(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, may I briefly speak to Amendment 1? It seems to be extremely straightforward. For a fair referendum, we want an entirely clean situation where adequate notice is given and where there is no possible scope for the public sector, the Government, the EU or any public body to spend money influencing the course of the campaign. As has just been stated, the Electoral Commission supported this amendment. It is in line with what the Government have said they are seeking to do. I find it quite irritating that there is such complexity surrounding what is really a pretty straightforward point but I very much hope that the Government will accept the amendment in the spirit in which it is offered.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 2, which has been somewhat incongruously grouped with Amendment 1. However, I do not mind that because I am speaking to this amendment somewhat tongue in cheek, not in the expectation that the Government will accept it but to make a point about the fairness of this referendum and the need for the outcome to be accepted for a generation to come.
My amendment would change the date from 2017 to 2019. I have put this down to make a broader political point: that there is, in my view, a fundamental contradiction in the Government’s renegotiation strategy. They say that they want a fundamental change in the relationship with the European Union and, at the same time, they have chosen to impose a unilateral timetable for this renegotiation by saying that they need to have the referendum by the end of 2017. In practice it should be said—I think that the Government would sort of accept this—that the real deadline is the end of 2016. No one really thinks that you can muddle up a British referendum with the French presidential and German Bundestag elections, which will be dominating Europe in 2017. The Government have in practice set themselves a very tight deadline for their renegotiation. The truth is that they cannot achieve within that timescale some of the objectives which they have apparently set themselves.
First, there is no prospect of comprehensive treaty change by the time of the referendum. Secondly, even on matters such as benefits for Polish workers in Britain, while it may be possible to achieve some kind of political consensus among the member states about what changes are necessary, there is very little prospect that such changes in European legislation, even if agreed in principle by the Council of Ministers, could have gone through the complex legislative procedures of the European Union, given the role of the European Parliament and the Council in co-decision, by the time of our referendum. I am sure that the former Members of the European Parliament who are in this House will agree with that. We are dealing with a situation where the Government will have to be content with agreements in principle and, possibly, devices such as the protocols which were granted to Denmark and Ireland, which were basically promissory notes of future changes in EU treaties when such treaty changes come to be made.
I would like to see honesty from the Government about this situation because if we are to win this referendum we do not want to create a situation where lots of people who campaigned against British membership immediately turn round and say, “We was robbed”, which is what happened in 1975. I think there is some risk of this so the Government have to be franker than they have been so far about their renegotiation strategy and what they can achieve within the timescale they have imposed. Let us remember, this is a unilateral British timescale; the European Union is not causing the problems. It is a unilateral timescale that we have laid down.
It is not the case that France has a veto in relation to the common agricultural policy, as I think the noble Lord well knows. All the decisions on the reform of the common agricultural policy have been taken by majority voting in the Council of Ministers. Of course, the council tries to take into account the views of member states which have particular interests. Surely he would acknowledge that, in the case of financial services, that is what has happened with Britain: our interests have been taken into account by the council.
I would have thought that what I have just said demonstrates that what I call sensible interests, including our interests, have often been overridden. With regard to agriculture, while I am well aware that the overall reforms of the system have been pan-EU, I think that France still has some protective vetoes. We will see whether this is correct, and what the negotiations are able to achieve.
I am critical also of the UK. There has been a lot UK gold-plating of what has come to the UK both internationally and from Europe. The introduction of RDR has simply removed financial advice being available to 70% of the country’s population, as a result of which the Government are struggling with providing guidance on pension fund services and leaving people hanging in mid-air as to who they might approach to manage their pension assets.
There is the need for an independent new appraisal of what regulation in the EU and even internationally is good and useful for markets and for clients, and what is unnecessary, harmful, and incurs a cost and adds no benefit. I would like to think that the UK will give an EU lead to reform of regulatory overkill and I wish the noble Lord, Lord Hill, enormous good fortune in his commitment to review the cumulative effects of the various regulatory reforms.
Does the noble Lord accept that the Commission has just produced precisely what he is asking for? Commissioner Timmermans has put forward a whole set of propositions on regulatory reform and on reviewing existing legislation to make sure that unnecessary regulation is cut back. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, appears to be making statements without full regard to what is happening currently in Brussels.
I am aware of what is happening in Brussels but I specifically said that I wanted to see the UK more active in terms of a programme of regulatory rationalisation and review. The key point I am seeking to make is that when I stand back, I perceive what I believe to have been enormous overkill, often not addressing the right areas, since the 2008 financial crisis.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Wheatcroft’s excellent amendment. If you go to America, you will find that cities have retained the right to finance infrastructure projects with municipal bonds. Indeed, income from bonds even enjoys the advantage of being tax-free. However, as she pointed out, much of the heritage of our great cities of the last century and much of their infrastructure investment were financed by municipal bond issues. That came to an end, sadly, during the Attlee Government after the Second World War. The argument was that the Government could borrow more cheaply via gilts and thus dosh out the money. What actually happened was that the money never got doshed out and the municipalities were unable to have their own bond issues.
For me, this subject is absolutely central to the reality of devolution to cities. It is about their ability to raise money and to invest in their own infrastructure. I, too, look forward to hearing of the opportunities in the sports world, but there is masses of scope for infrastructure investment. I raised this issue at Question Time in the House earlier this year I think, and got a response which seemed to be saying that, yes, the Government agreed with this and would include it in future legislation. Over a year ago, when I discussed the territory with the Mayor of London, he absolutely supported the idea that it should be a fundamental part of devolution to our cities.
I very much hope that the Government will accept my noble friend Lady Wheatcroft’s amendment, which, quite rightly, is designed to be cautious and not to allow the ability to go overboard. It would make a start and a crucially important contribution to real devolution.
My Lords, I express support for the principle of the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft. The combined authorities need more independent power to raise money for good local projects and I accept that we have to break away from the kind of Treasury stranglehold, as it were, that operates in this area. I would be interested to see how far the DCLG and its excellent Ministers, who are very committed to devolution, are getting on with the Treasury on this question. We look forward to the response on that. However, there are two problems, which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, will have thought of. The question is what the answers are—they may be in the response to the proposal.
First, there is the question of risk if something goes badly wrong. Not only would that be a failure for the combined authority that had sponsored the proposal but it would result in severe losses for local savers. Is there any way of spreading the risk and/or any form of insurance that could maybe bring the big institutions in to bear some of the risk? I am not a finance person, but the noble Baroness is and I am sure she will have thought about this.
Secondly, with a proposal of this kind you need to ask how the market in these bonds would operate. After all, people might have enough money to invest £10,000 or something in the future of their city—I could imagine people being very happy to do that—but their personal circumstances can change. They might want to be able to dispose of that bond. How would a secondary market operate in something that had initially been limited to residents of the area? However, in principle, this is exactly the kind of radical thinking that we need to revive municipalism.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Harrison on his committee’s excellent report. I have done that before but this is the first time that I am not doing so as Labour’s Europe spokesman. It is a great privilege to be able to address this body knowing that I am free to tell Labour what its policy ought to be rather than putting the best face on what its policy is, so I am looking forward to this speech. I should also say what a privilege it is to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Lamont. I do not agree with him on the euro but his reflections, as a former Chancellor, are extremely interesting and I would be the last person to argue that the euro does not still face difficult problems, which have to be resolved.
The euro’s future is of fundamental importance to Britain. In all the past arguments about whether we should join, the one where the pros have been conclusively proved right is that we in Britain cannot escape the consequences of the eurozone by being outside it. It has a material impact on our economy. We also have to be conscious of the fact that our circumstances might at some point in the future change. I am not arguing that there is any immediate prospect of our joining the single currency. I do not expect to see that for a very long time but Britain’s prospects could change, which might necessitate us joining the single currency.
The real danger for Britain is a repeat of what happened when we did not seize the initiative in Europe right at the start, in the 1950s. We have to be careful that a construction might be put in place that does not entirely suit our national interests. We saw that with the common agricultural policy, which led to the arguments about whether we should enter on the Tory terms in the 1970s and the renegotiation under Harold Wilson, which then led to Mrs Thatcher’s struggles for the British budget rebate, all of which poisoned our relations with our partners. We must try, as an insurance policy for Britain, to make sure that the development of the euro is one that suits us.
I want to stress the most important recommendation of this report and I am very disappointed by the Government’s reply. The recommendation is:
“The Government would be wise not to close the door on the possibility of participation in some elements of Banking Union in the future, and must stress the City of London’s strategic importance for the EU as a whole”.
I have no doubt that the Government will stress the City of London’s importance but if they want to influence the key ways in which the City’s future is determined, they must play a role in the banking union. Be in no doubt: the ECB will be the body that determines the rules by which financial markets work in Europe. It will be that body and the idea that, because we have some minority protections and a European Banking Authority we can sit back and relax, is for the birds.
What about the alliance of the euro-outs, which is supposed to protect our interests? Where are we with Mr Reinfeldt, after Mr Cameron’s ride in the boat with him? Is he not going down to defeat in the September election in Sweden anyway? As for the Poles, what are the prospects for Britain having any influence over Polish policy after what we now know of the expletive-laden remarks of their Foreign Secretary about his old Oxford friend, the Prime Minister? Can we really rely on Hungary and Mr Orbán when he is the man who plays footsie with Jobbik—the fascists in Hungary—who rigs the constitutional court in Hungary and who has passed laws that are offensive to press freedom in Hungary? Is that our only ally in Europe? Are we really proud of that? Do we think we can defend our interests on a crucial issue such as this simply by having an alliance with Hungary?
Would the noble Lord not agree that the collaboration between the Bank of England and the ECB has been and remains substantial? Indeed, quite a lot of the ECB regulatory arrangements have been modelled on what has happened here. Whatever the constitutional position may be, the practical position is that the two work hand in hand.
I am very strongly in favour of practical co-operation between the Bank of England and the ECB but, fundamentally, it is politics that matters. It will not all be decided in an independent regulatory context. The politics will matter, and we are not well placed at the moment.
The banking union is a significant development. I am a bit more bullish about it than the committee. I think it is a glass half full, rather than a glass half empty. Some academics I greatly respect, who are experts in the field, such as the Peterson Institute’s Adam Posen and Nicolas Véron, believe that we should consider that to be a very significant development. That is why it is so important that we try, as far as we can, to get inside—beyond simply co-operation between the Bank of England and the ECB.
On the wider issue of genuine economic and monetary union, the British love playing this intellectual parlour game of what are the necessary conditions for monetary union to proceed. They never think about the United Kingdom itself: is it a satisfactory monetary union? Clearly, in the United Kingdom we have a London economy which is a tremendous success and something that we all admire, but an out-of-London economy that continues to struggle. We all know that if we imagine them as separate countries, the London pound would be far stronger than the out-of-London pound. The country functions only because of massive fiscal transfers from its richer parts to the poorer.
You can argue that those transfers are not there in the eurozone—of course, they are not, except for the structural funds—but one of the problems with our fiscal transfers in Britain is that they have been extremely opaque. They are about to become less opaque as we go for devo-max in Scotland. I forecast that we will have more political arguments about the functioning of the United Kingdom economy in the decades to come as we have arguments about whether the extent of the fiscal transfers from London and the south-east to the rest of England are sustainable in the long run.
I make that point because I think that the mistake in looking at EMU is to neglect the extent to which its survival has depended on political will. Eurosceptics in this country always underestimate the strength of that political will. An enormous number of things have been done, including the European stability mechanism, the six-pack and two-pack legislation, the fiscal treaty, the ECB supervisory powers and the banking union. A lot has been done; let us not underestimate it. At the moment, politics is making a big difference to the chances of the monetary union overcoming its problems. We are seeing less emphasis on austerity and more fiscal flexibility. In part, we saw that with Mr Juncker going around making sympathetic noises to the Italians and the Spaniards to get their support for his nomination as Commission President.
More fundamentally, there has been a shift in Germany as a result of the formation of the grand coalition, with the disappearance of the Free Democrats from the coalition and the presence of the Social Democrats. The German Vice-Chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel—a Social Democrat—has said that he believes that the south needs more fiscal space and more fiscal flexibility. What the Germans are trying to do, of course, is to link that flexibility to support for needed structural reform in the countries of the south. They are also doing something to rebalance the eurozone themselves, with policies such as the introduction of a minimum wage, which will boost spending power in Germany.
The one remarkable thing in the crisis is that, thankfully, unlike the 1930s—this is the huge historical difference from the 1930s—there has not been a political collapse and a reversion to dictatorship in any of the EU countries, despite the very brutal circumstances that they have had to face. Reforms have been made and democracy has just about survived.
We will need to see further developments before the euro is safe. German rebalancing will have to go further and they will have to be more flexible. We will have to see some debt forgiveness because as the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, said, it is difficult to see how those levels of debt are sustainable in the long run. We will have to see more of a European-led investment policy. That is one way of doing things in favour of growth but making them conditional on reform.
I see the eurozone rescue as an incomplete project but I think the politics are working in the right direction. The political will has been demonstrated. My fear is that as a Euro-out we are not really putting our minds to how we will retain influence over this construction in the years and decades ahead. This report has been an extremely valuable contribution to what is an extremely important issue for the future of the United Kingdom.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I begin with two personal points. First, I declare an interest in that the think tank that I chair, Policy Network, has in the past received support from the City of London Corporation. Secondly, it is a pleasure to welcome the noble Lord, my brother-in-law, to the Front Bench opposite. Therefore, there will not be an excess of partisanship on this occasion on my part.
As always, it has been an interesting debate, not least because of the final contribution from my noble friend Lord Desai, which I am still trying to absorb. My noble friend Lord Harrison began the debate with an admirable summary of his report. As usual, one wishes that the country was governed by the committees of your Lordships’ House rather than by the prejudices of its Executive, because we would be much better governed. It is an admirable report.
An interesting, rather off-the-wall point was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner. It is something on which I have long reflected: why is discussion of Europe such a male-dominated subject? That is not something that we should discuss at length today, but we have to take it very seriously if the pro-Europeans want any chance of winning a referendum, so thank you to the noble Baroness for raising that issue.
I want to make three points. First, on the state of the euro itself, I believe that adjustment is on the way. Things are a lot better than they were. The question is whether what is occurring is socially and politically sustainable. I do not think that it will be without more fiscal flexibility. Nor do I think that it will be sustainable without considerable debt write-offs, particularly after the German elections in September. There will have to be an element of a transfer union to make the position of the mezzogiorno of the south, which the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, mentioned, sustainable. That will require further steps towards banking union, particularly in the case of Spain, because there is such an obvious link between bank debts and the sovereign debt position.
My second point is on the Britain in Europe debate. Banking union is the fourth major institutional development since the euro crisis started from which the United Kingdom has stood aside. There was the European stability mechanism, the euro-plus pact, the fiscal compact and now the banking union, which was agreed in principle in June 2012, and which the British urged the eurozone to get on with. Indeed, I think George Osborne first recommended it as long ago as January 2011. He was very foresighted about that, but it is something from which we have chosen to stand aside.
If you read what this is about, while in the British debate it is presented as a measure to rescue the single currency, in the continental debate it is about the creation of what is called a financial market union. I think the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed that out. In the British Government’s view, this is all part of a clear narrative in which the eurozone is integrating and we have to establish a new kind of settlement and relationship with the members outside it; that is the British Government's narrative. However, the real question is: to whom does this narrative apply, other than the United Kingdom? How many other euro-outs share this conception of the British narrative? I might ask the Government what their view of that is.
That is a crucial point, first, in informing a view about the sustainability of the safeguards that the Government obtained on the banking union in the December 2012 summit. Secondly, it is fundamental to whether David Cameron’s essential assertion in his speech yesterday—that the core of Europe is the single market—is right. For most members, however, will it actually be the single currency? This point is fundamental because it is a question of whether we are going along with the support of other euro-outs, to try to negotiate a balanced relationship between outs and ins, or whether we are just making a case for special treatment for Britain, which will be far more difficult to negotiate.
The third point I want to make is about the position of the City of London. These are not just intellectual exercises; we are talking about something that is fundamental to our national interests. I have long believed that the UK is overdependent on financial services and I support the whole concept of rebalancing the economy towards manufacturing. My noble friend Lord Mandelson’s comment was right; there has been too much financial engineering and not enough real engineering. I agree with all that. However, the City is a crucial national interest and the financial centre of the single market. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Flight, that it is global and very resilient but it has benefited a lot from the single market in Europe—particularly from the opening-up of the financial single market, a lot of which occurred under the previous Labour Government.
Of course, no one worried about this at the time because it was the era of light-touch regulation. No one worried about the financial imbalances that were building up between countries and the lack of cross-border regulation. Well, the banking crisis changed all that and the Government recognised the need for regulation at EU level. It was a good thing that the Conservative Government, including Chancellor Osborne, accepted when they came in what Chancellor Darling had already agreed to: the establishment of European regulatory agencies.
Could I just make this point to the noble Lord? The investment management industry, in which I spent 40 years of my career, has still failed to penetrate the EU. There are a variety of cultural and other barriers, but a lot of American firms came over thinking that Europe was like America and that all they had to do was have offices. If one looks at how much money the London retail funds business has got from the EU, it is still pitifully small.
I agree that things vary from sector to sector but one of the reasons why so many foreign-based banks are in London is because it is the financial centre of the single market.
The point is that the banking crisis has changed the way that we thought about the City. It has made regulation absolutely essential. The euro crisis has made banking union essential in order to break the link between sovereign debt and the fact that nation states have had to underwrite their banks. It raises difficult issues for us in the UK. As long as we see ourselves as being outside the single currency, the centre of the European financial market will be remote from the core of the banking union. There is also the block vote problem: if regulation is concentrated through the ECB, we could be outvoted.
The UK made a disastrous attempt in 2011 to try to tackle this problem of what to do. This was at that year’s December summit, where a paper was circulated late at night without prior consultation with anyone. Full of complex detail, it had at the top the horrible word “unanimity”. Basically it was asking for unanimity on questions of financial services. Not only was this tactically maladroit, it was strategically misguided. If the sincere wish of the British Government is to deepen the single market in the European Union, we cannot go around demanding unanimity on a specific UK interest, because every other member state will demand unanimity on an interest specific to it.
That is why the proposals of, for instance, the Fresh Start group are extremely worrying. They do not demand unanimity but in cases of financial services they do demand use of the Luxembourg compromise and they talk about emergency brakes. If you believe in the single market, you cannot put forward such things in the European Union. I should like to hear from the Government that they have no intention of pressing for the Luxembourg compromise or emergency brakes in this area. This would be so damaging to Britain’s interests in pressing forward to the single market.
However, the Government achieved a notable success in December with the acceptance of the double majority principle. I agree with my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford that, for protecting our position, this is a lot better than nothing. Yet I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who asks how robust this is and whether it will last.
First, this double majority applies only to the banking agency, which is about the implementing regulations, and not to ECOFIN, which draws up the legislation. So we do not have a special position there. Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, is right that the ECB will be the big player in this and the EBA a weakly staffed and resourced organisation. How do the Government intend to deal with that? Thirdly, there is the question of time limitation. How many euro-outs, which are actually banking union-ins, will there be? If there are a significant number of euro-outs who will be banking union-ins, how long do we think that this special double majority arrangement will last?
There are alternatives. I am not saying that this is what the Labour Party would propose but, as my noble friend Lord Davies said, we have not had from the Government a proper cost-benefit analysis of what the alternatives might be. Did they look at how, as a euro-out, we might be a member of the banking union and whether it could be made to work? Could we have built on the model of the European Systemic Risk Board, of which the president of the European Central Bank is chair and the Governor of the Bank of England is vice-chair? Could we have used that as an umbrella? The Government have a duty to look at all the possible alternatives here because this is an issue of such vital importance to the future of the City. The fear that a lot of us have is that for reasons of ideology and prejudice, the UK has opted for very much a second-best, possibly a third-best, solution that would be gravely damaging to our interests in the long run. I will be grateful to the Minister if he can deal with some of these points.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it strikes me that this amendment points an important finger at a number of territories. In some ways the mismatch concerns me less; there are always likely to be mismatch problems. For starters, I was disappointed that the previous Government, as it were, gave away power in the territory of financial regulation to Europe. Substantial things are happening: we have MiFID 2; the banking supervision proposals; and, following on from those, the recent proposals arising from greater European economic and financial union. First, I would like to know that the UK parties batting for the UK are doing a good job and have raised all the issues. Secondly, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I am not certain whether this is a Treasury or a PRA matter but the PRA at least has the lead for the regulators in negotiating with the EU bodies. I should like to know how the Bank of England thinks it has done in dealing with the issues and protecting British interests.
The MiFID 2 proposals are coming up and I think that they could be extremely damaging to the UK if they went through as presently proposed. A lot of work needs to be done for them to be workable. If there were no public review or airing of what has been going on and the issues, it would perhaps be—in a fast-changing territory—somewhat undesirable. However, I am not quite sure what the right mechanism is for achieving what I seek to achieve.
My Lords, I rise briefly to support my noble friend Lady Hayter’s amendment. She has drawn attention to a crucial issue for the United Kingdom. The fact is that we benefit greatly from the existence of the European single financial market. I believe that one of the reasons why so many overseas banks base themselves in London is that we are part of a single regulated market. There are grave dangers for us in going down the road of separating ourselves from that single market.
It is important that we keep very closely in touch with European developments at all times. It is a very fast-moving scene. As we understand the results of the last European Council, banking supervision within the eurozone will be put under the European Central Bank by the end of this year. I noted with interest the Governor’s comment, as reported in the Financial Times at any rate, that this would make it easier for the Bank of England to deal with regulatory issues because there would be, as it were, a single telephone number to ring in the European Central Bank. It is also the case that the UK has a critically important influence in the European Systemic Risk Board. It is vital that we play a crucial role in that board, of which the Governor of the Bank of England is the deputy chair.
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI apologise to the noble Lord, but the point is surely valid. Growth last year in the eurozone was twice that in the UK. Therefore, to blame the eurozone for the present double dip is nonsense.
The big point that the Eurosceptics fail to understand is that we cannot avoid the consequences of the euro by being out of it. In or out, our future is deeply affected because of our exports and the interlinking of our financial system. As Robert Chote said, if Greece exits, who knows what will happen? We may never in the foreseeable future recover the level of output that we had in 2008. A policy of splendid isolation from the continent was never realistic for Britain, but in the world of globalisation and economic integration it does not work at all.
Nor is our isolation very splendid. We are losing influence and clout in Europe to a dangerous degree. I will give one telling illustration. The Prime Minister claimed that the reason he used the veto and walked out of the December European meeting was that his partners would not accept a set of proposals that he tabled at 2 am in order to protect the City of London. A couple of weeks ago, on the capital requirements directive, the Chancellor, George Osborne, and the British for the first time found themselves outvoted by 26 to one at ECOFIN on a key question of financial regulation. The Chancellor has now recognised that he has to go along with the majority. That is not an effective use of the British veto. It just shows how influence is draining away from us at the moment.
I was under the impression that the Chancellor had eventually obtained agreement to his point, which was that there could be some flexibility in the capital ratio of banks, with a view to the UK being rather more demanding than the rest of the EU.