Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Flight and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting : House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, it will be very important to address these issues because I suspect that CDCs will become very popular among the younger generation as they have considerable attractions. I add only that the principle of building up of reserve seems to be one way of evening out fairness.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

This has been a good debate. I think we are minded to support this measure. I am not very clear in my mind as to precisely how Royal Mail is tackling this issue at the moment, and if the Minister were able to deal with that in her response that would be a help. One thing that has come through from the Government’s own thinking about this is that wherever we end up on it, there must be specific rules. This should not be just a matter of trustees’ discretion; it should be clearly set out in the rules. I shall wait to hear what the Minister has to say.

Financial Guidance and Claims Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Flight and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 1st May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton (Lab)]

My Lords, we are happy to support the Government on this group of amendments. Amendments 7 and 8 in particular are very important, relating as they do to pensions guidance. Amendment 7 relates to personal pension schemes, Amendment 8 is a parallel one relating to occupational schemes, and there is a further subset of provisions relating to occupational schemes in Northern Ireland.

Our earlier deliberations and those of the other place had a strong focus on consumer protection, recognised this afternoon, on pressing back against pension scams and on the risks that can arise from an imbalance in information. These issues have been heightened in significance since the advent of pensions freedom, and we are wholly supportive of the requirement on the FCA to make rules which require trustees, managers and stakeholders, when liquidating and transferring entitlements, to refer members to appropriate guidance provided by the SFGB or its delivery partners to ensure that effective explanations and/or opting-out processes are in place.

Amendments 1 and 35, which we support, enable transfer schemes under Schedule 2 to transfer staff rights properly from the Consumer Financial Education Body to SFGB and devolved authorities. It would be relevant if devolved authorities became responsible for provision of debt advice in their area. This facilitates the devolved authorities being responsible for the debt advice in their area. As the Minister explained on introducing the Bill into your Lordships’ House, the devolved authorities currently deliver a broad range of guidance services. By transferring responsibility for debt advice, there will be opportunities for joining up the commissioning of services—and we obviously support this.

As has been evidenced from the earlier discussion on this item, there has been discussion about whether the clauses are robust enough in enabling impartial advice. We know the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. It seemed to me that the Minister had dealt with this; a note provided by the Minister would appear to put that matter to rest—in particular, about the need to look at the interaction between Clauses 3 and 5. I think that my noble friend Lady Drake touched on that matter. New subsection (7) in Amendment 7 and new subsection (6) in Amendment 8 define the pensions guidance referred to in the amendments as the “information or guidance” provided in pursuance of Clause 5 of the Bill. That clause requires the new body, as part of its “free and impartial” pensions guidance functions in Clause 3, to deliver what we know as Pension Wise guidance. That seems to address the very real concern that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, raised.

We enter the final straight on this important Bill, and we might reflect just briefly on the journey that we have made and the changes that have occurred, with yet more to follow this afternoon. This is an important measure, encompassing as it does the creation of a single financial guidance body and its reach to cover pensions guidance, debt advice, money guidance and consumer protection functions. It is charged with developing a national strategy to improve financial capability. It further deals with the regulation of claims management services, in particular to challenge fraudulent practices and excessive charging.

Some important changes have been made to the Bill, especially in your Lordships’ House, and this can be attributed to the open-book approach of the Minister in particular, for which we thank her, as well as the engagement cross party of your Lordships around the House. Key matters now include the duty of care for the FCA, and the breathing space scheme—a very important provision. My noble friend Lord Stevenson was heavily involved in that, of course. Then there is the prohibition on cold-calling for pensions and CMCs, with enabling legislation to cover other financial products; the interim fee cap for PFI claims management; default guidance for pensions; the extension of CMC regulation to Scotland; and much more. I hope that we will have the opportunity finally to thank the Minister and her colleagues in due course, but is right that we reflect on the journey that we have made so far in the Bill.

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, I support these amendments. I put on record the fact that, in the largest area of pensions saving, occupational schemes, participants typically do not seek advice but allow their savings to go into the default fund, which typically may have taken up as much as 90% of the total savings. There is nothing wrong with that, and default funds are generally constructed very sensibly for long-term pension fund investment. However, it is the area where most money ends up and where individual beneficiaries do not really take decisions themselves.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Flight and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 21st November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 7 I shall also speak to Amendments 8 and 78. Amendment 7 would require that, for a master trust scheme to be operated, it must be authorised under all the provisions of Part 1. Part 1 covers provisions relating to authorisation, supervision, triggering events, continuity options, pause orders and withdrawal of authorisation—in others words, the totality of the Bill’s requirements apart from Part 2, which deals with administration charges.

We have already touched on the reason for the amendment with our reference to the Constitution Committee. In its letter of 11 November to the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Freud, it drew specific attention to Clause 39, which we just debated, pointing out that it could be used not only to extend the master trust regime to schemes to which it might otherwise not apply, but to prevent a regime applying in whole or in part to schemes to which, according to the terms of the Bill, it would otherwise apply. We would counter this by deleting the authority of Clause 39(1)(b) with Amendment 78. As I said, we would require all the Bill’s provisions to apply if someone is to be authorised to operate a master trust.

Clause 39, as we have debated, is an extraordinarily wide power to allot to the Secretary of State, notwithstanding the proposed use of the affirmative resolution procedure. I suggest it is incumbent on the Minister to do much more to justify these powers. In what circumstances will it be envisaged that the provisions would be disapplied? We identified some areas, but which provisions do the Government have in mind? This gives the opportunity to disapply some or all of the provisions. Some might be taken out of the scheme entirely—AVCs, for example—but how would they be partially disapplied? Further, if the provisions are to be ignored, what authority might there be to make alternative arrangements? What other regulatory procedures would kick in? This legislation is important to protect the savings of millions of people. However, much still needs to be developed.

Amendment 8 would require that a scheme’s policies relating to systems and processes be added to the list of matters to be included as part of the application. While we acknowledge that the Secretary of State can, by regulation, add to the list of matters that have to be addressed as part of the application, it seems odd not to include in the Bill information regarding matters about which the Pensions Regulator should be satisfied pre-authorisation.

Amendment 8 would also require the application to set out the extent to which it proposes to adopt the master trust assurance framework. This is a probing amendment. As an at least interim response to the acknowledged poor standards of governance administration, in 2014 the Pensions Regulator and the ICAEW developed a master trust assurance framework to help improve governance for DC schemes. This is a voluntary framework that has been adopted by only a minority of master trust schemes to date—some 11 out of a current total of 84. It involves commissioning an independent reporting accountant to assess the design and operational effectiveness of the control procedures in place. As we know, there are two types of report: type 1 checks the design of a scheme’s control procedures; type 2 checks the operational effectiveness over a reporting year.

The point has been made to us that, other things being equal, accreditation will increasingly become a commercial imperative for providers so they can demonstrate that their scheme is well run. We agree with the Government that simply making the assurance framework compulsory is not a full response to the risk that such master trust schemes engender. In contrast to the Bill, it does not cover, for example, the financial stability of the provider and capital adequacy. Although it is not an alternative to the legislation, a question arises as to the future of the framework. This is particularly pertinent, as it appears that the regulations which will enable most of the Bill to come into force are some way off—possibly two years. Can the Minister give us the Government’s view on what should happen in the interim? We urge them to set out some analysis of the key areas of consistency between what the Bill requires, in so far as it can be determined, and the assurance framework, and to encourage schemes which have not obtained assurance to do so.

The FCA states that master trusts are expected to obtain independent master trust assurance to demonstrate the meeting of standards of governance and administration that meet the DC code and DC regulatory guidance. Clear indications from the Government are vital now so that schemes under the Pensions Regulator and the ICAEW can know where they stand. I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Flight, has an amendment still to come. I will withhold my comments on that until we have heard from him. I beg to move.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I support Amendment 8. It is disappointing that reference to the master trust assurance framework was not already in the Bill, particularly given that the accreditation procedure confirms the rigour in the administrative procedures within the master trust. It is right that that should be added.

My Amendment 9 is a probing amendment to ask whether a continuity strategy not be the ongoing responsibility of the trustees rather than something which the regulator determines.

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[Lord Flight]

My Lords, this is a very simple amendment. The use of the word “the” assumes that a fee will apply and that, effectively, this legislation is laying that down. Should not it be best left to the Secretary of State or the regulator to determine whether or not a fee will apply? Hence, I suggest that “any” is substituted for “the”.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, we have Amendments 12 and 82 in this group. We are happy to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, on this occasion.

Amendment 12 requires a new clause to be inserted in the Bill requiring the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the sufficiency of resources available to the Pensions Regulator for the purposes of the Bill. I think we can anticipate the specifics of the reply to that formulation but I stress that this is about trying to get something on the record today about resources, rather than it necessarily being dealt with on the basis of a clause in the Bill. We know from the impact assessment that there will be additional costs to business from funding the Pensions Regulator and an ongoing levy charge. However, like so much of this Bill, we have no further detail.

The Pensions Regulator has a very significant role in the new era of master trusts and it is vital that the regulator is resourced to play its part in full. When fully commenced, the Pensions Regulator will be responsible for applications for authorisation; judgments about fit and proper persons; decisions as to whether a scheme is financially sustainable, with all the calculations that that entails; a sound business strategy with sufficient financial resources; taking a view on whether the systems and processes used in running the scheme are sufficient to ensure that it is run effectively; and determining whether a master trust has an adequate continuity strategy. On an ongoing basis, the Pensions Regulator is the recipient of supervisory returns and scheme accounts, and must deal with significant events—whatever that may be, and we are going to come on to that—issue penalty notices where appropriate and withdraw authorisation where criteria are no longer met. Further, the Pensions Regulator has an important role as a consequence of a triggering event and winding-up. Not all these responsibilities will bite immediately. It looks as though it could be two years before the commencement of all the Bill takes effect. However, there are responsibilities before that under the transitional provisions of Schedule 2.

Currently, of course, the Pensions Regulator has a role in relation to master trusts, but it is more limited than that provided for in this legislation. The extent of resources required depends upon the volume of master trusts, now and in the future. Although aggregate amounts are expected to increase—that is both members and investments, largely through auto-enrolment—there is the prospect at least of some providers exiting the market. Clearly the workload of the Pensions Regulator is likely to be front-end loaded as the authorisation of existing master trusts is completed and the role becomes more one of supervision. Notwithstanding that, there is much detail still to be settled and we are entitled to seek comfort on the capability of the Pensions Regulator to play what is a central role in the new regime.

On funding, is it proposed that fees and levies will provide the totality of additional resources needed to meet the requirements of the Bill? What assessment has been made of any recruitment needs given the expanded role? In particular, what, if any, changes are considered necessary to the skills set of the Pensions Regulator employees and what planning is under way to meet this? This is inevitably a probing amendment, but one to focus on the operational position of the Pensions Regulator given the important additional tasks of the organisation, which we support, based on the Bill.

Amendment 82 reinforces the Government’s commitment in the impact assessment dated October 2016. This recites that the level of uncertainty currently is too great to provide a meaningful estimate of the net cost to business of the introduction of the authorisation and supervision regime. However, it promises a full assessment at the secondary legislation stage. Our amendment causes this to be before triggering the bringing into force of the main provisions of the Bill. We seek some further clarification on timing, as presumably all the secondary legislation will not arrive at the same time. Are we going to get the impact assessment piecemeal? The purpose of these amendments is to make sure that we get the information about the overall impact of these provisions.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, should Amendment 12 be in the Act? Generally the Government and the Secretary of State have responsibility to see that something like TPR is funded and it is not solely a master trust issue. I question whether this should be in the Bill.

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I am grateful to the noble Lord.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I am interested to note that my amendment has resulted in a clear statement by the Government that a fee will be charged and that it will be provided for in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Pensions Bill

Debate between Lord Flight and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Wednesday 18th December 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments raise some issues that relate back to the previous Pensions Bill and, at least as far as I was concerned, some not very clearly answered questions about the potential size that the cash-flow deficit would grow to with regard to pay-as-you-go pensions.

First, my understanding is that, whether it is a pay-as-you-go public sector scheme or a funded public sector scheme, with the ending of contracted-out contributions, the money that the schemes will no longer receive will go towards financing part of the new state pension. Therefore, it has gone off to one box for that purpose. So we are left with pay-as-you-go public sector schemes and the impact that there is on them, and financed public sector schemes, such as local government schemes. My understanding is that, with pay-as-you-go public sector schemes, the money is no longer going to come in from contracting out and therefore the impact will be on the extent of cash-flow deficit going forward relating to public sector schemes. I should be interested to know the aggregate amount that pay-as-you-go public sector schemes will lose per annum as a result of no longer receiving the contracted-out contributions.

I think that there was some discussion during the passage of the Public Service Pensions Bill about the extent of the potential cash-flow deficit. Mr Michael Johnson and I calculated that it could be as large as £25 billion on the basis of including an estimate of the loss of contracted-out contributions. I think that the Government argued that it was not going to be as large as that but I could never quite get my head round the figures.

With regard to contributory public sector schemes, such as local government schemes—which is what these amendments are particularly concerned with—it will automatically become the financial liability of local government to make up the loss of the contracted-out contributions. How is that going to be financed? Not just in terms of what it might mean for a particular local authority, what is the extent of the aggregate cost to public sector schemes which are financed, and what is the average proportion that local government schemes, in particular, will have to make good as a result of the loss of contracting out?

I do not expect the Minister to be able to answer those questions with figures off the cuff, but it is desirable that they should be known and understood. Indeed, the impact on funded local government schemes may be very substantial, implying either significant increases in local council tax or the need for yet further substantial reductions in local government expenditure to finance the loss of contracting out.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, briefly, I commend my noble friend Lord Whitty and the noble Lord, Lord German, on trying to focus on solutions to deal with what seems to be a major problem, particularly in relation to local authorities. My noble friend Lord Whitty said that the annual cost of losing the 3.4% rebate is in the order of £700 million a year. Today, we had the local government finance settlement, which reinforced what was announced in the spending round: a further real terms cut of 2.3% in overall local government expenditure. Sir Merrick Cockell, who is a Conservative and the chairman of the Local Government Association, said that local authorities will have lost one-third of their budget by 2015. He said,

“This is the calm before the storm. We do not know how big the storm will be or how long it will last”.

The Audit Commission last year found that 29% of councils showed some form of financial stress. Council tax increases to cover this, even if they were contemplated at the level that the noble Lord suggested, simply are not on because of the need to have a referendum to go beyond a very small increase. Do the Government see this as a new burden which central government is placing on local authorities and therefore a burden which it should it meet?