(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will be asking for leave to withdraw this amendment, not on the basis that it will go away but on the basis that, first, there is room for further discussion, even though only a chink has opened up in what the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has had to say; and, secondly, on the basis that I accept that the amendment is not perfectly drafted and we would like to take further advice and further consider a number of matters in the drafting of the Bill. What I will say, very briefly if I can, about the amendment and the response of the Minister and the other speeches we have heard, is that this question has to be taken in the context of the introduction of the Bill.
There can be no doubt that the Bill will manifestly broaden the ambit of national security and protection legislation: first, because it is targeted not at individuals who have an obligation to the state but generally at citizens; and, secondly, in the way that the Bill is drafted. We talked about this a great deal last week, when we noted the inclusion of expressions such as, “know or reasonably ought to have known”, “conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service” and all those peripheral expressions. Indeed, we note the use of the phrase “prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom” when we know “the interests of the United Kingdom” are determined by what the Government of the day believe those interests to be. All those broaden the ambit of these criminal offences.
I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that this issue is not going to go away. All the briefings we have had from journalists and organisations tell us how important a public interest defence is. I completely take on board the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and by the Minister, that Article 10 on freedom of expression is a qualified right. Of course, people of legal distinction can disagree, but it is entirely wrong to suggest that the Law Commission does not contain people of legal distinction.
If it were translated into a consideration of this Bill, because there is no material distinction on the disclosure points, I feel confident that the Law Commission would come out with the same recommendation as it did in 2020. We also have the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in relation to a public interest defence. It is very difficult to argue that the fact that it is a qualified right under Article 10 does not mean that it would apply. Of course, we, the Law Commission and the Joint Committee on Human Rights have read the whole of Article 10 and understand the qualification, but the overwhelming point is the phrase
“necessary in a democratic society”.
Everything else is subject to that in the qualification.
Just so that I understand, is the noble Lord saying that the absence of a public interest defence, whether framed in the manner of this amendment or in a similar or a different way, means that the Bill would automatically be a violation of Article 10 of the European convention?
As drafted, I fear that it would. Since we have had absolutely no indication that concessions will be made to all the amendments we discussed last week—I rather doubt that we will get them—it seems to me that investigative journalism will be seriously affected in a way that risks being a serious breach of Article 10. It might be saved by the qualification suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, but I do not accept that that case is made out.
I entirely accept the noble Baroness’s point that the damage of publication cannot be recalled, but a balance must be struck which takes into account the interest in disclosure against the interest in secrecy. We emphasise the importance not just of free investigative journalism in a democratic society but of the control of wrongdoing. For my part, I cannot see anything in what the Minister said which comprehensively puts paid to the idea that there could be a cover-up of wrongdoing not possible for citizens to redress by disclosure without being subject to criminal proceedings under this Bill.
I accept entirely that this is a very difficult issue and that the balance to be struck is very difficult. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned the case of Clive Ponting, where there was undoubtedly government misinformation and wrongdoing. Clive Ponting was not a journalist; he was a former civil servant. In fact, he wrote books as well, including one on the truth about the “Belgrano”. Nevertheless, what he did was important. It is vital to our democracy that juries have the right—as one did in that case against the direction of the judge, because there was not a public interest defence—to say, “No, we will not convict because there has been wrongdoing.” A jury should not have to defy a judge and misapply the law because of the absence of such a defence to avoid covering up wrongdoing.
Of course I accept the point about drafting from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and that this amendment is not perfect. Indeed, it was he brought up the Ponting case at the very first instance in these proceedings. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, we cannot run away from drafting a public interest defence, if that is necessary, because the drafting is difficult. It is a different topic, but in Section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 we have a defence of reasonable comment on a matter of public interest. I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee for that Act, and we considered very carefully how that would work. However, at that stage—although they are rarer now as a result of that Act—these were matters for determination by a jury, and a jury can determine such a public interest defence.
First, with great respect, jury trial was effectively abolished by the Act that the noble Lord is talking about. Secondly, it put into statutory form a so-called Reynolds defence in a civil claim. Here we are talking about prosecutions of criminal offences of the most serious sort. The analogy is not appropriate.
I disagree—a fortiori, if such a defence is appropriate in a defence to a civil claim, it is appropriate in a defence to criminal proceedings that carry maxima of 14 years and life imprisonment. We may differ on that; nevertheless, of course I note that jury trial was abolished for defamation by that legislation. However, when we were considering the public interest defence, the abolition of jury trial was not then in mind; we had always had jury trials, and still can do in rare cases.
The only other point I wish to make is in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. Of course, in the case of whistleblowers, there are other avenues to pursue for those employed by the security services, but there are two answers to that point. The first is that we are not just concerned with those employed by the security services, or those employed by anybody in particular. We are concerned with offences designed to be used and prosecuted against ordinary citizens. Secondly, we have included in our amendment—it is one of the best drafted parts—that one of the factors to be taken into account would be
“the availability of any other effective authorised procedures for achieving the purpose of the alleged conduct and whether those procedures were exercised”.
That will always be an important point, because it answers the point that you could have gone to an authorised body for the protection of whistleblowers.
This issue is not going to go away. I suspect we shall come back to it on Report, and that there will be a vote on it. The amendment may be in a very different form, but nevertheless, with these very serious criminal offences, I cannot accept that a public interest defence is not in the interests of the public and the nation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I had two points to make, the first of which, about foreign power, has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, so I will not repeat it. The second is more of a question. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked, “Why not charge theft?” I have no doubt that I will be advised by the Minister, but is there not a requirement that you have to deprive somebody permanently of something to constitute the offence of theft? I can see some potential argument that somebody charged under that offence would say that they had no intention to deprive that person permanently of that information.
My Lords, I have not yet spoken to Amendments 9 and 10, which I was proposing to do before my noble friend spoke for us. Before doing so, I join my noble friend Lady Ludford in opposing the protection of all trade secrets without any requirement for there to be prejudice to the interests of the United Kingdom. That amendment, which has been proposed on behalf of the JCHR, seems to me to be sensible. I also share her bemusement, and that of others, that trade secrets are included in the Bill, because the way in which they are included is extremely wide.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has pointed out that Clause 2(2)(b)—he read it aloud, but I will not repeat doing so—is so wide that it effectively covers any information which has any commercial value of any significance. Of course, that information is important, and, to that extent, I accept the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. However, state actors may also steal, or act nefariously in respect of, trade secrets—as may others, be they state actors or not. They may be from the United Kingdom or abroad. They may be connected to national security, but if the Bill will deal with trade secrets, they need to be defined in such a way that it is confined to trade secrets that present a threat to national security. The Bill goes far too wide if we include wide threats to trade secrets in the criminal proceedings—which, as my noble friend Lady Ludford said, carry very heavy sentences—without the need to prove the threat to national security as an element of the criminal offence. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, threats to trade secrets are normally dealt with in the civil courts, where the protection to intellectual property is customarily and very frequently dealt with every day.
It is absolutely right, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, pointed out, that there is a requirement that the foreign power condition must be met. However, the foreign power condition in Clause 29 is not a very difficult hurdle to surmount. The present drafting does not require any prejudice to the security, defence or other interests of the United Kingdom. It is met if conduct is carried out not by a state Government but by any entity controlled or financially assisted by a foreign power—so that could be a commercial organisation that happened to be state-controlled. For “foreign power”, we have to read that as any power or any other state, including any friendly Government from anywhere in the world.
Our Amendments 9 and 10 tighten up the wording on trade secrets in Clause 2, but only in a limited way: by requiring that a trade secret must be subject to measures to prevent it becoming generally known or available to rival experts in the field. We suggest that it is simply not satisfactory—
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the IRAL came to the firm conclusion that Cart ought to go. It did so carefully considering the fact that Parliament should be slow before reversing decisions of the Supreme Court. It made the recommendation in relation to Cart and the case of Ahmed only, despite a number of other cases which were drawn to the panel’s attention as being possibly wrongly decided. As I pointed out in Committee, this was also the view of Lord Carnwath, who had specialist knowledge of the genesis of the Upper Tribunal. I believe it is the view of many, though of course not all, judges.
There are, as we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, a cohort of judges who have to consider what are almost always hopeless applications. They consider them very conscientiously. There may be an argument as to how much time precisely is spent and at what cost, but with very great respect, I am not sure that that is the point. The applicants have, in effect, already had three bites of the cherry. In the extremely unlikely event that a specialist tribunal has made an egregious error of law, I am sure the House will be aware of the fact that the qualified ouster clause contained in Clause 2 provides that, if there is a bad faith decision by the Upper Tribunal or one that is procedurally defective in a way as to amount to a fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice, there will still be an opportunity to challenge it. For the most part, there will not be.
Of course, I have enormous respect for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and other noble Lords who support this amendment, but I respectfully submit that we need to grasp the nettle. The poor prospects of success have not deterred applicants from making Cart judicial review applications in the past. I accept that this amendment would further reduce the avenues of challenge, but it would not, I suspect, put anybody off. I am sorry to say that this amendment seems to be something of a fudge. It will frustrate the purpose of the Bill. I fear that, if passed, a Cart JR application will continue to be the most popular JR application. The IRAL found that, of all the possible avenues of judicial review, this is the most popular and that statistic has not been challenged. Perhaps that is not surprising. If you are seeking asylum, it is not surprising that you would seek out every avenue in the hope that you would somehow be successful the next time.
On Amendment 6 from the Labour Front Bench, the potential review which this amendment envisages seems almost impossible to provide—although, no doubt, hard-working civil servants diverted from many other tasks would do their best if this amendment were to become part of the Bill. An asylum application will of course usually involve arguments that include references to Articles 3 and 8 and possibly even the Equality Act. By definition, these arguments have been rejected at all stages of the process. What precisely is this report supposed to do? Is it supposed to conduct a quasi-appeal of all those decisions? How will the material be obtained to enable the report to be provided? With great respect, the House really needs to know how this work will help, before committing the Government to an expensive and possibly fruitless exercise.
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, to which the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and I have added our names. I suggest that the amendment is a sensible compromise between abolishing Cart JRs altogether and setting a defensible limit on the prospect of excessive satellite litigation by limiting appeals.
We see and acknowledge the risk posed by large numbers of unmeritorious challenges to decisions of the Upper Tribunal dismissing appeals from the First-tier Tribunal, but believe that risk has been exaggerated by the Government, in terms of both the time and judicial resources expended on Cart JRs, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has explained, and the low success rates, which are contended and relied upon by the Government. In particular, we doubt that the Government’s figures take into account the full overall impact of successful JRs on the judicial review climate as a whole, particularly in the area of immigration, to which Cart JRs generally apply.
The Minister is not alone in overestimating the time and judicial resource that would be saved by the abolition of Cart reviews. I say now what I should have said during the debate on the last group: I am very grateful to the Minister for the time he spent discussing with us the issues arising in this Bill, including on Cart reviews. However, in spite of those discussions, we agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that any savings achieved by the abolition of Cart JRs are not worth tolerating the injustice that would be caused by their abolition. Every successful Cart application signals an injustice that would be done to a future applicant were this clause to be enacted.
As many of us said in Committee, this clause, unamended, would set an ugly precedent for ouster clauses in future legislation, building on the general purpose template in this clause, which is designed to insulate unlawful executive action from judicial review. I suggest that the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, elegantly avoids that pitfall and it is very important that we support it for that reason, as well as others.
The bar to launching a Cart review is and will remain high: the applicant for judicial review always has to surmount a difficult hurdle in securing permission to bring an application. That is as it should be, given the nature of the supervisory jurisdiction. Indeed, the conditions set out in the Cart case itself were restrictive and stringent, and they will not change. The provision outlined by the noble and learned Lord, whose amendment would allow for an appeal from a decision of the supervisory court directly to the Supreme Court only, in the most limited circumstances only and subject to very short time limits, is a sensible safeguard—and no more—to ensure that important points of law can be considered by the Supreme Court in appropriate cases. I suggest that the Government should not be concerned about that.
Amendment 6, to be spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seeks a review of the operation of the provisions in Clause 2, with particular reference to the consequences for persons with protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 and the enforcement of rights under the Human Rights Act 1998. We support it in principle, but of course we await hearing from both the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the Minister on this.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am most interested in the way in which the noble Lord analyses this. Is he essentially saying that this Bill is giving too much power to judges—power that ought to be vested in Parliament—and that a judicial review reform of this nature goes far too far and that judges should not be allowed to have these powers in case they exercise them inappropriately?
It is a two-pronged attack. I do not believe that the judges should have the power to make lawful what they have already found is unlawful with retrospective effect. That means that prospective-only orders are, in principle, wrong. However, if there were a case for changing regulations or for altering government action so as to bring it within the limits that Parliament wanted, that is for Parliament; that is for legislation, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, argued. It is not for the courts to say, “We find the act unlawful, but it is only going to take effect as unlawful for the future.” It is, in the example of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, an ex tunc approach; but an ex tunc approach, frankly, is right, whereas the removal of flexibility by ruling out the Part A power—the power to delay—would be a removal of flexibility, which would be unnecessary, and we support that. We do not support the presumption, but that is a different point.
The real important point, about retrospective charges and the points in Amendment 6, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is that they accept the unlawfulness—if that was the only amendment that was passed—but would go on to say, “You can rely on the unlawfulness as a defence in criminal proceedings and you can still apply for other financial remedies for judicial review, but the quashing order will only take effect prospectively.” That, in my respectful view, is to fudge the whole point of unlawfulness, and the universality and the universal application of judicial review, which lies at its heart.
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Of course, new subsection (8)(f) refers to
“any other matter that appears to the court to be relevant.”
So a court can decide that there are other matters that it thinks are important. This is not restricting or fettering the discretion of the court. Why is it so offensive?
It is absolutely right that the court can consider any other matter, but it must consider all the factors in new subsection (8)(a) to (8)(e). That is mandating the court where some of those factors may not be of any interest to the court at all. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, was right to point out that there is a potential conflict between the factors in subsection (8)(c) and (8)(d). For Parliament to be telling judges how they should exercise their discretion and what factors they should have regard to without giving them the option of disregarding some factors is wrong.
The court is exercising, as we all know, a supervisory jurisdiction over executive action or the claimed abuse, or excess, of delegated powers. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was right to argue that the way in which judicial review has worked in practice—and I suggest that it is the most important development in civil or administrative law over the past 50 years, above any other development that we have had—is that the judiciary, the Executive and Parliament work not exactly together but in balance, so that the powers are exercised in accordance with the law. With respect to what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, says, it is inappropriate and regressive for the Executive to tell Parliament what factors they should consider when performing that supervisory role. The courts should be left to consider executive action in accordance with the law passed by Parliament and to grant remedies accordingly. They do not need, and should not be tied down by, restrictive provisions that prevent them doing justice taking into account factors that they think are important.
Amendment 2, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, would at least limit the exercise of the provisions in Clause 1 to powers where the court was satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice to do so. I suspect that that amendment will be opposed on the basis that it would introduce an unnecessary fetter on judicial discretion—and I suggest that that is entirely ironic, because the whole of new subsections (8), (9) and (10) are precisely targeted at fettering the courts’ discretion, and it is to that that we object. It is also ironic that, if passed, this would be the only mention of the interests of justice in the clause.
Amendment 7 would make the new subsection (8) factors permissive, rather than mandatory. Therefore, it removes the point that I made in answer to the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that the court must consider factors which have an inherent conflict.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in those circumstances I think that it is for me to respond. I do not know whether the Minister wishes to respond to any question—although there has not really been a question.
My Lords, I believe this is in order, because I did not suggest for a moment that it was for the Government to send people to prison or to make up their mind. Ultimately, the policy that is reflected in this amendment is something that a Government would have to decide upon.
My Lords, at the end of this interesting debate, I say first that I am very grateful to all who have spoken and to the noble Lord the Minister for his careful response. Two things strike me: first, this amendment enjoys overwhelming support and, secondly, there has been a distinct theme to the contributions to the debate from noble Lords from all around the House, expressed perhaps by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, when he talked about a comprehensive and strategic approach. Others have talked about a holistic approach.
The aim has been to address the failures of the criminal sentencing system, as part of the criminal justice system, identified by, among others, the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Ponsonby. It is a rethink that is required—to use the expression of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Another important matter was identified by two dissimilar figures in general approach. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, talked about taking the political sting out of issues arising on sentencing. This was put in a similar way by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I share the slight surprise of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, at being told that she was a bleeding-heart liberal, but I take the point.
I do not intend the royal commission that we have described in this amendment to prejudge the issues. What we are calling for overwhelmingly is an evidence-based approach to sentencing, rather than a politically based approach or one that simply responds to public opinion or the perception of public opinion. I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that the question is not one where the Government are excluded from making decisions. The point about the royal commission is, as he put it, that the royal commission recommends and the Government then act on those recommendations. What distinguishes a royal commission, I suggest, is that its recommendations are widely seen by the public, the Government and the Opposition as authoritative. It is that quality of being authoritative that I believe gives the royal commission its weight.
It is a question not of outsourcing the decision-making process but of setting up a process to advise and direct the future. This Bill does none of that. It contains sentencing in its Short Title, yet it is piecemeal and bitty and lacks a philosophy. The Minister set out a philosophy that is two-sided, but only one of those sides is reflected in the Bill. We believe that a royal commission would address that, which is why I would like to see this amendment agreed. That said, however, what the noble Lord has said about the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice as a whole is of some encouragement, because I take criminal justice to include criminal sentencing. I hope I see him nod in agreement with that. I am waiting—he is not going to commit to the terms of reference, but it seems to me that that offers some hope for the future.
I am concerned about the use of the word “paused”. It should not be paused; it is urgent. If the Government take anything from this debate, I hope they will take the feeling around the House that this is an urgent matter requiring urgent attention and will revisit it. That said, and in the confidence that they will approach it in that way and that the royal commission will proceed, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, identifies the need for consistency, and he is right. I wonder whether this amendment was not provoked by the appalling case of Phillip Leece, who not only committed rape but named the victim and posted grossly insulting material on the internet. That is something that was probably outside the scope of those who drafted this legislation. Newspapers are regulated—as I know, as the regulator of newspapers—but social media remains wholly unregulated. There is significant work to be done in this regard, which Parliament will grapple with when looking at the online safety Bill. This is just the sort of matter that a duty of care should deal with, in a proper system to prevent this sort of posting taking place.
I am sure that the Attorney-General is thinking carefully about contempt of court aspects. Of course, there is a power on the part of the judge to deal with the matter much more seriously than with the derisory fines that are currently imposed, but it is something that has to go to the administration of justice, and it is not always predictable or easy to identify what cases will or will not constitute contempt of court—so I welcome that.
Although I wholly understand why this amendment has been proposed, it seems that it would be stark and inconsistent with other provisions—but it addresses a mischief that very much needs to be addressed.
My Lords, I shall speak briefly to this group of amendments. First, I turn to the minimum sentence for rape of seven years, subject to an exceptional circumstances disregard or permitted departure. We acknowledge and endorse everything that has been said to the effect that rape is the most appalling crime. The terribly low success rate of prosecutions of which the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman of Darlington, spoke is acknowledged by everyone and has been the subject of a great deal of research by parliamentarians, policymakers and the Government. It needs addressing. The problems that she talked of, of low reporting rates and very high withdrawal of support, along with very low conviction rates, all need addressing. However, I am not convinced that a minimum sentence would address any of those things. Furthermore, for all the reasons, which I shall not repeat, I believe that the use of an exceptional circumstances test for the ability of judges to depart from a minimum sentence is simply wrong.
I also agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, when he pointed out that, as anybody who has dealt with rape cases in criminal courts knows, rapes are so very different, the one from another. He was right to point to the very wide range of sentences endorsed in the sentencing guidelines, which mean that courts treat rape very differently, from the milder cases to the very serious cases that merit life imprisonment. I also have some concern that, in some cases, it would make juries even less likely to convict if they knew that there was a minimum sentence of seven years. I cannot support, and I do not think that we cannot support generally, the proposition that this seven-year minimum sentence should be legislated for.
By contrast, Amendment 78B, which would increase the sentence for publishing the identity of sexual offences complainants, is one that we do support. I suspect that it is not often realised quite how serious an offence this is. Sometimes there is a substantial risk of further harm when the identity of a complainant is published. There is very often significant fear on the part of the complainant if her name—as it is usually, although it may be his name—is published. There is almost always really significant distress caused by an unlawful publication. It is of course open to complainants to waive anonymity if they wish. But if they do not wish their identity to be published, to have the law flouted in the way the offence requires seems to me to justify a sentence of imprisonment in some cases. It is important to hear that these are only maximum sentences that we are dealing with.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that there are other cases of unlawful disclosure that should be considered and reviewed but, that being the case in an ideal world—and we all know that these things do not happen as fast as they should—that is no reason for not doing anything at all. So we support Amendment 78B.
For all the reasons given by my noble friend Lady Brinton and, no doubt, to be given by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby—the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, has already spoken to it—we support Amendment 78D on the duty to inform under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme, as well as the extension of the time limit for complaint in respect of unduly lenient sentences. In Committee we went through the reasons for the whole-life order to be taken as a starting point in cases of abduction, sexual assault and murder, and we do support that—again, because it is only a starting point—and this ranks right up there with the other serious offences for which a whole-life order is appropriate.
We support for the reasons given by my noble friend Lady Brinton her amendment on home detention curfews as well.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too apologise for not having been here at Second Reading, but I have had the opportunity of reading the short debate.
In Section 67 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, there is a mens rea, as it were, simply for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification. Unfortunately, one has to pose the question of why anyone is doing this at all—I think it used to be assumed that it must be for some form of rather strange sexual gratification—and this addition of “humiliating, alarming or distressing” is added to cover the possibility that there might be some other motive. Those words are familiar and often interpreted in one context or another in the criminal law, whereas I am unaware—I will be corrected if I am wrong—that the concept of invading privacy finds much resonance in the criminal law, although of course it is reflected in other aspects of our law, not least in Article 8 of the European convention.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly said that we do not want anyone who should be capable of relying on a defence to have one in circumstances where it would be unattractive if they did, and he cited a particular instance of someone having a laugh. He then gave the game away by saying it would be unfortunate if they could say this despite the distress that might be caused to the individual who had been the victim of this. Whose laugh are we talking about? Presumably we are talking about misjudged humour on the part of the perpetrator, not the amusement of the victim of this invasion. I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, that if there is to be a purposes clause, it is sufficiently wide. I think a magistrate directing himself or herself with the addition of a clerk would have no difficulty in considering this; nor would a recorder have any difficulty in directing a jury to consider this, so that if somebody said in their defence, “I was only doing it for a laugh”, they simply would not be believed.
My Lords, I agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I am not sure that invading privacy is not just as much a purpose as an activity. I shall be brief in support of Amendments 2 and 3 in my name and in the name of my noble friend Lady Burt of Solihull.
I made it relatively clear at Second Reading that I would have preferred the specified purposes provision to be omitted altogether, and in that regard I go further than the agnosticism of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. That would mean that an offence would be committed by anyone taking upskirting images without the consent of the victim, though I would add a different proviso: so long as the action of taking or recording the images was not accidental. This could have been quite easily achieved in the legislation by the use of a word such as “deliberately”, and would have constituted an acceptable required level of mens rea—or guilty state of mind—to constitute the behaviour criminal. But my chief concern, and that of my noble friend Lady Burt and others, has been to ensure that no one is permitted to avoid criminal liability by running the defence that he lacked the required purpose. The amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is designed to achieve that end.
I would add another problem that has not been covered. There is a concern that the specified purpose in new Section 67A(3)(b)—that is “humiliating, alarming or distressing” the victim, would be entirely absent, not only in the case of the robust constitution professed by the noble and learned Lady, Lady Butler-Sloss, but also in a case where the perpetrator intends to avoid detection by the victim by taking or recording the images without the victim knowing. If the victim is not to know of the behaviour, then she cannot be humiliated, alarmed or distressed by it. In such a case, the only remaining—
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. The distress may not be something the victim is aware of at the time it takes place, but were they to become aware—which ex hypothesi they would in the case of a prosecution—surely then they would suffer humiliation and distress, having found out what had been done to them.
I do not accept that, because in some cases these images would be published and a prosecution would follow without the victim ever being traced. The victim may not know the images are of her—there may be distinctive parts, there may not—but there may be cases where distress can come either with the prosecution or later. In the proposed new section as it stands, the prosecution has to prove that the intention of the perpetrator was to bring about that distress. That seems an unnecessary complication and hurdle to erect in front of the prosecution so that it has to prove that purpose to secure a conviction.
There may well be cases in which the perpetrator can say that sexual gratification, whether for himself or another person, was not his intention or purpose—the example has been given of “having a laugh”. In Amendment 2, we have identified financial gain, where these images are to be published to make money, as another intention. In Amendment 3, we have identified entertainment or amusement, which is another way of saying “having a laugh”, as another.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has argued that financial gain will be achieved by the creation of these images or recordings only if they are to be sold for someone’s sexual gratification. I am not sure that this is entirely true. I believe that, in some circumstances, financial gain may be made by unscrupulous individuals peddling sick humour arising from such images, with no intention on the perpetrator’s part to secure sexual gratification for anyone, whether others may view them for that purpose or not. The purpose of the perpetrator must be proved, not the coincidental fact that others may get sexual gratification from viewing such images later.
The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is elegant and cleverly covers our point. However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, indicated to us that he might look on that amendment favourably even if I have not persuaded the Government—I am not sure that I have persuaded the Minister—of the merits of our amendments. I hope that I have done so; I do not see the difficulty in accepting our amendments. We regard them as improving the Bill by specifically outlawing taking or recording images for financial gain or for entertainment or amusement. Our amendments can be taken with those in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, which I hope the Government will accept in any event. The point is to avoid people who clearly should be convicted of offences under this new and welcome legislation unjustly running defences of absence of the relevant purpose and getting away with it.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberAbsolutely not. The Judicial College can respond, and be required to respond, to political guidance if Parliament chooses to legislate on the level of damages. I do not say that that is what is wrong. My concern is about the fairness and comparability of picking out whiplash injuries in an attack on fraud and reducing the compensation to genuine claimants accordingly. My point about the £225 and £450 figures—
Does the noble Lord accept that if you reduce the amount of damages, it provides something of a disincentive to those who are fraudulent?
Of course I accept that. It is a question of whether the cost in unfairness is worth paying. It is a dilemma that the noble Lord himself correctly outlined in his speech. We are simply saying that we ought to try every other avenue before trying this drastic avenue of introducing an unfair system for genuine claimants. I will see if I can get beyond the next couple of sentences.
My point about the £225 and £450 figures is that they represent a cliff edge. They compare to £1,800, which is the expected award set out in the Government’s impact statement for such injuries of less than three months’ duration to date. The Government’s response to the outcry that these damages are so low has not been to meet the outcry at all but to reduce them from £235 to £225 and from £470 to £450.
One of our problems with the present proposals is that there is no evidence base for a recent increase in the number of fraudulent claims. We entirely accept the case that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made both at Second Reading and today that there is a wide prevalence of fraudulent claims that we have to tackle. However, there is not a wide base of evidence for an increase in such claims, nor is there sufficient evidence of how many claims are fraudulent or genuine. There is certainly no evidence that only the fraudulent claims would be deterred and that the genuine claims would continue. That worries me seriously, because the noble and learned Lord suggested earlier today that a genuine claimant might continue whereas a fraudulent one might be deterred. We simply do not accept that. It is just as likely—and I say this also without an evidence base—that genuine claimants would be deterred because the amount at stake had become so low, even though they had a fair claim.
We entirely agree with the Government that the proposal for compulsory medical reports discriminates between genuine and fraudulent claimants. I repeat my declaration at Second Reading that I have just concluded some litigation about compulsory medical reports and the operation of the pre-action protocol. However, there is no corresponding evidence of discrimination in the case of these drastic cuts in damages, which we say are unjust, unfair and fail to give fair compensation to genuine claimants. They discriminate unfairly between injuries sustained in road traffic accidents by drivers and passengers in motor vehicles and those sustained in such accidents by cyclists and pedestrians. Who would receive the traditional level of damages? Passengers and motorists would not, even in genuine cases. They discriminate unfairly between accidents which are covered by the Bill and accidents at work or accidents caused by, for instance, a council’s negligence. Those can also be a source of fraudulent claims.
If the Government are determined to have a tariff, we are worried about the cliff edge. I see no fundamental reason in principle against a tariff; it is a question of weighing the advantages of certainty outlined by the noble and learned Lord against the fact that you have a cliff edge where those cases that are very close to the three-month level produce very large discrepancies in damages. If we are to have a tariff, let it at least be one that does not penalise genuine claimants by allowing them an award that is far too low. That is the basis for our alternative Amendments 13 and 96. We do not put them forward as a preferred option, but they are more acceptable than the Government’s proposals.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will not delay the House long, either. We have rightly concentrated on the rights of the innocent; they are fundamental to our system. But I will address your Lordships very briefly on the position of victims. Victims’ groups complain, not without justification, that in the past they have not always been taken seriously by the police or prosecuting authorities. Victims need to be encouraged to come forward. We should not underestimate the courage it takes to report offences of the sort we are concerned with to the police. You may not be believed. You may have to face—so you think—the ordeal of being cross-examined by men in wigs who suggest that you have lied. You may feel very alone, particularly if you have been abused by someone in authority.
Noble Lords will have seen the footballers coming forward many years after the event, and the courage that it took and the incredible upset that it caused them in a macho culture to admit what had happened so many years ago. I take the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, of someone in a care home. They come to the police many years later. Their evidence is the first of any sort of being abused in a care home by somebody who runs the care home. After they have given their account, the man who is running the care home denies vociferously that he abused this character. There is a suggestion that he may have come forward for financial motive. But what if others come forward? The first complainant may feel that he cannot go through with the matter at all unless some of the other people, whom he knows very well have been abused, do so.
In Committee, I raised the point with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that I was concerned that his amendment might result in the police charging rather earlier than they would otherwise have done because they want to flush out potential corroborative witnesses; and that that might be inappropriate. I did not suggest there was any lack of bona fides on the part of the police; this is a very difficult decision to make. However, I suggest that there is that real risk, even with CPS involvement. It is most important that people are encouraged to come forward to give evidence in appropriate cases.
Of course, safeguards have been mentioned, whether in the magistrates’ court or the High Court, but this is a police operational matter. Despite judges’ ability to deal with many difficult things, it is not the right case for them to consider. I suggest that if there is a need for a tightening of the guidelines or for further offences that deal with police behaviour, so be it. But, focusing on the victim, I am for the moment not satisfied that there needs to be a change in the law.
My Lords, I will address a couple of points briefly. First, I will address the difference between Amendments 182 and 187 on the central question of whether it is right to extend pre-charge anonymity to all offences or to sexual offences only. I completely appreciate the logic of the position adopted by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. However, I believe that there is a distinction to be drawn between sexual offences on the one hand and other offences on the other.
I believe that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, was right about this. It seems to me that a particular stigma attaches to accusations of sexual offences, which is generally more difficult to rebut where such accusations are made than where an accusation is made of another offence against the person or of offences against property. It is often far more difficult in sexual offence cases to clear conclusively and for ever the name of a suspect who is not charged than it is in the case of other offences. As the noble and learned Baroness pointed out, there is also the interest of the press in sexual offence cases. I suggest that that is why so much publicity has been given to sexual offences, particularly historical offences, in this debate and in your Lordships’ House generally.
A further point is that the nature of the evidence in sexual offences tends to be historical and tends to involve pitting the word of the claimant against the word of the victim. In those circumstances, the no smoke without fire rubric gains currency. I see this as a question of balance in which the balance in the all-offences case mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, comes down against pre-charge anonymity, whereas it comes down in favour of it in respect of sexual offences. It is a case of the robustness and security that we as a society allow to the presumption of innocence.
The second question I wish to address is that of the stage at which anonymity should cease. I entirely take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that the arrest is part of the criminal process and therefore that there is, generally speaking, a public right to know because the liberty of the subject is being taken away at that early stage. However, I cannot get away from the central point that arrest can be effected by a police officer on reasonable suspicion only. That reasonable suspicion frequently arises when the suspect has been given no chance to offer a full explanation which, if he were offered that opportunity, might dispel the suspicion altogether—whereas, to justify a charge, it has to be shown that there is evidence which would, if it were accepted at a trial, lead to a conviction by a court of law. I believe that that distinction is important, and that again the balance is against lifting anonymity at arrest and keeping it therefore at charge.
I then come to the question of witnesses coming forward. I completely appreciate the concern that exists around the House and outside it that witnesses should not be deterred from coming forward. But I also agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, that in most cases, if evidence from further witnesses is available, it will come forward after charge, so that forbidding pre-charge publicity will delay further evidence rather than prevent it coming to light altogether. There is nevertheless a concern, raised by the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Pannick, about the possibility of pre-charge anonymity preventing genuine witnesses—notably other victims—coming forward with allegations that might lead to a suspect being charged when he would otherwise escape justice altogether. That is why the detail of the proviso inserted in the amendment of my noble friend Lord Paddick addresses this point precisely, and it is very different from the amendment that was presented in Committee.
Under this amendment a judge is entitled to say that he is,
“satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to remove or vary a restriction provided for”,
and to,
“direct that the restriction shall be lifted or shall be limited to such extent and on such terms as the judge considers the interests of justice require”.
The amendment further states:
“In considering an application … the judge shall have particular regard to the possibility that further witnesses might volunteer evidence relating to sexual offences allegedly committed by the person”.
I believe that that is the best we can do in striking a balance between encouraging witnesses to come forward and enabling them to know about allegations in appropriate cases, and protecting suspects from unjust publicity that causes the dreadful consequences of which we have all heard.
It is all a question of balance and I appreciate that it is a very difficult balance to strike. But I suggest to your Lordships’ House that the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Paddick strikes that balance accurately and should be supported.
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe question of appropriate sentencing powers is a difficult one. It goes back to 1952, when the magistrates were first given their powers. There are different views on whether it is appropriate to increase the sentencing powers. For example, the Prison Reform Trust and the Howard League think there ought to be a decrease in sentencing powers. There is a great deal of thought being carried out on this. I am not currently aware of any modelling and I cannot go beyond the answer given, but I will take that back to the department and bear in mind the question posed by the noble Lord.
My Lords, this change has been on the statute book since 2003. The Magistrates’ Association argues strongly that retaining more cases in the magistrates’ court and reducing the number of cases committed to the Crown Court for sentence would cut delays, as the noble Baroness, Lady Seccombe, said, save some £40 million and, importantly, make justice more local. Do the Government see any persuasive arguments against now implementing the change?
The noble Lord is right; it was as long ago as 2003 that this potential increase in sentence was statutorily allowed. A number of factors have been taken into account by successive Governments. He makes an important point about cost savings. He is quite right; it is, of course, much cheaper to use magistrates than go to the Crown Court and, if they have appropriate powers, it is more likely that magistrates will deal with the matter. We have to bear in mind—I think the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, directed his question towards this matter—the possible effect on the prison population and how magistrates will feel able, or want, to use any increase in powers. It is a difficult question.
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, any member of the public can walk into court to hear proceedings being conducted. That is at the heart of open justice. I have long believed that allowing proceedings to be televised is the natural extension of that principle—subject of course to safeguards, in particular for witnesses. Does the Minister agree that the limited televising of proceedings to date has been a success and should be further extended?
There has been some televising of proceedings. The Supreme Court, for example, even has its own website. I do not think it is doing very well in the ratings war, but it provides accessible opportunities to see what goes on the courts. The Court of Appeal Criminal Division is also now available to the public, and a pilot is proceeding on the Crown Court and sentencing remarks. While of course the Government are very much in favour of open justice, we have to proceed carefully in this area, perhaps because of the risk of people being diverted in the way they perform in court, whether they be witnesses or even—dare I say?—lawyers thinking about how they will be perceived.
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government, in the light of the latest figures on deaths in custody and prison violence, what plans they have to improve prison safety in the short term.
My Lords, the Government recognise that our prisons need reform. There is much more to do to ensure that prisons are places of decency, hope and rehabilitation, and improving safety is fundamental. There is no single, simple solution to the increases in deaths and violence in prison, but we are taking action. This includes implementing the recommendations from the review of the process to support prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm, and trialling the use of body-worn video cameras.
My Lords, my Question was quite specific. We commend the Government’s commitment to long-term prison reform, but last week’s figures demand immediate action to reduce prison violence. Homicides, assaults on prisoners and staff, suicide and self-harm are all up, by roughly a quarter overall—and that is over the previous dreadful year’s figures. We urgently need more staff, fewer prisoners, less of prisoners’ time spent locked in cells and an end to cell cramming. What action will the Government take now?
The noble Lord will know, because his party was in government for five of the last six years, that what happens in prisons represents a real challenge for any Government. However, I can tell him that prison officers have increased in number by 440 this year. Further to that increase, we are continuing our drive for more prison officers; the training is improving—going from six to 10 weeks; we are cracking down on psychoactive substances and their importation into prison; and we are acting through a number of different initiatives to identify particular risk points for violence. We are doing everything we can to tackle these very real problems.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberWe have reduced by 584 the number of IPP prisoners in the last year. There is an indeterminate sentence prisoners co-ordination group, run by NOMS, where close examination is taking place of all serving IPP prisoners. Efforts are made to accelerate their access to the appropriate courses, and we have removed backlogs from the Parole Board. We think that everything is being done to make sure that those who are safe to be released are being released when the Parole Board decides.
My Lords, today we have further evidence of prison overcrowding from another shocking inspection report of Wormwood Scrubs, which holds 35 indeterminate sentence prisoners. It makes the obvious recommendation that single cells should not be used for more than one prisoner. Will the Government now recognise that the injustice of keeping IPP prisoners beyond their tariffs serves only to add to the scandal of holding prisoners in overcrowded, squalid and understaffed prisons?
The noble Lord refers to the report on Wormwood Scrubs, which I entirely accept shows a distressing picture. As he and the House will know, the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister are determined to improve our prison system, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer has given £1.3 billion to enable that to happen. It will not happen overnight, but I am sure the House will accept the Government’s sincerity and determination to deal with some of the most unattractive aspects of our prison system.
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to tackle the incidence of deaths, serious assaults and incidents of self-harm in prison.
My Lords, the Government recognise the seriousness of this problem and are taking action to respond. We are trialling the use of body-worn video cameras, the Psychoactive Substances Act will introduce new offences to control supply and possession and we have reviewed the process for supporting prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm. We recognise that our prison system needs reform, and there is much more to do to ensure that prisons are places of decency, hope and rehabilitation.
My Lords, 2015 saw a record number of deaths in custody, a 20% increase in assaults and a 25% increase in self-harm incidents. Those increases were over record figures the previous year. The Justice Secretary appears committed, rightly, to prison reform, but has he been promised the resources to address the causes of these dreadful figures—squalid conditions, overcrowding, understaffing and prisoners locked for far too long in their cells?
The causes of violence are multifactorial. They include of course the increased use of psychoactive substances, to which the Government are responding positively. It is a ceaseless challenge to try to prevent them coming into prison, but we have a new offence, and we are taking steps to make it very difficult for these substances to be thrown over walls or secreted in parts of the body. It is generally a significant challenge. We are also looking at a two-year violence reduction project, to help us better understand the causes and characteristics of violence and to strengthen our handling of it. There is also the use of body-worn cameras. Ultimately, the best way to reduce violence may be to give, as the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have suggested, much more power to prison governors to give them the tools necessary to reform the way their prisons are run and to help rehabilitate offenders.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we will set out our proposals in due course. While we want to remain part of the ECHR, we will not stay at any cost. If we cannot achieve a satisfactory settlement within the convention, we may have no option but to consider withdrawal. However, we are confident that we can make progress from within the ECHR.
My Lords, the convention obligation to comply with final decisions of the Strasbourg court protects us all against breaches by Governments, in other Council of Europe countries and our own. In the light of the Russian Constitutional Court’s decision that Russian domestic laws should trump Strasbourg decisions, do the Government not accept that if we took a similar line—let alone threatened to leave—it would encourage other Governments to do the same? Will the Government commit on this Human Rights Day that they still accept that the binding obligation to comply with final decisions of the Strasbourg court is the bedrock on which the convention is built?
My Lords, the legislation passed by the Russian Duma does not actually mean that Russia is leaving the ECHR. It was a response to a decision of the ECHR about the unfettered right to tap phone calls and Article 8. This Government remain absolutely committed to the protection of human rights, both here and abroad, on this international Human Rights Day. We are party to no fewer than, I think, seven explicit treaties protecting human rights, as well as many others which bear on them. We will remain within the convention and the obligations under Article 46. Any future plans will involve the protection of all those rights contained within the convention.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberDoes the Minister recognise that one difficulty under the existing system, with giving priority to legal gender, is that trans people who turn out to be offenders may be the least likely to apply for gender recognition certificates under the 2004 Act? Will the government review take that into account?
The decision to apply for a certificate is, of course, an intensely personal one. What is important is that a prisoner, or indeed anybody, should know that they have the right to do so—but it would be entirely inappropriate to in any way place pressure on somebody to go through that process. The matter is one that the Act rightly treats with great care in terms of protection of data and all the sensitive matters that it is necessary to take into account when making a momentous decision of this sort.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they are satisfied that the Legal Aid Agency’s evaluation of tenders for the new duty solicitor contracts was fairly and effectively conducted.
My Lords, we are. The Legal Aid Agency followed a robust and fair process in assessing duty tender bids. The assessment process was subject to careful moderation and management at all stages, including independent validation. All staff who assess the bids received comprehensive training to ensure transparent, consistent and fair treatment of all bids.
My Lords, two whistleblowers involved in this assessment process have now said publicly that there were too few staff, many of them virtually untrained agency temps with no relevant experience, and that assessment of the bids and moderation of the assessments were subjected to highly unreasonable time targets. Now that this has led to 100-plus legal challenges and calls from the Law Society for a full and proper investigation, what do the Government propose to do to review the process in view of the Answer just given by the noble Lord?
The noble Lord is right that this has been the subject of legal challenges, just as the bidding process itself was subject to an unsuccessful judicial review. There have been individual legal claims under public procurement regulations and a judicial review in relation to the process. It is inappropriate for me to comment in detail about matters which are the subject of litigation. However, I can say that about 19% of the staff were temporary. The Government are satisfied that these staff were thoroughly adequately trained and that what they were asked to do was reasonable in the time afforded to them.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberThe Government are aware that there are a number of schemes, in not only Northern Ireland, but Australia, New Zealand and parts of North America. There is no standardised way of delivering restorative justice but the Government are committed to continuing this as a significant way of improving reoffending rates and providing victims with a reasonable involvement with the criminal justice system.
My Lords, the MoJ is to be congratulated on its action plan produced by the coalition Government and on promoting Restorative Justice Week. There is strong evidence that restorative justice programmes can be effective in prisons as well as in the community, and Sycamore Tree has been running programmes in 40 prisons. Will the new prisons built to replace existing outdated ones have the facilities necessary to run restorative justice programmes, and in surroundings that are sympathetic to victims, who are central to restorative justice?
The noble Lord is right that restorative justice is provided in a number of settings, including in prisons. Of course, the new prison plans are somewhat in their infancy at the moment but I am sure that the Secretary of State will have well in mind the desirability of maintaining this tradition.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the current policy on the treatment of transgender individuals in the criminal justice system.
My Lords, criminal justice agencies are mindful of their duties under the Equality Act 2010. In particular, the National Offender Management Service policy on the care and management of transsexual prisoners states that prisoners are normally placed according to their “legally recognised gender”. The guidelines allow, however, some room for discretion and in such cases senior prison management will review the circumstances with relevant experts to protect the prisoner’s safety and well-being, and those of other prisoners.
My Lords, Tara Hudson—a woman, after six years of gender reconstruction—was originally imprisoned at HMP Bristol, a tough prison for 600 men, causing her great distress. She was moved to a women’s prison only after the judges considering her appeal suggested that the Prison Service reconsider. How can prison allocation be so insensitive to transgender offenders, particularly in the light of the Minister’s Answer? Will his department ensure that in future, if a transgender defendant is at risk of a custodial sentence, full and careful thought will be given to allocation before sentence rather than after placement?
I am slightly surprised that the noble Lord has commented in such detail on Tara Hudson; he will be aware of the obligations under the Data Protection Act and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which place restrictions on the disclosure of information relating to prisoners. As noble Lords will be aware, it is the policy of the Ministry of Justice and its executive agencies never to discuss individual cases. However, without breaching any of the obligations under those Acts, I can assure the House that she is being held in an appropriate environment and is receiving the care that she needs.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI do not believe that there was any downgrading of human rights. We have a proud history of protecting human rights, both here and abroad, and we will continue to maintain our concern for those human rights.
My Lords, independent reports—the Minister’s answer appears to confirm this—state that there will be no pre-legislative scrutiny of this vital and, frankly, ill-defined proposal and that the Government will go to legislation after a consultation of about only 12 weeks. Can the Minister refute those reports and promise full pre-legislative scrutiny of a constitutional measure of this fundamental importance?
We will consult fully on our proposals, and will announce further details in due course. There have already been two consultations pursuant to the commission on a Bill of Rights, and there will be a third consultation. This is in marked distinction to what happened on the Human Rights Act, which was brought in without any consultation at all, within six months of the Labour Party gaining power.
(9 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI can assure the noble Lord and the House that all the Ministers in the Ministry of Justice are wedded to the rule of law and to access to justice. But the question that arises out of social welfare law is whether it is always necessary for everybody who has quite real problems to have a lawyer at £200-odd an hour, or whether there are better and more effective ways of giving advice.
The National Audit Office also reported on the LASPO reforms last November. A key finding was that there had been, as predicted, a large increase in litigants appearing in person, with an estimated extra cost of £3.4 million a year. May we now have a full and urgent cost-benefit analysis to assess what changes could be made to improve access to justice without driving up unduly the cost to the public purse?
Well, it is interesting that the noble Lord is now very much against the legislation that the coalition Government promoted. Neither his party nor the Labour Party in their manifesto suggested that they would reverse any of these cuts. Indeed, they did not suggest in either of their manifestos that they would look at it any earlier than we intend to do. Of course—
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI presume that the noble Lord is referring to the judicial review instituted by NAPO that was withdrawn by NAPO, which was ordered to pay the substantive costs of that judicial review. As to pre-sentence reports, there is a 97% response rate of timely reports. As all those who have had to sentence offenders will appreciate, from time to time before this transformation there were delays in these reports. It is greatly to the credit of the probation service that it has maintained this standard. It is to be congratulated on the hard work that it is doing in coping with this transformation.
My Lords, can my noble friend the Minister tell the House what progress is being made by the Probation Institute—the professional body for which many of us argued and which was established last year by the Probation Chiefs Association, the Probation Association and the two trade unions NAPO and UNISON? What role do the Government believe this institution might have in ensuring the continuing delivery of effective probation services?
My noble friend is quite right to draw the House’s attention to the Probation Institute, which, as well as providing assurance that existing standards are to be maintained when the various bodies to which he referred are combining, is also there to capture the innovation that we hope will follow the Transforming Rehabilitation programme. It has been going for a year, involves all those concerned with probation, and will help with training, research and the establishment of good practice.
(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this has been a lengthy debate in which we have had some important contributions from a number of noble Lords, some of whom have been with us for the whole journey of scrutiny and some of whom have made their first appearance today. I am sorry that more noble Lords were not able to participate in the very considerable number of meetings in which the Government explained what they were doing. We answered many of the questions which have been raised by a number of noble Lords for the first time today. We answered them in correspondence. We also had a number of meetings in which we went through the plans. While I do not wish any disrespect to those noble Lords who have asked a number of questions to which I have already given the answer in various contexts, I hope they will forgive me if I refer significantly to the debates that have already taken place at Second Reading, in Committee and on Report, and to various letters to all Peers. I will try to keep my remarks as short as is consistent with answering the general burden of the debate.
I was disappointed that my noble friend Lord Marks said that there had been no opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny. I accept that the scrutiny may not have satisfied him or other noble Lords that the plans are appropriate, but scrutiny there has been.
I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend but he has plainly misunderstood what I was saying. I am not complaining about the scrutiny of this Bill. I am complaining about the lack of a parliamentary approval proposal from the Government before girls and under-15s can be placed in secure colleges.
My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, perhaps he would reconsider the issue of whether it is more appropriate to go to the affirmative resolution rather than the negative. I have sat on the Front Bench for many years with many of my colleagues here and have been through the same debate, but often it is wiser and more sensible to try to pursue something that allows Parliament to have that debate rather than simply to brush it aside. I understand the negative procedure only too well, and I hope that on this point my noble friend will reconsider.
My Lords, before my noble friend answers that question, will he confirm to my noble friend Lord Glenarthur and the whole House that the present proposal is that there would be no parliamentary procedure at all apart from the laying of a report for consideration—no vote, no regulations and no SI is proposed?
I thought that I had made it reasonably clear that there will be the laying of the report. That is the limit to which I committed and I commit to it now. It is beyond what we committed before. It may not be enough for some noble Lords but none the less the report, informed as I have said that it will be, will enable Parliament to consider whether it is appropriate.
That is entirely correct. The discretion would exist on whether to award costs. This is the discretion which is fettered, I entirely accept, to the extent that the Government think it is appropriate for it to be fettered because they consider that, because of what results from bringing a judicial review in terms of cost consequences, it is perfectly reasonable to provide within the realms of privacy the basis on which you are funding. That excludes those small contributors whom I have characterised, and whom I accept would be covered by the rules. Beyond that, however, we consider it to be an appropriate obligation. It is there to prevent what has been a potential evil. I will not go over the Richard III case again; the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is relieved. Undoubtedly there have been cases where shell companies have been used; the case is lost; there is nobody for anybody to recover costs from and again the taxpayer loses. This can happen. This is not a draconian matter: we have made a concession which, I suggest, is a reasonable one. The rule committee can be trusted to come up, with its experience in the matter, with an appropriate compromise reflecting the principles that I have endeavoured to outline on the Floor of the House.
I have two questions for the Minister. First, will he clarify that the figures for claimants’ costs—and it is, of course, the claimants’ costs that are important when considering financial information—are those related only to straightforward cases? Secondly, will he confirm that I am right in saying that the level that the Government intend as a matter of principle should be reflected in the rules is a level of only a few hundred pounds—in other words, very small contributions rather than significant contributions from larger contributors?
In answer to my noble friend’s first question, I did use the word “straightforward” and that is entirely correct; I adhere to that. On the second question, I am reluctant to give figures because, for the reasons I have given and in terms of what we are talking about, it relates to a small contribution to a fighting fund. That would not be £10,000 to £15,000. I do not think it is appropriate to go beyond that. That is a matter that I will leave to the rule committee: it will arrive at an appropriate figure in the light of its experience.
(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberWe are aware of our obligation. NOMS has invested a considerable amount in a number of interventions. We are doing our best to provide a variety of courses in order to ensure that they have the opportunity of showing that they are ready for release.
My Lords, this Government abolished new IPPs and at the same time introduced a power for the Secretary of State to change the release test. This matter has been raised endlessly in debate and in Questions. Can my noble friend now try to provide some justification for not implementing the power so as to ensure that prisoners whose release would be safer are released quickly?
I refer the House to the answer I gave to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd.
(10 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I moved amendments in these terms in Committee and so I will try to be brief, although the area they cover is quite complicated. Clause 76 is in the Bill because the Aarhus convention of 1998, which was ratified by this country in 2005, committed the United Kingdom to ensuring that environmental litigation will be,
“fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”.
My amendments are founded on the principle that Parliament has a duty to ensure that this country acts in a way that is compliant with its international obligations.
Clause 76 recognises that the restrictions on costs capping orders as proposed in the Bill have the effect of making environmental litigation prohibitively expensive in any case. That is true ex hypothesi, because in a case where a judge would decide that a costs capping order is needed in order to enable an applicant to pursue the application, it follows that the application, if pursued without such an order, would be prohibitively expensive. It is for that reason that rules of court have already introduced rules limiting costs awards in Aarhus convention judicial review claims to relatively low fixed sums. Those sums are £5,000 against an individual applicant, £10,000 against a corporate applicant and £35,000 against a defendant.
However, the costs capping provisions are not the only provisions of the Bill that would put us in breach of the Aarhus convention: so would the provisions on disclosure of actual and likely financial resources and on the consequential orders for costs based on that information, as disclosed. Those provisions would have the effect that sources of support for judicial review applications would be choked off, making them prohibitively expensive for applicants without means, who would be left without the support of those people deterred from giving such support. The provisions on interveners and on costs capping would also have the effect of making environmental cases prohibitively expensive. Our amendments are therefore directed at broadening Clause 76 to exclude Clauses 71 and 72 on information about resources, and Clause 73 on interveners, for environmental cases as well as the costs capping provisions.
A further difficulty with Clause 76 is that it is permissive only and not mandatory, so that the Lord Chancellor is not required to make any regulations excluding the operation of the restrictions on costs capping. The provision is limited to ensuring that he is entitled to do so, if he chooses. Any such regulations that he chooses to make may also, under Clause 76(2), be as wide or as narrow as he chooses. Regrettably, this Lord Chancellor has given us little confidence that he is concerned to make challenges on judicial review less expensive.
Our amendments would also allow for costs capping orders in any case where the court considers that without such an order, the proceedings are unlikely to be,
“fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”,
so as to bring the provisions squarely in line with our obligations under the convention. In our Amendment 174A, subsection (4) of the proposed new clause would introduce an objective test which would,
“prescribe … terms upon which a costs capping order may be made”,
to ensure compliance, once again by using the words of the convention. This is particularly important because the compliance committee established under the Aarhus convention has already found the United Kingdom to be non-compliant in a number of respects. The safe course is to ensure that the statute complies with the convention specifically and that there is a requirement that the regulations and rules of court do the same.
A further problem arises regarding definition. Clause 76(1) says that the definition of environmental cases is those cases which are environmental,
“in the Lord Chancellor’s opinion”.
Amendment 174B, which introduces a definition squarely based on the convention, is intended to address that difficulty and introduce an objective test. I beg to move.
My Lords, Clause 76 allows for judicial review claims on issues which relate entirely or partly to the environment to be excluded from the revised costs capping regime established by Clauses 74 and 75. This is to ensure continuing compliance with our obligations under the Aarhus convention and the various European directives which implement it. The requirements include that relevant procedures must not be prohibitively expensive. This is relevant to judicial reviews in certain environmental cases. Consequently, Clause 76 allows for environmental judicial reviews to be excluded from the approach in Clauses 74 and 75.
(10 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful for the speeches made by my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in this group of amendments concerning the criminal courts charge. There was lengthy debate in Committee, and I responded at some length, so I hope they will not consider it any disrespect to their arguments if I summarise the Government’s position fairly briefly.
The question of discretion has arisen once more. My noble friend Lord Marks seeks to vary his original suggestion by fettering the discretion somewhat but nevertheless importing a degree of discretion, as was discussed at length. It is the Government’s position that that is inappropriate.
The point was made in Committee and this evening that many noble Lords consider the charge unfair in the case of poor offenders. The Government believe that it is right that all adult offenders, whatever their means, pay towards the cost of running the courts, alleviating the burden on the taxpayer. I know that noble Lords who are concerned about this area will have seen the figures published on the website before Committee stage about the charges by band. They are quite modest, but it is nevertheless hoped that they will reflect some compensation to the country for defendants who use the courts because they have committed offences. As I said previously, offenders can apply to vary payment rates if their financial circumstances change. In addition, offenders who comply with their payment terms and who do not reoffend can have their charge remitted after a specified period. The imposition of this charge is not designed to be a punishment, so confusing it with the various discretionary powers that the court has rather misses the point.
Amendment 125D would stipulate that the charge cannot exceed the amount specified by the Lord Chancellor in the regulations. The Bill is drafted so that a charge to be paid is of an amount specified by the Lord Chancellor, so I am sure that my noble friend Lord Marks will agree that this leaves no room for charges exceeding the amount specified to be imposed, which should mean that the amendment is unnecessary.
Amendment 126A would omit the requirement for a specified period of time to have passed before the court charge debt can be written off. If accepted, it would provide the court with wide discretion to remit the charge early, as and when it sees fit. The clause as it currently stands has the benefit of allowing a court to remit the charge where the offender has taken all reasonable steps to pay and does not reoffend. This is a powerful incentive for offenders to repay the charge and refrain from reoffending, ensuring that a specified period is a fundamental feature of the remission provisions—a key aspect of this policy which I hope the House will not overlook.
Amendment 125E seeks to specify that where a charge can be remitted it can include the remission of interest. I respectfully point out to my noble friend Lord Marks that Clause 42 gives the magistrates’ court power to remit the charge under particular circumstances. It is intended that this provision be used where an offender has paid accordingly and has not gone on to reoffend. It can also be remitted where the debt is unenforceable.
New Section 21D(4) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, inserted by Clause 46, makes it clear that interest payable under the regulations is to be treated as part of the charge. It therefore follows that any remission of the charge would comprise the whole debt, including the interest. I hope that reassures the House that the Government have carefully considered this provision and will satisfy my noble friend such that he might not press his amendment.
I stress, however, that this is a novel scheme and the Government have already agreed to review the policy after three years. Of course, we will monitor its impact closely until then. The Lord Chancellor must repeal the provisions if he considers it appropriate, having regard to that review. I am sure that the noble Lord will agree that this further safeguard demonstrates the Government’s commitment to getting this right.
I turn finally to the Criminal Procedure Rules and the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Beecham, which seek to widen the conditions that must be met for the courts charge to be remitted. The amendments would broaden the court’s power to such an extent that the charge could be remitted also in cases specified in those rules.
The effect of the amendments would be to confer on the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee a jurisdictional power by enabling it to set rules concerning substantive legal matters and by giving it a significant level of discretion to prescribe the circumstances in which the charge could be remitted. This would of course contravene the Government’s position that it is an administrative charge.
If I understand the noble Lord’s arguments correctly, he is seeking to afford the committee the power to determine the instances in which the criminal court charges might be remitted, although he does not give a clear indication as to which cases would be specified in the rules to which discretion may be applied.
The Bill as it stands already allows for the courts to cancel the charge, as I have indicated, but we submit that it is inappropriate to use these rules as a means to set the criteria for remission. I am sure noble Lords are aware that the function of the Criminal Procedure Rules is to govern the practice and procedure of the criminal courts. The responsibility of the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee is to make those rules. With great respect, this amendment would afford that committee a power beyond its current jurisdiction. The choice of criteria for remission should be one for Parliament itself. I fear I cannot agree that it is appropriate for this power to be attributed to the committee.
I understand the noble Lord’s concern about the impact of the charge on particular offenders whom he encounters in his capacity as a magistrate. The Government are aware of that risk and are monitoring any adverse impacts. I also confirm what the noble Lord said about his discussion with my officials in relation to Section 135 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. I hope that I have satisfied the noble Lord and that he will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I will of course seek leave to withdraw the amendment in a moment. Very briefly, the point of tabling further amendments on Report, following the debate in Committee, which move slightly towards the Government’s position, was in the hope that the Government might have considered the debate and moved towards our position. So I make no apology for repeating the position that I took in Committee.
I also want to make it clear that I think all of us in this House agree with the general principles stated by my noble friend that there is a very strong case for ordering defendants who can pay a criminal courts charge on conviction so to pay it. Our concern is with those who plainly cannot pay it or cannot pay all of it. I entirely accept and appreciate the support of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for my position. However, I am not sure that the traditional punishment meted out to those who are drunk and brought before the magistrates’ court of £1 or a day—that kind of formulation of giving a period of custody in default of payment right at the outset—will mitigate the mischief at which my amendments are aimed.
I shall also simply say two further things. First, the point of my Amendment 125D and the words “no greater than” is to make sure that the amount specified in the regulations is the maximum that can be charged, but that the court would have the power to impose a lesser charge. I believe that the amendment, if implemented, would have achieved that end.
Finally, I suspect that when it comes to the review of the operation of this charge in three years’ time, Parliament and the Government may well find that the procedure for remitting the charge and having hearings as to whether or not a charge should be cancelled at a later date is unduly unwieldy, cumbersome and expensive. With those observations, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(10 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI hope to come to that in a moment.
As was explained in Committee, the code will not only encourage the use and enforcement of contractual provisions to ensure that current FoI obligations about information held on a contracting authority’s behalf are met but will promote the voluntary provision of other information where this would help to provide a more meaningful response to requests. The success of this approach will, as was also made clear in Committee, be monitored by both the Government and the Information Commissioner. If it does not achieve sufficient transparency, we will consider what other steps, including the possible formal extension of FoI to contractors, are required. Once the code of practice is issued, it is important that we give it the opportunity to prove its worth before deciding whether further measures are necessary. I therefore invite noble Lords not to press Amendments 7 and 120.
We also debated Amendment 8 in Committee, and I sought then to explain why it is not appropriate. We agree that the code of practice is a necessary and important document. It is intended to make sure that the necessary safeguards are in place for the proper management of the data gathered by electronic monitoring conditions. It will, of course, comply with the Data Protection Act. However, it is for operational purposes and will not introduce any new legal requirements. That is why we do not propose to agree its content through parliamentary procedure.
I should remind the House that it passed the provisions in the Crime and Courts Act 2013 that inserted new Section 215A into the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This also provides for a code of practice relating to the processing of data from electronic monitoring and is linked to provisions allowing location monitoring of offenders as a community requirement. This provision was approved by Parliament with no requirement for the code to be subject to affirmative secondary legislation. The amendment would, therefore, be inconsistent with the provisions already approved for a code of practice.
I should perhaps add a little more about the scrutiny that has been undertaken in relation to electronic monitoring and the approach to contract management that has informed the new contracts. Within the MoJ, and specific to electronic monitoring, this has meant the new contracts being drafted and let with key elements such as open-book accounting being critical. Accountability for contract management will be much clearer, with contract owners called regularly to account for their detailed knowledge of the contracts and their operational assurance that services are properly assured and audited.
On the amendment, I can only reiterate the assurances that I have given previously. We have committed to consultation on the code of practice, which will include consulting the Information Commissioner. I also confirm that the code of practice will be published. I do not have, at the moment, a specific date for publication of the code of practice but we hope to issue guidance to the standard contract clause by the end of 2014. If I receive further information on the probable date for the code of practice, I of course undertake to inform the House, and certainly the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.
I hope that I have satisfied the House on these issues of concern. Electronic monitoring would naturally be a matter of concern, but it is also a valuable tool in the detection and prevention of crime. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, in relation to Amendment 6, I accept my noble friend’s point that it is for the Secretary of State rather than the court to deal with electronic monitoring conditions. He is right about that. He was also right to recognise the concerns as to whether such conditions could be imposed inappropriately or where unnecessary, unjust or impractical.
I understand him to have given an assurance that he understands that the power to make an order which makes,
“provision by reference to whether a person specified in the order is satisfied of a matter”,
enables the order to ensure that the person is satisfied that it would not be impractical to impose such an electronic monitoring condition. On that basis, I join in his observation that it is not entirely clear, even though it may be clear from the Explanatory Notes, which of course form no part of the statute. Those who are left with the difficult task of unravelling this arcane piece of drafting will no doubt be able to read the report of that assurance. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
As noble Lords will be aware from previous discussion on this matter in Committee, this clause was added to the Bill by a Back-Bench amendment in the other place and the principle agreed by your Lordships’ House. Noble Lords will also be aware that agreement has not been reached on the policy underlying this clause within the Government, so I hope that noble Lords will understand why I cannot speak to the detail of these clauses, much though I would like, for example, to have risen to the challenge posed by my noble friend Lord Carlile.
The only thing I can say is simply to assist the House in answer to a technical query about Section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and the welfare of the child and the young person. That is not—and I do not think my noble friend Lord Marks suggested it was—an impediment to actually passing a sentence of this sort. Otherwise, a child might not ever be sent into the secure children’s estate.
I hesitate to interrupt. My noble friend knows full well that that section merely requires the court to have regard to the welfare of the child and therefore is not an impediment to imposing the compulsory sentence. My point is that the circumstances that the court may take into account in declining to impose the mandatory sentence are so circumscribed that that runs counter to the spirit of the provision mentioned.
I assumed I was interrupting, but perhaps that is not the case and my noble friend has finished. I do not propose at this late hour to press these amendments to a vote because I do not suppose they would produce a conclusive result in favour of the amendment, although those in my party feel extremely strongly about this. We deeply regret that the Labour Party has decided not to support our position on 16 and 17 year-olds in particular, and the reason for that regret is that in the lead-up to this debate, and indeed in the lead-up to the debate in Committee, I saw not one shred of evidence from any professional body supporting the imposition of compulsory custodial sentences for 16 and 17 year-olds in these circumstances. We on these Benches believe that maintaining judicial discretion is vital to the administration of justice and we are deeply concerned by its reduction in this and other sections of this Bill. I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, before my noble friend formally concludes speaking to the amendment in response to the Minister, perhaps I might indicate that in our view it is unsatisfactory that an amendment is reaching the statute book with very detailed amendments proposed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Berridge and Lady Browning, without the Government having expressed any view as to the degree to which they work. If what I suspect is now going to happen does happen, these amendments will be carried and this is the way that the Bill will go on to the statute book. We regard that as unsatisfactory. Perhaps consideration should be given to procedure on a Bill of this sort in future.
The Government’s position has not changed. Parliamentary counsel assisted the noble Baroness in making sure that the necessary amendments were properly and accurately drafted. I hope that that assists the noble Lord.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe problem was that there was nobody to enforce an order for costs against, effectively. That was the disadvantage that accrued to the taxpayer. Clause 65, which was welcomed by the senior judiciary, provides for information about financial resources to be provided and for that information to be used. The problem was that that case proceeded and there was no way of recovering the costs when it concluded.
I am sorry to take up the Committee’s time, but I am not sure that the Minister has answered the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. First, there is clearly a power to order the backers of a shell company to pay the costs if a shell company is put forward as the applicant. The question to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, wanted an answer was whether the Minister agreed that in the exercise of that power, or in considering the exercise of that power, the court would not have ample power to require information about the nature and extent of the backing and then to consider orders accordingly. I suggest that it is quite clear that the court has that power.
The court certainly has power to make orders against non-parties in appropriate circumstances under the existing law. It is not normally the case that that is happening. The purpose of these clauses is to provide a statutory framework in which the court can find the information and use it if it thinks appropriate while retaining the discretion.
Presumably my noble friend would concede that the claimant who fills out the form is only going get the information from the supporters who are proposing to support him.
Quite so, but I thought that the inference was that some full disclosure of all financial circumstances was going to be required of third parties, and that is not what the rules suggest.
We suggest that these clauses are not making a radical change in the existing law. They are not, in fact, removing the capacity of those who should be able to bring claims for judicial review; they are simply placing on the statute book what some of the senior judiciary wanted, which was a degree of transparency to stop those rare cases where the taxpayer is having to pay for judicial reviews in circumstances where the true funders are managing to obscure the position in a way that no one in this Committee would like.
Since we are in Committee, perhaps I can try to assist the Committee.
The power derives from restatements of principles which, as the noble Lord said, are inherent in the court’s processes. In the Court of Appeal case Regina (on the application of Corner House Research) v the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in 2005—EWCA Civ 192—the Court of Appeal considered that Corner House, which was an anti-corruption NGO, should, if unsuccessful in the judicial review, exceptionally be protected from being liable for the defendant’s costs because,
“the issues of public importance that arose in the case would have been stifled at the outset, and the courts would have been powerless to grant this small company the relief that it sought”.
It also set out the general principles for when a protected costs order should be granted: first, the issues are of general public importance; secondly, the public interest requires that those issues should be resolved; thirdly, the claimant has no private interest in the outcome of the case; fourthly, the financial means of the claimant mean that the protected costs order is fair and just; and, finally, if the order is not made, the claimant will probably discontinue the proceedings.
On Clause 68, there is only one amendment in my name, Amendment 75F, which removes subsections (6) to (11). The reason for that is we firmly believe that the making of costs capping orders should be left to the discretion of the court in appropriate circumstances. Of course, those depend on the financial circumstances of the parties, which are mentioned in subsection (5), so they should stay in Clause 68. However, the factors that are set out in subsections (6), (7) and (8) relate to public interest proceedings and might legitimately influence the decision of the court in an appropriate case.
By Amendment 80A in relation to Clause 69—I am proceeding on the basis of a suggestion that Clauses 68 and 69 should be debated together—which is in my name and that of my noble friends Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Lord Carlile of Berriew, further factors are listed as factors that the court should take into account.
In relation to the explanation that the Minister has just given of the origin of the costs capping jurisdiction, I fully accept that the Corner House principles limit the jurisdiction to public interest proceedings. I am not sure that that limitation is legitimate or necessary, although it is plainly relevant. The reason I suggest that it is not necessary to limit it in that way is that there may be unusual cases where an individual is so justifiably aggrieved by an unlawful decision of a public body in a case which does not have universal or public importance that a costs capping order or a protected costs order might be appropriate, even though there is no wider public interest.
I fully support Amendments 75 and 75A in respect of Clause 68, which would remove the bar on making a costs capping order until after the permission stage. For my part, I can see no reason for such a bar, unless it were to choke off applications for leave to apply for judicial review for fear of an uncapped costs order. That, I suggest, is an unacceptable reason for stifling proceedings at that stage.
Our Amendments 77A, 80A and 80C to Clause 69 would restore the position that costs capping orders in judicial review proceedings are discretionary. Amendment 77A would require the court, when considering making such an order and then in considering the terms of any such order, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case. There would then follow a list of circumstances to which the court should have regard. This is a common enough formulation: in the provision of a non-exhaustive list, Parliament gives an indication to the courts as to the factors that should be considered. However, in its acknowledgement of the fallibility of lawmakers, and of the range of possibly unforeseeable circumstances, as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, the requirement that the court should have regard to all the circumstances of the case is, I suggest, a just and sensible one, which would allow judges to make the right decision in the particular cases that come before them.
As I have said, Amendment 80A would add to the list of factors that the courts should take into account all the factors drawn from the present proposals in Clause 68. These factors would not—and, I suggest, should not—be ranked in any particular order of importance. The court would be entitled to have regard to them as it thought appropriate. As I have also said, this does not require public interest considerations to be a precondition for a costs capping order.
Amendment 80C would remove the requirement that a costs capping order in favour of an applicant would necessarily import a requirement that the court make a costs capping order in favour of the defendant at the same time. It would make the imposition of such an order discretionary in any given case. This was the present position, as outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in answer to the question posed by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. It does not seem to me that there is anything sensible or justifiable in an automatic rule that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. It may sometimes be appropriate to make a costs capping order in relation to a defendant’s costs—more rarely, I suggest, because of the nature of the parties, than it is to make such an order in respect of an applicant’s costs. But again, I see no reason for interfering with the discretion of a court to make whatever orders appear to it to be just.
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords—my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham—for their contributions to this debate. Clause 70 enables provision to be made to exclude judicial reviews about issues which relate entirely or partly to the environment from the revised costs capping regime established in Clauses 68 and 69, which we debated in the previous group. Clause 70 is to reflect our obligations under the Aarhus convention and the various European directives which implement it, which set out requirements for access to justice concerning environmental matters. This includes a stipulation that such procedures must be,
“fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”.
This is relevant to judicial reviews in certain environmental cases. Allowing for such environmental cases to be excluded from the costs capping regime in Clauses 68 and 69 allows the Secretary of State enough flexibility to meet future changes in the international landscape. A separate regime has already been established in the Civil Procedure Rules to govern costs capping orders in such cases in England and Wales. It applies a fixed costs framework under which, in a claim raising issues that fall under the Aarhus convention, the liability of the claimant to pay the defendant’s costs is automatically capped at certain levels. This regime is simple to operate and understand.
Amendments 81C and 82B would seek to exclude certain types of judicial review from the provisions in Clauses 64 to 69. Those claims might be considered very broadly as “environmental”. Amendment 81C defines those cases that are excluded by reference to the Aarhus convention and introduces a requirement that, provided certain conditions are met, costs capping orders should be made in these cases.
Amendment 81C also aims to restore the full recoverable success fee and after-the-event insurance premium structure that the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 removed, implementing the Jackson reforms to reduce excessive costs in civil litigation. Amendment 82C would seek to define what would fall within the definition of an Aarhus convention claim. Amendment 81A is contingent on Amendment 81C. Its effect is to make Clause 69 subject to the changes to Clause 70, which I have already discussed.
Attempting to define these claims in statute risks either being too generous and gold-plating the Aarhus requirements, or alternatively being too restrictive and missing out claims which should be caught by the Aarhus regime. The definition as set out in the proposed new clause is very broad, and appears to err on the side of gold-plating. In particular, we would not necessarily accept that all private law claims falling within the new clause should come under the term “Aarhus Convention claim”.
The Government see no reason for excluding additional cases, particularly such a broad range of cases as would be covered by these amendments. Too broad a definition would create an incentive for claimants to characterise their claims as “environmental”, generating satellite litigation and assisting, for example, those bringing weak claims to shelter from their proper costs liability. In the Government’s view Clause 70, which allows for the exclusion of certain environmental judicial reviews from the new protective costs order regime which Clauses 68 and 69 will establish, is sufficient to ensure compliance with our obligations under the Aarhus convention and the directives which implement it. The proposed new clauses would upset the careful balance between ensuring the proper measure of access to justice in environmental and other matters and ensuring that judicial review is not misused.
I turn now to Amendment 82D. The new clause seeks to amend Section 10 of the LASPO Act, which makes provision about exceptional case determinations for individuals, and Schedule 3 to that Act, which makes provision about exceptional case determinations for legal persons, so that Section 10 and Schedule 3 would both refer explicitly to claims for judicial review related to the Aarhus convention. The Government do not believe that such an inclusion is necessary. First, funding would already be available to bring a judicial review with a potential benefit to the environment, subject to the merits and means test. This is in the scope of the general civil legal aid scheme by virtue of paragraph 19 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to LASPO. Section 10 of LASPO provides for exceptional funding in cases that are outside the general scope of civil legal aid. Secondly, along with the provisions of the Aarhus convention, this amendment is concerned with reflecting EU directives. The current provisions under Section 10 and Schedule 3 already provide for legal aid to be granted where it is necessary to make the services available to the individual or legal person because failure to do so would be a breach of the individual or the person’s enforceable EU rights.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to reviewing the CPR. The Government have committed to reviewing the costs regime for environmental cases when the European Court of Justice handed down its judgment in the Commission v the United Kingdom case. Following that judgment in February this year, and recent case law, we are reviewing the current costs regime. As part of that review, we will consider whether the current costs regime for Aarhus claims should make provision for statutory review proceedings dealing with environmental matters, look at what scope there is to amend the current cap—which is currently £5,000 for individuals and £10,000 for businesses—and consider the principles determining what level of costs in a particular case would be prohibitively expensive, as set out in Edwards v Environment Agency and reiterated by the European Court of Justice in its various infraction judgments, and whether they could be included in the costs regime.
The Government do not accept that all private nuisance claims are caught by the convention requirements. They tend to focus on enabling those with interests in land to protect their private property rights rather than enabling members of the public to challenge environmentally deleterious acts. However, on the occasions where a private nuisance claim relates to actions which do not merely harm the claimant’s private property rights but contravene provisions of national law relating to the environment, there are judicial and administrative procedures which may be relied upon by members of the public.
The Aarhus convention protects the right of environmental NGOs to bring judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to intervene in existing cases, so Clause 67 does not put the UK in breach. As to reviewing the application of LASPO to this area, I recall that during the debate when the LASPO Bill was going through Parliament there was an attempt to carve out an exception for cases of this sort. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the Committee will have heard me say, the Government are committed to reviewing the effect of the LASPO provisions, but it is far too early to do so in this particular context. The review will take place within five years—perhaps sooner than five years, but certainly not much sooner—so as to allow a full review of the effect, bearing in mind in particular that there was a large spike in cases before April 2013, the cut-off date, which may make it very difficult to analyse satisfactorily the effect of LASPO.
Of course, I will reflect carefully on the observations of my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, but I gratefully decline my noble friend’s invitation to amend the Long Title of the Bill as currently advised. It is our view that these provisions are sufficient to ensure compliance with our obligations under the convention and the EU directives. I therefore respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am bound to say that I am not greatly surprised by my noble friend’s declining to amend the Long Title of the Bill. I merely say that the amendments that I and others have put forward are directed only at making the United Kingdom’s procedures compliant with the Aarhus convention. I entirely take on board what he said about the impending review of the rules in the light of the European case, and I understand what he said about private nuisance claims. It is certainly not the case, and I never suggested that it was, that all private nuisance claims are covered. I am merely repeating the decision of the Court of Appeal that there is no reason why private nuisance claims relating to environmental matters should not be Aarhus convention claims. At the moment we have no costs regime to enable compliance with the convention in respect of those.
As far as legal aid is concerned, I entirely take my noble friend’s point about the review of LASPO that is due. My point is directed only at the fact that at the permission stage there is now a restriction on legal aid for judicial review claims that ought not to apply to Aarhus convention claims. In those circumstances I of course beg leave to withdraw my amendments at this stage, but I do rely on my noble friends having an opportunity to consider what I have said during the Recess and to come back and report.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI was going to come on to this, but it is a highly pertinent point. The position as I understand it is that a decision which has resulted in a declaration, whether it is called a declaration formally or not, whereby the validity of the argument is acknowledged, might give the applicant the satisfaction—and, if there is any significance, significance can be drawn from it—of knowing that there has been an unlawful act, or whatever the nature of the challenge is. But that would not necessitate a full-blown hearing to determine something that is evident on the papers but does not require there to be a full hearing some months later, for example. I am concerned about that point, and I shall consider it further in terms of the mechanism whereby the answer can be given without the need for expensive and cumbersome litigation. I appreciate the point.
May I press my noble friend the Minister a little further on that? As I read the clause as drafted, the fact that the:
“High Court … must refuse to grant relief”,
encompasses a refusal to grant the declaration. For that reason, I was concerned by the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, as he expressed it on the point, because my noble friend the Minister’s final speech has dwelt on the question of whether the no-difference test is met. What he does not appear to allow for—and I shall be corrected if I am wrong—is, if the no-difference test is met, under this clause as drafted there is nothing that the court can do if this were implemented, because it must refuse to grant relief. That is how it seems to me, and to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
I do not think that I can expand much on my previous answer. If it makes no difference, it is true that, as the clause says, no relief should be granted. What I said that I would consider is the question of when it would make no difference but there is some benefit of a declaration or some judgment which reflects the lawfulness, whereby there might be some scope for providing that that should be given in the course of determining the very issue that Clause 64 covers. I think that that is as far as I can go. I shall consider the argument.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this has been a very useful and well informed debate. It continues the debates we had on Monday. I respectfully ask those in the Chamber at the moment to read the debate on Monday in which I gave a reply—I think for more than 20 minutes—in which I dealt with a considerable number of the points raised, although I did not purport to deal with all points. Indeed, I said on that occasion that I was proposing to write to sweep up any points that on examination of Hansard I had not dealt with adequately. I adhere to what I said then and will include any further points that have arisen out of the debate today.
What has emerged—as my noble friend Lord Cormack quite rightly said—is that we all have the same concern about providing the most helpful outcomes for troubled young people. It was also common ground that the focus on education is most welcome. What there is a lack of confidence in at the moment is whether the secure colleges can provide precisely what all of us in this House would wish to achieve for young offenders. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, is quite right, of course, that many of those who find themselves in this situation come from troubled backgrounds. Many have been in care and present particular challenges for whatever establishment is going to have them when they are serving the sentence passed by the court.
The clause which is the subject of this stand part debate is the statutory framework for the creation of secure colleges so that the Government can trial a new approach to youth custody. Clause 29 provides the Secretary of State with the power to provide secure colleges, which is a new form of youth detention accommodation in England, and replaces the current Section 43 of the Prison Act 1952 with the new section. The current section gives the Secretary of State a power to provide young offender institutions, remand centres and secure training centres. As your Lordships will know, there are no remand centres in operation. The new Section 43 will additionally give the Secretary of State the power to provide secure colleges in England and Wales. Clause 29 introduces Schedule 5, which makes a number of amendments to other legislation to reflect the fact that secure colleges are being introduced.
I remind the Committee of the context for our proposed reform of the youth custodial estate. At present, we pay around £100,000 a year for a place in youth custody, and yet almost 70% of young people go on to reoffend within 12 months of release. In the case of secure children’s homes—the advantages of which were very much emphasised by those in debate on Monday—the cost rises beyond £200,000 a place, and yet the reoffending outcomes are no different.
Does my noble friend accept that the comparison of costs for secure children’s homes with other institutions is perhaps a little unfair? It is the nature of secure children’s homes that they take the most difficult and troubled children, so the costs per year of a place in such institutions is necessarily considerably higher.
It is true, and I am going to come on to deal with that. The different establishments are there, in the view of the Youth Justice Board, to deal with the different challenges that the individuals present. My point is that secure children’s homes are no panacea. The starting point is that the overall rate of reoffending is simply not acceptable. That is why we are introducing secure colleges.
I entirely accept the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that the Government should be aware of the long-term cost as well as the short-term cost. Indeed, the whole purpose of secure colleges is that, with the benefit of proper education, the Government consider that there should be a cost-saving in the long term because of the accrued benefit for young people who go to secure colleges.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend Lady Linklater spoke to Amendment 43B as if it were part of this group. There is nothing more that we wish to say on that amendment, which is in a further group, and because of the time I wonder if the Minister could indicate if he has anything special to say about it, subject to anything that the Labour Front Bench wishes to say.
I am happy to deal with that amendment; in the interests of economy, that seems a sensible suggestion. The amendment raises a concern about how the enhanced and tailored provision offered by a secure college might influence the behaviour of the courts when making sentencing decisions in respect of children and young people—so-called up-tariffing, as it has been referred to in other contexts.
We have seen a fall in the number of children and young people sentenced to custody in recent years. I hope noble Lords will be reassured that statute and international convention already provide that a custodial sentence must be imposed only as a measure of last resort. Statute provides that such a sentence may be imposed only where the offence is,
“so serious that neither a community sentence nor a fine alone can be justified”.
That is referenced in the Sentencing Guidelines Council’s current guideline, Overarching Principles—Sentencing Youths, which goes on to explain that even when a threshold for a custodial sentence is crossed, a court is not required to impose it. Before deciding whether to impose a custodial sentence on a young offender, the court must ensure that all statutory tests are satisfied, taking into account the circumstances, age and maturity of the young offender. Those tests are that the offender cannot properly be dealt with by a fine alone or by a youth rehabilitation order; that a youth rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and surveillance, or with fostering, cannot be justified; and that custody is a last resort. To demonstrate that the statutory tests have been followed, the court must, in addition, state its reasons for being satisfied that the offences are so serious that no other sanction is appropriate other than the custodial sentence.
As regards the length of the sentence, the court, again by statute, is required to set the shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, and those overarching principles I referred to earlier set out guidance on how the judiciary should approach deciding the length of the sentence for children and young people. Furthermore, courts will no doubt be aware that due to the variation in needs and vulnerabilities among children in custody, there is a range of provision. They certainly should be aware. As my noble friend Lady Linklater will know, there are secure children’s homes, secure training centres and young offender institutions, as well as, in future, we hope, secure colleges.
When sentencing children and young people, the court can determine only the type of sentence to be imposed and its length. The decision on which type of establishment a child or young person is placed in is taken by the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, rather than by the court. Its experienced placement service considers factors specific to the young offender—for example, their age and needs.
Finally, the noble Baroness noted that the amendment would have the wider effect of fettering the discretion of the independent Sentencing Council by stipulating precisely what its guidelines should say. That is a road which I am sure noble Lords would not wish us to go down.
I hope, therefore, that I have assuaged noble Lords’ concerns sufficiently for them not to press this amendment also.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThere were quite a number of interventions. I will endeavour, very briefly, to say what I can within the terms that I speak today. On the question of sentencing guidelines, they are of course changed from time to time. It is a matter for the House to consider whether sentencing guidelines are an appropriate way to deal with this or whether it is more appropriate to use the clause as it currently appears in the Bill—whether that is called sending out a message, providing a deterrent or whatever construction one places upon that particular clause.
As to all the other matters, there is no question of a Liberal Democrat plot. I readily concede that this is an unusual situation. However, I am simply not in a position to say more than I have in answer to the various questions raised, except to say this: the issue for the House is fairly before the House, as brought by my noble friend Lord Marks, and it is whether the clause currently in the Bill should stand part.
My Lords, this has been an important debate. It has been a serious and sober debate. I agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, on that point. It has also not been a political debate in the sense that noble Lords on all sides have spoken both ways. My understanding of the Government’s position is that the position of Conservative Ministers remains as it was in the House of Commons; they will not support the clause as it stands, as inserted by the Back-Bench amendment; nor will they oppose it.
However, the position is that everyone in this House is agreed that we cannot, do not and never will condone knife crime. We all share the aim of driving knife crime down. I listened carefully to the points made, particularly those made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Blair. All of them of course have enormous experience of the criminal justice system. Other noble and learned Lords, notably the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, spoke the other way.
The points made against me and in favour of Clause 25 principally concern deterrents and sending a message. However, what has been entirely unclear is the notion that there is clear evidence that a message and deterrence are better sent by a mandatory provision in a statute than they could be by judges exercising their discretion—going on television if necessary, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, described; by action outside Parliament, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis described; or by sentencing guidelines, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, suggested, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.
Sentencing guidelines are daily used and daily applied, but they do not remove judicial discretion to sentence appropriately, departing from the guidelines where that is the right and just thing to do. I do not believe that deterrence by a mandatory provision in a statute is proven to have any beneficial effect at all. I believe that a mandatory provision for minimum sentences in a statute, to be imposed where judges would not—when wishing to do justice—otherwise impose them, removes judicial discretion and inevitably does injustice in a number of cases. For those reasons we oppose this clause.
Your Lordships have also heard the extent to which the clause is defective. It is not supported by either of the parties of Government. It is not supported by many of great experience who have spoken from the opposition Benches. It is not supported by many of those who have spoken from the Cross Benches. The Motion will be that this clause stands part of the Bill. I urge noble Lords to oppose the Motion and vote not content. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I refer the House to my registered interest as a practising barrister. My noble friend’s department has in the past largely dismissed fears for the future availability of publicly-funded barristers, given the cuts in the scope of legal aid and in remuneration rates. Does my noble friend share my concern at the 38% drop in available tenancies in chambers over the year to 2011-12 and the long-term decline in the availability of pupilages, particularly in chambers doing legally-aided work? How can we reverse this trend?
My Lords, that is a little way from social welfare law. Of course we need lawyers to represent those in every section of society in all sorts of fields. The fact remains that there is less for lawyers to do and inevitably there will be fewer lawyers to do it. It is important that the profession maintains high standards but I do not think that I can comment on numbers in particular chambers.
(10 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was referring to the draft data protection regulation—which is not a directive—not to the right to be forgotten.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, rightly raised this privacy issue in the Queen’s Speech debate. Most of us are, I suspect, blissfully unaware that the so-called location services on our mobiles act as an insidious spy in the pocket, constantly recording our every movement wherever we go. Should we not at least start by obliging smartphone and network providers to tell us clearly what personal information they collect and how, and how we, as consumers, can turn it off?
The noble Lord is right that this is a source of anxiety and a matter which continues to alarm all sorts of people and organisations. The consumer has a role to insist on this information being provided. That, rather than legislation, is probably the answer for the moment.