Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Viscount Simon

Monday 17th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That is an interesting point and, significantly, my noble friend Lord Rooker has prefaced the point that I was just about to make. As I said, the central issue is that the calculations of the numbers of national representatives per head of population take account only of national legislatures and do not include references to levels of representation beneath that tier. If we look below the national level, the United Kingdom has far fewer elected officeholders per head of population than almost all comparable countries. An academic study by Democratic Audit found that, at local government level, the population per elected member is around 2,600 in the United Kingdom, 250 in Germany and 116 in France. Therefore, when sub-national elected representatives are factored in, as my noble friend Lord Rooker has pointed out, it is apparent that the UK does not suffer from overrepresentation; if anything, it suffers from the opposite.

In any event, there is a fundamental problem in seeking to draw simple comparisons between the numbers of elected representatives in different national legislatures. Some countries are unitary states, whereas others are federal states; some have a Westminster model, like that of the United Kingdom, whereas others have a presidential system, like that of the United States of America. As a consequence, their administrative and electoral systems are organised in different ways. Therefore, comparing rates of representation in one national legislature with those in another is a largely pointless exercise akin to comparing apples and pears.

A more sensible basis on which to decide what level of representation is right for the UK is to examine how the size of the House of Commons has changed over time. If the number of Members of Parliament were growing inexorably and out of all proportion to the size of the electorate, there would clearly be a problem. However, the evidence shows that that is not the case. The Commons has not grown disproportionately in size over recent years. The size of the Commons has increased by around 3 or 4 per cent, or by 25 Members, since 1950, but the electorate—and, therefore, the average size of constituencies—has increased by 25 per cent over that period.

There has also been a significant increase in the case load of Members of Parliament, which has grown out of proportion to the size of the population as a consequence of changing social norms, political developments and new forms of communication. According to the Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons, in the 1950s and 1960s Members received on average 12 to 15 letters per week. Today, the average is 300 per week—I am still quoting figures from the Modernisation Committee—and then there are e-mails, faxes and telephone calls to take into account. There is no evidence that having fewer MPs will reduce the demand for their services. Assuming that that remains the same, the pressure on the remaining Members and their staff will increase.

If the service that Members of Parliament provide to their constituents is not to deteriorate, and if MPs are to be able to take part in Select Committees and Public Bill Committees, which have become considerably more active in recent decades, Members of Parliament will need greater resources to employ people as caseworkers and secretaries. The savings made through a reduction of 50 Members of Parliament would inevitably be lost, which would undermine the argument that this is a worthy, cost-cutting measure.

The provision on the size of the House of Commons is one of the most important in the Bill. We are being asked to cut 50 seats from the primary political body in the United Kingdom and to fix its size in statute, in perpetuity, at 600, but we are not really being given any proper explanation as to why that is the most appropriate size for the House of Commons. Does anyone in this Chamber honestly think that this is the right way to enact such a fundamental constitutional change? What, I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, is the justification for reducing the size of the House of Commons and increasing the size of this place?

In conclusion, one of the central arguments that can be made in support of an unelected House of Lords is that its Members are able to exercise a greater independence of thought than representatives who are elected—they are that bit freer of the party constraints that have a more restrictive impact on the actions of colleagues in the other place. That is one reason why, down the years, your Lordships have been able to act as the guardians of the constitution and face down Executive moves that are rooted in party interests and not the national interests.

The new era of coalition government is a challenge to your Lordships’ House—a challenge as to whether it is willing and able to act as an independent-minded revising Chamber. The alternative is to become a rubber stamp for the Executive. This Bill, and this issue perhaps more than many others, will serve as an important litmus test on how your Lordships’ House intends to respond to that challenge.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Simon)]

I must advise your Lordships that, if Amendment 58A is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 59 to 63ZA inclusive and Amendment 66B due to pre-emption.