Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, on his Amendment 13. He rightly suspected that my Amendment 14 is a little more in the way of a probing amendment. I tabled it because of the concern I expressed earlier about the people not in the room when, by definition, a judicial review is brought by one party against a government department.

My Amendment 14 would be far less preferable to his Amendment 13 if we could clear up the problem with proposed subsection 29A(1)(b). As I said earlier, there is the question of whether that starts engaging the court with a more legislative function in deciding exactly who is and is not to benefit from the wider class of citizens not in the room.

So, we are back to the Minister’s saying that this is just about putting some extra discretionary tools in the judicial toolbox, to be used where appropriate. If that is the case and we could clear up the issue with paragraph (b), I would have no problem with allowing this extra tool, so that, in some cases, the quashing could not take effect until a future date, and the department could sort itself out and effect new regulations or, if necessary, even come to Parliament with emergency legislation. As a former government lawyer, I would have no problem with that possibility—but why all the rest of it?

On the one hand, the Minister talks about trusting the courts; on the other hand, we are all to be tied in knots with our various interpretations of all the various differently tilted tests that follow. That is probably the difference between me and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I say that because I have genuinely changed my mind about various aspects of this during Committee. If it is just a tool in the toolbox, make it an open-textured discretion that allows the suspended quashing order, and leave the rest to the court.

I shall make two further points. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made an essential point that is worth repeating: central government is a party to most judicial reviews and certainly the ones that are going to cause concern to the Government. So the Government can relax a little at this stage, knowing that any crucial arguments about the effect of particular discretionary remedies on wider public administration will be put by government lawyers to the court. Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, talked about the risk of litigation with an overly complex provision. That has to be taken seriously. I hope it will not be said in response that that amounts to a threat. That has been said to me in the past when I have suggested that a convoluted provision will lead to litigation. It is not a threat; it is based on experience of what happens when discretion is tied in knots in that way. Inevitably, that leads to more litigation, not less.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely support the amendments put forward, for the reasons that have been given. I do not want to add to them. It seems odd to give judges discretion and say that we trust them, then immediately circumscribe what they can do.

That leads to my concern about new Section 29A(10). When listening to the Minister earlier, I asked myself why new Section 29A(8) was there because all the points are perfectly obvious. I wonder whether we are looking at a new technique here being laid down for future use. Do you list perfectly obvious things in new subsection (8) to bring in the killer in new subsection (10)? I hope the Minister can assure us that we are not going to see in any future legislation dealing with judicial review—who knows whether there will be any—the codification of perfectly obvious principles as a means of bringing in by the back door what one sees here in new subsection (10).

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

Perhaps I might briefly add to that point before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, speaks. An absolutely classic example of legislating for discretion would be Section 33 of the Limitation Act, which courts are applying every single day of the week, which lists a large number of factors which the court may take into account and concludes by saying that it may take any other thing into account. Although I absolutely take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, there is nothing particularly unusual about setting out in detail the discretion and then, nevertheless, allowing the court to take into account other matters.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, spoke with such eloquence in making all the points that I can confine myself to making four short points.

First, as he rightly stressed, this is an important part of the conditions for TPIMs because it enables a judge and the Home Secretary, when making the decision, to concentrate on the factual evidence in relation to terrorist activity. The other conditions are more difficult to establish, or it might be more a question of judgment, but this at least concentrates on the facts.

Secondly, the amendment seeks what some may feel is an overgenerous compromise. I do not think so; I think that it is right to say that, for the first and initial period, a lower standard can be acceptable.

However, thirdly, that cannot be acceptable when one is looking at longer periods where a person’s liberty is to be constrained—particularly with the amendment that we will come to next, which concerns the indefinite detention period.

Fourthly, and finally, it seems to me that there can be no justification for making such a change unless there is evidence. Indeed, what was said about the position in the other place has been clearly set out.

I ask the Minister to set out fully what he believes is the evidence for this change. If he cannot do so in public on this occasion, there must be a means of informing those who are interested in this matter of the evidence so that it can be carefully reviewed before we impose on people accused of obviously very serious issues a standard of proof that really is completely unacceptable in any civilised society.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has given your Lordships a very clear and succinct history of control orders and TPIMs—as one would expect, given his experience. He pointed out very fairly that control orders had the very same test that it is now proposed in the Bill should be used to decide whether a TPIM is appropriate. It is also worth pointing out that control orders were highly controversial and subject to a considerable number of challenges in the courts to see whether they survived a proper challenge based on the European Court of Human Rights and the convention. They survived that, which will reassure your Lordships.

I accept that the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, which is supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is relatively modest, and I understand the reasoning for it, whereas the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, goes rather further and seems to involve a degree of subjectivity—although I will listen with interest to what he says—and that subjectivity might be difficult to satisfy.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the genesis of this debate is at least in part the evidence that the former President and current President of the Supreme Court gave to the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House. We had a good debate in Committee. It is clear that the judges wanted clarity as to how they should approach decisions of the European Court of Justice post Brexit, perhaps not least because of the difficulty they had relating to the Human Rights Act in determining what “taking into account” meant. Clarity would certainly have followed if they were told either to follow or to ignore the decisions, but that would not have been sensible or what the Government wanted.

As a result, we were engaged in something of a struggle to find the right formulation. The word “appropriate” in the original Bill received an almost unanimous no. “Relevant” is clearly important, but in some senses it is hardly necessary because the court will not take into account a decision that is irrelevant. I tabled an amendment, which is before the House, saying “relevant and helpful”. I readily concede that “helpful” is not a word that often finds its way into statute. However, I was quoting precisely what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, recently said about how the court would regard, for example, foreign law and whether it would follow it because the reasoning was persuasive, rather than because it was bound to follow it.

Therefore, “relevant” on its own is, frankly, suboptimal, but I have been nevertheless persuaded by what my noble and learned friend said. It is the result of a number of heads being put together and the best conceivable solution being found. I was particularly reassured by his answer to the four points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, not least his answer to his fourth point about the position of the Lord Chancellor, which I am sure everybody in this House would support.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make one or two observations, having raised this matter at Second Reading. I am very grateful to the Minister for his amendment, which certainly brings about clarity and certainty. But, having discussed the matter with others, I want to make sure that the certainty and consequences are clearly understood.

The draftsmanship is elegant, because although under subsection (2) a court may have regard to decisions made by the European Court of Justice after exit so far as they are relevant to any matter before the court, making that provision subject to subsections (3) to (6) means that a court could do so only to clarify the meaning or effect of retained EU law as at the date of exit. It therefore has the effect of confirming what I describe as the ossification of retained EU law as at the date of exit. Only the Supreme Court is permitted to depart from any retained EU case law under the test set out in subsection (5).

Although certainty is therefore brought about, it is at the price of ossification, other than by appeal to the Supreme Court. Ossification is a principle alien to the common law, which, while it has always sought certainty, has also always allowed a significant degree of flexibility to enable the law to develop and adapt to changing times. The principles of common law development are thus denied in the application of retained EU law to any court other than the Supreme Court.

A further feature of the clause is that the Supreme Court is given no guidance as to how it may exercise its right to depart from decisions of the European Court of Justice, save by reference to the 1966 practice statement and the subsequent case law. I think it right therefore to remind the House that it is giving the Supreme Court a very considerable degree of untrammelled power, subject, of course, to the right to reverse any such decision. I am very grateful to the Minister for the assurance he has given that if, in the exercise of that power, decisions are made they will be fully defended, but it is a considerable power.

I will make two further observations. First, a consequence of confining the power to depart from European Court decisions to the Supreme Court may well mean a significant increase in the case load of the Supreme Court. As we know, it has much else to do. I therefore ask the Minister if he would reconsider amending subsection (5) to permit the Courts of Appeal of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland, and the Inner House in Scotland, to be given a similar power. Not only would that alleviate the burden on the Supreme Court, but the experience of many sitting in the Supreme Court has shown that it is generally greatly assisted if it has a prior judgment of the Court of Appeal or Inner House on the question before it.

The final observation I will make echoes what the Minister said. As was often said in Committee, the Bill seeks to provide for a functioning statute book on exit in the event that there is no agreement with the EU. It has also been said there will have to be significant amendment by at least one further Bill in the event of agreement. If, for example, it is agreed that certain fields of our law or regulation must remain aligned for the purposes of non-tariff barriers, it will be necessary to ensure that the courts can take this into account in interpreting retained EU law and therefore have regard to subsequent European Court decisions to ensure that the law or regulations remain completely aligned. It is therefore, I regret to say, a matter that, in the event of an agreement, we shall have to return to at a subsequent stage. Again, I emphasise my thanks to the Minister for the discussions he has had and the certainty and clarity he has brought about.