United Kingdom: Productivity

Lord Flight Excerpts

Tuesday 8th September 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, I will focus, separately, on the unusual period of 2007 to 2015 and the general long-term structural weakness in UK productivity growth. The UK economy did not get back to its 2007 level until the beginning of 2015, but with some 6% more people employed, remarkably. In a sense, this was socially good. Historically, after a financial crash, thousands of people may have been thrown out of work, but generally companies kept them employed. The companies may have reduced their hours, but there was not a massive rise in unemployment. One has to face up to one of the main reasons for that, which is that labour was cheap—labour costs could be cut—and, in turn, the reason for that was income tax credits. Former Chancellor Darling has admitted that tax credits, which were intended to boost living standards for those on low pay, have served to freeze or reduce pay, in turn causing productivity to fall: there is no need for employers to pay if the state is going to top up pay. The cost of income tax credits, originally around some £7 billion, has gone up to £34 billion.

We have been here before. In the late 18th and early 19th century there was something called the Speenhamland system, named after the village where it was invented, under which pay was subsidised. That led to massive labour hoarding, largely in the agricultural sector. When it was eventually ended in 1834, there was a huge shake-up, and agricultural employment fell by roughly one-third. Indeed, labour was released to go and work in the new industries that were coming up, causing the great economic success of the 1840s. One has to face up to the fact that if you are stuck with tax credits—and I believe we should not be—the only way to reduce their effects is to have a much higher minimum wage. This is of course why the Government are introducing the NLW. Personally, I do not like Governments interfering in pay, and I think our growing regional differences in the cost of living need to help determine pay rates locally. However, a higher minimum wage is unavoidable if government is continuing to subsidise pay.

A second big factor during the period was the growth in regulation and regulatory burdens. Many more regulators were employed in the financial services industry and many more staff were employed by companies—tens of thousands. There was also huge growth in energy and agriculture. In all these areas, output did not increase at all but the number of people involved rose dramatically.

Interestingly, productivity during the period was actually up in manufacturing but down substantially in services and in the public sector—I very much welcome what my noble friend Lady Noakes had to say about the public sector. Also, despite its strained infrastructure, London performed much better than the rest of the country in terms of productivity—29% above the UK average. However, colleagues on all sides of the House whom I have spoken to rather agree with me that the big issue causing the fall in productivity was the knock-on effect of income tax credits.

As has already been pointed out, the long-term poor productivity trend goes back more than 100 years. The average increase pre-2007 was 2.4% per annum, and of course poor productivity restricts growth. Indeed, successful recovery and continuing economic growth requires much better productivity. The only other way it can be made up is by growth in the labour force, which is one of the reasons why the UK has permitted significant immigration going back nearly 50 years. The figures show us to be poor versus the US, Germany and France: the UK is some 19% below the G7 average for productivity and 31% below the US. Interestingly, among the G7, only Japan has been worse than us.

I believe that the statistics are materially wrong. Living standards are a knock-on symptom of productivity growth and, remarkably, living standards in the UK are just as good as in much of the rest of the EU—in some cases, better. In many ways, the UK has done better over the past 35 years generally. I very much welcome the fact that Charlie Bean will be reviewing the statistics.

The main difference between the UK and the economies that have performed better is that we have had such a low savings rate for a long time. Never forget Keynes’s famous dictum that investment equals savings and savings equals investment. If you have a low savings ratio, you are likely to have less investment. The UK has got by on borrowing other people’s saving surpluses and selling the family silver to finance it. We have had a £700 billion current account deficit built up over 15 years. Now, for example, 46% of city properties are foreign-owned and 53.8% of listed UK-domiciled companies are foreign-owned. The UK always used to have a big net surplus of foreign assets; there is now a substantial deficit of international assets that we own versus UK assets that are foreign-owned. It is clear that a low savings rate generally leads to low investment, and that that leads to poor productivity growth. That has been the biggest single factor contributing to our poor productivity growth.

Today, investment is not so much about old-fashioned physical plant but about intangible knowledge-based assets. I suspect accounting may often treat such investment, important though it is, as expenditure rather than investment. In the UK, we have, over the past few years, had a major growth in entrepreneurship: 1.5 million new companies in the past two years, not just in London and the south-east, many in new, digital technology. We have been much more successful in that context than the rest of Europe. Also, the UK may have effectively rationed its investment better than others—than Japan, for example, which has been building bridges to nowhere to keep the economy afloat.

There are clearly some useful things in the Government’s plan, but I felt that it mostly cobbled together various policies already in place, such as cutting corporation tax and freeing up planning, and attaching all that to a productivity plan label. I found nothing hugely innovative or major. There are some positive things: upping the annual investment allowance to £200,000; a new compulsory apprenticeship levy; and a new 2020 road fund. UK infrastructure is clearly fundamental, particularly in the south-east, where the road network is wholly inadequate and has been neglected for a long time. The 95% target for superfast broadband is good news. The Government can contribute ingredients, and macro policy can help. Improved skill training is obviously a good idea. No one speaks up for the university technical colleges of my noble friend Lord Baker, which will be incredibly important in improving the flow of people through education into skill training and into work—the more the better.

I question the Government’s initiatives to raise exports. We have heard a lot about them for a long time but nothing much happens. The crucial thing is export finance, which needs to be more easily available and cheaper to be competitive with that in France and the US.

Above all, now that the economy is back on its feet, there is a clear need to increase the savings rate if we want higher investment and productivity. It is not happening; indeed, the savings rate is falling. We need better fiscal incentives for people to save—dare I say it, making it clear to people that if they do not save, they may not be able to rely on the state in their old age because, as the baby boom explodes, that will simply not be affordable. Above all, we need a savings rate that averages 10% per annum. That would underpin a considerably better performance in productivity.