and development in the creative industries. Some £58 million has gone to research and development through the creative clusters, £39 million directly from government and £25 million from industry. But that does not answer the noble Baroness’s question, which regards the definition. I read with interest the paper by Hasan Bakhshi and Elizabeth Lomas, Defining R&D for the Creative Industries. If the noble Baroness is willing and amenable, I would like to sit with her and discuss this matter further.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, appears to have hit on an idea that can go further. However, can we put a time limit on this? The Budget is coming up on 11 March, and redefining that process can be announced then so that these important businesses can benefit from the tax benefits of research and development. Could the Minister therefore also adhere to a timetable that enables the Budget to play a role in this?

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

On tax, it is important to stress that we offer a significant amount of tax relief that covers all the wider creative industries, from film animation to museums and galleries and the theatre, and so far it affects a significant proportion of those areas. The noble Baroness raised the exact definitions, which is important, because thus far we are bound by the Frascati convention of the OECD definition, which is tilted primarily towards technology and science. I will not go into too much detail, but this of course misses the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties inherent in this particular problem—you do not hear that every day.

Extinction Rebellion

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Thursday 31st October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

To be clear, we do lead the world in this area: our legislation is world-beating. The important thing right now, on the glide path towards COP, will be several more announcements to show exactly how we can take that leadership role and encourage others to walk in our steps.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister was right to call this a cross-community challenge. We are going into an election, and there will be all sorts of attempts to outbid the others with different dates and different policies, but when we come back here in December decisions will have to be made that will take a great deal of money and cause an awful lot of change in our country. They can be made only if they are made across Parliament and beyond one Parliament. Does the Minister agree that delivering our targets on climate change needs a cross-parliamentary approach in which the Government work with all parties across Parliament?

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The important aspect is that the work we are doing is based on the work of the Committee on Climate Change. It is an independent body advising on these matters. No matter who comes in over the next decade or so, that body will be integral in ensuring that science is at the heart of our decarbonisation.

Net Zero Carbon Emissions

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Tuesday 29th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I am happy to assure the noble Lord that nuclear will remain part of our strategy. It is indeed a low-carbon approach. We are strongly committed to small modular reactors and right now we need a baseload to complement our renewable electricity supply.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, when the Minister and his department review the infrastructure report, will he also take into consideration the words of Ofgem, whose annual summary of trends was published this month. It says that the decarbonisation of energy has retracted to its,

“slowest rate of decline since 2012”.

There is a disconnect between the Government’s target of 2050 and what is actually happening. Can he tell us what Her Majesty’s Government are doing to reverse that trend, and when will the decarbonisation of energy start to accelerate again?

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

It is sometimes difficult to assess the rate at which we are decarbonising, but I can assure the noble Lord that, as we continue to phase out coal and to work carefully with the domestic heating approach, we are on track to meet our 2050 commitments. It will be a challenge, and all must do their part.

Brexit: Workers’ Rights

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Tuesday 29th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I welcome the comments from the noble Lord. One of the important issues is the question about what a future trade agreement with the EU would deliver. I accept that he is saying that there is apparently nothing else to negotiate and perhaps it can be done very quickly indeed. This Government’s policy has always been that we can do that trade deal very quickly; it is important to stress that.

As to the elements in the leaked document, it will not surprise the noble Lord to know that I will not be commenting on them specifically. However, having been a member of the European Parliament, what I will say is that the European Parliament and the European Union set minimum standards. The secret to those is how you enforce them. This Government have put substantial investment into enforcing the rights and standards throughout all employment and welfare, which has not been matched by other countries. It is also important to suggest that we can now manage our own affairs in this regard and that it is for the other place and this place to determine what they shall be. My final point is that this Government will not diminish workers’ rights whatsoever.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating this Answer. Nobody doubts his sincerity in reading it out but, given the catalogue of issues set out at length by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I am sure that the Minister will understand that there will be distrust out there; there will be people who suspect that Downing Street has said one thing and done another. So would the Minister agree that the best way of setting people’s minds at rest would have been to have an international trade Bill in which all these rights were set out and protected, and to have the scrutiny process enshrined in law? Does the Minister agree that it is a great tragedy that that has been canned by the Conservative Government?

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

All the rights that we have accrued as a member of the EU are retained from EU law into our corpus of domestic law. That is the best place for them to be set out. Any changes to that, including any that a future Government may wish to make, must be made with the permission of the other place and this place, using voting procedures in the normal way. There shall be no diminution of the rights of workers as a consequence of this.