National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I share the view that I think is being proposed, at least implicitly, by those who tabled the amendment that nobody should be prosecuted if a prosecution would be contrary to the public interest. Indeed, I share the view that nobody should be prosecuted if their belief, however unreasonable, was that something was in the public interest. I would hate to see a wholly unreasonable person prosecuted for something that they believed was in the national interest if, for example, they suffered from a psychiatric condition that made their belief totally irrational.

I have to say that I believe that this clause does not achieve the purpose which it is purported to achieve. The noble Lord who opened this debate did say—I recognise this—that he is not claiming this is a perfect clause, but I suggest that, if we are to have a clause anything like this, it needs an awful lot of work done on it. As drawn, subsection (3) in effect means that a jury would have to decide, in part at least, whether what the defendant had done was or was not in the public interest and then go on to decide whether the belief that they had that it was in the public interest was reasonable. I think it is very difficult to draft a credible and usable clause that achieves the end that is aimed for.

Indeed, my belief is that the target of this amendment is wrong. The target should be that people are not prosecuted for offences that should not be offences. We should try to remove from this Bill those parts which tend to criminalise, for example, journalists, rather than using a clause of dubious validity and coherence such as this.

There are criminal charges, mostly regulatory offences and often strict liability offences, in which there is a defence of reasonable excuse. A defendant can raise the evidential burden that they had a reasonable excuse for certain activities, and the prosecution then has to disprove the claim of reasonable excuse. There are torts, for example in defamation, where a public interest defence is specifically provided for, and that has been heavily litigated, including a very important judgment that was given by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope in one relatively recent case.

However, so far as I am aware—and I am sure I will be corrected if I am wrong—I do not know of a criminal offence where a jury has to decide what was in the public interest, and I would urge those who believe that this is something that could be placed before a jury to have sympathy with the courts that would have to deal with this provision, because judges in every case have the very important responsibility of summing up the law to the jury, and they would have to describe to the jury a reasonable definition of the public interest. That would have to be done, under current practice, by judges in writing, handing a document, a route to verdict, to the jury—and I apprehend that this provision would create impossible difficulty.

I return with an apology to something that I said in an earlier debate this evening about the public interest. Subsection (3) actually does set out tests which I imagine are habitually applied by the Director of Public Prosecutions if he—it is he at the moment—is determining whether it is in the public interest for a prosecution to take place. That is the right location for this decision to lie. What is set out here is the responsibility of the Director of Public Prosecutions. I apprehend that, in the sort of case that those tabling this amendment have in mind, it would be extremely rare for the DPP to decide that it was in the public interest for a prosecution to take place. That is not the role of the jury, and in my view it would be a serious mistake to make the judgment of the public interest the role of a jury.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have very little to add to that brilliant exposition of the difficulties with this amendment. As I said in relation to a previous amendment, I am of course very concerned with any threat to public interest journalism, and therefore I have some initial sympathy with the idea of a public interest defence. But I am afraid that, the more I looked at it and thought about it, the more I was convinced that this was not the answer. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, pointed out so cogently, Article 10 is not an issue here. Article 10 has always been a qualified right. There is no violation of the convention by the absence of a public interest defence.

I am particularly concerned about proposed new subsection (2). It seems to me that what is contemplated is that, if a defendant raises some prima facie case that they disagree with government policy, or whatever their general justification is for being in breach of one of the very serious offences to which this would apply, the prosecution will have to prove that the conduct was not in the public interest. It is difficult to know how that can be done without potentially disclosing matters that, in the interests of national security, it might be most unwise to disclose. In fact, it might even result in the prosecution not going ahead because the prosecution might take the view that it would be too damaging to disclose this. That itself would not be in the public interest in appropriate cases.

I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said. A jury would be given a complex direction in writing. I can then only anticipate—I have had this experience myself, but not in this sort of case—that the jurors, who may be bewildered by a direction such as this, would ask a series of supplementary questions. What is meant by this? How do we respond to this? What if we agree with the defendant but do not think this? Et cetera, et cetera. It is difficult to conceive of this being a very satisfactory procedure, or indeed in the public interest.

So, although I sympathise with what lies behind this, I am concerned that the Bill could be altered more satisfactorily to protect journalists and whistleblowers. I am afraid that this is not the answer.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 26th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, the Bill has been broadly welcomed, in light of the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham attacks, by noble Lords across the House. One could add to that sad litany of attacks the murder of three men in Forbury Gardens, Reading. Noble Lords accepted the need for legislation such as this with something of a heavy heart. There have been anxieties expressed in Committee today and at Second Reading about some aspects of the Bill. I particularly noted the comments at Second Reading of the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, who described himself as “horrified” by the reduced role of the Parole Board.

I share, I am sure, with all noble Lords very considerable respect for what the Parole Board does. Decisions about serious offenders are particularly challenging. The boards, which have enormous experience, are given a great deal of material to make their decision, which they do with scrupulous care. I do not see that the purpose of the Bill in any way excludes or marginalises the board. The purpose, surely, is to ensure that serious terrorist offenders spend longer in prison and longer on licence, and it is that fact that removes the Parole Board from the picture, not any lack of respect for what it does.

I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said about the statistics on reoffending by terrorist offenders who are released, and I am sure that he is absolutely right to make that point. I would add just one gentle caveat, in the sense that a terrorist who commits another offence, maybe of the most extraordinary gravity, is not comparable to, say, a burglar who breaks into a house repeatedly, serious though that can be.

The offenders who will no longer be susceptible to review by the Parole Board will have their licence condition, when they are released, set by prison governors on behalf of the Secretary of State. As I understand their position, prison governors will be informed by the probation service, the multi-agency public protection panels, and presumably by information gathered about the prisoners in the prison or prisons where they have served their sentence, which will be something of an incentive for them to behave well. Prison governors have much experience of this process.

The Bill is certainly concerned with the protection of the public. Keeping the most serious offenders in prison for longer and removing their opportunity for early release is what causes the reduced role of the Parole Board. The removal of its involvement for what I understand is likely to be a very small cohort of 50 or so—perhaps the Minister can help—seems to be justified in the public interest.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that we are dealing with the determination of licence conditions in the context of terrorist prisoners having been sentenced to longer sentences. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, who has very considerable and relevant experience, and with my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich that the Parole Board has an important potential role to play in these cases.

It is said that the determination of licence conditions can adequately be dealt with by prison governors. That may be true in some cases, but prison governors do not have the range of expertise, the judicial discipline and the clear legal accountability of the Parole Board. It is therefore my view that this task should be undertaken by the Parole Board, which has all the relevant qualifications to do it. If the Parole Board was placed in that position it would command the confidence of the public. Indeed, those who believe that too much control is being taken of prisoners by government would be able to see that there was a thoroughly independent, accountable, quasi-judicial organisation dealing with these cases empirically and on their merits.